■V>v
`
`22 = 5220 ORIGINAL
`
`No: 22-
`
`IN THE
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`PALANI KARUPAIYAN; Petitioner
`v.
`
`i
`
`19 7Z2
`JiEeSSco{ggggC
`
`i
`I
`
`JATINDER SINGH;
`NICK JOE; individually and in his official capacity as employer of
`Jatinder Singh;
`NICK DOE'S TRANSPORTATION BUSINESS;
`KHALID MAHMOOD; JOHN DOE, individually and in his official
`capacity as employer of Khalid Mahmood;
`JOHN DOE'S LIMO BUSINESS
`
`-—Respondents
`
`PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`to the United States Court of Appeals
`for the Third Circuit (21-3163 & 22-1159 Consolidated)
`
`Palani Karupaiyan.
`Pro se, Petitioner,
`Email: nalanikav@ginail.com
`212-470-2048(m)
`
`P~-SiVED
`22
`
`t
`
`1
`
`

`

`I QUESTIONS PRESENTED
`1) USCA failed to vacate the Sua sponte order of dismissing the
`complaint is error
`2) Lower Courts dismissing/denying petitioner’s Intellectual
`property damage claim(s) is error.
`3) Lower Courts dismissing/denying the color/ ethnical
`discrimination under 42 U.S.C § 1988 (vindication of Civ.
`rights), Civil Rights Act of 1866 is error.
`4) Lower Court should not deny the Petitioner’s
`property damages is error.
`5) Lower Court denying claims under 26 U.S.C § 7201 -
`Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 18 U.S.C § 1956 -
`Laundering of monetary instruments, Money
`Laundering Control Act of 1986, Insurance fraud and
`unemployment fraud is error.
`6) Lower Court fail to apply Rule 8(f) “All pleadings shall be so
`construed as to do substantial justice” when applying Federal
`law(s) or state law(s) or both together.
`
`II PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
`All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.
`
`Ill RELATED CASE(S)
`None
`
`

`

`] l i
`
`..ll
`fiii
`iv
`
`IV TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Contents
`I QUESTIONS PRESENTED..........
`II PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
`III RELATED CASE(S)...:..............
`IV TABLE OF CONTENTS............
`V INDEX OF APPENDIX............
`VI TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`1
`1
`1
`...2
`3 .
`5
`8
`11
`
`VII PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`VIII OPINIONS BELOW
`IX JURISDICTION
`X CONSTITUTIONAL AND SATATUTORY PROVI SIONS INVOLVED
`XI STATEMENT OF THE CASE
`Dist Court ruling.
`USCA-3’s Ruling...............................................
`XII REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
`1) USCA failed to vacate the Sua sponte order of dismissing the complaint is
`error..................................................................................................................... ,.......................
`11
`2) Lower Courts dismissing/denying petitioner’s Intellectual property damage
`claim(s) is error..........................................................................................................................
`11
`3) Lower Courts dismissing/denying the color/ ethnical discrimination under
`42 U.S.C § 1988 (vindication of Civ. rights), Civil Rights Act of 1866 is error...... 13
`i) Petitioner’s color/ethnicity violation should survive Under 42 U.S.C § 1981
`and 42 U.S.C § 1982.............................................................. ..........................................
`ii) New Jersey Law against discrimination (NJLAD) should survive with
`Section 1988........................................................................................................ .............
`15
`4) Lower Court should not deny the Petitioner’s property damages is error... 18
`i) Petitioner’s property damage(s) claims should survive under Section
`1982.
`18
`Properties damages and Skin Injury claims should survive under State
`ii)
`Law (Supplemental jurisdiction) when one or more federal claims survived. 18
`5) Lower Court denying claims under 26 U.S.C § 7201 - Attempt to evade or
`defeat tax, 18 U.S.C § 1956 - Laundering of monetary instruments, Money
`
`15
`
`u
`
`t
`
`t
`
`

`

`Laundering Control Act of 1986, Insurance fraud and unemployment fraud is
`error..............................................................................................................................................
`19
`1)
`26 U;S. Code § 7201 - Attempt to evade or defeat tax/payroli tax evasion should survive with
`21
`False Claims Act and/or NJ False Claim Act, Section 1988.....................................................
`2) 18 U.S. Code § 1956 - Laundering of monetary instruments, Money
`Laundering Control Act of 1986 should survive with False Claims Act, Section
`1988
`21
`.)
`ii) Insurance Fraud claim and unemployment fraud should survive under .
`Section 1988, False Claim act, NJ-False Claim act, New Jersey Insurance
`Fraud Prevention Act
`22
`6) Lower Court fail to apply Rule 8(f) “All pleadings shall be so construed as to
`do substantial justice” when applying Federal law(s) or state law(s) or both
`together.............
`XIII CONCLUSION...;
`
`23
`24
`
`V INDEX OF APPENDIX
`
`a) USCA 3rd Circuit Opinion
`
`b) USCA 3rd Circuit's entry of Judgment
`
`c) Dist Court Sua Sponte dismissal order
`
`d) Order denied for SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING
`
`e) Order denying for amend the rehearing
`
`f) Petitioner's Skin Injury exhibit
`
`la
`
`,4a
`
`6a
`
`10a
`
`12a
`
`13a
`
`in
`
`

`

`17
`23
`6,14
`10 :
`6
`
`9,11
`23
`24
`11
`
`67
`
`11
`5
`18
`15
`16, 24
`16, 24
`15
`
`VI TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`Brazier v. Cherry. 293F. 2d 401...............................................................................................
`'Conley v. Gibson. 355 US 41 - Supreme Court 1957.............................................................
`Deramus v. Shapiro Schwartz. LLP, No. 19-4683, 2020........................................................
`Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr.. 850 F.3d 545, 567 (3d Cir. 2017)..........................................
`Dubai Islamic Bank v. Citibank, N.A., 126 F. Supp. 2d 659, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)...........
`Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs. v. Grace Consultins. Inc.. 307 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir.
`2002)..........................................................................................................................................
`Estelle. 429 U.S., at 106, 97 S.Ct. 285......................................................................................
`FMC Stores Co. u. Boroush of Morris Plains. 495 A. 2d 1313 - NJ: Supreme Court 1985
`Fries vr Barnes. 618 F. 2d 988, 989 (2d Cir.1980)...................................................................
`McRae v. Norton. No. 12-1537,2012.......................................................................................
`Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).............................................................................
`Salahuddin u. Cuomo. 861 F. 2d 40 - Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit 1988........................
`Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012)......................................................
`Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park. Inc.. 396 US 229.................................................................
`Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 US 229 - Supreme Court 1969.........................
`Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks. 281 U. S. 548, 569-570.......................................
`Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rissby. 241 U. S. 33, 39................................................................
`Tillman, supra, at 439-440, 93 S.Ct. 1090..............................................................................
`Statutes
`17 U.S.C. § 102(a)....................... ..................
`17U.S.C. § 501(b)..........................................
`17 U.S.C. §§ 201(a)........................................
`18 U.S.C.§ 1956........... .................................
`26 U.S.C. § 7201...........................................
`28 U.S.C. § 1367............................................
`28 U.S.C. § 1915...........................................
`28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)........................
`28 U.S.C. § 7201...........................................
`28 U.S.C. § 7401...........................................
`42 U.S.C § 1981.................... .......................
`42 U.S.C. § 1983...........................................
`42 U.S.C. $ 1988...........................................
`Civil Rights Act of 1866...............................
`Copyright Act of 1976..................................
`Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and amended
`Judiciary Act of 1789...................................
`Money Laundering Control Act of 1986....
`
`12
`7
`12
`9,19
`5, 8,19, 23
`10
`
`7566
`
`15
`9
`passim
`.3, 8,15
`4, 7,12
`10
`4
`5,6
`
`IV
`
`

`

`New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice § 2C:21-4.6...........
`New Jersey Insurance Fraud Prevention Act..................
`New Jersey Law against discrimination (NJLAD)
`New Jersey Tort Act............................................................
`Rules
`Rule 12(b)(6)
`Rule 8(f).....
`
`4
`22
`15
`3
`
`5
`23, 26,
`
`v
`
`

`

`VII PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`Petitioner respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review
`
`the oninion/iudgment/order below.
`
`VIII OPINIONS BELOW
`(a) The Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals 3rd Cir. appears
`
`at Appendix: A (la) to the petition. Date Mar 01 2022. Docket- 21-3163
`
`Present: Hon. JORDAN, RESTREPO, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges.
`
`(b) USCA 3r Cir. Order Denying Rehearing Penal and En Banc appears
`
`at Appendix: D (10a). Judge Scirica’s vote is limited to panel rehearing
`
`only. Dated Jul 6 2022.
`
`(c) US Dist Court Letter order dated Nov 12 2021 (Appendix: C, 6a)
`
`Hon Esther Salas is Dist Judge and Hon Edward S. Kiel, U.S.M. J.
`
`IX JURISDICTION.
`The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my
`
`case was Mar 01 2022 at Appendix: A Pet.Ayy-la
`
`A timely filed petition for rehearing and en Banc which was
`
`denied by the United States Court of Appeals on Jul 6 2022, and a copy
`
`of the Order denying rehearing appears at Appendix: D. Pet.App-lOa.
`
`The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §
`
`1254(1).
`
`l
`
`

`

`X CONSTITUTIONAL AND SATATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
`
`1) New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD)
`2) 42 U.S.C. § 1988( Section 1988)
`3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983
`4) 42 U.S.C. § 1981
`5) Civil Rights Act of 1866
`
`6) 26 U.S.C. § 7201.
`7) 18 U.S.C. § 1956
`8) 18 U.S.C. § 286 and §287
`9) 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 - 3733 - false claim act.
`
`10) The Copyright Act of 1976
`11) 17 U. S. C. §§ 201(a)
`12) 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
`
`13)28 U.S.C. § 1367 - Supplemental jurisdiction.
`
`2
`
`

`

`XI STATEMENT OF THE CASE
`
`Pro se plaintiff Palani Karupaiyan (“Plaintiff’) initiated the
`
`instant action against defendants Jatinder Singh, Khalid Mahmood,
`
`Nick Doe, Nick Doe’s Transportation Business, Mahmood’s employer
`
`John Doe, and John Doe’s Limo Business (collectively, “Defendants”).
`
`(D.E. No. 1 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”)!). In connection with his
`
`Complaint, Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed in forma
`
`pauperis (“IFP”). (D.E. No. 4). Plaintiff asserts nine causes of actions
`
`against Defendants. In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Singh, Mahmood,
`
`and Nick Doe called Plaintiff a “black amazon man” or a “black Indian,”
`
`in violation of “New Jersey Law against Discrimination,” 42 U.S.C. §
`
`1988. and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. (Compl. at 11). In Count II,
`
`Plaintiff alleges that Singh pushed and injured Plaintiff, which violated
`
`the “New Jersey Tort Act.” (Id.). In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that
`
`Singh, Mahmood, and Nick Doe damaged Plaintiffs personal
`
`belongings, such as his laptop, a monitor, and a “Sportwagon car,” in
`
`violation of New Jersey’s “Property Damage Statute.” (Id. at 12). In
`
`3
`
`

`

`Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that Nick Doe drove his car over Plaintiffs
`
`laptop and damaged the computer program on the laptop, which
`
`constituted a violation of the Copyright Act of 1976. {Id.
`
`at 12-13). In Count V, Plaintiff alleges that Singh, Mahmood, and Nick
`
`Doe “said bad words about” Plaintiffs appeals in another litigation,
`
`which constituted “contempt of Court” and a violation of the Judiciary
`
`Act of 1789. {Id. at 13). In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Mahmood
`
`committed further violation of the Judiciary Act of 1789 by disallowing
`
`Plaintiff to charge his laptop, which Plaintiff used for his appeals. {Id.).
`
`In Count VI, Plaintiff alleges that Singh used Nick Doe’s car to avoid
`
`paying high car insurance that Singh would have paid because of his
`
`history of drunk driving. {Id. at 7). Plaintiff further alleges that Nick
`
`Doe’s Transportation Business bought car insurance for a few trucks
`
`but used the insurance policy to cover all its trucks. {Id. at 7 & 14). The
`
`Complaint asserts that the alleged conduct constituted insurance fraud
`
`in violation of New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice § 2C:21-4.6. {Id. at
`
`14). In Count VII, Plaintiff alleges that Nick Doe, Nick Doe’s
`
`Transportation Business, Mahmood’s employer John Doe, and John
`
`Doe’s Limo Business all committed tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C.
`
`4
`
`

`

`§ 7201. (Id.). In Count VIII, Plaintiff alleges that Singh and Mahmood
`
`fraudulently obtained unemployment benefits, which they transferred
`
`to India and Pakistan, respectively, in violation of the Money
`
`Laundering Control Act of 1986. (Id. at 15). Finally, Plaintiff apparently
`
`alleges that Mahmood’s claims of unemployment benefits constituted
`
`unemployment fraud.2 (See id.). As relief, Plaintiff seeks various
`
`monetary damages, injunctive relief, and jail time for Singh, Mahmood,
`
`and Nick Doe. (See id. at 17).
`
`Dist Court ruling
`1) Forma pauperis
`“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a
`
`claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for
`
`dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
`
`12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012).
`
`2) Federal laws
`The federal laws at issue are: (i) 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and the Civil
`
`Rights Act of 1866 (Count I), (ii) the Copyright Act of 1976 (Count IV),
`
`(iii) the Judiciary Act of 1789 (Count V), (iv) 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (Count
`
`VII), and (v) the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (Count
`
`VIII).Among them, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 7201, and the Money
`
`5
`
`

`

`Laundering Control Act ofl986 do not create a private cause of action.
`
`See McRae v. Norton, No. 12-1537, 2012 WL1268295, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
`
`Apr. 13, 2012) (dismissing the plaintiffs claim because “there is no
`
`private right of action to recover taxes on behalf of the government”)
`
`(citing 28 U.S.C. § 7401); Deramus u. Shapiro Schwartz. LLP, No. 19-
`
`4683, 2020 WL 3494558, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 2, 2020), report and
`
`recommendation adopted, No. 19-4683, 2020 WL 3491960 (S.D. Tex.
`
`June 26, 2020) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 does not create a private
`
`cause of action or confer federal jurisdiction); Dubai Islamic Bank v.
`
`Citibank, N.A., 126 F. Supp. 2d 659, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that
`
`no private cause of action exists under the Money Laundering Control
`
`Act of 1986).
`
`Thus, Plaintiff cannot assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 28
`
`U.S.C. § 7201, or the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986; nor can he
`
`raise “a claim of contempt” under the Judiciary Act of 1789.
`
`Accordingly, Counts V, VII, and VIII are dismissed with prejudice.
`
`Count I is also dismissed with prejudice insofar as it alleges a claim
`
`under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. That is, Plaintiff is barred from raising these
`
`claims again
`
`6
`
`

`

`To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the
`
`defendant was “a person acting under color of state law” and (2) the
`
`defendant’s conduct “deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or
`
`immunity guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”
`
`Parratt v. Taylor. 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). Here, Plaintiff alleges that
`
`Singh, Mahmood, and Nick Doe called Plaintiff a “black amazon man”
`
`or a*“black Indian.” (Compl. at 11). There is no allegation on whether
`
`the defendants acted under color of state law or whether Plaintiff was
`
`deprived of any rights protected by the Constitution or under federal
`
`law.
`
`Plaintiffs claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 thus falls short of
`
`meeting the pleading standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
`
`the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
`
`3) Dismissal of the intellectual (copyright) property damage
`
`Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support a claim under the
`
`Copyright Act of 1976, which provides for a cause of action for copyright
`
`infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b).
`
`4) Without prejudice
`Federal claims
`
`7
`
`

`

`Count I, insofar as it alleges a claim under the Civil Rights Act of ‘
`
`1866, and Count IV are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state
`
`a claim
`
`State Law Claims
`
`Count I, insofar as it alleges a claim under the New Jersey
`
`Law against Discrimination, and Counts II, III, and IV are dismissed
`
`without prejudice the Court will dismiss without prejudice Count IX,
`
`under which Plaintiff alleges that Mahmood committed unemployment
`
`fraud but fails to specify whether the claim is asserted under federal
`
`law or state law.
`
`USCA-3’s Ruling
`
`USCA granted the forma pauperis (IFP) that was filed in C.A. No. 22-
`
`1159.
`
`We [USCA3] exercise jurisdiction over Appellant’s challenge to the
`
`order dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim and declining
`
`to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental state law claims.
`
`The District Court’s decision is summarily affirmed because
`
`no
`
`substantial question is presented on appeal. 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4;3d Cir.
`
`I.O.P. 10.6. In particular, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 26 U.S.C. § 7201, and 18
`
`8
`
`

`

`U.S.C.§ 1956, do not by themselves provide for private causes of action.
`
`See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 702 (1973) (stating that §
`
`1988 “does not enjoy the independent stature of an ‘Act of Congress
`
`providing for the protection of civil rights,’ [but] [rjather, as is plain on
`
`the face of the statute, the section is intended to complement the
`
`various acts which do create federal causes of action for the violation of
`
`federal civil rights”): Lee v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 859 F.3d 74, 77
`
`(D.C. Cir. 2017) (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has ‘rarely implied a
`
`private right of action under a criminal statute’” (quoting Chrysler Corp.
`
`v.
`
`Brown. 441 U.S. 281, 316(1979))). Moreover, Appellant did not allege
`
`that any of the defendants acted under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C.
`
`§ 1983; Great W. Minins & Mineral Co., 615F.3d 159, 175-76 (3d Cir.
`
`2010) (recognizing that to obtain relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
`
`show, inter alia, that the defendant acted under color of state law).
`
`Appellant’s allegation that a computer program was damaged
`
`when of the defendants drove a car over his laptop failed to state a
`
`claim for copyright infringement. Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs. v.
`
`Grace Consulting. Inc.. 307F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining
`
`that to state a copyright infringement claim, “a plaintiff must establish:
`
`

`

`(1) ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) unauthorized copying of
`
`original elements of the plaintiffs work”).
`
`And the District Court acted within its discretion in declining to
`
`exercise jurisdiction over Appellant’s supplemental state law claims.
`
`See Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr.. 850 F.3d 545, 567 (3d Cir. 2017) (“A
`
`Court may [decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28
`
`U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)] when it dismisses all claims over which it has
`
`original jurisdiction.”).
`
`In USCA3, petitioner filed motion to amend the rehearing with
`
`following additional paragraph
`
`Avoid garnishment the defendants) did money laundering to India
`
`and purchased the properties in India. So this case, plaintiffs’ claims
`
`against the defendants and 26 U.S.C. § 720(Attempt to evade or defeat
`
`tax), 18 U.S. Code § 1956 (Laundering of monetary instruments) should
`
`have co-relation and provide private cause of action against the
`
`defendants.
`
`Both plaintiff and defendants from India, plaintiff is entitle to
`
`recover
`
`the damages from the defendants and. their assets/properties in India
`
`which was acquired/purchased by money laundering under Hindu
`
`Succession Act, 1956 and amended.
`
`USCA3 ,denied appellants motion to amend the rehearing. (App.l2a)
`
`10
`
`

`

`XII REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
`1) USCA failed to vacate the Sua sponte order of
`dismissing the complaint is error.
`Dist Court dismissed the complaint by Sua Sponte, ECF-7.
`
`In Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F. 2d 40- USCA-2 1988 @43
`
`“this Court [USCA 2nd Cir] has repeatedly cautioned against Sua Sponte
`dismissals of pro se civil rights complaints prior to requiring the
`defendants to answer. See, e.g., Bayron v. Trudeau, 702 F.2d 43, 45 (2d
`Cir. 1983); Fries v. Barnes. 618 F.2d 988, 989 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing cases).”
`For any and all reasons stated above, appellant plaintiff pray
`
`this Court to vacate the Sua sponte dismissal of complaint ECF-7,
`
`Arm.6a. App.la and remand the case to Dist Court for further
`
`trial.
`
`2) Lower Courts dismissing/denying petitioner’s
`Intellectual property damage claim(s) is error.
`Dist Court and USCA decided against petitioner intellectual property
`
`damage based on copyright infringement claim under Dun & Bradstreet
`
`Software Servs. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir.
`
`2002) and its 4 factor analysis.
`
`Petitioner’s claim is not copyright infringement. Count IV clearly said
`
`Intellectual Property damage. Petitioner’s computer programs are his
`
`intellectual property under
`
`li
`
`

`

`, i) The Copyright Act of 1976 (Act 1976)
`
`ii)
`17 U. S. C. §§ 201(a), Initial Ownership (Ownership of copyright)
`“Reid @ 737, The Copyright Act of 1976provides that copyright
`ownership vests initially in the author or authors of the work."
`17 U. S. C.§201(a). As a general rule, the author is the party who
`actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea
`into a
`fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection. §
`102".
`Hi)
`
`17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
`Computer programs are entitled to copyright protection as "literary
`
`works. Whelan Assoc, v. Maslow Dental, Lab 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d
`
`Cir.1986)
`
`Petitioner s claims should be analyzed under Community for Creative
`
`Non-Violence v. Beid, 490 US 730 - Supreme Court 1989 (Reid) where
`
`No copyright infringement
`
`was
`
`disputed, the copyright ownership
`
`was
`
`disputed.
`
`Petitioner is the only contributor to the computer program which is
`
`re-usable for day to day need in his Software consulting services.
`
`Because of damage to the USB disk, intellectual property is
`
`lost/damaged, irreparable lost and for that loss plaintiff claimed
`
`money.
`
`Under Reid standard, petitioner’s claim for Intellectual property
`
`damages which should not be denied as copyright infringement.
`
`12
`
`

`

`If not under Reid, Practically when USB drive/disc is $25 value and
`
`USB drive contents computer programs/codes value many million
`
`dollar, plaintiff should not be told to go small claim Court for $25 and
`
`computer programs/codes lost has no value.
`
`See complaint® 31
`
`31. Without my permission Jatinder took my picture, recorded video and
`showed to Nick and his employee drivers me Im black amazon man because
`I have long hair, and laughed and said go back to amazon, kill you. They used
`this photos, videos to entertain the drivers and promoted their business.
`32. Jatinder or nick did not pay me any penny for my video or photo
`appearance.
`33. Jatinder and nick called me south Indian super star.
`From the above fact, defendants recorded video/ took photo(s)
`without permission or contract, promoted their business and
`benefited by the petitioner’s images/photos and did not pay any penny
`to petitioner is copyright violation.
`Now federal claim endure/survive by any and all from Copyright Act
`
`of 1976, 17 U. S. C. §§ 201(a), and 17 U. S. C. §102(a). As well
`
`Supplemental Jurisdiction State claims should not be dismissed.
`
`3) Lower Courts dismissing/denying the color/
`ethnical discrimination under 42 U.S.C § 1988
`(vindication of Civ. rights), Civil Rights Act of 1866
`is error.
`
`Supporting fact(s) from complaint.
`Without my permission Jatinder took my picture, recorded video and showed
`13
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`

`

`to Nick and his employee drivers me Im black amazon man because I have long
`
`hair, and laughed and said go back to amazon, kill you. They used this photos,
`
`videos to entertain the drivers and promoted their business. Complaint (compl) @31
`
`'Khalid also said you black Indian go back to India, kill you and he did not allow me
`
`to charge my laptop said bad words about appeal. compl@60-62, 102-103.
`
`These are violation of federal law and state law (NJLAD).
`
`Dist Court ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 does not create a private cause of
`
`action or confer federal jurisdiction (Deramus v. Shapiro Schwartz.
`
`LLP, No. 19-4683, 2020 WL 3494558, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 2, 2020).
`
`To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the
`
`defendant was “a person acting under color of state law” and (2) the
`
`defendant’s conduct “deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or
`
`immunity guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”
`
`Parratt v. Taylor. 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981) which is error.
`
`USCA3 ruled and affirmed that
`
`See Moor v. County of Alameda. 411 U.S. 693, 702 (1973) (stating that §
`1988 “does not enjoy the independent stature of an ‘Act of Congress providing
`for the protection of civil rights,’ [but] [rjather, as is plain on the face of the
`statute, the section is intended to complement the various acts which do create
`federal causes of action for the violation of federal civil rights”);
`USCA ruling is error that failed to apply Civil rights Act 1866
`(Section 1981).
`
`14
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`

`

`1 ■
`
`i) Petitioner’s color/ethnicity violation should survive Under 42
`U.S.C § 1981 and 42 U.S.C § 1982
`Section 1981(c.) provide protection against non-governmental
`
`defendant which Part of Civil rights act 1866 which in Under law
`
`section of the complaint ^[6.
`
`In CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 US 442 - Supreme Ct 2008 @ 1956
`“As indicated in Runyon, the Court has construed §§ 1981 and 1982 alike
`because it has recognized the sister statutes' common language, origin, and
`purposes. Like § 1981. $ 1982 traces its orisin to § 1 of the Civil Rights
`Act of 1866. 14 Stat. 27. See General Building Contractors Assn., Inc, v.
`Pennsylvania. 458 U.S. 375, 383-384, 102 S.Ct. 3141, 73 L.Ed.2d 835
`(1982) (noting shared historical roots of the two provisions); Tillman, supra,
`at 439-440, 93 S.Ct. 1090 (same).’'
`Now the color/ethnicity violation claim Count-I should be review as
`
`Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park. Inc., 396 US 229 - Supreme Court 1969,
`
`Plaintiffs(s) brought action under section 1981 and 1982, Civil Rights
`
`Act of 1866 for damages. In fact, Petitioners color/ethnicity violation
`
`claim should survive under Civil rights act of 1866 alone. In the same
`
`Sullivan standard Count-Ill property damage should not be dismissed.
`
`ii) New Jersey Law against discrimination (NJLAD) should
`survive with Section 1988
`In Sullivan @ 239-240,
`We had a like problem in Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, where suit
`
`was
`
`brought against federal officers for alleged *239 violations of the
`
`15
`
`

`

`)>
`
`Fourth and, Fifth Amendments. The federal statute did not in terms at
`
`least provide any remedy. We said: 239
`
`”[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from
`the beginning that Courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant
`the necessary relief. And it is also well settled that where legal rights have been
`invaded, and a. federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such
`invasion, federal Courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong
`done."Id., at 684.”
`The existence of a statutory right implies the existence of all
`
`necessary and appropriate remedies. See Texas & N. O. R. Co. v.
`
`Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 569-570. As stated in Texas & Pacific R.
`
`Co. v. Rigsbv. 241 U. S. 33, 39:
`
`"A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it
`results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
`was
`enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in default is implied . "
`Compensatory damages for deprivation of a federal right are governed
`
`by federal standards, as provided by Congress in 42 U. S. C. § 1988,
`
`which states:
`
`"The jurisdiction in civil. . . matters conferred on the district Courts by the
`provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protection of all persons in the
`United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised
`and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such
`laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are
`not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary *240 to
`furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as
`
`16
`
`

`

`modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the
`Court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the
`same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,
`shall be extended to and govern the said Courts in the trial and disposition of
`the cause..."
`This means, as we read § 1988, that both federal and state rules on damages
`may be utilized, whichever better serves the policies expressed in the federal
`statutes. Cf. Brazier v. Cherry. 293 F. 2d 401. The rule of damages, whether
`drawn from federal or state sources, is a federal rule responsive to the need
`whenever a federal right is impaired.
`In Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 US 693 - Supreme Court 1973 @725
`
`Section 1983 by reason of its equity provision merely gives "jurisdiction" to the
`District Court, while § 1988 allows the District Court to apply state law.
`
`Application by the federal Court of a state cause of action for damages is
`therefore in harmony with both § 1983 and § 1988. As we stated in Sullivan v.
`Little Hunting Park, 396 U. S. 229, 240, "This means, as we read § 1988, that
`both federal and state rules on damages may be utilized, whichever better
`serves the policies expressed in the federal statutes. . . . The rule of dam ages,
`whether drawn from federal or state sources, is a federal rule responsive to the
`need whenever a federal right is impaired." The federal rights there is the
`alleged "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
`Constitution and laws" as these words are used in § 1983.
`In this case the defendant(s) color/ethical wrongdoings are under Section
`
`1981 (Civil right Act 1866), and NJLAD so the lower Courts should not deny the
`
`petitioner’s color/ethnicity claim.
`
`17
`
`

`

`4) Lower Court should not deny the Petitioner’s
`property damages is error.
`Petitioner’s property damage(s) claims should
`under Section 1982.
`In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 US 229 - Supreme Court
`
`survive
`
`i)
`
`1969, Plaintiffs(s) brought action under section 1981 and 1982 for
`
`damages.
`
`In this case, petitioner’s one of the property damages claim
`
`was
`
`defendant(s) damaged the petitioner’s car. This damages should be
`
`under section 1982(Civil Rights Act of 1866)
`
`ii)
`
`Properties damages and Skin Injury claims should
`survive under State Law (Supplemental jurisdiction)
`when one or more federal claims survived
`As earlier stated Petitioners federal claims survived under section
`
`1981/Civil Rights Act of 1866, and The Copyright Act of 1976/17 U.S.C.
`
`§ 102/ 17 U. S. C. §§ 201, petitioner property damages claims should
`
`survive under supplemental jurisdiction state law claims.
`
`For any and all reasons stated above, petitioner prays this Court to
`
`vacate the lower Court orders/judgments against the petitioner and
`
`remand to district Court.
`
`18
`
`

`

`5) Lower Court denying claims under 26 U.S.C § 7201 -
`Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 18 U.S.C § 1956 -
`Laundering of monetary instruments, Money
`Laundering Control Act of 1986, Insurance fraud
`and unemployment fraud is error.
`
`Dist Court ruled that Plaintiff cannot assert a claim under 42 U.S.C.
`
`§ 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 7201, or the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986.
`
`USCA3 ruled that 26 U.S.C. § 7201, and 18 U.S.C.§ 1956, do not by
`
`themselves provide for private causes of action.
`
`Supporting facts
`
`i) Insurance fraud (Count-vi)
`
`40. While Nick and Jatinder were drunk, I asked Nick why he allowed
`Jatinder to use his old Camry car for Jatinder personal need.
`41. Nick said that Jatinder is drunk driver history so car Insurance for
`Jatinder is very high so he allowed his personal car to he used by Jatinder.
`45. Aug 2nd week onward, Jatinder is not on the road for driving because
`as
`of Nick business involved in insurance fraud in his trucking business
`Jatinder said. For few trucks they got insurance and use those few
`insurance to all trucks.
`50. Because of Jatinder have multiple reckless driving, drink and driving
`records, because of Jatinder car insurance is very high, Nick gave his 1995
`Camry to Jatinder for Jatinder’s personal use for the purpose of Insurance
`fraud.
`
`i