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`I hereby certify that a true copy of the following documents:
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`1.
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`2.
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`NOTICE OF APPEAL; and
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`COpy OF THE DECISION BY THE TTAB
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`has been sent via Express Mail and is being served upon the following office of record this
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`19th day of March, 2012, as follows:
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`VIA EXPRESS MAIL
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`Office of the Solicitor
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`United States Patent and Trademark Office
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`Mail Stop 8
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`Post Office Box 1450
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`Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
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`
`Gregg A. Paradise
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`ALVOGE 1'ls5P-021
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`
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`United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
`
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`ALVOGEN IP co. S.A.R.L.,
`
`
`Appellant,
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`v.
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`DAVID J. KAPPOS,
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`Appellee.
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`NOTICE OF APPEAL
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`Alvogen IP Co. S.a.r.l. hereby appeals the Court for review of the decision of the United
`States Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affinning the Examining Attorney's final refusal to
`register U.S. Trademark Application No. 77/939,659 for "A" LOGO issued on January 19, 2012,
`and entered on January 20,2012. The decision was received on January 20,2012.
`
`Gregg A. Paradise
`
`LERNER, DA VID, LITTENBERG,
`KRUMHOLZ & MENTLIK, LLP
`600 South Avenue West
`Westfield, New Jersey 07090
`Tel:
`908.654.5000
`Attorney for Appellant
`
`ALVOGE 1O.5P-021
`
`
`
`THIS OPINION
`IS NOT A PRECEDENT
`OF THE T.T.A.B.
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`Mailed:
`January 20 t 2012
`
`Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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`In re Alvogen IP Co. S.a.r.l.
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`Serial No. 77939659
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`Bruce H. Sales t Gregg A. Paradise and Robert B. Hander of
`Lerner David Littenberg Krumholz & Mentlik, LLP for Alvogen
`I P Co. S. a . r. 1.
`
`April Roach t Examining AttorneYt Law Office 115 (John
`Lincoski, Managing Attorney) .
`
`Before Rogers, Chief Administrative Trademark Judge, and
`Zervas and Lykos, Administrative Trademark Judges.
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`Opinion by Zervas, Administrative Trademark Judge:
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`On February 19, 2010, Alvogen IP Co. S.a.r.l.
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`("applicant") filed an application pursuant to Section l(b)
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`of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), for registration
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`on the Principal Register of the following mark,
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`
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`Serial No. 77939659
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`for International Class 5 goods identified as,
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`pharmaceutical preparations, namely, antibiotics,
`antidiabetics, antihypertensives,
`antidepressants, analgesics, anti-inflammatories,
`antivirals, and antiepileptics; transdermal
`patches for use in the treatment of infections,
`diabetes, hypertension, depression, pain,
`inflammation, and epilepsy; and contraceptive
`sponges,
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`and International Class 42 services identified as
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`"pharmaceutical research services." Applicant entered the
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`following description of the mark into the record:
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`"The
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`mark consists of a stylized A in a triangular-like shape."
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`The examining attorney finally refused registration
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`pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.
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`§ l052(d), in view of Registration No. 3127143 for the
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`following mark,
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`for International Class 5 goods identified as,
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`pharmaceutical preparations, namely, medicines
`for the treatment of obesity, tobacco withdrawal,
`and for prevention of cardiovascular diseases;
`dietetic foods adapted for medical use; beverages
`for medical use, namely, nutritionally fortified
`beverages and vitamin fortified beverages;
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`2
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`Serial No. 77939659
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`medicinal infusions in the nature of medicinal
`herbs .1
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`Applicant appealed the final refusal of its
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`application. Both applicant and the examining attorney
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`filed briefs. The refusal to register is affirmed.
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`Evidentiary Issues
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`Applicant has included an image of a mobius triangle
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`in its brief, which was not made of record prior to the
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`filing of the appeal. The examining attorney's objection
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`to the image is well taken -
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`the record should be complete
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`prior to the filing of an appeal. Trademark Rule 2.142(d).
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`We have not considered the image of the mobius triangle in
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`applicant's brief or the discussion regarding the image.
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`In addition, even though the examining attorney
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`objected to the inclusion of the image of the mobius
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`triangle in applicant's brief, applicant included pages
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`from www.new.myfonts.com with its reply brief. As these
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`1 The registration includes the following description of the
`mark, ftthe mark comprises a mobius triangle shape"; the following
`color claim, "the color(s) yellow, orange and red is/are claimed
`as a feature of the mark"; and the following color location
`statement, "different shades of the color yellow appear mostly in
`the upper portion of the triangle design, different shades of the
`color orange appear mostly on the left portion of the triangle
`design, and different shades of the color red appear mostly on
`the right portion of the triangle design."
`
`Applicant states that the cited registration is a three
`dimensional mark. The Office, however, does not consider the
`cited mark to be in three dimensions. See TMEP § 807.10 (8th ed.
`2011) .
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`3
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`Serial No. 77939659
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`pages too were not of record prior to the filing of
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`applicant's appeal, their submission is untimely and they
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`have not been given any further consideration.
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`Id. The
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`"excerpts" from these webpages duplicated in the reply
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`brief also have not been given any further consideration.
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`Likelihood of Confusion
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`Our determination of the issue of likelihood of
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`confusion is based on an analysis of all of the probative
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`facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors set
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`forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d
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`1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). See also, In re Majestic
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`Distilling Co., Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2003).
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`In any likelihood of confusion analysis,
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`however, two key, although not exclusive, considerations
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`are the similarities between the marks and the similarities
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`between the goods and/or services. See Federated Foods,
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`Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24
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`(CCPA 1976). See also, In re Dixie Restaurants Inc., 105
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`F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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`Turning first to applicant's and registrant's goods,
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`we find applicant's goods to be identical-in-part to
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`registrant's goods. Specifically, registrant's
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`identification of goods includes pharmaceutical
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`preparations, namely, medicines for the prevention of
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`4
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`Serial No. 77939659
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`cardiovascular diseases; and applicant's identification of
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`goods includes pharmaceutical preparations, namely,
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`antihypertensives and anti-inflammatories.
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`As for the remaining goods and services, the evidence
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`submitted by the examining attorney establishes that
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`(i) registrant's and applicant's goods, and (ii)
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`registrant's goods and applicant's services, are
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`commercially related to one another. The examining
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`attorney submitted numerous third-party registrations which
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`support her contention that, on the one hand, the involved
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`goods, and, on the other hand, the registrant's goods and
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`applicant's services, are of a kind that may emanate from a
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`single source under a single mark. Third-party
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`registrations which individually cover a number of
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`different items and which are based on use in commerce are
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`not evidence of commercial use of the marks shown therein,
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`or that the public is familiar with them, but have some
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`probative value to the extent they suggest that the listed
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`goods emanate from a single source. See In re Albert
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`Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783 (TTAB 1993); and In re
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`Mucky Duck Mustard Co., Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1467 (TTAB 1988).
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`In addition, the examining attorney submitted printouts
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`from the websites of five pharmaceutical manufacturers (for
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`example, Pfizer, Lilly) that offer (i) one or more of
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`5
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`Serial No. 77939659
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`applicant's and registrant's goods, and (ii) one or more of
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`registrant's goods and research services. The probative
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`value of the examining attorney's Internet evidence is
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`reduced, however, because the common marks for the goods,
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`and the goods and research services, are house marks. See
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`In re HerbalScience Group LLC, 96 USPQ2d 1321, 1324 n.3
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`(TTAB 2010).
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`It has not escaped our attention that applicant has
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`not contested the examining attorney's assertion that the
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`International Class 5 goods of the application are related
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`to the goods of the cited registration, and in fact did not
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`even address the issue of the similarity of the goods in
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`its main brief.
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`In its reply, applicant stated, "[t]o be
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`clear, Applicant does not assert that confusion is unlikely
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`due to the marks being directed to different goods or
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`consumers, but rather, because the overall connotations and
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`commercial impression of the applied-for mark and the [mark
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`in the] cited registration are truly distinct." Reply at
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`7. With regard to the similarity of registrant's goods and
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`applicant's services, applicant has not discussed the issue
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`in its briefs, effectively conceding the issue.
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`Thus, based on the record before us, and applicant's
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`concession of the issue, we conclude that applicant's goods
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`and services are closely related in a commercial sense to
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`6
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`Serial No. 77939659
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`the cited registrant's goods. We therefore find the
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`du Pont factor regarding the similarity of the goods, and
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`the goods and services, to weigh in favor of a finding of
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`likelihood of confusion.
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`Next, we consider the trade channels and classes of
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`consumers, and begin with those trade channels and classes
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`of consumers for applicant's and registrant's respective
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`goods. Because the goods are in part identical, and
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`because the identifications of goods lack any restrictions
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`as to channels of trade and classes of consumers, we must
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`presume that the channels of trade and classes of
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`purchasers for the goods overlap with one another. Hewlett
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`Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62
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`USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. eire 2002) ("[A]bsent restrictions
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`in the application and registration, goods and services are
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`presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the
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`same class of purchasersH)i In re Smith and Mehaffey, 31
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`USPQ2d 1531, 1532 (TTAB 1994)
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`("Because the goods are
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`legally identical, they must be presumed to travel in the
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`same channels of trade, and be sold to the same class of
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`purchasers. H) .
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`There is no information in the record regarding the
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`trade channels and classes of purchasers for registrant's
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`goods and applicant's services. The du Pont factor
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`7
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`Serial No. 77939659
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`regarding trade channels and classes of purchasers for
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`registrant's goods and applicant's services is therefore
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`neutral.
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`We now turn to the du Pont factor regarding the
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`similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their
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`entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and
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`commercial impression. See Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve
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`Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73
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`USPQ2d 1689 (Fed. Cir. 2005), quoting du Pont, 177 USPQ at
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`567).
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`In a particular case, anyone of these means of
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`comparison may be critical in finding the marks to be
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`similar.
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`In re White Swan Ltd., 9 USPQ2d 1534 (TTAB 1988);
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`In re Lamson oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041 (TTAB 1988).
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`In
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`addition, the test is not whether the marks can be
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`distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison,
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`but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in
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`terms of their overall commercial impression so that
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`confusion as to the source of the goods offered under the
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`respective marks is likely to result. San Fernando
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`Electric Mfg. CO. V. JFD Electronics Components Corp., 565
`
`F.2d 683, 196 USPQ 1
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`(CCPA 1977); Spoons Restaurants Inc.
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`V. Morrison Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1735 (TTAB 1991), aff'd
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`unpublished, No. 92-1086 (Fed. Cir. June 5, 1992).
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`Further, because the goods are in part identical, the
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`8
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`serial No. 77939659
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`degree of similarity necessary to find a likelihood of
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`confusion for the goods need not be as great as where there
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`is a recognizable disparity between the goods. Century 21
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`Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874,
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`23 USPQ2d 1698 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re SL&E Training Stable
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`Inc., 88 USPQ2d 1216 (TTAB 2008).
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`Applicant states that "the question on appeal is not
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`merely how the marks appear, but how they will be perceived
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`and recalled in the mind of the average consumer; namely,
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`one as [a] letter, and the other as a shape." Brief at 3
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`(emphasis in original). According to applicant, consumers
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`will perceive its mark as the letter "A" because of "the
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`gap in its right side, [and] the thickening and thinning of
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`the line which evokes the stroke of a writing implement .'1
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`Brief at 4-5. Registrant's mark, however I "[q]ue to its
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`closed circumference, inclined orientation, three
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`dimensional shading, and multiple colors ... will
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`overwhelmingly be perceived as a design rather than a
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`letter." Brief at 5.
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`Applicant's mark is so highly stylized that it cannot
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`be presumed that it would be perceived as a letter "Alii it
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`would take some study to discern a lower-case letter \\A" in
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`applicant's mark. At best, applicant's mark is in the grey
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`area between a pure design mark which cannot be vocalized
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`9
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`Serial No. 77939659
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`and a mark which would readily be identified as a letter.
`
`Cf., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Great Plains Bag Co., 614
`
`F.2d 757, 204 USPQ 697, 699
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`(CCPA 1980) ("It must be
`
`remembered that [the] trademark consists of highly stylized
`
`letters and is therefore in the gray region between pure
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`design marks which cannot be vocalized and word marks which
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`are clearly intended to be."). Because applicant has not
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`introduced any evidence at all into the record, we do not
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`have the benefit of any information that would bear on how
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`applicant promotes recognition of its mark or on consumer
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`perceptions of the mark, and applicant's contention that
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`its mark would be perceived as a lower case "A" is mere
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`argument. Hence, as was the case in In re Burndy Corp.,
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`300 F.2d 938, 133 USPQ 196, 197 (CCPA 1962), we must decide
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`this case based on the visual similarity of the marks.
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`Id.
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`("In our view, this case must be decided primarily on the
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`basis of visual similarity of the marks. The marks are not
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`word marks and are not capable of being spoken. They are
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`design marks
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`although each is based on a capital letter
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`'B' .... "). We consider applicant's mark as a pure design
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`mark rather than simply a stylized display of a letter
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`mark.
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`When we visually compare the marks, there are, of
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`course, certain specific differences between applicant'S
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`10
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`Serial No. 77939659
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`and registrant's marks which are clearly discernible upon a
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`side-by-side comparison of the marks. However, purchasers
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`do not always have the opportunity to compare marks on a
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`side-by-side basis, and thus the test which we must apply
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`in determining likelihood of confusion is not whether the
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`marks are distinguishable when compared side-by-side, but
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`rather whether they so resemble one another as to be likely
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`to cause confusion. On balance, we find the marks to be
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`more similar than dissimilar. This, of course is a
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`subjective determination, and hence we need not comment on
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`the specific similarities and differences between the marks
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`asserted in the briefs. See id. at 197 ("Since this is, of
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`necessity, a subjective opinion, no amount of discussion of
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`the matter can add to the statement of our conclusion which
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`is predicated on the apparent visual differences in the
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`marks.H). See also, The American Sunbathing Ass'n, Inc. v.
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`American Health Alliance, 157 USPQ 586, 589 (TTAB 1968)
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`("Each of the parties has made a side-by-side analysis of
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`the marks in question listing, in support of its position,
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`features of similarity or features of dissimilarity. This
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`method of analysis or dissection of marks is improper in
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`trademark proceedings because the commercial impression of
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`a mark is generally created or engendered by the mark as a
`
`whole .... "). We therefore resolve the du Pan t factor
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`11
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`Serial No. 779)9659
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`regarding the similarity of the marks against applicant, in
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`the context of the goods, and the goods and services.
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`We have found applicant's and registrant's goods,
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`trade channels and classes of purchasers to be in part
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`identical, and applicant's services and registrant's goods
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`to be related.
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`In addition, we have found the marks to be
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`similar. There is no evidence of any uses of marks similar
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`to registrant's mark, thus we consider registrant's mark to
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`be a strong design mark. We therefore find that
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`applicant's mark for the goods and services recited in its
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`application is likely to cause confusion with registrant's
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`mark-for the goods recited in its registration. Our
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`conclusion is consistent with prior decisions which state
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`that, where the marks are used on pharmaceuticals and
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`confusion as to source can lead to serious consequences, it
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`is extremely important to avoid that which will cause
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`confusion. See Alfacell Corp. v. Anticancer Inc., 71
`
`USPQ2d 1301 (TTAB 2004), citing Glenwood Laboratories, Inc.
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`v. American Home Products Corp., 455 F.2d 1384, 173 USPQ 19
`
`(CCPA 1972); Blansett Pharmacal Co. Inc. v. Carmrick
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`Laboratories Inc., 25 USPQ2d 1473 (TTAB 1992); Schering
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`Corp. v. Alza Corp., 207 USPQ 504 (TTAB 1980); and American
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`Home Products Corp. v. USV Pharmaceutical Corp., 190 USPQ
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`357 (TTAB 1976).
`
`12
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`
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`Serial No. 77939659
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`DECISION: The refusal to register under Section 2(d)
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`of the Trademark Act both the International Class 5 goods
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`and the International Class 42 services is affirmed.
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`13