`
`
`
`
`
`No. 21A756
`
`IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`REPRESENTATIVE RYAN GUILLEN TEXAS HOUSE MEMBER,
`REPRESENTATIVE BROOKS LANDGRAF, TEXAS HOUSE MEMBER,
`& REPRESENTATIVE JOHN LUJAN, TEXAS HOUSE MEMBER,
`
`Third-Party Applicants,
`
`v.
`
`LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, et al.,
`
`Respondents.
`
`PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ JOINT OPPOSITION TO
`EMERGENCY APPLICATION FOR STAY PENDING
`APPEAL IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT OR, IN THE
`ALTERNATIVE, PENDING DISPOSITION OF PETITION
`FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND REQUEST FOR
`IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE STAY
`
`
`Kevin J. Hamilton
`PERKINS COIE LLP
`1201 Third Avenue
`Suite 4800
`Seattle, WA 98101
`
`
`
`Max Renea Hicks
`LAW OFFICE OF MAX RENEA
`HICKS
`P.O. Box 303187
`Austin, TX 78703
`
`
`
`
`Abha Khanna
` Counsel of Record
`ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP
`1700 Seventh Ave., Suite 2100
`Seattle, WA 98101
`(206) 656-0177
`AKhanna@elias.law
`
`Aria Branch
`David R. Fox
`Francesca Gibson
`Richard A. Medina
`ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP
`10 G Street, NW, Suite 600
`Washington, D.C. 20002
`
`Counsel for Respondents who are plaintiffs in No. 1:21-cv-00965 (W.D. Tex.)
`
`(Counsel for additional respondents listed on following pages)
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Nina Perales
`MEXICAN-AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE &
`EDUCATIONAL FUND
`110 Broadway Street
`San Antonio, TX 78205
`(210) 224-5476
`
`Counsel for Respondents who are plaintiffs in No. 3:21-cv-00259 (W.D. Tex.).
`
`
`Lindsey B. Cohan
`DECHERT LLP
`515 Congress Avenue, Suite 1400
`Austin, TX 78701
`
`Neil Steiner
`DECHERT LLP
`1095 Avenue of the Americas
`New York, NY 10036
`
`Robert Notzon
`THE LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT NOTZON
`1502 West Avenue
`Austin, TX 78701
`
`
`Jon Greenbaum
`Ezra D. Rosenberg
`Pooja Chaudhuri
`LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR
`CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW
`1500 K Street, Suite 900
`Washington, DC 20005
`(202) 662-8600
`
`
`
`
`Counsel for Respondent Texas NAACP, plaintiff in No. 1:21-cv-01006 (W.D. Tex.)
`
`
`Chad W. Dunn
`BRAZIL & DUNN
`4407 Bee Caves Road
`Building 1, Suite 111
`Austin, TX 78746
`(512) 717-9822
`
`Mark P. Gaber
`MARK P. GABER PLLC
`P.O. Box 34481
`Washington, DC 20043
`
`Molly E. Danahy
`P.O. Box 26277
`Baltimore, MD 21211
`
`Jesse Gaines
`P.O. Box 50093
`Fort Worth, TX 76105
`
`Sonni Waknin
`10300 Venice Blvd. # 204
`Culver City, CA 90232
`
`
`Counsel for Respondents who are plaintiffs in No. 1:21-cv-00991 (W.D. Tex.)
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`George (Tex) Quesada
`Sean J. McCaffity
`SOMMERMAN MCCAFFITY QUESADA &
`GEISLER, LLP
`3811 Turtle Creek Blvd., Suite 1400
`Dallas, TX 75219
`(214) 720-0720
`
`
`Counsel for Respondent MALC, plaintiff in No. 1:21-cv-00988 (W.D. Tex.)
`
`
`Martin Golando
`THE LAW OFFICE OF MARTIN GOLANDO,
`PLLC
`2326 W. Magnolia Ave.
`San Antonio, TX 78201
`(210) 471-1185
`
`
`
`
`Counsel for Respondents Trey Martinez Fisher and Veronica Escobar, plaintiffs in
`No. 3:21-cv-00306 (W.D. Tex.) and No. 3:22-cv-00022 (W.D. Tex.)
`
`Gary L. Bledsoe
`THE BLEDSOE LAW FIRM, PLLC
`7901 Cameron Road
`Building 3-306
`Austin, TX 78754
`(512) 322-9992
`
`Nickolas A. Spencer
`SPENCER & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
`9100 Southwest Freeway, Suite 122
`Houston, TX 77074
`
`Counsel for Respondents who are plaintiff-intervenors in No. 3:21-cv-00259 (W.D.
`Tex.)
`
`
`
`Noor Taj
`Hilary Harris Klein
`Mitchell Brown
`Allison Riggs
`SOUTHERN COALITION FOR SOCIAL
`JUSTICE
`1415 West Highway 54, Suite 101
`Durham, NC 27707
`(919) 323-3380
`
`
`
`
`Jerry Vattamala
`
`
`
`David A. Donatti
`Ashley Harris
`Thomas Buser-Clancy
`Andre I. Segura
`ACLU FOUNDATION OF TEXAS, INC.
`P.O. Box 8306
`Houston, TX 77288
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`Susana Lorenzo-Giguere
`Patrick Stegemoeller
`ASIAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND
`EDUCATION FUND
`99 Huston Street, 12th Floor
`New York, NY 10013
`
`
`Counsel for Respondents who are plaintiffs in No. 1:21-cv-01038 (W.D. Tex.)
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS
`
`Applicants are Representatives Ryan Guillen, Brooks Landgraf, and John
`
`Lujan, who are members of the Texas House of Representatives. They were served
`
`with third party deposition subpoenas in consolidated actions in the United States
`
`District Court for the Western District of Texas. They are Appellants in the United
`
`States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
`
`Respondents are the following plaintiffs in the consolidated district court
`
`actions: Voto Latino, Akilah Bacy, Orlando Flores, Marilena Garza, Cecilia Gonzales,
`
`Agustin Loredo, Cinia Montoya, Ana Ramon, Jana Lynne Sanchez, Jerry Shafer,
`
`Debbie Lynn Solis, Angel Ulloa, Mary Uribe, Rosalinda Ramos Abuabara, League of
`
`United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), Southwest Voter Registration Education
`
`Project, Mi Familia Vota, American GI Forum of Texas, La Union Del Pueblo Entero,
`
`Mexican American Bar Association of Texas, Texas Hispanics Organized for Political
`
`Education, William C. Velasquez Institute, FIEL Houston, Inc., Texas Association of
`
`Latino Administrators and Superintendents, Emelda Menendez, Gilberto Menendez,
`
`Jose Olivares, Florinda Chavez, Joey Cardenas, Proyecto Azteca, Reform
`
`Immigration for Texas Alliance, Workers Defense Project, Paulita Sanchez, Jo Ann
`
`Acevedo, David Lopez, Diana Martinez Alexander, Jeandra Ortiz, Roy Charles
`
`Brooks, Sandra Puente, Jose R. Reyes, Shirley Anna Fleming, Louie Minor, Jr.,
`
`Norma Cavazos, Felipe Gutierrez, Phyllis Goines, Eva Bonilla, Clara Faulkner,
`
`Deborah Spell, Beverly Powell, Mexican American Legislative Caucus (MALC), Texas
`
`State Conference of the NAACP, Fair Maps Texas Action Committee, OCA-Greater
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`
`
`Houston, North Texas Chapter of the Asian Pacific Islander American Public Affairs
`
`Association, Emgage, Khanay Turner, Angela Rainey, Austin Ruiz, Aya Eneli, Sofia
`
`Sheikh, Jennifer Cazares, Niloufar Hafizi, Lakshmi Ramakrishnan, Amatullah
`
`Contractor, Deborah Chen, Arthur Resa, Sumita Ghosh, Anand Krishnaswamy, Trey
`
`Martinez Fisher, Veronica Escobar, Sheila Jackson Lee, Alexander Green, Jasmine
`
`Crockett, Eddie Bernice Johnson, and the United States of America, through the
`
`United States Department of Justice.
`
`The Defendants in the consolidated district court cases are the State of Texas,
`
`Governor Greg Abbott, Lieutenant Governor Dan Patrick, Texas Secretary of State
`
`John Scott, and Deputy Secretary of State Jose A. Esparza.
`
`The district court proceedings below are consolidated as League of United Latin
`
`American Citizens, et al. v. Abbott, et al., No. 3:21-cv-00259-DCG-JES-JVB (W.D.
`
`Tex.). The Fifth Circuit proceeding is League of United Latin American Citizens, et
`
`al. v. Representative Ryan Guillen, et al., No., 22-50407 (5th Cir.).
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`
`
`RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
`
`Under Supreme Court Rule 29.6, Respondents each represent that they do not
`
`have any parent entities and do not issue stock.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
`
`BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................ 6
`
`ARGUMENT...................................................................................................................... 8
`
`I.
`
`The Court lacks jurisdiction to grant a stay pending appeal because the
`three-judge court’s order is not appealable. ...................................................... 8
`
`A. The denial of the motion to quash is not a final decision. ....................... 9
`
`B. The denial of the motion to quash is not appealable under the
`collateral order doctrine. .......................................................................... 10
`
`II. Applicants are not entitled to a stay pending appeal. .................................... 13
`
`A. The Court is unlikely to grant certiorari because there is no circuit
`split and no developed record, and the jurisdictional question will at
`least complicate review on the merits. .................................................... 13
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`There is no relevant circuit split. ................................................... 13
`
`There is no developed record to enable a decision about state
`legislative privilege. ......................................................................... 16
`
`The jurisdictional issue would, at a minimum, complicate review
`on the merits. .................................................................................... 17
`
`B. The Court is unlikely to reverse on the merits. ..................................... 18
`
`C. Applicants do not face irreparable harm. ............................................... 23
`
`D. The equities support denial of the Application. ..................................... 24
`
`III. There is no basis for a stay pending a mandamus petition. .......................... 24
`
`IV. There is no basis for a stay pending the Court’s decision in Milligan. ......... 27
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 28
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iv
`
`

`

`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`A-Mark Auction Galleries, Inc. v. Am. Numismatic Ass’n,
`233 F.3d 895 (5th Cir. 2000) ............................................................................. 1, 9, 11
`
`Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Alviti,
`14 F.4th 76 (1st Cir. 2021) ................................................................................. passim
`
`Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C.,
`542 U.S. 367 (2004) ............................................................................................. 25, 26
`
`City of Mobile v. Bolden,
`446 U.S. 55 (1980) ........................................................................................... 4, 19, 22
`
`Clinton v. Goldsmith,
`526 U.S. 529 (1999) ...................................................................................................... 9
`
`Clinton v. Jones,
`520 U.S. 681 (1997) ......................................................................................... 4, 19, 23
`
`Cobbledick v. United States,
`309 U.S. 323 (1940) ...................................................................................................... 9
`
`Corporación Insular de Seguros v. Garcia,
`876 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1989) .............................................................................. passim
`
`Dombrowski v. Eastland,
`387 U.S. 82 (1967) ...................................................................................................... 18
`
`Dove v. Atl. Cap. Corp.,
`963 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1992) .................................................................................... 1, 10
`
`EEOC v. Wash Suburban Sanitary Comm’n,
`631 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2011) ...................................................................................... 14
`
`Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
`427 U.S. 445 (1976) .................................................................................................... 22
`
`In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig.,
`288 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 2002) ........................................................................ 1, 10, 11, 26
`
`Hall v. Hall,
`138 S. Ct. 1118 (2018) .................................................................................................. 9
`
`
`
`v
`
`

`

`
`
`Hollingsworth v. Perry,
`558 U.S. 183 (2010) (per curiam) ....................................................................... 13, 24
`
`In re Hubbard,
`803 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2015) .......................................................................... passim
`
`Jefferson Cmty. Health Care Ctrs., Inc. v. Jefferson Par. Gov’t,
`849 F.3d 615 (5th Cir. 2017) ...................................................................................... 16
`
`In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.,
`756 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Kavanaugh, J.) ........................................................ 21
`
`Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of Cal.,
`426 U.S. 394 (1976) ............................................................................................... 5, 25
`
`Lee v. City of L.A.,
`908 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2018) ............................................................................. 14, 16
`
`MDK, Inc. v. Mike’s Train House, Inc.,
`27 F.3d 116 (4th Cir. 1994) ............................................................................. 2, 10, 11
`
`Merrill v. Milligan,
`142 S. Ct. 879 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).................................................. 28
`
`Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter,
`558 U.S. 100 (2009) ............................................................................................ passim
`
`Nashville Student Org. Comm. v. Hargett,
`123 F. Supp. 3d 967 (M.D. Tenn. 2015) ......................................................... 3, 15, 21
`
`Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc.,
`2 F.3d 1397 (5th Cir. 1993) ............................................................................. 1, 10, 11
`
`Nat’l Super Spuds, Inc. v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch.,
`591 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1979) ........................................................................ 2, 5, 12, 26
`
`Newton v. NBC,
`726 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1984) ................................................................................. 2, 12
`
`Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
`457 U.S. 731 (1982) ...................................................................................................... 8
`
`Rodriguez v. Pataki,
`280 F. Supp. 2d 89 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) .......................................................................... 16
`
`Tenney v. Brandhove,
`341 U.S. 367 (1951) .................................................................................................... 22
`
`
`
`vi
`
`

`

`
`
`Thornburg v. Gingles,
`478 U.S. 30 (1986) ................................................................................................. 4, 19
`
`Trump v. Vance,
`140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) ..................................................................................... 4, 18, 19
`
`United States v. Gillock,
`445 U.S. 360 (1980) ............................................................................................ passim
`
`United States v. Ryan,
`402 U.S. 530 (1971) ..................................................................................................1, 9
`
`Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
`429 U.S. 252 (1977) ............................................................................................. 19, 23
`
`Whole Woman’s Health v. Smith,
`896 F.3d 362 (5th Cir. 2018) ...................................................................................... 11
`
`Statutes
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1253 ........................................................................................................ 17, 18
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1291 .......................................................................................................... 9, 10
`
`28 U.S.C. § 2101(f) ............................................................................................................ 8
`
`
`
`vii
`
`

`

`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Applicants seek a stay pending their appeal of a non-appealable interlocutory
`
`discovery order, over which there is no relevant circuit split, and which did not even
`
`address the fact-bound questions of state legislative privilege that Applicants would
`
`like this Court to review. The Court should decline the invitation and allow discovery
`
`to proceed in these time-sensitive redistricting cases, which are before a three-judge
`
`court on a highly expedited schedule necessary to enable complete review before the
`
`2024 election cycle begins. Meanwhile, the three-judge court’s order will ensure that
`
`any information Applicants assert is privileged will remain under seal and
`
`confidential until their privilege claim has been fully adjudicated.
`
`I. The decision Applicants appeal is not appealable at all. “[O]ne to whom a
`
`subpoena is directed may not appeal the denial of a motion to quash that subpoena
`
`but must either obey its commands or refuse to do so and contest the validity of the
`
`subpoena if he is subsequently cited for contempt.” United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S.
`
`530, 532 (1971). Nor is an order to disclose privileged information immediately
`
`appealable. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 114 (2009). The courts
`
`of appeals that have addressed the question unanimously agree that these
`
`jurisdictional limitations generally apply to orders enforcing subpoenas directed to
`
`third parties in civil litigation, even where a privilege is asserted. See, e.g., In re Flat
`
`Glass Antitrust Litig., 288 F.3d 83, 90 (3d Cir. 2002); A-Mark Auction Galleries, Inc.
`
`v. Am. Numismatic Ass’n, 233 F.3d 895, 897–98 (5th Cir. 2000); Nat. Gas Pipeline Co.
`
`of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 2 F.3d 1397, 1405 n.16 (5th Cir. 1993); Dove v. Atl.
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`
`
`Cap. Corp., 963 F.2d 15, 17 (2d Cir. 1992); MDK, Inc. v. Mike’s Train House, Inc., 27
`
`F.3d 116, 122 (4th Cir. 1994); Corporación Insular de Seguros v. Garcia, 876 F.2d 254,
`
`256 (1st Cir. 1989).
`
`The Eleventh Circuit, and now the Fifth, apply a narrow exception for
`
`nonparties’ claims of governmental privilege. See App.13 n.1; In re Hubbard, 803 F.3d
`
`1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 2015). But most circuits to consider the issue reject such an
`
`exception as inconsistent with this Court’s cases. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Alviti,
`
`14 F.4th 76, 84 (1st Cir. 2021); Corporación Insular de Seguros, 876 F.2d at 257–59;
`
`Newton v. NBC, 726 F.2d 591, 593–94 (9th Cir. 1984); Nat’l Super Spuds, Inc. v. N.Y.
`
`Mercantile Exch., 591 F.2d 174, 176–81 (2d Cir. 1979). And Applicants do not attempt
`
`to defend a governmental-privilege exception here. Rather, they broadly assert that
`
`the order is appealable simply because it is directed at a third party, Application 5, a
`
`position that every circuit to consider the question has rejected. See cases cited supra.
`
`II.A. Jurisdiction aside, Applicants do not make the showing required to obtain
`
`a stay pending appeal. The Court is unlikely to grant certiorari because there is no
`
`circuit split in this dispute over fact-bound discovery issues, with an inadequate
`
`record and serious barriers to review of any underlying privilege question.
`
`Applicants argue that there is a split over the substance of state legislative
`
`privilege between the Fifth Circuit on the one hand and the First, Ninth, and
`
`Eleventh Circuits on the other. But the three-judge court’s order did not decide any
`
`question of legislative privilege. App.5, 14. It merely held that Applicants are not
`
`entirely exempt from being deposed, including because these are redistricting cases
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`
`
`focused (in part) on Applicants’ own districts, so there are “relevant areas of inquiry
`
`that fall outside of topics potentially covered by state legislative privilege.” App.4.
`
`Indeed, Representative Lujan’s deposition will concern only those topics because
`
`Representative Lujan was not in office when the challenged legislation was passed.
`
`No circuit has held that state legislators may never be deposed, even about subjects
`
`falling outside the scope of legislative privilege. Nor is there a circuit split over the
`
`“admirably deliberate and cautious approach” that the three-judge court adopted to
`
`adjudicate any disputes over legislative privilege that do arise, App.15, because no
`
`other circuit has ever addressed similar procedures, although they have been used by
`
`district courts before, see App.4; Nashville Student Org. Comm. v. Hargett, 123 F.
`
`Supp. 3d 967, 971 (M.D. Tenn. 2015). And even if the substance of the legislative
`
`privilege were implicated here, there is no clear split over that, either: Applicants
`
`object to how the Fifth Circuit describes the state legislative privilege, but all circuits
`
`agree that it is a qualified privilege that may be overcome where appropriate, and
`
`Applicants do not identify any analogous cases that have come out differently in
`
`different circuits.
`
`The record is also insufficiently developed to enable this Court’s review of any
`
`substantive question of privilege. The three-judge court has made no ruling on any
`
`concrete issue of privilege because the record was inadequate to allow it to do so.
`
`App.2. If the Court grants a stay, it will freeze the record in its inadequate state and
`
`prevent any meaningful decision on the scope of privilege. And if the Court were to
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`
`
`grant review, the jurisdictional issue discussed above might splinter the Court and
`
`preclude a majority opinion on the merits.
`
`II.B. Even if the Court reviews, it is unlikely to reverse on the merits.
`
`Applicants seek a sweeping ruling exempting them from being deposed at all, even
`
`about nonprivileged topics. There is no support for such an exemption. The legislative
`
`immunity cases on which Applicants rely are irrelevant because no one is suing
`
`Applicants. See, e.g., United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 372 (1980) (citing Tenney
`
`v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)). They face only the limited burden of being
`
`deposed, to which even sitting Presidents are subject in appropriate circumstances.
`
`Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2427 (2020); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708
`
`(1997). And the process the three-judge court laid out for adjudicating privilege claims
`
`is reasonable under the particular facts here, where Applicants have relevant
`
`testimony to offer that is not even potentially privileged, see Thornburg v. Gingles,
`
`478 U.S. 30, 37 (1986), and where the Court’s precedent makes the subjective intent
`
`of legislators directly relevant to Respondents’ constitutional claims, City of Mobile v.
`
`Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980), and where Applicants have asserted an
`
`extraordinarily broad conception of the legislative privilege that has already
`
`interfered with the three-judge court’s ability to assess legislative motivation,
`
`Supp.App.50 n.14, and that would have made a farce of any deposition at which
`
`Applicants could refuse to answer questions on legislative privilege grounds.
`
`II.C., D. Applicants do not face irreparable harm absent a stay, and the equities
`
`favor allowing the case to proceed. The burden of sitting for a deposition is limited,
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`
`
`and the three-judge court’s procedure ensures that any assertedly privileged
`
`information will remain secret, on pain of sanctions, until the court addresses the
`
`privilege claim. In contrast, a stay would disrupt this case’s expedited schedule,
`
`potentially preventing adjudication of Respondents’ claims before the start of the
`
`2024 election.
`
`III. Applicants alternatively request a stay pending a mandamus application,
`
`but there is no basis for that “drastic” remedy either. Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for N. Dist.
`
`of Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). The three-judge court’s ruling was reasonable, not
`
`a “judicial ‘usurpation of power,’” id., and the procedure it adopted ensures that
`
`privilege claims will be carefully adjudicated before any assertedly privileged
`
`material becomes public. Much as in Kerr, the three-judge court’s ruling enables
`
`Applicants to “assert the privilege more specifically” as to particular information and
`
`have the court review the information in camera before any privilege claim is
`
`overruled and any material made public. Id. at 404. That provides an adequate
`
`alternative remedy, id., and if that is not enough for Applicants, they may disobey
`
`the court’s order and obtain review via contempt—a longstanding requirement that
`
`limits the disruption of interlocutory review by requiring the aggrieved litigant to
`
`decide whether “the importance of the issue and the risk of adverse appellate
`
`determination . . . warrant being branded as a contemnor.” Nat’l Super Spuds, Inc.,
`
`591 F.2d at 180 (Friendly, J.).
`
`IV. Finally, there is no basis for a stay pending this Court’s decision in a
`
`different redistricting case, Merrill v. Milligan, No. 21-1086 (U.S.). Milligan has
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`
`
`nothing to do with the legislative privilege, the sole issue that has been appealed
`
`here, and it could not possibly moot the need for Respondents to depose Applicants,
`
`because it will address only the scope of Section 2, and not Respondents’ claims under
`
`the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as to which Applicants’ testimony may
`
`be most relevant.
`
`BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
`
`In October 2021, the Texas Legislature enacted bills that redrew the state’s
`
`congressional, state Senate, state House of Representatives, and Board of Education
`
`districts. Multiple sets of private plaintiffs (the “Private Respondents”) filed separate
`
`lawsuits for injunctive relief, alleging that the new maps discriminate against voters
`
`of color in violation of the United States Constitution and Section 2 of the Voting
`
`Rights Act. Among the claims raised by Private Respondents are claims that the
`
`electoral maps were enacted with discriminatory intent. The United States filed a
`
`similar suit of its own, and all ten cases were consolidated in the Western District of
`
`Texas in El Paso before a three-judge district court (Judges Jerry Smith, Jeffrey
`
`Brown, and David Guaderrama). The three-judge court set an expedited schedule—
`
`with a discovery deadline of July 15, 2022, and trial set to begin on September 28,
`
`2022—to ensure that full review may be completed before the 2024 election starts.
`
`Supp.App.67, 69.
`
`Discovery has proceeded apace. The parties have produced documents,
`
`answered interrogatories, and begun scheduling depositions. But when the United
`
`States served deposition subpoenas upon Applicants, three members of the Texas
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`
`
`Legislature, they moved to quash, arguing that “legislative privilege and immunity”
`
`categorically protects them, and by extension other legislators, from sitting for any
`
`depositions at all. Supp.App.71. And when Private Respondents served deposition
`
`subpoenas upon Applicants, Applicants moved to quash those too. Supp.App.91.
`
`On May 18, 2022, the three-judge court unanimously denied both motions.
`
`App.1. The court emphasized that Applicants have relevant information that is not
`
`even potentially privileged. Id. at 4. And it explained that “[w]hether state legislative
`
`privilege attaches is fact- and context-specific; for the purposes of depositions, ‘it
`
`depends on the question being posed.’” Id. at 2 (quoting Perez v. Perry, No. SA-11-CV-
`
`360-OLG-JES, Dkt. 102 at 5 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2011)).
`
`The court therefore ordered the depositions, scheduled for this week, to go
`
`forward. Id. But it adopted a procedure to preserve Applicants’ claims of legislative
`
`privilege for adjudication on a more developed record. Applicants may invoke
`
`legislative privilege in response to particular questions, and any answer given will be
`
`provided subject to the privilege claim and under seal, not to be revealed publicly or
`
`relied on by any party until the court addresses the privilege claim. Id. at 4-5.
`
`Applicants filed an interlocutory appeal to the Fifth Circuit and moved the
`
`three-judge court to stay its ruling pending appeal, Supp.App.104. Without waiting
`
`for a ruling from the three-judge court, Applicants also sought a stay from the Fifth
`
`Circuit. Both the three-judge court and the Fifth Circuit unanimously denied
`
`Applicants’ motion for a stay. App.7, 13.
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`
`
`The Fifth Circuit explained that Applicants were unlikely to succeed on the
`
`merits because the three-judge court had properly concluded that “’there are likely to
`
`be relevant areas of inquiry that fall outside of topics potentially covered by state
`
`legislative privilege’ and that the issues relating to the privilege were ‘not yet ripe for
`
`decision,’ since ‘no questions have been asked, and no answer given.’” App.14-15. It
`
`emphasized that “the district court did not deny that state legislative privilege might
`
`apply to this case.” App.14. And it praised the three-judge court for its “admirably
`
`deliberate and cautious approach to the legislative privilege issue.” App.15.
`
`Concurring only in judgment, Judge Willett found no appellate jurisdiction to review
`
`the issue. App.14–15 n.1.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Applicants’ request for a stay pending
`
`appeal, and Applicants do not show their entitlement to a stay under the governing
`
`standards.
`
`I.
`
`The Court lacks jurisdiction to grant a stay pending appeal because
`the three-judge court’s order is not appealable.
`
`As Judge Willett concluded below, Applicants’ request for a stay pending
`
`appeal fails at the threshold, because the three-judge court’s denial of the motion to
`
`quash is not a final decision of a district court and is not appealable under the
`
`collateral order doctrine. App.13–14 n.6. This Court has no certiorari jurisdiction
`
`unless there is a pending appeal from an appealable order. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
`
`457 U.S. 731, 741–43 (1982). And absent certiorari jurisdiction, the Court has no
`
`power to issue a stay pending appeal, either. See 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f) (authorizing a
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`
`
`stay “[i]n any case in which the final judgment or decree of any court is subject to
`
`review by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari”); Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S.
`
`529, 535 (1999) (holding that a case that is beyond a court’s “jurisdiction to review” is
`
`beyond the ‘aid’ of the All Writs Act in reviewing it”). The Court therefore lacks
`
`jurisdiction over Applicants’ request for a stay pending appeal.
`
`A.
`
`The denial of the motion to quash is not a final decision.
`
`The denial of the motion to quash is not appealable as a “final decision[].” 28
`
`U.S.C. § 1291. “A final decision ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing
`
`for the court to do but execute the judgment.’” Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118, 1123-24
`
`(2018) (quoting Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund, 571 U.S. 177, 183
`
`(2014)). The order denying the motion to quash is not “final” in that sense—litigation
`
`in the three-judge court continues.
`
`Applicants argue that there is an exception when a subpoena is directed at a
`
`non-party. This Court, and the courts of appeals that have considered the issue,
`
`unanimously reject such an exception. “[O]ne to whom a subpoena is directed may
`
`not appeal the denial of a motion to quash that subpoena but must either obey its
`
`commands or refuse to do so and contest the validity of the subpoena if he is
`
`subsequently cited for contempt.” Ryan, 402 U.S. at 532; see also Cobbledick v. United
`
`States, 309 U.S. 323, 323 (1940). And while Ryan arose in the grand jury context,
`
`courts of appeals consistently apply that same principle to non-party subpoenas in
`
`civil cases, too. See, e.g., A-Mark, 233 F.3d at 897–98 (rejecting the argument that
`
`“the discovery order appealed from is a final order because it finally resolves [the non-
`
`party’s] discovery obligation, which was the only issue presented to the district
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`
`
`court”); Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 2 F.3d at 1405 n.16 (“A discovery order, even
`
`one directed at a non-party, is not a final order and hence not appealable.”); Dove, 963
`
`F.2d at 17 (“A non-party witness ordinarily may not appeal directly from an order
`
`compelling discovery . . . .”); Corporación Insular de Seguros, 876 F.2d at 256
`
`(“Discovery orders, whether directed at parties or at non-parties to the underlying
`
`litigation, are not generally appealable as ‘final decisions of the district courts.’”
`
`(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1291)); MDK, Inc., 27 F.3d at 122 (following “a long line of cases
`
`holding that courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to review orders compelling discovery
`
`of nonparties.”); Flat Glass, 288 F.3d at 90 (rejecting the argument that Cobbledick
`
`is limited to grand jury subpoenas).
`
`B.
`
`The denial of the motion to quash is not appealable under the
`collateral order doctrine.
`
`The denial of the motion to quash also is not appealable under the “collateral
`
`order doctrine.” The collateral order doctrine expands the final judgment rule to allow
`
`the immediate appeal of “a ‘small class’ of collateral rulings that, although they do
`
`not end the litigation, are appropriately deemed ‘final.’” Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at
`
`106 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Ind. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949)). But
`
`this Court held in Mohawk that “the collateral order doctrine does not extend to
`
`disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege.” 558 U.S. at 114. As this
`
`Court explained in Mohawk, “the limited benefits of applying ‘the blunt, categorical
`
`instrument of § 1291 collateral order appeal’ to privilege-related disclosure orders
`
`simply cannot j