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`ESTTA Tracking number:
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`ESTTA801456
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`Filing date:
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`02/14/2017
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`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`Proceeding
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`Applicant
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`86455558
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`Iris Data Services, Inc.
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`Applied for Mark
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`ARC
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`Correspondence
`Address
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`Submission
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`Attachments
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`Filer's Name
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`Filer's e-mail
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`Signature
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`Date
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`CARLA CALCAGNO
`CALCAGNO LAW PLLC
`2101 L STREET NW
`WASHINGTON, DC 20037
`UNITED STATES
`cccalcagno@gmail.com
`
`Reply Brief
`
`Applicant ARC reply brief.pdf(95992 bytes )
`Exhibit A to Applicant ARC Reply Brief.pdf(84985 bytes )
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`Carla C. Calcagno
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`cccalcagno@gmail.com, trademarks@canopyparalegal.com
`
`/Carla C. Calcagno/
`
`02/14/2017
`
`
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`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`
`
`In re Application:
`SN: 86-455558
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`Applicant: Iris Data Services Inc.
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`Examining Attorney: Andrea Hack, Esq.
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`Law Office: 108
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`REPLY TO EXAMINING ATTORNEY’S APPEAL BRIEF
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`Applicant wishes to make a brief statement in response to a few points raised by the
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`newly appointed Examining Attorney in her Appeal Brief. Applicant respectfully submits that
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`the Examiner’s Statement misstates the evidence, the applicable facts, the procedural history, and
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`the legal standards on which this Appeal is based. Accordingly, Applicant respectfully requests
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`that the Board consider and reverse the refusal to register.
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`PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
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`In light of the unusual nature of the prosecution history, Applicant wishes to clarify the
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`events leading to the amendment of goods between the filing of Applicant’s brief and the current
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`Examiner’s Statement.
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`Applicant did not sua sponte amend the identification of services. Instead, the
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`undersigned added the bolded language upon a proposal by the former Examiner to resolve the
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`ex parte appeal. Specifically, in September 2016, after he read Applicant’s Appeal Brief, the
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`first examiner in this case called the undersigned attorney. He proposed the amendment to the
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`Applicant, as a means of resolving the appeal and allowing Applicant’s mark to proceed to
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`publication. After consideration, as it narrowed the identification, Applicant agreed to amend its
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`description of services as proposed by the Examiner, if, and only if, as he proposed, he would
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`withdraw the refusal to register. To that end, on September 22, 2016, Applicant amended its
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`originally filed identification to add the language provided exclusively to law firms, so that it
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`reads as follows: “Litigation support services provided exclusively to law firms, namely,
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`conducting electronic legal discovery in the nature of reviewing e-mails and other electronically
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`stored information that could be relevant evidence in a lawsuit”.
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`An Examiner’s Amendment was duly issued on September 23, 2016. However, on
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`September 28, 2016, the undersigned was advised that a PTO supervisor rejected the agreement
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`and refused to pass the mark to publication.
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`On that same date, in light of the fact that the amendment had been entered into upon
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`reliance in the Examiner’s and Applicant’s agreement and after the prosecution of the application
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`had been closed, the Board issued an order noting that no new evidence could be filed. Despite
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`this, Examiner Hack has relied on dictionary definitions in support of her Argument.
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`To the extent that this is a violation of the Board’s order, Applicant objects. However,
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`even with this new evidence, Applicant respectfully submits that the refusal to register is
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`improper.
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`ARGUMENT
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`Applicant wishes to clarify and stress that the present identification is “Litigation support
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`services provided exclusively to law firms, namely, conducting electronic legal discovery in
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`the nature of reviewing e-mails and other electronically stored information that could be
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`relevant evidence in a lawsuit”.
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`2
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`By virtue of this identification, the law presumes conclusively that (1) Applicant
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`provides electronic legal discovery services, as that term is commonly understood and (2) these
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`electronic discovery services are offered and provided exclusively to law firms.
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`The Examiner’s Statement rests on the mistaken conclusion that “legal services”
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`comprises “electronic legal discovery.” No evidence supports the Examiner’s conclusion.
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`Numerous dictionaries define the phrase “legal services” as the services provided by a
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`“lawyer to his or her client.” See, e.g. Exhibit B to Applicant’s Appeal Brief and attached hereto
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`as Exhibit A.1
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`Given these definitions of the phrase “legal services” one need not engage in the
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`Examiner’s multi-staged tortured ontological analysis derived from the meaning of the term
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`“law” to derive at a meaning of the phrase. The Cambridge Dictionary and others reflect that
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`“Legal Services” is a defined phrase. This meaning differs materially from that proposed by the
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`Examiner.
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`Moreover, Applicant respectfully invites the Board’s attention to the fact that even in the
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`Examiner’s definition, Number 6, which Applicant recommends as the most relevant, defines
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`“legal” as “applicable to attorneys.” Further when carried to its logical and Applicant
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`respectfully submits, improper conclusion, the Examiner’s proposed ontological definition of
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`legal services would encompass such materially differing services as a process server, a judge in
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`a courtroom, a mail room clerk in a law firm. This definition conflicts with the precise clear
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`definition of the phrase “legal services” offered by two standard dictionaries as what consumers
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`understand by the phrase.
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`1
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` While Applicant maintains its objection to the Examiner’s evidence, nonetheless, only to the
`extent that the Board permits the Examiner to submit the dictionary definitions attached to her
`brief, in fairness, Applicant requests that the Board take judicial notice of the additional
`definition attached hereto as Exhibit A.
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`3
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`Most importantly, no evidence in the record exists that lawyers typically offer electronic
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`legal discovery services. In fact, the record shows the exact opposite. As the Committee Notes
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`Committee Notes and Applicant’s specimens cited in Applicant’s Main Brief has shown,
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`discovery and electronic discovery are defined as entirely different concepts. Lawyers conduct
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`discovery. Computerized technology companies, like Applicant’s, conduct electronic discovery.
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`As stated in Applicant’s opening brief, this is because both the knowledge and the technology to
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`conduct each differ.
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`Electronic legal discovery requires the use of computers to locate, analyze documents for
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`metadata and other electronically stored information (ESI) that humans cannot even perceive.
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`As Judge Faciolla held, in one of the most famous cases first defining the rules on
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`electronic discovery, appropriate searching of electronic data is too complicated for lawyers, but
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`instead required the use of computerized solutions experts. U.S. v O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14
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`(D. D.C.2008). As that court stated, ediscovery involves “the interplay at least of the sciences of
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`computer technology, statistics and linguistics… Given this complexity, for lawyers and judges
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`to opine is truly to go where angels dare to tread.” Id. Subsequent cases therefore have
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`affirmatively sanctioned counsel for failing to retain such companies to perform ediscovery. See
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`e.g., Mosley v. Conte, 110623/2008 (8-17-2010), 2010 NY Slip Op 32424(U), 14 (N.Y. Misc.
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`2010), explaining the problems of attempting to analyze ESI without a computer forensic expert
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`and ordering party to retain and search and analyze documents through a computer forensic
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`expert. [“The affidavit of a computer expert following his or her examination of and search
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`through Conte's computers, email databases, and the like, also might have alleviated these
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`problems. In their absence, the Court does not find the Conte affidavit sufficiently
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`comprehensive or persuasive about the existence of ESI.]
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`4
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`Thus, nothing is this record supports the Examiner’s conclusion that “legal Services” is
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`broad enough to encompass electronic discovery services, such as Applicant’s. These services,
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`“electronic discovery services in the nature of reviewing ESI” and the like are computerized
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`technology based solutions. As Judge Faciolla held, due to the mass of documents typically
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`involved and the complex nature of the search required, knowledge of the sciences of computer
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`technology, statistics and linguistics are integral to the services required.
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`Second, the classes of customers involved in the case at bar differ completely. As
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`conclusively shown by Applicant’s amendment, Applicant is higher in the distribution chain than
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`Registrant. Applicant sells exclusively to “law firms.” The Registrant is a law firm. And the
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`Examiner has failed to introduce any evidence that law firms are a typical purchaser class for
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`other firm’s “legal services.” Instead, as the Examiner has noted, law firms sell to corporations
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`and individuals including the poor, immigrants and the like. for Applicant’s services. As the
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`purchaser classes differ completely, consumer confusion cannot occur. In re Nexgen Resources,
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`2006 WL 2557987 (TTAB 2006) [“although coal is supplied to companies that generate
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`electricity, electricity is bought and sold in entirely different markets and channels of trade than
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`coal”].
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`Third, the relevant purchaser class undoubtedly consists of only the most sophisticated
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`purchasers imaginable. As Applicant’s recitation of services is expressly limited to sales to law
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`firms, the Examiner’s contention that Applicant would sell to the poor, the illiterate, and
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`immigrants is legally false. Further, it is belied by the identification of services, and the
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`evidence of record which consists of Applicant’s brochures, pp. 57- 70 at Docket Number 8 of
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`Applicant’s Request for Reconsideration. As indicated in Applicant’s brochures, pp 57-70
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`5
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`Docket 8, Request for Reconsideration, discovery solutions cost a good deal of money. Poor
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`people and immigrants, typically are not the consumers for such services.
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`To the extent that Registrant sells to persons other than those to whom Registrant sells,
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`these sales are irrelevant. This is because, as the Board knows, confusion cannot exist, unless a
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`mark is encountered by the same class of purchaser. In re Nexgen Resources, supra.
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`Fourth, even assuming without conceding that Registrant ARC IP LAW offers its
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`services to other law firms, this shared purchaser class constitutes the most sophisticated of
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`consumers imaginable. Electronic discovery is costly and burdensome. Further, courts award
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`severe sanctions if the matter is not handled correctly. See, e.g., U.S. v O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d
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`14 (D. D.C.2008) and Mosley v. Conte, 110623/2008 (8-17-2010), 2010 NY Slip Op 32424(U),
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`14 (N.Y. Misc. 2010). Due to the high costs of electronic discovery and the likely enormous
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`sanctions for failing to perform those services correctly, law firms can be expected to exercise
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`the greatest possible care and time in selecting an ediscovery provider.
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`Fifth, because of the extremely sophisticated nature of the consumer class, the
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`Examiner’s arguments and cited cases as to the degree of care likely to be exercised by
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`purchasers in making purchasing decisions are inapplicable. The cases cited by the Examiner,
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`such as Squirtco, Vitarroz and the like, generally involve consumer products and do not involve
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`professional purchasing agents as would exist here. As noted in Applicant’s Main Brief, where
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`as here, the parties are sophisticated, even identical marks have been allowed. See Applicant’s
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`Main Brief, pp 16-18.
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`Sixth, the Examiner’ argument as to the weakness of the Registrant’s Mark continues to
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`misstate the evidence of record, ignores Applicant’s evidence as to the inherent weakness of the
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`term ARC, and simply ignores the two recent Federal Court cases cited by Applicant in its Main
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`6
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`Brief, instructing the USPTO on the proper weight to give evidence of third party use and
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`registrations. For the Board’s convenience, its attention is respectfully directed to Applicant’s
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`Brief at pp. 5-8, which summarized Applicant’s evidence and pp.11-14 which summarize the
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`applicable law.
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`Each of the quoted text listed in Applicant’s Brief at pp. 5-8 has come directly from the
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`cited web page or published applications/registrations. Applicant respectfully submits that the
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`parties who advertise and promote their services know how to define their services. Further,
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`each is either for legal services, or litigation support services, or for services involving the
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`storage, preservation and retention of ESI, just as Applicant’s.
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`In this regard, the Examiner’s argument that these third party uses are irrelevant because
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`they are either not law firms or not the same exact type of services as Applicant is incorrect. If,
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`as the Examiner contends, legal services is broadly construed, it must be broadly construed to
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`include all legal services provided by lawyers to clients, whether in a traditional law firm or not.
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`Further, that those services are classified in Class 45 or not is of no moment in determining
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`likelihood of confusion, or the relatedness of third party uses.
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`Finally, the Examiner’s argument that these third party uses and registrant’s may be
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`dismissed as they contain other wording is incorrect. As indicated above, the evidence reflects
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`that most of the marks, except LuminArc and ARC STONE add either generic, descriptive or
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`highly suggestive terms to the word ARC. See Applicant’s Main Brief, pp 16-18. Further, most
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`of the third parties - including LuminArc and ARC STONE – separate or emphasize “ARC”
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`apart from the remaining terms through separation, color, highlighting and the like. See, pages
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`24-92 of Applicant’s Request for Reconsideration, Docket No. 8.
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`7
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`Thus, Applicant has shown that at least thirteen different third parties actually use the
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`term ARC for legal services and litigation support services, which evidence is more than simply
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`applications. Under the applicable law, this evidence proves that in the real world, the term ARC
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`and its phonetic equivalents, is inherently and commercial weak in both the Registrant’s and
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`Applicant’s fields and thus entitled to a narrow scope of protection. See, e.g., Juice Generation
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`v. GS Enterprises, 794 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015); and Jack Wolfskin Ausrustring Fur Draussen
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`v. New Millenium Sport, 797 F.3d 1363 ( Fed. Cir. 2015)
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`As to Applicant’s existing registration for IRIS/ARC and the peaceful coexistence of the
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`Registrant’s mark with Applicant and the remaining third party registrants’ including, ARC
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`MAIL for according to its website an “archive email system that reduces discovery costs”, ARC
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`LOGICS for “computer software in the field of regulatory compliance” and ARC ADVANCED
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`REGULATORY COMPLIANCE for “legal consulting services”, the Examiner’s argument
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`misses the point. Applicant does not contend that these prior determinations legally preclude the
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`Board from finding confusion here. However, given the fact that Applicant is an IP law firm,
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`one must presume that if Applicant was bothered by the impact of these marks on its rights, it
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`would have opposed. That this did not happen and at least four other Examiners have allowed
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`co-existing applications and registrations in the field of litigation support or legal services,
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`strongly suggests that this Examiner’s unsupported contention that ARC is strong and that
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`confusion is likely, is simply incorrect. Applicant and Registrant have coexisted for three years.
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`As instructed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re E. I. du Pont de
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`Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973), the Board must a) take into
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`account all evidence when weighing the issue of likelihood of confusion; and b) concern itself
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`with the real probability of confusion as opposed to speculative or hypothetical possibilities.
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`8
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`In this instance, Applicant respectfully submits as it is based upon a misunderstanding of
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`the nature of Applicant’s services, the evidence of record and the applicable law and facts, the
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`refusal to register is incorrect.
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`Wherefore, as Applicant has argued consistently throughout this case, because of the
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`dissimilarity of the services provided by the parties, the dissimilarity of the customers, the
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`sophistication of the purchasers, the inherent and market weakness of the term ARC, the
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`dissimilarities between the marks at issue, as well as the peaceful coexistence of the parties – and
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`other third parties - for at least three years, the Examiner has not met its burden of proving that
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`confusion is likely. Accordingly, Applicant respectfully requests that the Board reverse the
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`refusal to register and approve Applicant’s mark for publication.
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`
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`Date: February 14, 2017
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`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/Carla C Calcagno/
`
`Attorney for Applicant
`Carla C Calcagno, Esq.
`CALCAGNO LAW PLLC
`2101 L Street NW
`Washington DC 20037
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`Legal services legal definition of legal services
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`Also found in: Dictionary, Medical, Encyclopedia, Wikipedia.
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`Related to legal services: Legal Services Corporation
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`legal services
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`n. the work performed by a lawyer for a client.
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`Copyright © 1981-2005 by Gerald N. Hill and Kathleen T. Hill. All Right reserved.
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`Ads by Google related to: legal services
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`LS legalshield.com v
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`Le9a| service
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`Affordable Legal Help is Available. Protect Your Family or Business Now
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`Affordable Legal Services - Over 40 Years Experience - 24/7/365 Coverage
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`How It Works
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`Small Business Plans
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`Personal Legal Plans
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`Why LegalShield?
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`SHOP N
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`FOR UP To 72 MONTHS
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`FOR WELL-QUALIFIED BUYERSm
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`date, and is not intended to be used in place of a visit, consultation, or advice of a legal, medical, or
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`any other professional.
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`http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.confllegal+services
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`2/14/2017
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