Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 no persons are required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control number.
`PTO Form 1960 (Rev 10/2011)
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`OMB No. 0651-0050 (Exp 09/20/2020)
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`Request for Reconsideration after Final Action
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`Input Field
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`SERIAL NUMBER
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`LAW OFFICE ASSIGNED
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`MARK SECTION
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`MARK FILE NAME
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`LITERAL ELEMENT
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`STANDARD CHARACTERS
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`USPTO-GENERATED IMAGE
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`ARGUMENT(S)
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`The table below presents the data as entered.
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`Entered
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`87524734
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`LAW OFFICE 101
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`https://tmng-al.uspto.gov/resting2/api/img/87524734/large
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`FAMILIA DENTAL
`
`NO
`
`NO
`
`In a first office action dated October 18, 2017, the Examiner requested a disclaimer of FAMILIA DENTAL on the grounds that Applicant?s
`FAMILIA DENTAL mark merely describes a feature of Applicant?s goods or services. Applicant has been using its FAMILIA DENTAL
`mark since 2009 and therefore filed a Section 2(f) declaration in response to the office action. However, the Examiner issued a further office
`action on November 17, 2017 asserting that Applicant?s FAMILIA DENTAL mark is generic in connection with the identified services, and
`further that even if it is not generic, it is descriptive despite Applicant?s 2(f) declaration. In response, on April 24, 2018, Applicant submitted
`arguments that FAMILIA DENTAL is not generic, as well as further evidence that the mark has become distinctive. On May 31, 2018, the
`Examiner issued a Final Office Action continuing to assert that Applicant?s mark is generic such that FAMILIA DENTAL should be
`disclaimed, and that even if it is not generic, it is descriptive and has not become distinctive. In addition to the arguments and evidence
`previously submitted, Applicant now makes further new arguments and submits additional evidence that its FAMILIA DENTAL mark is not
`generic and has become distinctive. Applicant requests that the Examiner reconsider its previous findings and approve the mark for
`publication. I. The Examiner has not met the difficult burden of establishing that Applicant?s FAMILIA DENTAL mark is generic. A mark is
`not found to be generic unless the examiner is able to make a ?substantial? showing that the mark is generic, which must be based on ?clear
`evidence of generic use.? In re Merrill Lynch, 828 F.2d 1567, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (reversing examiner finding that CASH MANAGEMENT
`ACCOUNT was generic). The Board has repeatedly explained that an examiner?s burden in this instance is difficult and requires very clear
`evidence. In re Tennis Industry Assn., 102 U.S.P.Q.2d 1671 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. 2012) (reversing examiner finding that TENNIS
`INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION was generic); see also In re Trek 2000 Int?l Ltd., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d 1106 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. 2010)
`(reversing examiner finding that THUMBDRIVE was generic); In re Payclerk, Inc., 2007 WL 2972193 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd 2007)
`(reversing examiner finding that PAYCLERK was generic); In re American Food Co., Inc., 2004 WL 2368423 (reversing examiner finding
`that THE BEEF JERKY OUTLET was generic); Am-Pro Protective Agency, Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1234, 1239-40 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
`(explaining that ?clear evidence? is equivalent to ?clear and convincing evidence,? which is a heavier burden than preponderance of the
`evidence). In this instance, the Examiner?s evidence that FAMILIA DENTAL is generic consists of various websites showing dental
`companies that have FAMILY DENTAL in their business name. The words FAMILIA DENTAL do not appear in a single one of the websites,
`and not one of the websites uses the words FAMILY DENTAL alone. Rather in each case, as Applicant previously pointed out, the word
`FAMILY is used to name a specific family, such as ?Sharpe Family? or ?Davis Family,? and then the word dental describes the practice.
`Applicant is not aware of any Board decision affirming that a mark is generic when not one reference could be found using the exact mark at
`issue in a generic manner. In addition, in each instance to which the Examiner cites, ?family dental? is not used generically in conversation to
`refer to services but rather is used in business names for various families or in a few cases, geographic locations. Given the high burden of
`showing that a mark is generic, citing websites of family business names, with not a single reference to FAMILIA DENTAL or FAMILY
`DENTAL alone, is not nearly enough. This is particularly true given that none of the examples used by the Examiner shows the relevant public
`or purchasing public referring to FAMILIA DENTAL in a generic manner. There is not one article, news story, blog, etc. showing generic
`references to FAMILIA DENTAL by the purchasing public or anyone else; rather, each example is use of FAMILY DENTAL as part of a
`larger dental practice name. Notably, the Board specifically addressed this situation in In re Country Music Association and found the
`Examiner?s evidence insufficient to prove that the mark was generic. In that case, the Applicant sought to register COUNTRY MUSIC
`ASSOCIATION, and the Examiner asserted the mark was generic and cited to third party uses such as THE LESBIAN AND GAY
`COUNTRY MUSIC ASSOCIATION; CHRISTIAN COUNTRY MUSIC ASSOCIATION; NEW YORK METROPOLITAN COUNTRY
`MUSIC ASSOCIATION; and others for support. In finding such evidence insufficient to satisfy the Examiner?s burden, the Board stated in
`part the following: Considered in the context of the record as a whole in this case, the examining attorney's evidence of third-party use of the
`
`

`

`phrase ?Country Music Association? does not clearly establish genericness. We note that all of the Internet and LEXIS/NEXIS excerpts show
`the phrase ?Country Music Association? in initial capitalization form, which, as discussed further below, may be indicative of use as a trade or
`brand name. In addition, the evidence shows that third-party organizations use the term ?Country Music Association? in combination with
`other descriptive, geographic, or other terms to designate the name of their respective organizations. Taking into account these points and the
`evidence presented by applicant which is discussed below, we are not convinced that the examining attorney's evidence of use of the phrase
`?Country Music Association? suffices as clear evidence that the relevant purchasers perceive the phrase as naming the genus of the services at
`issue. We are left with doubt on the issue and find the evidence to be equally compatible with a conclusion that the phrase is not the name of a
`genus of services but merely an apt name for an association comprised of country music professionals or promoting the country music
`industry. Cf. In re American Fertility Society, 51 USPQ2d at 1836 (?AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION is certainly an apt name for a
`national association of lawyers?). In re Country Music Ass?n, Inc., 100 USPQ2d 1824 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. 2011). Similar to the
`examples cited in that case, the Examiner?s examples here consist of trade names or brand names, which are not generic references, and they
`also all contain ?family dental? in combination with other terms to designate the name of their entities, i.e. surnames or geographic locations.
`Such third party uses do not show that Applicant?s mark is generic. In addition, the particular uses cited by the Examiner are not probative of
`how the relevant public?ordinary consumers?would view Applicant?s mark. The asserted exemplary uses consist of websites owned by dental
`service providers?i.e., professionals in the trade of dental services, not members of the relevant consuming public. The fact that a limited
`subset of dental practices might import a particular meaning to the term ?family dental? says little about how the ordinary consumer might
`view the term. ?Clearly, when dealing with ordinary consumer goods or services, the test for genericness is the term?s meaning to consumers,
`not necessarily the professionals in the trade.? Zimmerman, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425. To illustrate, the Federal Circuit rejected a claim that the
`mark TOUCHLESS was generic for ?automobile washing services? where the only evidence cited was usage by operators and manufacturers
`of car wash equipment and not automobile owners generally. Magic Wand, Inc. v. RDB, Inc., 940 F.2d 638, 639 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The Federal
`Circuit noted that car wash equipment operators and manufactures only fell within the relevant public insofar as they were automobile owners,
`and even then, they only made up a subset of the relevant consuming public. Similarly in this case, dentists at best make up a small subset of
`the relevant consuming public for dental services. Evidence illustrating how some dentists might use the term ?family dental? does not clearly
`and convincingly establish that ordinary consumers would understand the term to be generic. See also Burger King Corp. v. Pilgrim's Pride
`Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1522, 1525 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (upholding a jury verdict finding that the mark CHICKEN TENDERS was not generic
`because ?although there was evidence that the term ?tender? might be generic within the chicken industry, it was not generic among the
`general public?). In another example, the Board rejected a challenge to the mark SYSTEMS USER as being generic for the title of a trade
`publication. See Hunter Publ?g Co., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1996 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 29, 1986). The Board noted that while there was some evidence that
`persons in the industry were referred to as ?system users,? there was nothing indicating that the relevant public would interpret the term as
`referring to a publication. See id. The Board, therefore, found that the evidence did not support a finding that the mark was generic. In addition
`to the above-referenced issues in the evidence cited by the Examiner, Applicant itself provided a plethora of evidence demonstrating that the
`mark is not generic. One type of evidence previously submitted consisted of results from Internet searches, namely, searches through Google
`and Westlaw. While many Board cases recognize such evidence in demonstrating that a mark is not generic, the Examiner discounted this
`evidence, stating that the search results have ?limited probative value because such a list does not show the context in which the term or phrase
`is used . . .? While that may be possible with certain searches, it is not true of the results submitted by Applicant. To the contrary, the point in
`both searches was that the hits did not and could not have shown generic uses at all because the great majority of the hits referred directly to
`Applicant. This is apparent merely by looking at Exhibits 1 and 2 to Applicant?s previous response. The Google search clearly shows, by way
`of example, that the first three hits are Applicant?s website; the fourth hit is a list of reviews from those who have worked with Applicant; the
`fifth hit is a reference to one of Applicant?s locations in Wisconsin; and so on. Likewise in the Westlaw search, the first hit is an article about a
`dentist employed by Applicant; the second hit refers to a community event involving Applicant; the third hit refers to another community event
`featuring Applicant; the fourth hit refers to a new location of Applicant; and so on. The fact that most of the hits would reference Applicant
`specifically, as opposed to generic third party uses of FAMILIA DENTAL, or even FAMILY DENTAL for that matter, is strong evidence that
`the public associates the FAMILIA DENTAL mark with Applicant and that the mark is not generic. The cases cited by the Examiner on this
`point do not demonstrate otherwise. The Bayer case referred to search result summaries in which there were hits of the mark being used
`descriptively and the context was not clear. In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 488 F.3d 960, 966-67 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Here, given that nearly all
`hits clearly directly refer to Applicant, the context is clear and the fact that the mark is not being used generically is made clear. The same is
`true of the Star Belly case, as the Board noted in that instance that the search results did not show the mark being used in the link or in content
`on a website and again that the context of the use could not be determined. In re Star Belly Stitcher, Inc., 107 U.S.P.Q.2d 2059, n. 4
`(Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. 2013). Here, the results show how the mark is being used, and in many cases, it is in the link, and again, is almost
`always referring to Applicant. These consistent hits pointing to Applicant, even in light of the evidence put forth by the Examiner, shows that
`the FAMILIA DENTAL mark is not generic. See In re Merrill Lynch, 828 F.2d at 1571 (stating that ?the mixture of uses unearthed by the
`NEXIS computerized retrieval service does not show, by clear evidence, that the financial community views and uses the term CASH
`MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT as a generic common descriptive term for the brokerage services . . .?). In addition, to remove any doubt on this
`point, Applicant is attaching the actual website content for each hit on the first page of results from both Google and Westlaw to even more
`clearly show the context and direct references to Applicant. See Composite Exhibits 1 & 2 respectively. In addition to the search engine hits,
`Applicant previously provided other evidence that FAMILIA DENTAL is not generic, such as for example, the fact that FAMILIA DENTAL
`is not in the dictionary. The Examiner asserts that the fact the phrase does not appear in the dictionary is not controlling on the question of
`registrability when the word or term has a well understood and recognized meaning. However, Applicant asserts that when this is combined
`with other evidence, such as the search engine hits, it further buttresses the argument that the mark is not generic. This is particularly true
`given that, since the website hits largely refer directly to Applicant, it is not clear that FAMILIA DENTAL has a well understood and
`recognized meaning despite not being in the dictionary since what the hits show is that they understand the mark to refer to Applicant.
`
`

`

`Applicant also previously provided a list of other similar federal registrations that have registered with no generic objection (see e.g., GOLD
`COAST FAMILY DENTAL, Reg. No. 4,658397 where only FAMILY was disclaimed as descriptive; FAMILY DENTAL CENTERS (and
`design), Reg. No. 4,240,926, where FAMILY DENTAL CENTERS was disclaimed as descriptive not generic; and WEST COAST DENTAL,
`Reg. No. 2,801,606, registered on Supplemental Register). The Examiner pointed out that such registrations were not technically a part of the
`record since Applicant did not provide copies of the registrations. Applicant therefore attaches these registrations hereto as Composite Exhibit
`3. In addition, Applicant previously made the point that it has a prior registration for FAMILIA DENTAL (and design), Reg. No. 3,779,160 for
`which it was requested to disclaim FAMILIA DENTAL as possibly descriptive, not generic. Since that time, Applicant has used its mark
`continuously for seven more years and now has 42 dental locations covering 6 states around the country. Applicant has continued to expand
`and develop its FAMILIA DENTAL brand relying on the well-known premise that, even if its mark was at one point descriptive, it had the
`ability to make it distinctive, and presumably would have done so after more than 5 years of use. For the Trademark Office to suddenly assert
`that FAMILIA DENTAL is now generic, is highly detrimental and prejudicial to Applicant. In response, the Examiner points out that under
`TMEP ? 1209.02, examiners do not initially issue generic refusals but also acknowledges that applicants should be apprised as early as
`possible of the prospects for registration. Given Applicant?s circumstances and the way its brand has expanded over the years, to now deny
`registration on generic grounds, particularly with the evidence Applicant has submitted demonstrating that the mark is not generic, is very
`detrimental and unfair to Applicant. The Board has in the past found persuasive applicants continuing to develop their marks in reliance on
`prior Trademark Office decisions in finding that the mark is not generic. See e.g., In re Trek 2000 Int?l Ltd., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d 1106 (recognizing
`applicant?s argument that ?it relied on the prior determination that led to its registration on the Supplemental Register and since ?November
`21, 2006, when THUMBDRIVE was placed on the Supplemental Register, Applicant has continued to strengthen and protect its mark.??). All
`of this evidence put together, namely the Internet search results, the lack of dictionary references, Applicant?s prior registration and the other
`cited registrations, makes a strong case that FAMILIA DENTAL is not generic. This is particularly true in light of the Examiner?s high burden
`of demonstrating that a mark is generic. As the Federal Circuit and the Board consistently recognize, when the record contains mixed evidence
`such as this, creating doubt on whether the mark is generic, the Board resolves such doubt in favor of the applicant. In re America Online Inc.,
`77 USPQ2d 1618 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. 2006); see also In re Trek 2000 Int?l Ltd., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d 1106. As the Board stated in In re
`Trek: As noted in America Online, the Federal Circuit has addressed a similar case where there was a mixed record on the question of
`genericness. America Online, at 77 USPQ2d at 1623, citing Merrill Lynch, 4 USPQ2d at 1143. Similarly, here we find that ?the evidence of
`generic use is offset by applicant's evidence that shows not only a significant amount of proper trademark use but also trademark recognition?
`by third parties. Id. Thus, we cannot conclude that ?members of the relevant public primarily use or understand the term sought to be protected
`to refer to the genus? of the goods. At a minimum, the record creates doubt and we are constrained to resolve that doubt in favor of applicant.
`In re Trek 2000 Int?l Ltd., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d 1106; see also In re Nat?l Council for Therapeutic Rec. Cert., Inc., 2006 WL 2850881 (Trademark
`Tr. & App. Bd. Sept. 15, 2006) (finding CERTIFIED THERAPEUTIC RECREATION SPECIALIST was not generic due to mixed evidence);
`In re Zuffa, LLC, 2005 WL 2034531 (finding ULTIMATE FIGHTING was not generic due to mixed evidence of uses of the phrase referring
`to Applicant and uses of the phrase in a generic manner). Applicant asks that the Examiner reconsider the generic finding and withdraw the
`disclaimer request. II. The Examiner has also not demonstrated that the mark is highly descriptive. As Applicant has been using its FAMILIA
`DENTAL mark for nearly ten years, it responded to the Examiner?s initial disclaimer request with a filing under Section 2(f). At that point,
`Applicant had submitted prima facie evidence of the FAMILIA DENTAL mark?s distinctiveness. Specifically, under Section 2(f), ?proof of
`substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a mark by the applicant in commerce for the five years before the date on which the claim
`of distinctiveness is made? serves as ?prima facie evidence that the mark has become distinctive.? Once this prima facie case is made through a
`Section 2(f) claim, the burden shifts to the Examiner to show that Applicant?s mark is ?highly descriptive? if she nevertheless intends to refuse
`registration on descriptiveness grounds. See In re Synergistics Research Corp., 218 USPQ 165, 1983 WL 51947, *2 (Trademark Tr. & App.
`Bd. 1983). The Examiner responded with an assertion that the mark is generic and that, even if it is not generic, additional evidence was
`needed to show that the mark has become distinctive. Applicant then filed in addition to evidence and arguments against genericness, a
`declaration and arguments with a large amount of additional evidence demonstrating that the mark has become distinctive, but the Examiner
`continues to assert that the evidence was not sufficient stating that it is Applicant?s burden to show that the mark is distinctive. This is
`incorrect, as Applicant has already made a prima facie case of distinctiveness, and the burden has shifted to the Examiner to demonstrate that
`the mark was not just descriptive, but highly descriptive. The conclusion that a mark is ?highly descriptive? cannot be arbitrary, but must be
`supported by evidence, such as ?dictionaries defining the term sought to be registered as having some unmistakeable relationship to the goods,
`or documentary evidence of highly descriptive or generic use by the applicant or by others.? Id. (citing In re Illinois Powder & Paint Co., 188
`USPQ 459, 462 (TTAB 1975)). The burden of establishing that a mark is ?highly descriptive? is on the Patent and Trademark Office. Id.; see
`also In re Caddy Girls USA, Inc., 2001 WL 1587169, *4 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. 2001) (same). The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
`explained in In re Synergistics Research Corp.: [W]hile a declaration of long use by an officer of an applicant is sometimes dismissed as self-
`serving, its significance cannot be undervalued. Its credibility must be considered in light of the fact that the declaration has been made with
`knowledge of personal responsibility of the declarant under Section 1001 of Title 18 of the United States Code. Taken at its full value, the
`solemn declaration of appellant?s substantially exclusive use for a period of five years has meaning not only from the standpoint of recognition
`by purchasers of the product?s source but also that competitors apparently recognize or have acquiesced in applicant?s claim of trademark
`rights. 1983 WL 51947, *2. In Synergistics, the Examining Attorney refused registration on the Principal Register of the mark BALL DARTS
`on the grounds that the mark was merely descriptive of the goods to which it was applied, declining to accept evidence of five years of
`substantially exclusive and continuous use as prima facie evidence of acquired distinctiveness. Id. at *1. In reversing, the Board concluded that
`since (1) neither the composite term BALL DARTS, nor the term in reverse (i.e. ?dart balls?) has any known dictionary significance, and (2)
`the Examining Attorney had not introduced any evidence of use of the term BALL DARTS (or ?dart balls?) by competitors or by the public,
`the term BALL DARTS was ?not so highly descriptive that its registrability under Section 2(f) may not be determined on the basis of a
`presumption of distinctiveness from the applicant?s declaration of substantially exclusive and continuous use of the mark in commerce for at
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`

`

`least a five year period.? Id. at *2. Accordingly, the Board reversed the Examining Attorney?s refusal to register. Id. at *3. See also In re
`Caddy Girls USA, Inc., 2001 WL 1587169, *4 (no evidence of third party use of CADDY GIRLS or need to use those words in that order;
`refusal to register reversed). Here, the Examiner argues that Applicant?s mark is highly descriptive but bases that claim on no evidence of
`dictionary significance of the composite term FAMILIA DENTAL or any use of the phrase FAMILIA DENTAL at all, by competitors or the
`public. Instead, as described above, the Examiner points only to third party websites referring to surname dental practices, such as ?Smith
`Family Dental.? There are no uses of FAMILIA DENTAL at all or even FAMILY DENTAL as a stand-alone phrase. Applicant asserts that the
`Examiner has not met the burden of establishing that the FAMILIA DENTAL mark is highly descriptive. Moreover, in addition to the Section
`2(f) amendment, Applicant submitted a detailed declaration from its Director of Corporate Development. The statements in the declaration
`were not merely conclusory but rather discussed many different ways in which the distinctiveness of the mark is shown and attached numerous
`exhibits demonstrating the same. The Examiner argues that the evidence Applicant submitted merely shows what Applicant has done in
`attempting to develop distinctiveness rather than showing that the mark is in fact distinctive. Applicant disagrees. The type of evidence
`submitted, particularly given the size of Applicant and its locations, the length of its use, and its significant revenues and marketing budget, is
`the exact type of evidence that the Board routinely finds to demonstrate distinctiveness. See e.g., In re HM Electronics, Inc., 2015 WL
`12722655 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. Nov. 17, 2015) (finding mark acquired distinctiveness with high revenues and high amounts spent on
`advertising); In re Mittal Steel Tech. Ltd., 2008 WL 5078736 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. Nov. 18, 2008) (examining significant revenues and
`advertising spend and finding mark acquired distinctiveness); In re Dollar-A- Day Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 173 USPQ 435 (Trademark Tr.
`& App. Bd. 1972) (finding mark acquired distinctiveness due to significant revenues and advertising expenditures). As these cases discuss,
`facts such as a longer period of use, significant revenues, significant advertising expenditures, and press coverage all demonstrate that a mark
`has acquired distinctiveness and that the public would associate the mark with the applicant. Applicant also submitted evidence such as news
`articles, press releases and use of the mark at trade shows but the Examiner stated that this evidence did ?not project to potential customers that
`the name ?familia dental? is the brand name for the services rather than the commercial name of the services? and that the advertisements ?do
`not direct the consumer to view the proposed mark as a source of origin for the services.? Applicant respectfully disagrees. The news articles
`Applicant submitted expressly and directly refer to FAMILIA DENTAL as the brand of Applicant?s services, as opposed to any kind of
`generic or descriptive reference to dental services. Some of the articles even have pictures of Applicant?s locations, with the FAMILIA
`DENTAL mark and logo emphasized and separated apart from any other text. Applicant also submitted pictures of its use of the mark at trade
`shows, which have the FAMILIA DENTAL mark and logo on booths and other promotional items such as brochures, t-shirts, bags, mugs or
`pens. All of these examples very clearly show use of the mark as a brand and identifier of Applicant and its services. Given the substantial and
`significant evidence of distinctiveness submitted, Applicant asks that the Examiner reconsider the finding that Applicant?s FAMILIA
`DENTAL mark has not become distinctive and withdraw the same. III. Conclusion Applicant?s mark FAMILIA DENTAL is not generic. The
`Examiner?s burden to prove that a mark is generic is extremely difficult, and Applicant has submitted a plethora of evidence against a finding
`that the mark is generic. Any doubt in this regard is resolved in favor of Applicant. In addition, Applicant has demonstrated that the FAMILIA
`DENTAL mark has become distinctive. The Examiner has not shown that the mark is highly descriptive such that Applicant?s 2(f) declaration
`and other evidence would not suffice. Applicant has used the mark for nearly ten years and grown to 42 dental locations covering six states
`with significant revenues and advertising spend. The FAMILIA DENTAL mark has become distinctive and does not need to be disclaimed. In
`light of the foregoing, Applicant respectfully requests that the rejections be lifted, and submits that this application is now in condition for
`passage to publication.
`
`EVIDENCE SECTION
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`        EVIDENCE FILE NAME(S)
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`       ORIGINAL PDF FILE
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`       CONVERTED PDF FILE(S)
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`evi_3810116184-20181128100212329641_._New_OA_-_Exhibit_2.pdf
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`\\TICRS\EXPORT17\IMAGEOUT17\875\247\87524734\xml11\RFR0048.JPG
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`       ORIGINAL PDF FILE
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`       CONVERTED PDF FILE(S)
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`evi_3810116184-20181128100212329641_._New_OA_-_Exhibit_3.pdf
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`Exhibit 1 (printouts of Google hits); Exhibit 2 (printouts of Westlaw hits); Exhibit 3
`(registration certificates)
`
`/Mindi M. Richter/
`
`Mindi M. Richter
`
`Attorney of record, IL & FL bar member
`
`8132297600
`
`11/28/2018
`
`YES
`
`NO
`
`Wed Nov 28 10:05:34 EST 2018
`
`USPTO/RFR-XX.XXX.XX.XXX-2
`0181128100534958421-87524
`734-6106ba5a7e794289e88c9
`21551e6541948ed8349c27632
`91711b925ab72cfc5b7-N/A-N
`/A-20181128100212329641
`
`       ORIGINAL PDF FILE
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`       CONVERTED PDF FILE(S)
`       (6 pages)
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`DESCRIPTION OF EVIDENCE FILE
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`SIGNATURE SECTION
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`RESPONSE SIGNATURE
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`SIGNATORY'S NAME
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`SIGNATORY'S POSITION
`
`SIGNATORY'S PHONE NUMBER
`
`DATE SIGNED
`
`AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY
`
`CONCURRENT APPEAL NOTICE FILED
`
`FILING INFORMATION SECTION
`
`SUBMIT DATE
`
`TEAS STAMP
`
`Unde