From: Richards, Leslie
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`Sent: 2/19/2014 11:13:31 AM
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`To: TTAB EFiling
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`CC:
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`Subject: U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 85713043 - LEARDI - N/A - Request for Reconsideration
`Denied - Return to TTAB - Message 5 of 12
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`Attachment Information:
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`Count: 1
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`Files: tina-4.jpg
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`httn:.‘imasscases.conrlcases.lsicl33-tr'39d.masst51.htrrl
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`lJ2i19.I'201-i. tEl:5?:3El AM
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`srnal print suggests. as thejudge reoomized. 'a clear and calculated efforlto Ilrrlher mislead tenants.“ It suggests to tenants that the"! signatires on the lease constitute a waiver ofthei
`right to habitable housing.
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`Paragraph five ot the stxrdard apartment lease. wlich lhejudge below characterized as "an unabashed attempt to arrrrl or render less rnearingfur rights gisrantreed by the State sanitary
`code, seems waned mm the same impermissible purpose which evidently mottrratecl paragraph eight. It provides that '[Ll]'rless Tenant shall notify Landlord to the contrary wrmrn two (2;
`days after taking possession of the prernises_ ltre same and the ecpiprrrent located therein said he corhchrsivelyprescvnedto he in good, tenantable order and condition in all respects.
`except as any aforesaid notice shal set forth‘ (emphasis added]. 30 even iftenanls are sufficienlly sophisticalred to Llrderstand ltrat paragraph eight is not an absolilre disclaimer ot ttm
`right to habitable housing. paragrqlh five r.I'rlaw‘|‘r.ly suggts ttlat this right is waived urless notification is made wihin two days attrerthe tenant moves "I1. Conseqrerltty. we conclude ttlat
`there was no error in thejudgee conclusion that paragraphs five and eight were deceptive and unconscionable, particularly when those provisions are viewed in the context ofthe
`Illndarnental nature of the irrlpled wrrrarrty ot habilabtlihr. [Note i"]
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`b. Iriiury Under 6. L. c. 93A. The defendants nerrt contend that. regardess cflhe alleged legality ot the lease. the plaintiffs have not suffered sufficient "irjrrr to support an award of
`damages under (3. L. c. BSA. Section 3. Note §] The rletendants argue that
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`Panelstt
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`even though ttre 1979 amendment to c. 93A deleted the requirement mat the plaintiffs show sonre loss of “money or pI'DD¢|'l}r,“ [Note 9] nonetheless the plaintiffs slil rrrust show some
`quanhm ot hanrr. The defendants further argue that the mere presence ot urlavrful. provisions in the lease does r1ot constiiirne an 'I'L'|rIy. where the landlord never atherrpted to enforce ttle
`Lrrhurfrl provisions. and where ttre plaintiffs lave conceded. for the pwposes ot this motion, that they have never even read the offensive clauses in the lease.
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`In Batdassari rr. PLI:l'rc F'n Trust, 369 Mass. 33 . 44-46 (1975), we held that a ptairrtiffs chims under c. 931! shorld be dismissed where the plairtiff deged “severe emotional listless.‘ and
`not the loss ot ‘money or property’ reqrired by the version of c. 931A then in effect. The Lengislahrre then amended the statute. proviiing a right ot action to "[a]ny person .
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`. who has been
`irirred by another persons use or employment of any method. act or practice declared to be trrlarrrfrl by section two or any rule or regrlation issued thereunder." The t9'.l'9 arrrerrchrent
`appears to have been, in put, a reaction to the restrictiueness ofour holding in Bddassari v. Pdalic Fin. Tmst, supra. See Gremey. (‘.onsLrner Protection Law. 65 Mass. L. Rev. 88. R9
`[19tt0}:Giitir1. Constrner Law, t9'.l'9 NI1. Survey Mass. Law 333, 351-353. In fact, we have already recognized that the changes in mtutrory lmglrage “srbstantialy broadened the class of
`persons who could maintain
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`actions r.I'rder G. L. 1:. 93%, Section 9.” Van Dylre v. St. Pail Fire 8: Marine Ins. Co., 383 Mass. 671 . BI5 (19831.
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`I’age1.'J9
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`“Statutes are to be construed in the light of the precrrislirrg comrnon and statutory law with reference to the nischiefprobatrly intended to be remedied.” Ferr.lo's Case. 331 Mass. 635 . 63?
`[1954}. We have noted that G. L. c. 93A is a "statute of broad 'rnpact." which forms a "comprehensive 5ll.I2E|fl'IiIlE and proceduat business and consumer protection package." Slaney v.
`Westwood Auto, Inc.. 366 Mass. 638 .693 (19?5]. “[T]echnicai‘lies are not to be read into the stature it such a way as to impede the acconrplishrrrerrt of sr.rbstar'rtiaIjrst'rce.' Bddassari v.
`Pdalic Fin. Tmst, supra at 41. We further note that terrarts are among those forwhnse benefitttre Consumer Protection Act was passed, Rice, New Private Remedies for Consuners: The
`Amendment of Chapter 93A, 54 Mass. L G. 30?. 313 (19691: see, e.g.. Woifherg rr. Hunter, 385 Mass. 390 [19El2}. and we have tracltiorraly been zrealous in protecting tenants who have
`shown that the": landlords, forwhatever reason, fail to frlfil the obigations imposed upon them by mtutre a1d decisional law. See. e.g.. Bemtan 8: Sons v. Jefferson, 379 Mass. 195 [19?9}.
`The question before us now is a close one, but "Ir ight ot a the circurrslzrrces we believe that the tenant class has been 'injured' within the meanirg of G. L c. 93.5..
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`The nesilt we reach heroes on or: interpretation ot the word "irI'p.rry.' “The interpretation at wel-defined words and phrases in the common law coniea over to stotrrlres“ as long as such
`irlerprelation "appear[s] fittirg and in the absence of evidence to indicate contrary intent." 2;! C. Sands. Sutherland Statutory Construction Section 50.03 (Jtlh ed. 1983). See Conley u. Hill.
`387 Mass. 11 . 15 [I962]. Accordng to the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 711.965), the term "irj.rry" denotes ‘the invasion ot any legally protected irtrerest ol'another." Moreover.
`“[t]1e most usurl form ofinjury is the initiation of some harn'r: but there may be an injury alhough no hanrr is done.‘ Remternent {Second} of Torts Section ? comrnent a (19651. As
`Prnlhsfinr hrl':l".nrmir'k tn: r-Jxnlairlsrt "VlflIatll1r-. turn dlrnmr: rII.rIrin=.r. as a hasis frr n 'u'I1rIIr=.rIl frr riwtlanefi is rnl has (I rtwnama. but “irirrin "