Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Electronic Filing System. http://estta.uspto.gov
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`ESTTA Tracking number:
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`ESTTA741925
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`Filing date:
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`04/22/2016
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`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`Proceeding
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`Applicant
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`86534651
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`Rugged & Dapper LLC
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`Applied for Mark
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`RUGGED & DAPPER
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`Correspondence
`Address
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`Submission
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`Attachments
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`Filer's Name
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`Filer's e-mail
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`Signature
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`Date
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`CHRISTINE B REDFIELD
`FENWICK & WEST LLP
`801 CALIFORNIA STREET
`MOUNTAIN VIEW, CA 94041
`UNITED STATES
`trademarks@fenwick.com
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`Appeal Brief
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`RUGGED & DAPPER -Ex Parte Appeal TTAB.pdf(53112 bytes )
`RUGGED & DAPPER -Ex Parte Appeal - Exhibit A reduced.pdf(5370884 bytes )
`RUGGED & DAPPER -Ex Parte Appeal - Exhibit B reduced.pdf(903768 bytes )
`RUGGED & DAPPER -Ex Parte Appeal - Exhibit C reduced.pdf(1936042 bytes )
`RUGGED & DAPPER -Ex Parte Appeal - Exhibit D reduced.pdf(877263 bytes )
`RUGGED & DAPPER -Ex Parte Appeal - Exhibit E reduced.pdf(1227562 bytes )
`RUGGED & DAPPER -Ex Parte Appeal - Exhibit F reduced.pdf(1357224 bytes )
`RUGGED & DAPPER -Request for Remand with Exhibits A & B re-
`duced.pdf(3289106 bytes )
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`Christine B. Redfield
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`trademarks@fenwick.com,aolivas@fenwick.com,kali@fenwick.com
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`/Christine B. Redfield/
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`04/22/2016
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`

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`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`Serial No.:
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`Mark:
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`Applicant:
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`86534651
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`RUGGED & DAPPER
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`Rugged & Dapper LLC
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`Examining Attorney: Keri H. Cantone
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`EX PARTE APPEAL
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`APPLICANT’S BRIEF
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`Applicant’s Brief – Ex Parte Appeal – SN 86534651
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`32846/00070/DOCS/3983757.2
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`

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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`ISSUE ON APPEAL....................................................................................................................... 1 
`PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ................................................................................................. 1 
`REQUEST FOR REMAND ........................................................................................................... 1 
`STANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................................................ 2 
`ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 2 
`A.  Confusion is Unlikely Because the RUGGED Component is Dilute and
`Consumers will Look to Other Elements as Source Identifiers ......................................... 3 
`B.  The Examining Attorney Fails to Consider Material Facts Regarding the Cited
`Marks and third-party RUGGED WYPES Mark ............................................................... 5 
`C.  RUGGED & DAPPER Differs in Appearance, Meaning, and Overall Commercial
`Impression from the Cited Marks ....................................................................................... 7 
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 10 
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`i
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`32846/00070/DOCS/3983757.2
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page
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`CASES
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`California Fruit Growers Exchange v. Sunkist Baking Co.,
`166 F.2d 971, 76 U.S.P.Q. 85 (7th Cir. 1947) .......................................................................5, 6
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`Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co.,
`81 F. Supp. 114, 79 U.S.P.Q. 14 (D. Pa. 1948), aff’d on other grounds, 175
`F.2d 795, 81 U.S.P.Q. 430 (3d Cir. 1949) .............................................................................5, 6
`
`Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Group, Inc.,
`637 F.3d 1344, 98 USPQ2d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ...................................................................8
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`Conde Nast Publications, Inc. v. Miss Quality, Inc.,
`184 U.S.P.Q. 422 (C.C.P.A. 1975) ..........................................................................................10
`
`In re Bose Corp.,
`772 F.2d 866 (Fed. Cir. 1985)....................................................................................................2
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`In re National Data Corp.,
`224 U.S.P.Q. 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985).............................................................................................7
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`Knight Textile Corp. v. Jones Investment Co.,
`75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1313, 2005 WL 1691588 (T.T.A.B. 2005) ..................................................8, 10
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`Swatch v. Movado,
`2003 WL 1872656 (S.D.N.Y.) ...................................................................................................5
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`STATUTES
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`15 U.S.C. § 1070 ..............................................................................................................................2
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`Trademark Act Section 2(d) ...............................................................................................1, 6, 8, 10
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`OTHER AUTHORITIES
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`2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
`COMPETITION §11.85 (4th ed. 2010) ..........................................................................................9
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`2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
`COMPETITION §11.90 (4th ed. 2010) ..........................................................................................7
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`TMEP Section 1207.01(a)(iii) .........................................................................................................6
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`TMEP Section 1207.01(b)(iii) .........................................................................................................8
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`ii
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`32846/00070/DOCS/3983757.2
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`ISSUE ON APPEAL
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`Is there a likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d) between Applicant’s
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`RUGGED & DAPPER application and (1) RUGGED Registration No. 3903332 owned by Coty
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`Germany GmbH and (2) RUGGED FIX Registration No. 4103613 owned by Wella GmbH?
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`PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
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`
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`On February 13, 2015, Applicant filed Application Serial No. 86534651 seeking to
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`register the RUGGED & DAPPER mark for the following goods: “Men's Skincare, Grooming
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`and Beauty products, namely, facial moisturizers, cleansers, oils for the face and hair, hand
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`cream.” In an Office Action dated May 22, 2015, the Examining Attorney refused to register
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`Applicant’s mark, citing a likelihood of confusion with (1) RUGGED Registration No. 3903332
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`owned by Coty Germany GmbH (“Coty”) for “Soaps, perfumery; essential oils; cosmetics;
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`cosmetic hair lotions” and (2) RUGGED FIX Registration No. 4103613 owned by Wella GmbH
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`(“Wella”) for overlapping goods “Hair care preparations, namely, shampoos, hair conditioners
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`and non-medicated hair scalp treatments, namely, restructurizers and scalp conditioners.” (Initial
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`Office Action at 2.) Applicant timely responded to this Office Action on June 29, 2015. The
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`Examining Attorney issued a final Office Action, continuing her refusal to register Applicant’s
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`mark under Section 2(d), on July 23, 2015. Applicant timely filed a Request for Reconsideration
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`and concurrent Notice of Appeal in response to this Office Action on January 25, 2016. The
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`Examining Attorney denied Applicant’s Request for Reconsideration on February 19, 2016.
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`This appeal followed.
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`REQUEST FOR REMAND
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`Concurrent with this brief, Applicant will also submit a Request for Remand for Inclusion
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`of Additional Evidence. Applicant seeks to introduce evidence consisting of (1) a letter from
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`Coty consenting to Applicant’s registration of the RUGGED & DAPPER application; and
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`1
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`32846/00070/DOCS/3983757.2
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`(2) third-party RUGGED and RUGGED-based marks for toiletries that further highlight the
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`crowded field of RUGGED-based marks for toiletries, particularly men’s toiletries.
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`STANDARD OF REVIEW
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`This appeal arises from the Examining Attorney’s final refusal to register Applicant’s
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`RUGGED & DAPPER mark and is proper under 15 U.S.C. § 1070. The Board reviews the
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`decision of the Examining Attorney to determine “whether or not, based on the record before the
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`examiner, the examiner’s action was correct.” In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866, 869 (Fed. Cir.
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`1985).
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`ARGUMENT
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`Applicant’s RUGGED & DAPPER mark is not confusingly similar to Coty’s RUGGED
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`and Wella’s RUGGED FIX registrations (the “Cited Marks”). The Examining Attorney fails to
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`consider the highly probative fact that the Cited Marks are coexisting on the registry for
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`overlapping goods, and erroneously assumes that Coty’s consent regarding Wella’s registration
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`somehow shields the common RUGGED component of Coty’s and Wella’s marks from being
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`diluted or weakened when many courts have held the opposite. The Examining Attorney also
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`incorrectly dismisses evidence regarding the Cited Marks’ coexistence with RUGGED WYPES,
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`Registration No. 2611014 owned by Clean Plus Incorporated for “multiple purpose, pre-
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`saturated cleaning towel” broadly, by focusing on extrinsic evidence of Clean Plus’ use, rather
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`than the goods recited in the registration. Further, the Examining Attorney disregards the
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`probative value of the RUGGED, RUGGED FIX, and RUGGED WYPES registrations’
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`coexistence for overlapping and/or highly related goods with the sweeping statement that “prior
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`decisions and actions of other trademark examining attorneys in registering other marks have
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`little evidentiary value and are not binding.” (Request for Reconsideration Denial at 3.) Third-
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`party registrations are relevant to show that a component of a mark, RUGGED in this case, is
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`2
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`suggestive or dilute such that the consuming public will rely on other elements to distinguish the
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`source of the goods. Moreover, the Examining Attorney violates the anti-dissection rule by
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`focusing on only the “rugged” component of Applicant’s mark and not the mark as a whole—
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`RUGGED & DAPPER.
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`When these factors, as further discussed below, are considered in light of the fact that the
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`term “rugged” is suggestive, not highly distinctive, the relevant consumers are not likely to be
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`confused.
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`A.
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`Confusion is Unlikely Because the RUGGED Component is Dilute and
`Consumers will Look to Other Elements as Source Identifiers
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`It is well established that in a likelihood of confusion analysis, the strength of the Cited
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`Marks is a key factor. The more distinctive a mark is on the distinctiveness spectrum, the
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`stronger the scope of protection it is afforded, and vice versa. In finding a likelihood of
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`confusion between Applicant’s RUGGED & DAPPER mark and the Cited Marks, the
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`Examining Attorney fails to consider that “rugged,” amongst other things, means “rough and
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`strong in character,” and is suggestive of an aspirational characteristic when used in connection
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`with personal care products. (See, e.g., Request for Reconsideration Ex. D, print-outs of
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`registration certificates and TSDR pages of examples of third-party RUGGED-based consumer
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`goods products, attached as Ex. A). The fact that RUGGED WYPES registered based on
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`acquired distinctiveness is additional evidence that RUGGED-based marks for personal care
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`products should not be afforded a broad scope of protection. (Request for Reconsideration
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`Ex. A, print-outs of RUGGED WYPES Registration No. 3675406 in Class 3 (Principal Register
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`based on Section 2(f) acquired distinctiveness) and Registration No. 2611014 in Class 21
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`(Supplemental Register) registration certificates and TSDR pages, attached as Ex. B.)
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`3
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` The suggestive and dilute nature of “rugged” is highlighted by the numerous third party
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`uses of RUGGED and RUGGED-based marks for various personal care products, particularly
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`for men, in the marketplace. (See Request for Remand Ex. B, attached as Ex. C, for goods such
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`as MR RUGGED Beard Balm Conditioner, RUGGED for Men Natural Lotion, RUGGED
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`Rescue Natural Skin Balm, RUGGED OAK Lotion, RUGGED RESTORATION Company
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`toiletries, RUGGED Hair & Beard Balm, RUGGED Shaving Cream Soap, RUGGED Outdoors
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`Beard Oil, RUGGED MONKEY Beard Balm and Conditioner, RUGGED RILEY Men’s Shave
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`Soap). Because “rugged” is suggestive for personal care products, and consumers are used to
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`seeing RUGGED and RUGGED-based marks for such goods in the marketplace, consumers
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`have learned to look for elements other than “rugged,” such as “& dapper” in this case, in order
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`to distinguish amongst different sources.
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`Further, the Cited Marks’ scope of protection is narrowed by the marks’ coexistence with
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`each other and the RUGGED WYPES registration for overlapping and/or highly related goods.
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`If Coty’s RUGGED registration for soaps broadly (which encompass hair soap), essential oils
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`broadly (which encompass hair and scalp oils), and cosmetic hair lotions (which encompass hair
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`“restructurizer” and conditioners) can coexist with Wella’s RUGGED FIX registration for
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`shampoo, hair conditioner, and hair restructurizer and scalp conditioner; and if both registrations
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`can coexist with Clean Plus’ RUGGED WYPES registration for “multiple purpose cleaning
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`towel pre-saturated with cleaning compounds”; then the Cited Marks should be able to similarly
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`coexist with Applicant’s RUGGED & DAPPER mark. (See Request for Reconsideration Ex. E,
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`print-outs showing third-party “hair soap” products and “hair oil” products, attached as Ex. D.)
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`B.
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`The Examining Attorney Fails to Consider Material Facts Regarding the
`Cited Marks and Third-Party RUGGED WYPES Mark
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`The Examining Attorney fails to consider material facts by (1) incorrectly assuming that
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`the consent agreement between Coty and Wella negates the probative value of their coexistence
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`on the registry for a RUGGED mark and a RUGGED-based mark for overlapping goods;
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`(2) incorrectly dismissing the probative value regarding the Cited Marks’ coexistence with Clean
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`Plus’ RUGGED WYPES registration by focusing on extrinsic evidence of Clean Plus’ use, rather
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`than the goods recited in the registration; and (3) incorrectly disregarding the probative value of
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`the RUGGED, RUGGED FIX, and RUGGED WYPES registrations coexisting for overlapping
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`and/or highly related goods with the sweeping statement that “prior decisions and actions of
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`other trademark examining attorneys in registering other marks have little evidentiary value and
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`are not binding.” (Request for Reconsideration Denial at 3.)
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`First, contrary to the Examining Attorney’s assumption, there is no general rule that
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`coexistence agreements shield marks from being weakened. Indeed, courts have held the
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`opposite. The Southern District of New York, for example, has noted that a plaintiff’s
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`coexistence with another party in the marketplace, where the coexistence was consented to,
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`dilutes the plaintiff’s rights. See, e.g., Swatch v. Movado, 2003 WL 1872656 at *3 (S.D.N.Y.)
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`(finding against summary judgment for plaintiff and noting that a third-party use with plaintiff’s
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`permission “surely dilutes the distinctiveness of plaintiff’s mark”). Some courts have gone even
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`further, treating consent agreements akin to an admission against interest or giving it an estoppel-
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`like effect. See, e.g. California Fruit Growers Exchange v. Sunkist Baking Co., 166 F.2d 971, 76
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`U.S.P.Q. 85 (7th Cir. 1947) (no likelihood of confusion resulting from use of SUNKIST for
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`bread where plaintiffs had consent agreement that there’s no likelihood of confusion between
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`SUNKIST for citrus fruit and SUN-KIST for canned fruit and vegetables); Campbell Soup Co. v.
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`Armour & Co., 81 F. Supp. 114, 120, 79 U.S.P.Q. 14 (D. Pa. 1948), aff’d on other grounds, 175
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`F.2d 795, 81 U.S.P.Q. 430 (3d Cir. 1949) (“plaintiffs have obtained no exclusive right of user to
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`the red and white band for the reason that each of them have used it and diluted of whatever of
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`value there was in it by reason of the registration to both of them”). Regardless of whether
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`California Fruit or Campbell would be applicable here, the Examining Attorney is erroneous in
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`assuming that the Cited Marks’ coexistence for overlapping goods does not impact their rights in
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`the RUGGED component simply because Coty consented to Wella’s registration. At the very
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`least, the Cited Marks’ coexistence should be given as much weight as if Coty had not consented
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`to Wella’s registration.
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`Second, per TMEP Section 1207.01(a)(iii), for purposes of a Section 2(d) refusal, the
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`scope of the RUGGED WYPES registration should be determined based on the goods recited in
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`the registration, not by relying on extrinsic evidence. TMEP 1207.01(a)(iii) (“The nature and
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`scope of a party’s goods or services must be determined on the basis of the goods or services
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`recited in the application or registration… If the cited registration describes goods or services
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`broadly, and there is no limitation as to their nature, type, channels of trade, or class of
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`purchasers, it is presumed that the registration encompasses all goods or services of the type
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`described …”). Here, the RUGGED WYPES registration covers “multiple purpose cleaning
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`towel pre-saturated with cleaning compounds.” The RUGGED WYPES registration does not
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`contain a disclaimer or recitation that it is limited to industrial cleaning towels. Consequently,
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`for a Section 2(d) analysis, the registration’s scope is based on the recited goods—not extrinsic
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`evidence, and the RUGGED WYPES registration is probative regarding the relative weakness of
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`RUGGED-based marks for personal care items. Cleaning towels pre-saturated with cleansing
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`compounds are overlapping—or at the very least related to—the soaps and shampoos covered by
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`the Cited Marks since cleansing towels and wipes are commonly used for beauty and personal
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`care. (Request for Reconsideration Exs. B and C, print-out of Dictionary.com “soap” definition
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`as “a substance used for washing and cleansing purposes” and print-outs of third-party facial and
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`body soaps and pre-saturated facial and body towel cleansers, e.g., Clean & Clear Night
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`Relaxing All-In-One Cleansing Wipes, Simple Cleansing Facial Wipes, Dude Wipes Personal
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`Wipes, No Rinse Cleansing & Deodorizing Bath Wipes, attached as Ex. E.)
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`Third, third-party registrations are relevant to show that a component of a mark,
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`RUGGED in this case, is suggestive or dilute such that the consuming public will rely on other
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`elements to distinguish the source of the goods. 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
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`TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §11.90 (4th ed. 2010) (“Third party registrations are
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`relevant to prove that some segment of the composite marks … has a normally understood and
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`well-recognized … suggestive meaning, leading to the conclusion that that segment is relatively
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`weak. Such registrations could also show that the PTO, by registering several marks with such a
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`common segment, recognizes that portions of such composite marks other than the common
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`segment are sufficient to distinguish the marks as a whole and to make confusion unlikely.”) For
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`this reason, contrary to the Examining Attorney’s assertion, the existence of the RUGGED
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`WYPES registration is not of “little evidentiary value” and the Examining Attorney has
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`erroneously failed to give proper weight to the RUGGED WYPES registration’s coexistence on
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`the registry with the Cited Marks for overlapping or highly related goods.
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`C.
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`RUGGED & DAPPER Differs in Appearance, Meaning, and Overall
`Commercial Impression from the Cited Marks
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`The Examining Attorney also improperly dissected Applicant’s RUGGED & DAPPER
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`mark in determining a likelihood of confusion with the Cited Marks. In re National Data Corp.,
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`224 U.S.P.Q. 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Likelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on a
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`dissection of a mark . . . . [T]he ultimate conclusion rests on a consideration of the marks in their
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`entireties.”). Rather than considering the commercial impression imparted by the RUGGED &
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`DAPPER mark as a whole, the Examining Attorney simply rejects Applicant’s arguments out of
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`hand and asserts:
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`Adding a term to a registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity
`between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a
`likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). In the
`present case, the marks are identical in part. The identical portions of the marks
`convey the same commercial impression in relation to the goods. The addition of
`the term DAPPER does not create a double meaning or double entendre in
`connection with the goods at issue.
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`(Request for Reconsideration Denial at 3 (emphasis added).)
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`The Examining Attorney misinterprets Section 1207.01(b)(iii). Section 1207.01(b)(iii)
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`actually states that “[l]ikelihood of confusion is not necessarily avoided between otherwise
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`confusingly similar marks merely by adding or deleting [matter].” Section 1207.01(b)(iii) does
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`not establish that additions or deletions to a mark are “generally” negligible in a Section 2(d)
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`analysis. To the contrary, Section 1207.01(b)(iii) specifically states that “[a]dditions … may be
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`sufficient to avoid a likelihood of confusion if: (1) the marks in their entireties convey
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`significantly different commercial impressions; or (2) the matter common to the marks is not
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`likely to be perceived by purchasers as distinguishing source because it is merely … diluted”—
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`which is precisely the case at hand. See, e.g., Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Group, Inc.,
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`637 F.3d 1344, 1356, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming TTAB’s holding that
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`applicant’s CAPITAL CITY BANK marks for banking and financial services is not likely to
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`cause confusion with opposer’s CITIBANK marks for banking and financial services, based in
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`part on determination that “capital” is the dominant element of applicant’s marks, and gives a
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`geographic connotation in addition to a look and sound distinct from opposer’s marks); Knight
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`8
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`Textile Corp. v. Jones Investment Co., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1313, 2005 WL 1691588 (T.T.A.B. 2005)
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`(No confusion likely between ESSENTIALS and NORTON MCNAUGHTON ESSENTIALS
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`for identical and highly similar goods because “essentials” is weak and the addition of the
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`NORTON MCNAUGHTON component suffices to avoid a likelihood of confusion.).
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`On the whole, Applicant’s mark conveys a distinct commercial impression from the Cited
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`Marks. In terms of appearance and sound, the marks only share the term “rugged,” which should
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`not be the only basis for finding a likelihood of confusion because, as discussed prior, “rugged”
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`is relatively dilute and, in a crowded field, “customers will not likely be confused between any
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`two of the crowd and may have learned to carefully pick out one from the other.” 2 J. THOMAS
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`MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §11.85 (4th ed. 2010).
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`Applicant’s mark is five syllables and thirteen letters. In contrast, the cited RUGGED
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`mark is only two syllables and six letters, and the cited RUGGED FIX mark is only three
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`syllables and nine letters. Further, the Cited Marks do not contain the terms “& dapper,” which
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`are distinct in sound and appearance. As discussed prior, since “rugged” is relatively weak for
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`the relevant goods, and “& dapper” is visually and audibly the larger component of Applicant’s
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`mark, consumers may perceive “& dapper” to be the dominant element, distinguishing
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`Applicant’s mark from the Cited Marks.
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`The marks at issue also convey different meanings. The term “rugged” means “rough
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`and strong in character,” “strongly built or constituted,” “seamed with wrinkles and furrows,” or
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`“having a rough, uneven surface.” The term “dapper,” on the other hand, means “neat and trim
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`in appearance,” “small and active,” or “alert and lively in movement and manners.” By using the
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`ampersand “&” to conjoin “rugged” with “dapper,” Applicant’s mark creates a somewhat
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`incongruous and aspirational image of a neat, trim, and lively man who also balances a rough
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`and strong demeanor. This is distinct from “rugged” alone, which may refer to the texture or
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`endurance of Coty’s product, or “rugged fix,” which implies that Wella’s product is a strong fix
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`or will fix one’s ruggedness. (Request for Reconsideration Ex. G, Merriam Webster and
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`Dictionary.com “rugged,” “dapper,” and “fix” definitions attached as Ex. F.) These meanings
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`are distinct from the meaning of Applicant’s mark.
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`Consumers will perceive differences between the RUGGED & DAPPER mark and the
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`Cited Marks because “rugged” is suggestive and relatively weak for the goods at issue, and
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`Applicant’s mark as a whole differs in appearance, sound, meaning, and overall commercial
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`impression. See, e.g., Conde Nast Publications, Inc. v. Miss Quality, Inc., 184 U.S.P.Q. 422
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`(C.C.P.A. 1975) (COUNTRY VOGUES for women’s dresses and VOGUE for a fashion
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`magazine and clothing patterns not confusingly similar as the common word “vogue” was
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`outweighed by the dissimilarities between the marks viewed in their entireties); See also Knight
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`Textile Corp. v. Jones Inv. Co., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1313 (T.T.A.B. 2005) (NORTON
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`MCNAUGHTON ESSENTIALS not confusingly similar to ESSENTIALS).
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`CONCLUSION
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`In light of the above, RUGGED & DAPPER is not confusingly similar to RUGGED and
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`RUGGED FIX based on Trademark Act Section 2(d). Applicant respectfully requests that the
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`Board reverse the Examining Attorney’s refusal to register Applicant’s mark.
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`32846/00070/DOCS/3983757.2
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`FENWICK & WEST LLP
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`By:
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` /Christine B. Redfield/
`Christine B. Redfield, Esq.
`Kelly K. Yang, Esq.
`FENWICK & WEST LLP
`Silicon Valley Center
`801 California Street
`Mountain View, CA 94041
`(415) 875-2329
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`Attorneys for Applicant
`Rugged & Dapper LLC
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`11
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`32846/00070/DOCS/3983757.2
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`Dated: April 22, 2016
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`EXHIBIT A
`EXHIBIT A
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`wfiitgh étatefi Uf @1113I. I
`fllnitetl Qtatesi fiatent ant ‘illrahemarls ®fIi1:e
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`Rugged Armor
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`Reg. No. 4,757,897
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`SPIGEN, INC. (CALIFORNIA CORPORATION]
`9338 RESEARCH DRIVE
`
`Registered June 16, 2015 IRVINE, CA -32515
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`Int. CL: 9
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`TRADEMARK
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`FOR: CASES TOR MOBILE PHONES; CELL PHONE CASES; CLEAR PROTECTIVE COVERS
`SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR PERSONAL ELECTRONIC DEVI CES, NAMELY, CELL PHONES,
`PERSONAL DIGITAL ASSISTANTS. TABLET PERSONAL COMPUTERS; FITTED PLASTIC
`FILMS KNOWNAS SKINS FOR COVERING AND PROTECTING ELECTRONIC APPARATUS,
`NAMEIX, CELL PHONES, TABLET COIVIPIITERS, MP3 PIAVERS, SMARTPHONES;
`SUPPLEMENTAL REGISTER PROTECTIVE CASES POR SIVIARTPI [ONES-, PROTECTIVE COVERS AND CASES FOR
`CELL PHONES. L..'\P‘l'0P5 AND PORI‘ALILI.-' MEDIA PLAYERS; PROM.-'CI'1VLr GLASSES,
`IN CLASS 9 (us. CLS. 21, 2.3, 25. 3fiAN[) as).
`
`FIRST USE 3~1T"~20]5; IN COMMERCE 3- l 7.-2015.
`
`THE MARK. CONSISIS OF STANDARD CHARACTERS WITHOUT CLAIM TO ANY PAR-
`TICULAR FONT, 5'I'YLE_ SIZE, OR COLOR.
`
`SER. N0. 86-541.746. FILED P.R. 2-2|}2C|lS'.AM. SR. 3-2(r20l5.
`
`WENDY UOUDMAN. EXAMININU A'l'l"ORNl:ZY
`
`Director of the United States
`Patent and Trademark Oflioc
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`

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`REQUIREMENTS TO MAINTAIN YOUR FEDERAL
`TRADEMARK REGISTRATION
`
`WARNING: YOUR REGISTRATION \V]I..L BE CANCELLED IF YOU DO NOT FILE THE
`DOCUMENTS BELOW DURING THE SPECIFIED TIME PERIODS.
`
`Requirements in the First Ten Yenrs*
`What and When to File:
`
`First Filing Deadline: You must file a Declaration of Use (or Excttsable Nonuse} between the
`5th and 6th years after the registration date. See E5 U.S.C. §§ 1058, I I4 lk.
`If the declaration is
`accepted, the registration will continue in fo me for the remainder ofthe ten-year period, calculated
`from the registration date, unless cancelled by an order of the Commissioner i'or Trademarks or a
`federal coun.
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`Sec-and Fiiirig Deaa'.firte.' You must tile a Declaration of Use (or Excusable Nonuse) and an
`Application for Renewal between the 9th and ltlth years after the registration date.‘
`See I5 U.S.C. §lt}S9.
`
`Requirements in Successive Ten-Year Periods"
`What and When to File:
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`You must file a Declaration ol'Use (or Eiteusable Nonuse) and anApplieation for Renewal between
`every 9th and ltlth-year period. calculated from the registration date.‘
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`Grace Period Fiiiugs*
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`The above documents will be accepted as timely iflilod within six months alter the deadlines listed above
`with the payment of an additional fee.
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`*A'I"I‘ENTIO.\' MADRID PROTOCOL REGISTRANTS: The holder ofan international registration with
`an extension of protection to the United States under the Madrid Protocol must timely file the Declarations
`of Use (or Excusable Nonuse) referenced above directly with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
`(USPTOJ. The time periods for filing are based on the U.S. registration date (not the international registration
`date). The deadlines and grace periods for the Declarations of Use (or Excusable Nonusc) are identical to
`those for nationally issued registrations.
`-Ska: t5 U.S.C. §§l058, tl4lk. However, owners of international
`registrations do not file renewal applications at the USPTO. Instead. the holder must file it renewal oi‘ the
`underlying international registration at the international Bureau ofthe World Intellectual Property Otganinttion,
`under Article 1' of the Madrid Protocol, before the expiration of each ten-year term of protection. calculated
`from the date ofijte international registration. See 15 U_S_C_ §l 1:11]. For more intbrmation and renewal
`fonns for the intemtttional registration, see hnp:ihvww.wipo.inUnetdrid!enf.
`
`NOTE: Fees and requirements for maintaining registrations are subject to change. Please check the
`USPTO website for further information. With the exception of renewal applications for registered
`extensions of protection, you can lite the registration maintenance documents referenced above online
`at hItp:i'lwww.u$pt0.gov_
`
`NOTE: A courtesy e-mail reminder of USPTO maintenance filing deadlines will be sent to trademark
`ownersiholders who authorize e—mail communication and maintain a current e-mail address with the
`USPTO. Th ensure that o-mail is authorized and your address is torrent, please use the Trademark
`Electronic Amilieation System (TEAS) Correspondence Address and Change of Owner Address Form:
`available at http:!N.rww.uspto.gov.
`
`Page: 2! RN it 4,157,897
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`

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`Generated on:
`
`This page was generated by TSDR on 2016-O1-2514:55:44 EST
`Mark: RUGGED ARMOR
`
`U5 Serial Number: 86541746
`Feb. 20, 2015
`Us Registration Number: 4?5?59?
`Jun. 16. 2015
`Filed as TEAS Plus: Yes
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`Supplemental
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`Register:
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`Hark Type:
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`Trademark
`Amended to Principal No
`Regisber:
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`Mar. 26, 2015
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`Status:
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`Application Filing Date:
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`Registration Date:
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`Currently TEAS Plus:
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`Date Amended to Current
`Register:
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`Rugged Armor
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`Registered. The registration date is used to determine when post-registration maintenance documents are due.
`Status Date:
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`Jun. 16. 2015
`
`Hark Literal Elements:
`RUGGED ARMOR
`Standard Character Claiin:
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`Mark Information
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`Yes. The mark consists of standard characters without claim to any particular font style. size. or color.
`ltllarlt Drawing Type:
`4 — STANDARD CHARACTER MARK
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`Note: The following symbols indicate that tile registrantiowner has amended the §OOdS.tSEl\|‘l¢E'B'.
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`Goods and Services
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`n Brackets [..] indicate deleted goodslservioes:
`0 Double parenthesis ((__}} identify any goodsfsenrices not claimed in a Section 15 atfidavit of incontestabilityr; and
`I Asterisks '..' identify additional {new} wording in the goodsalservices.
`For:
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`cases for mobile phones; Cell phone cases; Clear protective covers specially adapted for personal electronic devices, namely, cell
`phones, personal digital assistants, tablet personal computers; Fitted plastic films known as slcins for covering and protecting electronic
`apparatus, namely, cell phones, tablet computers, mp3 players, srnartphones; Protective cases for smartphones; Protective covers and
`cases for cell phones, laptops and portable media players; Protective glasses
`International Class[es:a: U09 — Primary Class
`O21. O23. O26. O36. 033
`Class Status:
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`U3 Classtesl:
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`Basis:
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`First Use: Mar. 1?. 2015
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`Use in Commerce:
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`‘ital
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`Mar. 17, 2015
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`Filed Use: No
`Filed ITU: Yes
`Filed «D: No
`Filed “E: No
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`Basis Information (Case Level)
`Currently Use: Yes
`Current|y|TU: No
`Currently -“D: No
`Currently HE:
`
`Amended Use: No
`Amended ITU: No
`Amended 440: No
`Amended ME: No
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`

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`Filed ISEA: Mo
`Filed Na Basis: No
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`Currently fifiA: Na
`curtenlly No Basis: No
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`Current Owner(s) Information
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`Spigen. In I:,
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`Owner Name