`(Slip Opinion)
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` Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023)
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`Per Curiam
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
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` Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
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` pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
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` No. 21–1333
`_________________
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` REYNALDO GONZALEZ, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
` GOOGLE LLC
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`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
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`APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`[May 18, 2023]
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`PER CURIAM.
`In 2015, ISIS terrorists unleashed a set of coordinated at-
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`tacks across Paris, France, killing 130 victims, including
`Nohemi Gonzalez, a 23-year-old U. S. citizen.1 Gonzalez’s
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`parents and brothers then sued Google, LLC, under 18
`U. S. C. §§2333(a) and (d)(2), alleging that Google was both
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`directly and secondarily liable for the terrorist attack that
`killed Gonzalez.2 For their secondary-liability claims,
`——————
`1“ISIS” is shorthand for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. In some
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`form or another, it has been designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization
`since 2004; ISIS has also been known as the Islamic State of Iraq and
`the Levant, al Qaeda in Iraq, and the al-Zarqawi Network.
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` 2Title 18 U. S. C. §2333(a) provides: “Any national of the United States
`injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of
`international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue
`therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall
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`recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit,
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`including attorney’s fees.” Section 2333(d)(2) provides: “In an action un-
`der subsection (a) for an injury arising from an act of international ter-
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`rorism committed, planned, or authorized by an organization that had
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`been designated as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of
`the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U. S. C. 1189), as of the date on
`which such act of international terrorism was committed, planned, or
`authorized, liability may be asserted as to any person who aids and
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`

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`2
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`GONZALEZ v. GOOGLE LLC
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`Per Curiam
`plaintiffs alleged that Google aided and abetted and con-
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`spired with ISIS. All of their claims broadly center on the
`use of YouTube, which Google owns and operates, by ISIS
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`and ISIS supporters.
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`The District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint for fail-
`ure to state a claim, though it offered plaintiffs leave to
`amend their complaint. Instead, plaintiffs stood on their
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`complaint and appealed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in
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`a consolidated opinion that also addressed Twitter, Inc. v.
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`Taamneh, ___ U. S. ___ (2023). 2 F. 4th 871 (2021). With
`respect to this case, the Ninth Circuit held that most of the
`plaintiffs’ claims were barred by §230 of the Communica-
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`tions Decency Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 137, 47 U. S. C.
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`§230(c)(1). The sole exceptions were plaintiffs’ direct-
`and secondary-liability claims based on allegations that
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`Google approved ISIS videos for advertisements and then
`shared proceeds with ISIS through YouTube’s revenue-
`sharing system. The Ninth Circuit held that these poten-
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`tial claims were not barred by §230, but that plaintiffs’
`allegations failed to state a viable claim in any event.
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`We granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit’s appli-
`cation of §230. See 598 U. S. ___ (2022). Plaintiffs did not
`seek review of the Ninth Circuit’s holdings regarding their
`revenue-sharing claims. In light of those unchallenged
`holdings and our disposition of Twitter, on which we also
`granted certiorari and in which we today reverse the Ninth
`Circuit’s judgment, it has become clear that plaintiffs’ com-
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`plaint—independent of §230—states little if any claim for
`relief. As plaintiffs concede, the allegations underlying
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`their secondary-liability claims are materially identical to
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`those at issue in Twitter. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 58. Since we
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`hold that the complaint in that case fails to state a claim for
`aiding and abetting under §2333(d)(2), it appears to follow
`——————
`abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires
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`with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism.”
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`3
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` Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023)
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`Per Curiam
`that the complaint here likewise fails to state such a claim.
`And, in discussing plaintiffs’ revenue-sharing claims, the
`Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs plausibly alleged neither
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`that “Google reached an agreement with ISIS,” as required
`for conspiracy liability, nor that Google’s acts were “in-
`tended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, or to
`influence or affect a government,” as required for a direct-
`liability claim under §2333(a). 2 F. 4th, at 901, 907. Per-
`haps for that reason, at oral argument, plaintiffs only
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`suggested that they should receive leave to amend their
`complaint if we were to reverse and remand in Twitter. Tr.
`of Oral Arg. 58, 163.
`We need not resolve either the viability of plaintiffs’
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`claims as a whole or whether plaintiffs should receive fur-
`ther leave to amend. Rather, we think it sufficient to
`acknowledge that much (if not all) of plaintiffs’ complaint
`seems to fail under either our decision in Twitter or the
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`Ninth Circuit’s unchallenged holdings below. We therefore
`decline to address the application of §230 to a complaint
`that appears to state little, if any, plausible claim for relief.
`Instead, we vacate the judgment below and remand the
`case for the Ninth Circuit to consider plaintiffs’ complaint
`in light of our decision in Twitter.
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`It is so ordered.
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