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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Electronic Filing System. http://estta.uspto.gov
`
`ESTTA Tracking number:
`
`ESTTA823111
`
`Filing date:
`
`05/25/2017
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`Proceeding
`
`Applicant
`
`86806949
`
`RSRK Incorporated
`
`Applied for Mark
`
`EMERGENCY RELIEF SHOT THERAPY
`
`Correspondence
`Address
`
`Submission
`
`Attachments
`
`Filer's Name
`
`Filer's e-mail
`
`Signature
`
`Date
`
`FRANCIS JOHN CIARAMELLA
`RICK RUZ PLLC
`300 SEVILLA AVENUE, SUITE 301
`CORAL GABLES, FL 33134
`UNITED STATES
`francis@ruzlaw.com, rickruz@ruzlaw.com
`
`Appeal Brief
`
`EMERGENCY RELIEF SHOT THERAPY - Brief for Applicant.pdf(142050 bytes
`)
`
`FRANCIS JOHN CIARAMELLA, ESQUIRE
`
`francis@ruzlaw.com, rickruz@ruzlaw.com
`
`/Francis John Ciaramella/
`
`05/25/2017
`
`

`

`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`Trademark Attorney:
` Siddharth Jagnnathan
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`In re Application of
`RSRK Incorporated
`Application Serial No:
`86/806,949
`Filed: November 2, 2015
`For: EMERGENCY RELIEF
`SHOT THERAPY
`
`
`_____________________________
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
`P.O. Box 1451
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1451
`
`
`
` Law Office 114
`
`
`BRIEF FOR APPLICANT
`
`
`
`Pursuant to a Notice of Appeal filed with the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board on
`
`March 14, 2017, the Applicant hereby appeals from the Examining Attorney’s final refusal to
`
`register the above-identified mark, dated September 14, 2016, and respectfully requests the
`
`Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to reverse the Examining Attorney’s decision on the grounds
`
`that the Applicant’s mark does not create a likelihood of confusion with the mark cited by the
`
`Examining Attorney.
`
`
`
`STATEMENT OF FACTS
`
`
`
`Applicant seeks registration on the Principal Register of its mark, EMERGENCY
`
`RELIEF SHOT THERAPY, for analgesics, in International Class 005. The trademark application
`
`was filed on November 2, 2015, and received U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 86/806,949.
`
`The Examining Attorney refused registration of Appellant’s mark EMERGENCY
`
`RELIEF SHOT THERAPY in an Office Action, dated February 24, 2016, contending that the
`
`mark, when used on or in connection with the recited goods, is likely to be confused with U.S.
`
`1
`RICK RUZ, PLLC
`300 Sevilla Avenue, Suite 301, Coral Gables, FL 33134 • Telephone (305) 921-9326 • Facsimile (888) 506-2833
`
`
`
`

`

`Registration No. 4,710,506, for the mark FIRST AID SHORT THERAPY for: “Clinical
`
`beverages which are clinical and medicinal in nature to address acute and chronic conditions,
`
`namely, upset stomach, allergies, pain, migraine headache, hangover; clinical shots which are
`
`clinical and medicinal beverages in nature to address acute and chronic conditions, namely, upset
`
`stomach, allergies, pain, migraine, headache, hangover; medical beverages which are intended to
`
`be used to address upset stomach, allergies, pain, migraine, headache, hangover; medicinal
`
`beverages which are intended to be used to address upset stomach, allergies, pain, migraine,
`
`headache, hangover; medicinal shots in the nature of medicinal beverages which are intended to
`
`address upset stomach, allergies, pain, migraine, headache, hangover; dietary therapeutic
`
`beverages which are clinical and medicinal in nature to address acute and chronic conditions,
`
`namely, upset stomach, allergies, pain, migraine, headache, hangover; therapeutic shots in the
`
`nature of beverages which are clinical and medicinal in nature to address acute and chronic
`
`conditions, namely, upset stomach, allergies, pain, migraine, headache, hangover; fortified
`
`beverages which are fortified with herbal and other generally recognized as safe (GRAS)
`
`ingredients and/or Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved over the counter drugs,
`
`nutritionally fortified beverages; vitamin fortified beverages all of which are intended to address
`
`upset stomach, allergies, pain, migraine, headache, hangover; vitamin and mineral beverages,
`
`dietary supplemental drinks in the nature of vitamin and mineral beverages, dietetic beverages
`
`adapted for medical purposes, dietary beverage supplements for human consumption in liquid
`
`form for therapeutic purposes, and dietary supplement beverages for treating acute, chronic, or
`
`daily medical conditions, namely, upset stomach, allergies, pain, migraine, headache, hangover
`
`herbal drinks used to aid in sleep and relaxation; and medicinal herbal drinks for treating acute,
`
`chronic, or daily medical conditions; and water, namely, clinical water, medical water, medicinal
`
`water, therapeutic water all used to address upset stomach, allergies, pain, migraine, headache,
`
`hangover; nutritionally fortified water, nutritionally fortified water, vitamin enriched water,
`
`vitamin fortified water, medicated water to address upset stomach, allergies, pain, migraine,
`
`headache, hangover; and medicated water for the treatment of upset stomach, allergies, pain,
`
`migraine, headache, and hangover” in International Class 005, and “Beverages, namely, energy
`
`beverages, non-alcoholic energy shots, sports beverages, sports beverages containing electrolytes,
`
`non-alcoholic sports shots, water beverages, flavored drinks with fruit, herbal or other natural or
`
`2
`RICK RUZ, PLLC
`300 Sevilla Avenue, Suite 301, Coral Gables, FL 33134 • Telephone (305) 921-9326 • Facsimile (888) 506-2833
`
`
`
`

`

`artificial flavoring, isotonic drinks, and isotonic non-alcoholic drinks; and water, namely, energy
`
`water, sports water, sports water containing electrolytes, flavored water, flavored bottled water,
`
`drinking water, distilled drinking water, purified water, bottled water, bottled drinking water,
`
`purified bottled drinking water, mineral water, and spring water” in International Class 032.
`
`In the Applicant’s response to the initial refusal to register dated August 24, 2016, the
`
`Applicant argued that the mark FIRST AID SHOT THERAPY was dissimilar to EMERGENCY
`
`RELIEF SHOT THERAPY when compared for similarities in their appearance, sound,
`
`connotation, and overall commercial impression.
`
`The Examining Attorney further expounded his position in a Final Office Action, dated
`
`September 14, 2016, maintaining that the Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods travel in the same
`
`channels of trade, are purchased by same purchasers, and that the respective marks are similar in
`
`their overall appearance, sound, and commercial impression. The Examining Attorney supported
`
`his refusal by attaching as evidence, definitions of the phrase first aid, analgesics, emergency,
`
`and relief.
`
`In response thereto, the Applicant requested reconsideration of the Examining Attorney’s
`
`final refusal on March 14, 2017, by citing multiple third party registrations as evidence of the
`
`widespread use of EMERGENCY and FIRST AID for class 005 goods. The Applicant also set
`
`forth the difference in appearance, sound, and overall commercial impression between FIRST
`
`AID and EMERGENCY.
`
`Finally, the Examining Attorney denied Applicant’s request for reconsideration on March
`
`29, 2017, finding that Applicant’s additional support and arguments neither resolved all
`
`outstanding issues, nor raised a new issue or provided compelling evidence as to the lack of
`
`confusion between the respective marks.
`
`
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`
`
`The test for likelihood of confusion is whether a “reasonably prudent consumer” in the
`
`marketplace is likely to be confused as to the origin of the goods or services bearing one of the
`
`marks. In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 177 U.S.P.Q. 563 (C.C.P.A 1973).
`
`Consequently, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals adopted multiple factors for the purpose of
`
`3
`RICK RUZ, PLLC
`300 Sevilla Avenue, Suite 301, Coral Gables, FL 33134 • Telephone (305) 921-9326 • Facsimile (888) 506-2833
`
`
`
`

`

`deciding likelihood of confusion on a case-by-case basis, known as the DuPont factors.
`
`Applicant respectfully traverses the refusal to register under Section 2(d) of the Lanham
`
`Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052(d), in view of the following factors. Applicant believes that by viewing
`
`the overall commercial impression of the mark EMERGENCY RELIEF SHOT THERAPY in
`
`relationship to the named goods, there will not be a likelihood of confusion between the marks.
`
`
`
`1) Dissimilarity of the Marks in their Entireties as to Appearance, Sound, Connotation, and
`
`Commercial Impression (The Sight, Sound, and Meaning Analysis)
`
`
`
`In testing for likelihood of confusion, the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks with
`
`regard to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression are important
`
`considerations. Application of E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 U.S.P.Q.
`
`(BNA) 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP Section 1207.01. Similarity of the marks in one respect—
`
`sight, sound or meaning—will not automatically result in a finding of likelihood of confusion
`
`even if the goods are identical or closely related. TMEP Section 1207.01(b)(i). Rather, the rule is
`
`that taking into account all of the relevant facts of a particular case, similarity as to one factor
`
`alone is not necessarily sufficient to support a holding that the marks are confusingly similar. In
`
`re Lamson Oil Co., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1041, 1042 n.4, 1987 WL 124020 (TTAB 1987). The
`
`Applicant believes that by taking into account all the relevant factors in comparing the
`
`Applicant’s mark to the above cited mark, including the different commercial impression when
`
`comparing FIRST AID to EMERGENCY RELIEF, the Board will find that a likelihood of
`
`confusion does not exist.
`
`The meaning or connotation of a mark must be determined in relationship to the named
`
`goods. Even marks which are identical in sound and/or appearance may create sufficiently
`
`different commercial impressions when applied to the respective parties’ goods so that there is
`
`no likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., In re Sears, Roebuck and Co., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1312,
`
`1987 WL 123813 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. 1987) (CROSS-OVER for bras held not likely to
`
`be confused with CROSSOVER for ladies’ sportswear).
`
`Applicant respectfully requests that the Board take judicial notice of the following
`
`differences between EMERGENCY RELIEF SHOT THERAPY and FIRST AID SHOT
`
`4
`RICK RUZ, PLLC
`300 Sevilla Avenue, Suite 301, Coral Gables, FL 33134 • Telephone (305) 921-9326 • Facsimile (888) 506-2833
`
`
`
`

`

`THERAPY.
`
`As stated in both its August 24, 2016, and March 14, 2017 responses, Applicant’s mark
`
`for EMERGENCY RELIEF SHOT THERAPY immediately impresses into the minds of
`
`consumers multiple and diverse images as a result of the mark’s word portion. Applicant’s mark
`
`suggests multiple meanings: 1) that Applicant’s goods are to be used in an emergency; 2) that
`
`Applicant’s goods are designed to relieve the consumer’s intense pain; and 3) that Applicant’s
`
`goods are designed to work quickly (as they are used in the context of an emergency). In what
`
`cannot be more of a stark contrast, the mark for FIRST AID SHOT THERAPY suggests: 1) that
`
`the goods are designed to work over a period of time (i.e., not in an emergency situation where
`
`time is of the essence); and 2) are designed to relieve minor pain as opposed to extreme pain.
`
`Both FIRST AID and EMERGENCY RELIEF have completely different meanings in
`
`common usage. Specifically, FIRST AID is typically rendered by the average person (e.g.,
`
`applying a cold cloth to break a fever, or putting an adhesive bandage on a cut). Emergency
`
`relief, however, is generally provided by a trained professional or physician (e.g., removing a
`
`bullet from a gunshot victim, or stopping blood loss). EMERGENCY RELIEF implies
`
`emergency room care by a trained physician (e.g., in a room or area staffed and equipped for the
`
`reception and treatment of persons requiring immediate medical care). FIRST AID, by strong
`
`contrast, implies treatment given to an ill or injured person before regular medical aid can be
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`obtained (i.e., such as emergency room care).
`
`EMERGENCY RELIEF SHOT THERAPY implies that time is of the essence, whereas
`
`FIRST AID SHOT THERAPY implies the opposite.1
`
`
`
`2) The Fame of the Prior Mark
`
`
`
`All trademarks are not equal. Some are strong, some are weak and most are somewhere
`
`in between. “Strong” marks are given “strong” protection—protection over a wide range of
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`related products and services and variations on visual and aural format. The stronger the mark,
`
`the more likely it is that encroachment on it will produce confusion. Conversely, relatively weak
`
`marks are given a relatively narrow range of protection both as to products and format variations.
`
`1 It is also noted that the Examining Attorney, in his February 24, 2016 refusal plainly acknowledged that both
`marks begin with a different term.
`
`5
`RICK RUZ, PLLC
`300 Sevilla Avenue, Suite 301, Coral Gables, FL 33134 • Telephone (305) 921-9326 • Facsimile (888) 506-2833
`
`
`
`

`

`2 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 11:73 (4th ed.). Likewise, here, there is
`
`no evidence that the cited registration is famous or has acquired secondary meaning within the
`
`marketplace, or that consumers associate the term EMERGENCY RELIEF or FIRST AID with
`
`the owner of the FIRST AID SHOT THERAPY trademark.
`
`
`
`3) The Nature and Extent of Any Actual Confusion
`
`There has been no documented evidence that shows that any consumers have confused
`
`
`
`the respective marks in commerce. There have been no demonstrated events of confusion by
`
`consumers between the respective marks.
`
`
`
`Courts have long held that concurrent use of such marks without instances of actual
`
`confusion is evidence of no confusion. 4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §
`
`23:18 (4th ed.); Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 490,
`
`212 U.S.P.Q. 246 (1st Cir. 1981) (“[W]hen the marks have been in the same market, side by side,
`
`for a substantial period of time, there is a strong presumption that there is little likelihood of
`
`confusion.”); Greentree Laboratories, Inc. v. G.G. Bean, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 998, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d
`
`1161 (D. Me. 1989) (concurrent use for five years without confusion where plaintiff's mark is
`
`weak creates a presumption that confusion is unlikely; judgment of no infringement);
`
`Aktiebolaget Electrolux v. Armatron Intern., Inc., 999 F.2d 1, 4, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1460 (1st Cir.
`
`1993) (“[A]n absence of actual confusion, or a negligible amount of it, between two products
`
`after a long period of coexistence on the market is highly probative in showing that little
`
`likelihood of confusion exists.”).
`
`
`
`4) Any Possible Confusion Would be De Minimis
`
`
`
`Furthermore, even if there were to be evidence of actual confusion in the future, such
`
`instances can be dismissed as inconsequential or de minimis. Evidence of actual confusion of a
`
`very limited scope may be dismissed as de minimis. Probable confusion cannot be shown by
`
`pointing out that at someplace, at some time, someone may make a false identification.
`
`McGraw-Hill Pub. Co. v. American Aviation Associates, 117 F.2d 293, 295, 47 USPQ 494 (App.
`
`6
`RICK RUZ, PLLC
`300 Sevilla Avenue, Suite 301, Coral Gables, FL 33134 • Telephone (305) 921-9326 • Facsimile (888) 506-2833
`
`
`
`

`

`D.C. 1940). The First Circuit observed: “Just as one tree does not constitute a forest, a
`
`[potential] isolated instance of confusion does not prove probable confusion. To the contrary, the
`
`law has long demanded a showing that the allegedly infringing conduct carries with it a
`
`likelihood of confounding an appreciable number of reasonably prudent purchasers exercising
`
`ordinary care.” International Ass’n of Machinists & Aero. Workers v. Winship Green Nursing
`
`Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 41 USPQ2d 1241 (1st Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
`
`Evidence of the number of instances of actual confusion must be placed against the
`
`background of the number of opportunities for confusion before one can make an informed
`
`decision as to the weight to be given the evidence. If there is a very large volume of contacts or
`
`transactions which could give rise to confusion and there is only a handful of instances of actual
`
`confusion, the evidence of actual confusion may receive relatively little weight.
`
`
`
`Here, any potential confusion between EMERGENCY RELIEF SHOT THERAPY and
`
`FIRST AID SHOT THERAPY would be de minimis, especially given that there have been no
`
`present documented cases of actual confusion.
`
`
`
`5) Applicant’s and Registrant’s Marks are Weak and Entitled to a Narrow Scope of
`
`Protection
`
`
`
`Applicant submitted copies of several U.S. Trademark Registrations and Applications
`
`from the X-Search database and from the paper files of the U.S. Trademark Office, attached to
`
`Applicant’s Request for Reconsideration as Exhibit B, for marks which include the term FIRST
`
`AID or EMERGENCY for various class 005 goods (of which both Applicant and Registrant
`
`occupy). Such third-party use demonstrates two important points: (1) that the term FIRST AID
`
`and/or EMERGECNY is/are weak, and entitled to a limited scope of protection vis-à-vis other
`
`marks which use the same term for class 005 goods; and (2) that these registrations are able to
`
`co-exist on the Principal Register without causing a likelihood of confusion with each other.
`
`Accordingly, Applicant maintains that use and registration of its mark EMERGENCY
`
`RELIEF SHOT THERAPY is not likely to lead to confusion, mistake or deception with U.S.
`
`Registration No. 4,710,506, for the mark FIRST AID SHOT THERAPY.
`
`
`
`
`
`7
`RICK RUZ, PLLC
`300 Sevilla Avenue, Suite 301, Coral Gables, FL 33134 • Telephone (305) 921-9326 • Facsimile (888) 506-2833
`
`

`

`Applicant again cites to several third party registrations and applications, which
`
`incorporate the term FIRST AID or EMERGENCY [See Exhibit B attached to Applicant’s
`
`Request for Reconsideration]. These include the following marks:
`
`
`
`
`
`Trademark
`
`Registration
`
`Class
`
`FIRST AID RESPONSE
`
`FIRST AID INSIDE
`
`FIRST AID ONLY
`
`MY FIRST AID
`
`MY FIRST AID COMPANY
`
`ELITE FIRST AID
`
`FIRSTAID EXCHANGE
`
`INTELLIGENT FIRST AID
`
`FIRST AID ONLY
`
`FIRST AID TO GO!
`
`EMERGEN-ZZZZ
`
`ER TO GO
`
`EMERGEN-C
`
`ER EMERGENCY RATION
`
`EMERGENCY ESSENCE
`
`ER 911
`
`5144100
`
`4947133
`
`4781929
`
`4327506
`
`4327501
`
`4322859
`
`3259101
`
`4255657
`
`3177591
`
`2240644
`
`4773815
`
`4189395
`
`2616360
`
`3803107
`
`2769605
`
`2290161
`
`005
`
`005
`
`005
`
`005
`
`005
`
`005
`
`005
`
`005
`
`005
`
`005
`
`005
`
`005
`
`005
`
`005
`
`005
`
`005
`
`If these marks as well, as the Registration, are able to co-exist with so many other similar
`
`trademarks for analogously similar goods/services, then it can also be said that there is room for
`
`Applicant’s mark for EMERGENCY RELIEF SHOT THERAPY.
`
`8
`RICK RUZ, PLLC
`300 Sevilla Avenue, Suite 301, Coral Gables, FL 33134 • Telephone (305) 921-9326 • Facsimile (888) 506-2833
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`For the reasons set forth above, Applicant submits that there is no likelihood of
`
`confusion, mistake or deception between Applicant’s mark and the prior cited registration.
`
`Accordingly, Applicant’s mark is entitled to registration.
`
`The Board is therefore respectfully requested to reverse the Examining Attorney’s
`
`decision refusing registration of Applicant’s mark.
`
`Thank you for your consideration.
`
`
`By: /Francis J. Ciaramella/
`Francis J. Ciaramella, Esquire
`Florida Bar No. 111927
`
`
`RICK RUZ, PLLC
`Counsel for the Applicant
`300 Sevilla Avenue, Suite 301
`Coral Gables, Florida 33134
`Telephone No. (305) 921-9326
`Facsimile No. (888) 506-2833
`
`9
`RICK RUZ, PLLC
`300 Sevilla Avenue, Suite 301, Coral Gables, FL 33134 • Telephone (305) 921-9326 • Facsimile (888) 506-2833
`
`
`
`

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