To:
`
`Subject:
`
`Sent:
`
`Sent As:
`
`Attachments:
`
`Unbreakable Performance LLC (ip@msf-law.com)
`
`U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 87218147 - UNBREAKABLE PERFORMANCE CENTER -
`5033-2 - Request for Reconsideration Denied - Return to TTAB
`
`3/9/2018 9:56:13 PM
`
`ECOM109@USPTO.GOV
`
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`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
`OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION
`
`*87218147*
`
`GENERAL TRADEMARK
`INFORMATION:
`
`http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/index.jsp
`
`VIEW YOUR APPLICATION FILE
`
`U.S. APPLICATION
`SERIAL NO. 87218147
`
`           
`
`MARK:
`UNBREAKABLE
`PERFORMANCE
`CENTER
`
`CORRESPONDENT
`ADDRESS:
`      
`SUSAN M.
`SCHLESINGER
`
`       MEISTER SEELIG &
`FEIN LLP
`
`125 PARK AVENUE,
`      
`7TH FLOOR
`
`NEW YORK, NY
`      
`10017
`
`      
`
`APPLICANT:
`Unbreakable Performance
`LLC
`
`    
`
` 
` 
` 
`  
` 
`

`

`REFERENCE/DOCKET
`
`NO:       
`
`  5033-2     
`
`CORRESPONDENT
`
`E-MAIL ADDRESS:       
`
`ip@msf-law.com
`
`REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED
`
`ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 3/9/2018
`
`The trademark examining attorney has carefully reviewed applicant’s request for reconsideration and is denying the request for the reasons
`stated below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(3); TMEP §§715.03(a)(ii)(B), 715.04(a).  The following refusal made final in the Office action dated
`
`August 21, 2017, is maintained and continues to be final:  
`-        SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION.  
`
`See TMEP §§715.03(a)(ii)(B), 715.04(a).   
`The following requirement made final in the Office action is satisfied:  
`
`-        DISCLAIMER REQUIREMENT
`
`See TMEP §§715.03(a)(ii)(B), 715.04(a).
`
`In the present case, applicant’s request has not resolved the outstanding issue, nor does it raise a new issue or provide any new or compelling
`evidence with regard to the outstanding issue in the final Office action.  In addition, applicant’s analysis and arguments are not persuasive nor
`do they shed new light on the issues.  Accordingly, the request is denied.
`
`If applicant has already filed a timely notice of appeal with the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, the Board will be notified to resume the
`appeal.  See TMEP §715.04(a).
`
`If no appeal has been filed and time remains in the six-month response period to the final Office action, applicant has the remainder of the
`response period to (1) comply with and/or overcome any outstanding final requirement(s) and/or refusal(s), and/or (2) file a notice of appeal to
`the Board.  TMEP §715.03(a)(ii)(B); see 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(3).  The filing of a request for reconsideration does not stay or extend the time
`
`for filing an appeal.  37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(3); see TMEP §§715.03, 715.03(a)(ii)(B), (c).  
`
`SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
`
`The examining attorney has considered the applicant's arguments carefully but has found them unpersuasive.  Accordingly, the refusal under
`Section 2(d) is maintained and continues to be FINAL.
`
`In the first Office Action, the examining attorney refused registration of the proposed mark because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in
`U.S. Registration No. 3432415.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
`
`  
` 
` 
` 
`  
` 
` 
`

`

`In this case, the applicant’s mark is UNBREAKABLE PERFORMANCE CENTER in standard characters for “Personal fitness training
`services and consultancy; Providing classes, workshops, seminars and camps in the fields of fitness, exercise, boxing, kick boxing and mixed
`martial arts; Providing general fitness and mixed martial arts facilities that require memberships and are focused in the fields of general fitness,
`exercise, and mixed martial arts; Providing health and fitness educational and training services in the field of recovery techniques”; the
`registrant’s mark is UNBREAKABLE WOMAN in standard characters for “self-defense and fitness classes, seminars and workshops.”
`
`Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a consumer would be
`confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant(s).  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). 
`Determining likelihood of confusion is made on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
`476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir.
`2017).  However, “[n]ot all of the [ du Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be
`considered.”   Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1366, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re
`Mighty Leaf Tea, 601. F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir 2010)).  The USPTO may focus its analysis “on dispositive factors,
`such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods [and/or services].”   In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747
`(quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc. , 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see TMEP §1207.01. 
`
`Comparison of the Marks
`
`As discussed in the previous action, marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial
`impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting
`Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005));
`TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”   In re Davia, 110
`USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc. , 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8
`USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
`
`In the present case, applicant’s mark is UNBREAKABLE PERFORMANCE CENTER in standard characters and registrant’s mark is
`UNBREAKABLE WOMAN in standard characters. 
`
`In the first action, the examining attorney found the marks similar in sound, appearance, and connotation because of the dominant wording
`“UNBREAKABLE” common to both marks.
`
`Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared
`marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce , 228 USPQ 689,
`690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n , 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1
`USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229
`USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560
`(TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).
`
`Applicant has submitted printed or electronic copies of third-party registrations for marks containing the wording UNBREAKABLE to support
`the argument that this wording is weak, diluted, or so widely used that it should not be afforded a broad scope of protection. Only one of these
`registrations, Reg. No. 5109676, appears to be for services that would be properly considered similar to those identified in applicant’s
`application. The remaining registrations or pending applications, by contrast, cover goods that range from, at best, complementary, to distantly
`
`related, to applicant’s services.   
`
`The weakness or dilution of a particular mark is generally determined in the context of the number and nature of similar marks in use in the
`marketplace in connection with similar goods and/or services.  See Nat’l Cable Tel. Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc.
`, 937 F.2d 1572,
`1579-80, 19 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A.
`1973).  Evidence of widespread third-party use of similar marks with similar goods and/or services “is relevant to show that a mark is relatively
`weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection” in that particular industry or field.  Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin
`Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373-74, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 1345,
`
`68 USPQ2d 1059, 1062-63 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  
`
`However, evidence comprising only a small number of third-party registrations for similar marks with similar services, as in the present case, is
`generally entitled to little weight in determining the strength of a mark.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1328-29, 123 USPQ2d 1744,
`1751-52 (Fed. Cir. 2017); AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Products, Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
`
`Moreover, to the extent the registrations applicant cites cover goods that are meaningfully similar or related to the services at issue, these few
`registrations are “not evidence of what happens in the market place or that customers are familiar with them.”   AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods.,
`Inc., 474 F.2d at 1406, 177 USPQ at 269; see Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 216 USPQ 989, 992 (TTAB 1982).  Thus, the few
`similar third-party registrations submitted by applicant are insufficient to establish that the wording UNBREAKABLE is weak or diluted as
`applied to the services at issue. 
`
` 
` 
`

`

`Further, evidence comprising third-party registrations for similar marks with different or distantly related goods and/or services, as is the case
`with the majority of the registrations applicant cites, has “no bearing on the strength of the term in the context relevant to this case.”   See Tao
`Licensing, LLC v. Bender Consulting Ltd., 125 USPQ2d 1043, 1058 (TTAB 2017) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1328, 123
`USPQ2d at 1751)).  Thus, these third-party registrations submitted by applicant are insufficient to establish that the wording UNBREAKABLE is
`weak or diluted as applied to the applicant’s and registrant’s services.
`
`It should also be noted that, while the term UNBREAKABLE is suggestive as applied to the applicant’s and registrant’s services, it is
`descriptive of a quality or characteristic of many of the goods covered by the registrations applicant cites. Accordingly, this undermines the
`argument that the term is diluted or weak with respect to the fitness and therapeutic services at issue here.
`
`To the extent there were merit to applicant’s weak-mark argument, it is nevertheless unpersuasive. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
`and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board have recognized that marks deemed “weak” or merely descriptive are still entitled to protection
`under Section 2(d) against the registration by a subsequent user of a similar mark for closely related goods and/or services.  TMEP
`§1207.01(b)(ix); see King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc. , 496 F.2d 1400, 1401, 182 USPQ 108, 109 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Max
`
`Capital Grp. Ltd., 93 USPQ2d 1243, 1246 (TTAB 2010).  
`
`Applicant argues that the marks are distinguishable in part because of the differences in the wording that follows “UNBREAKABLE” in the
`marks, i.e., “WOMAN” in the registered mark and “PERFORMANCE CENTER” in the applied-for mark.
`
`In this case, the addition of “PERFORMANCE CENTER” in the applied-for mark does not distinguish it from the registered mark because it is
`descriptive of or generic for applicant’s services and, as such, has been properly disclaimed by the applicant. Although marks are compared in
`their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d
`1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp. , 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
`TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less
`significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  See In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir.
`1997); In re Nat’l Data Corp. , 753 F.2d at 1060, 224 USPQ at 752; TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).
`
`Similarly, applicant’s argument that the term “WOMAN” in the cited mark is at once merely descriptive but also capable of
`distinguishing the parties’ marks, is unpersuasive. In this case, the descriptive nature of “WOMAN” increases, rather than
`diminishes, the likelihood of confusion because, as a term describing the intended users of the services, it, like the wording “ PERFORMANCE
`CENTER” in the applied-for mark is accorded less weight in a marks-comparison analysis. Matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s
`goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant in relation to other wording in a mark. See Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Innvopak
`Sys. Pty Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1816, 1824-25 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Chatam Int’l Inc. , 380 F.3d 1340, 1342-43, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1946 (Fed.
`Cir. 2004)).
`
`Thus, the additional differing wording in the marks is less significant in terms of affecting the marks’ commercial impressions, and renders the
`wording UNBREAKABLE the more dominant, source-indicating element of both parties’ marks.
`
`Applicant’s argument that the examining attorney’s marks-comparison analysis constitutes “an improper dissection” of the marks is
`unpersuasive in light of the descriptive nature of the additional differing wording in the marks. Applicant correctly notes that marks must be
`compared in their entireties and should not be dissected; however, a trademark examining attorney may weigh the individual components of a
`mark to determine its overall commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1322, 110 USPQ2d
`1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[Regarding the issue of confusion,] there is nothing improper in stating that . . . more or less weight has been given
`to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties.”) (quoting In re Nat’l
`Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). 
`
`Thus, having given appropriate weight to each feature of the marks, the examining attorney maintains that the marks, when considered in their
`entireties, are sufficiently similar to cause confusion or mistake as to the source of the services.
`
`Comparison of the Services
`
`As discussed in the previous action, the goods and/or services of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of
`confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton,
`214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one
`another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  
`
` 
` 
` 
` 
` 
` 
`

`

`The respective goods and/or services need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such
`that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”   Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph
`Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724
`(TTAB 2007)); Gen. Mills Inc. v. Fage Dairy Processing Indus. SA, 100 USPQ2d 1584, 1597 (TTAB 2011); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
`
`In the previous actions, the examining attorney found the parties’ services related because, w ith respect to the applicant’s classes, workshops,
`seminars, and camps in the fields of fitness, exercise, boxing, kick boxing and mixed martial arts, as well as providing facilities for such
`activities, these services may be seen as overlapping in nature with or encompassed by the registrant’s more broadly worded “self-defense and
`fitness classes, seminars and workshops.” Moreover, t o the extent the remaining services differ from or are not encompassed by or overlapping
`in nature with the services in the cited registration, they are nevertheless related in that they are marketed to the same consumers through the
`same trade channels and/or are often associated with a single source. 
`
`In this case, the applicant’s “Providing health and fitness educational and training services in the field of recovery techniques,” and “Providing
`health and fitness therapeutic services in the field of recovery treatments and therapies; Providing IV therapy, cryotherapy and laser technology
`treatments in the field of muscle recovery” are closely related to the registrant’s “self-defense and fitness classes, seminars and workshops”
`because the same entity commonly provides the relevant services and markets the services under the same mark. Thus, the services at issue are
`likely to travel in the same channels of trade and be encountered by the same classes of consumers.
`
`Additional attached evidence further supports finding a likelihood of confusion based on the relatedness of the services. Specifically, the
`trademark examining attorney has attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of a number of third-party marks
`registered for use in connection with the same or similar services as those of both applicant and registrant in this case.  This evidence shows that
`the listed therein, namely, the registrant’s self-defense and fitness classes, as well as the applicant’s educational and therapeutic services in the
`fields of recovery techniques, treatments, and therapies, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark.  See In re
`Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d 1122, 1126 n.5 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); In
`re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).
`
`See attached printouts of U.S. Reg. Nos. 5406066, 5275360, 5264748, 5264606, 5264591, 5149624, 4814527, 4896384, 5174581, 5055754¸
`5036329, 4932343, 4796710, and 4581854; and 4583713, 5018445, 4995847, 4709236, 4687550, 4284887, and 4009796.
`
`  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty
`Therefore, applicant’s and registrant’s services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.
`Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
`
`Applicant argues that differences in how and to whom the services are marketed prevent any likelihood of confusion. Specifically, applicant
`argues that the services are “directed to completely different consumers” and that the applicant’s services are “offered to and used by a
`particular clientele” comprising, inter alia, celebrities and professional athletes.  
`
`However, this argument is unpersuasive, first because the question of likelihood of confusion, with respect to the relationship between the
`services, is determined based on the description of the services stated in the application and registrations at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of
`actual use. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting
`Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
`
`Absent restrictions in an application and/or registrations, the identified services are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the
`same class of purchasers.”   In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v.
`Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
`
`In this case, the identifications set forth in the application and registration have no restrictions as to the channels of trade for, or the nature, type,
`or classes of purchasers of, the services at issue. Therefore, it is presumed that the identified services travel in all normal channels of trade, and
`are available to the same class of purchasers.
`
`The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the services, but to protect the registrant from adverse
`commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed.
`Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i);
`see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio),
`Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
`
`Furthermore, the Trademark Act guards against not only the misimpression that the senior user is the source of a junior user’s services, but it
`also protects against “reverse confusion,” where a significantly larger or prominent junior user is perceived as the source of a smaller, senior
`user’s services such that the “senior user may experience diminution or even loss of its mark’s identity and goodwill due to extensive use of a
`confusingly similar mark by the junior user” for related services.   In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1329, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1752 (Fed.
`Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro
`
` 
`

`

`Indust., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 474-75, 31 USPQ2d 1592, 1597-98 (3d Cir. 1994).
`
`Finally, the examining attorney is unmoved by applicant’s intimation that, because the registrant “is now generally providing speaking and
`consulting services” rather than the fitness and self-defense classes recited in the registration, registrant has in effect abandoned its service mark
`due to nonuse or otherwise prejudiced its rights. A trademark or service mark registration on the Principal Register is prima facie evidence of the
`validity of the registration and the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark in commerce in connection with the specified goods and/or
`services.  See 15 U.S.C. §1057(b); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iv).
`
`Thus, evidence and arguments that constitute a collateral attack on a cited registration, such as information or statements regarding a registrant’s
`nonuse of its mark, are not relevant during ex parte prosecution.  See In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1408, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1534-35 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 1997); In re Peebles Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1795, 1797 n.5 (TTAB 1992); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iv).  
`
`Accordingly, use of UNBREAKABLE PERFORMANCE CENTER and UNBREAKABLE WOMAN by different parties in connection with
`the identified services is likely to lead to consumer confusion or mistake as to the source of the services. As such, the refusal under Section 2(d)
`is maintained and continues to be FINAL.
`
`/Roger T. McDorman/
`
`Trademark Examining Attorney
`
`Law Office 109
`
`571-272-5224
`
`roger.mcdorman@uspto.gov
`
`     
`
` 
` 
`    
`

`

`Print: Mar 8, 2818
`
`88888885
`
`DESIGN MARK
`
`Serial Number
`88888885
`
`Sfiuus
`REGISTERED
`
`Word Mark
`CR
`
`Standard Character Mark
`No
`
`Registration Number
`4581854
`
`Date Registered
`2814YD8YD5
`
`Type at Mark
`SERVICE MARK
`
`Register
`PRINCIPAL
`
`Mark Drawing Code
`[5] WORDS, LETTERS, ANDXOR NUMBERS IN STYLIZED FORM
`
`Owner
`NORTH SHORE NAPRAPATHIC FITNESS & WELLNESS CENTER LLC CORPORATION
`
`ILLINOIS 3330 DUNDEE ROAD,
`
`SE] NORTHBROOK ILLINOIS 60062
`
`GoodsfServiees
`G A S: PROVIDING
`100 101 10?.
`US
`IC 041.
`ClaSS Status —— ACTIVE.
`FITNESS AND EXERCISE FACILITIES: EDUCATIONAL AND TEACHING SERVICES,
`NAMELY, CONDUCTING CLASSES, SEMINARS, CONFERENCES, WORKSHOPS AND
`WEBINARS IN THE FIELD OF NAPRAPATHY, PHYSICAL THERAPY, EXERCISE
`REHABILITATION, OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY, ACUPUNCTURE, PERSONAL FITNESS
`TRAINING, WEIGHT MANAGEMENT, WELLNESS, LIFE COACHING AND CONSULTANCY;
`PERSONAL TRAINING SERVICES, NAMELY, FITNESS, BALANCE, STABILITY,
`STRENGTH, FLEXIBILITY, MOBILITY, COORDINATION, AGILITY, RESILIENCE,
`ADAPTABILITY, VITALITY, POWER, MOTIVATION, EMPOWERMENT, EFFECTIVENESS,
`EFFICIENCY, RECOVERY, RESTORATION, AND CONDITIONING TRAINING AND SPEED
`AND REACTION TRAINING TO ENHANCE ATHLETIC PERFORMANCE AND INCREASE
`
`
`
`ENDURANCE; PHYSICAL FITNESS TRAINING SERVICES, NAMELY, THREE
`DIMENSIONAL MOVEMENT TRAINING AND PERFORMANCE TRAINING; GOLF FITNESS
`INSTRUCTION; PHYSICAL FITNESS CONDITIONING CLASSES PERTAINING TO GOLF,
`BASKETBALL, WRESTLING, SOCCER, BASEBALL, BOXING, KICK BOXING, TAE KWON
`DO, KARATE,
`JUDO, YOGA, MIXED MARTIAL ARTS, T—BALL, LACROSSE, HOCKEY,
`FOOTBALL, TENNIS, SWIMMING, WATER POLO, FIELD HOCKEY, CRICKET,
`
`
`
`.1.
`
`

`

`Print: Mar 8, 2818
`
`88888885
`
`
`
`SWIMMING, BIKING AND RUGBY; SPORTS TRAINING SERVICES IN THE NATURE OF
`
`
`
`
`
`ON AND OFF THfi FIfiLD SPORTS AND CONDITIONING TRA N NG: SPORTS
`
`PERFORMANCE TRAINING, SPORTS COACHING. First USE: ZOIOHOZKOI. First
`Use In Commerce: ZOIOEOZXOI.
`
`IC 044.
`
`US
`
`ICC 101.
`
`G a s: ALTERNATIVE
`
`Goodsfiervices
`CIass Statue —— ACTIVE.
`
`MEDICINE SERVICES, NAMELY, PROVIDING NAPRAPATHY PHYSICAL THERAPY FOR
`
`ADULTS, SENIORS, CHILDREN AND ATHLETES; THERAPEUTIC REHABILITATION;
`ACUPUNCTURE; CONSULTATION IN THE FIELD OF NAPRAPATHIC SERVICES,
`PHYSICAL REHABILITATION SERVICES, MEDICAL SERVICES, THERAPEUTIC
`REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, EXERCISE REHABILITATION SERVICES,
`PHYSIOTHERAPY SERVICES; NAPRAPATHIC THERAPY SERVICES; HEALTH CARE
`SERVICES, NANELY, CONDUCTING EVALUATION OF PERSONS WITH CONNECTIVE
`TISSUE DISORDERS THROUGH THE USE OF NAPRAPATHIC CASE HISTORY AND
`PALPATION OR TREATMENT OF PERSONS BY THE USE OF CONNECTIVE TISSUE
`
`
`
`
`
`
`MANIPULATION, THERAPEUTIC AND REHABILITATIVE EXERCISE, POSTURAL
`COUNSELING, OCCUPAT_ONAL THERAPY, ACUPUNCTURE, MASSAGE THERAPY,
`NUTRITIONAL COUNSELING, AND THE USE OF THE EFFECTIVE PROPERTIES OF
`PHYSICAL MEASURES OF HEAT, COLD, LIGHT, WATER, RADIANT ENERGY,
`
`ELECTRICITY, SOUND AND AIR, AND ASSISTIVE DEVICES FOR THE PURPOSE OF
`PREVENTING, CORRECTING, OR ALLEVIATING A PHYSICAL DISABILITY; HEALTH
`CARE SERVICES, NAMELY, WOMEN'S HEALTH, MEN‘S HEALTH, CHILDREN'S
`HEALTH, AND SENIOR'S HEALTH IN THE NATURE OF THE TREATMENT OF
`CONTRACTURES, MUSCLE SPASMS,
`INFLAMMATION, SCAR TISSUE FORMATION,
`ADHESIONS, LESIONS, LAXITY, HYPOTONICITY, RIG—DTTY, STRUCTURAL
`IMBALANCE, BRUISING, CONTUSIONS, MUSCULAR ATROPHY, AND PARTIAL
`SEPARATION OF CONNECTIVITY TISSUE FIBERS; MIN—MALLY INVASIVE SURGICAL
`SERVICES, NAMELY, SPINAL THERAPIES FOR INCREASING SPINE CONTROL;
`PROVIDING WELLNESS SPORTS AND FACILITIES; THERAPEUTIC EXERCISE
`SERVICES; NAPRAPATHIC SERVICES; AND CHIROPRATIC SERVICES. First USE:
`2014f02f01. First Use In Commerce: 2014f02f0i.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Description of Mark
`The mark consists of CONNECTED AND EXPANDED LETTERS "C" AND "R".
`
`Colors Claimed
`Color is not Claimed as a feature of the mark.
`
`Filing Date
`zolaxloxlo
`
`Examining Attorney
`EVANKO, PATRICIA
`
`Attorney»r of Record
`DAVID L. NEWMAN
`
`

`

`
`
`

`

`Print: Mar 9, 201B
`
`863844-51
`
`DESIGN MARK
`
`serial Number
`86384451
`
`Status
`REGISTERED
`
`Word Mark
`NIFTY AFTER FIFTY FITNESS
`
`Standard Character Mark
`Yes
`
`Registration Number
`481452?
`
`Date Registered
`zolsxogxls
`
`Type of Mark
`SERVICE MARK
`
`Register
`PRINCIPAL
`
`Mark Drawing Code
`[4]
`STANDARD CHARACTER MARK
`
`Owner
`ENCCRE WELLNESS, LLC LIMITED LIABILITY CCMPANY CALIFORNIA 1501 E.
`Orangethorpe Ave., Suite 180 Fullerton CALIFORNIA 92831
`
`GoodsfServiees
`Class Status -- ACTIVE.
`
`IC 041.
`
`US
`
`100 101 10?.
`
`G d S: Health club
`
`in the field of
`services, namely, providing instruction and equipment
`physical exercise; personal training services, namely, strength and
`conditioning training; physical fitness consultation; physical fitness
`instruction: Customized fitness services, namely, providing
`disease—specific fitness programs for individuals with medical
`conditions both mental and physical, such as COPD, CHF, diabetes, high
`blood pressure, CKD and other medical conditions, by identifying the
`medical condition, its associated weaknesses and designing specific
`fitness programs targeted at increasing overall fitness levels and the
`recovery to a more fit state of being for that individual; Providing a
`web site featuring information on exercise and fitness. First Use:
`ZOlSEOTXOE. First Use In Commerce: ZOlEXOTEOE.
`
`GoodsIServiees
`G & S: Providing
`100 101.
`US
`IC 044.
`Class Status —— ACTIVE.
`assistance, fitness evaluation and consultation to individuals to help
`
`.1.
`
`

`

`Print: Mar 9, 201B
`
`863844-51
`
`them make healthIr wellness and nutritional Changes in their daily
`living to improve health; Medical testing services, namely, fitness
`evaluation. First Use: 2015f01f06. First Use In Commerce:
`ZOlSXOTXUE.
`
`Prior Registratioms)
`33048?5;349?131;3491158
`
`Disclaimer Statement
`NO CLAIM IS MADE TO THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO USE "FITNESS" APART FROM
`THE MARK AS SHOWN.
`
`Filing Date
`ZOZLMOBHUB
`
`Examining Attorney
`DE JONGE, KATHY
`
`Attomoy of Record
`Lori M. Lofstrom
`
`

`

`NIFTY AFTER FIFTY FITNESS
`
`

`

`Print: Mar 8, 2818
`
`86386688
`
`DESIGN MARK
`
`serial Number
`86386688
`
`Status
`REGISTERED
`
`Word Mark
`TRI—ACTIVE ENDURANCE
`
`Standard Character Mark
`No
`
`Registration Number
`4186118
`
`Date Registered
`2815x88x18
`
`Type of Mark
`SERVICE MARK
`
`Register
`PRINCIPAL
`
`Mark Drawing Code
`[3] DESIGN PLUS woRDS, LETTERS ANDXOR NUMBERS
`
`Owner
`Robert Reinhard INDIVIDUAL UNITED STATES 2043 Mohawk Drive Pleasant
`Hill CALIFORNIA 94523
`
`GoodsfServiees
`Class Status —— ACTIVE.
`
`10 041.
`
`US
`
`100 101 107‘.
`
`G a 8: Athletic
`
`training services; personal coaching services in the fields of
`endurance, wellness,
`injury prevention, safety, triathlon performance,
`nutrition to support athletic performance, nutrition for races,
`nutrition for post-race recovery, and body composition consultation
`for athletes; coaching in the field of sports and nutrition; personal
`trainer services; physical fitness conditioning classes; personal
`training services, namely, endurance, speed, strength, and
`conditioning training. First Use: EDldfflngl. First Use In Commerce:
`ZUldfflngl.
`
`Disclaimer Statement
`NO CLAIM IS MADE TO THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO USE "ENDURANCE" APART FROM
`THE MARK AS SHOWN.
`
`Description of Mark
`The mark consists of a stylized runner inside a triangle, all above
`
`.1.
`
`

`

`Print: Mar 8, 2818
`
`86386688
`
`the words "TRI—ACTIVE ENDURANCE"Ir against a square background.
`
`Colors lClaimed
`Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark.
`
`Filing Date
`2014x09xo5
`
`Examining Attorney
`MARTIN, CHRISTINE
`
`iiittornegilr of Record
`D. Alexander Floum
`
`

`

`
`
`lTI-l 3Z3U—c
`
`> (“WVE
`RANCE
`
`

`

`Print: Mar 9, 2018
`
`86477389
`
`DESIGN MARK
`
`serial Number
`86411389
`
`Status
`REGISTERED
`
`Word Mark
`PERSEvERA
`
`Standard Character Mark
`Yes
`
`Registration Number
`4896384
`
`Date Registered
`zolsxczxcz
`
`T‘ype at Mark
`SERVICE MARK
`
`Register
`PRINCIPAL
`
`Mark Drawing Code
`[4]
`STANDARD CHARACTER MARK
`
`Owner
`Clarry Partners LLC LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NEW YORK 4220 24th
`Street Apt. 26D Long Island City NEW YORK 11101
`
`GoodsfServiees
`
`G a S: Physical
`100 101 10?.
`US
`IC 041.
`Class Status -- ACTIVE.
`fitness consultation: Physical fitness instruction: Physical fitness
`training of individuals and groups; Physical fitness training
`services; Providing assistance. personal training and physical fitness
`consultation to individuals to help them make physical fitness,
`strength, conditioningIr and exercise improvement
`in their daily
`living; Providing facilities for physical fitness training; Providing
`fitness and exercise facilities; Providing fitness training services
`in the field of physical recovery techniques. First Use: 2315/10/23.
`First Use In Commerce: 2015H10f23.
`
`GoodsiServices
`Class Status —— ACTIVE.
`
`IC 044.
`
`US
`
`100 101.
`
`G & S: Food nutrition
`
`consultation: Nutrition counseling: Providing informa