`No.
`
`FILED
`
`OFFICE OF THE CLERK
`SUPREME COURT MR
`
`3fa tfje
`Supreme Court of tfie ©tuteti States;
`
`In re GREGORY CHARLES KAPORDELIS,
`
`Petitioner.
`
`ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
`TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
`
`PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
`
`Gregory C. Kapordelis, Pro Se
`Fed. I.D. No. 63122-053
`P.O. Box 5000
`Oakdale, LA 71463
`
`January 20, 2022
`
`
`
`■t
`
`>, i
`
`"■■Q
`. 'V*^.
`
`l
`QUESTION PRESENTED
`Whether this Court should issue a writ of
`mandamus directing Eleventh Circuit judges Grant
`and Lagoa to exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28
`U.S.C. § 1291, and to thereby effect a merits review of
`otherwise appealable recusal orders issued by the
`district court in the underlying civil proceeding,
`where (i) appellate jurisdiction under § 1291 is non-
`discretionary! (ii) appellate jurisdiction is not pre
`dicated on the COA requirements set forth at 28
`U.S.C. § 2253(c); (iii) the recusal orders were rendered
`appealable (i.e., ripe) once they were targeted in the
`notice of appeal after entry of a final order disposing
`of all claims in the case; and (iv) this Court has
`deemed it "treason" to the Constitution for a federal
`court to decline the exercise of statutory jurisdiction
`established by Congress.
`
`
`
`11
`
`PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
`1. Gregory C. Kapordelis, Petitioner;
`2. Hon. Britt C. Grant, Eleventh Circuit Judge,
`Respondent;
`3. Hon. Barbara Lagoa, Eleventh Circuit Judge,
`Respondent;
`4. United States of America, Respondent.
`
`CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
`Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6, Peti
`tioner states for the record that no parent or publicly
`held company has any interest in this case.
`
`RELATED CASES
`Kapordelis v. United States, Case No. Ull-CV-00280-
`CAP, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
`Georgia.
`United States v. Kapordelis, Case No. 2:04-CR-00249-
`CAP-GGB, U.S. District Court for the Northern
`District of Georgia.
`
`
`
`1
`
`11
`
`11
`
`n
`
`in
`v
`
`1 2 3
`
`4
`6
`
`6 7 7
`
`10
`
`10
`
`Ill
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`QUESTIONS PRESENTED...........
`PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
`CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
`RELATED CASES
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`RELIEF REQUESTED..................
`ORDERS BELOW...........................
`JURISDICTIONAL STATEMEMT
`CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
`AND RULES INVOLVED......................................
`STATEMENT OF THE CASE
`A. District Court Proceedings....
`B. Notice of Appeal......................
`C. Eleventh Circuit Proceedings
`REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT,
`
`INTRODUCTION AND RULE 20.1
`STATEMENT....................................
`
`I. THERE IS NO OTHER ADEQUATE
`MEANS TO ATTAIN THE DESIRED
`RELIEF.......................................
`11
`
`
`
`IV
`
`13
`
`15
`
`25
`
`II. THE RIGHT TO RELIEF IS CLEAR
`AND INDISPUTABLE.......................................
`A. Jurisdiction for appellate review of ripe
`recusal orders is established at 28 U.S.C.
`§ 1291................................................................
`13
`B. The COA provisions at 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) do
`not effect § 129l's appellate jurisdiction to
`review ripe recusal (or similar) orders........
`III. THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
`HERE JUSTIFY THE SUPREME COURT'S
`USE OF THE EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF
`MANDAMUS.........................................................
`IV. AN ALTERNATIVE REQUEST FOR
`RELIEF OUT OF AN ABUNDANCE
`OF CAUTION.........................................
`CONCLUSION................................................
`APPENDIX
`Appendix A: Order of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
`Appeals Denying a COA (Aug. 12, 2021)
`.............................................................. App.l
`Appendix B: Order of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
`Appeals Denying re-hearing (Sept. 24,
`App.2
`2021)
`Appendix C; Order of the Supreme Court granting a
`filing-time extension (December 9,
`2021)
`App.3
`Appendix D: Kapordelis’s Notice of Appeal to the
`App.4
`Eleventh Circuit
`
`28
`30
`
`
`
`V
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`13, 16
`
`Cases:
`Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, Inc., 179
`F.3d 1279 (Uth Cir. 1999).............
`21
`Ankenbrandt v. Richards,
`504 U.S. 689 (1992)...........................
`Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland,
`346 U.S. 379 (1953)...........................
`Bracy v. Superintendent, Rockview SCI,
`986 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2021).............
`Campbell v. Sec'y Dept, of Corn, 2021 U.S. App.
`LEXIS 7813 (11th Cir. 1999)
`20, 23-24
`Cary v. Curtis,
`44 U.S. 236 (1945).................
`Castro v. United States,
`540 U.S. 375 (2003)..............
`Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C.,
`542 U.S. 367 (2004)..............
`Cohens v. Virginia,
`19 (6 Wheat) U.S. 264 (1821)
`Greenlaw v. United States,
`554 U.S. 237 (2008)....... .......
`Evitts v. Lucey,
`469 U.S. 387 (1985)..............
`
`25-27
`
`25
`
`17
`
`14
`
`29
`
`11
`
`29
`
`26
`
`
`
`VI
`
`Harbison v. Bell,
`556 U.S. 180 (2009).
`Iacullo v. United States,
`463 Fed. App'x 896 (llth Cir. 2012)
`In re Collins, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS
`13421 (llth Cir. 2018)......................
`Jackson v. Motel 6Multipurpose, Inc.,
`130 F.3d 999 (llth Cir. 1997)..........
`Johnson v. Steele,
`999 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2020)...........
`Kemp v. United States,
`52 Fed. App'x 731 (6th Cir. 2002)...
`Kirkland v. Nat'lMortg. Network, Inc.,
`884 F.2d 1367 (llth Cir. 1989)......
`Kontrick v. Ryan,
`540 U.S. 443 (2004)...........................
`Liteky v. United States,
`510 U.S. 540 (1994)...........................
`Marshall v. Jerrico,
`446 U.S. 238 (1980)...........................
`Marshall v. Marshall,
`547 U.S. 293 (2006)...........................
`Mixon v. United States,
`620 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1980)............
`Nelson v. United States,
`297 Fed. App'x 563 (8th Cir. 2008).
`
`17-19, 23, 28-29
`
`19-24
`
`14
`
`14
`
`19
`
`18
`
`14
`
`13
`
`22
`
`11
`
`25
`
`21
`
`19
`
`
`
`Vll
`
`New Orleans Pub. Serv. Inc. v Council of City
`of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989).....
`Ohle v. United States, 2018 U.S. App.
`LEXIS 24190 (3d Cir. 2016)....................
`Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Ind. Inc.,
`825 F.2d 1521 (llth Cir. 1987)...............
`Procup v. Strickland,
`792 F.2d 1069 (llth Cir. 1986)(an banc).
`Rice v. McKenzie,
`581 F.2d 1114 (4th Cir. 1978)..................
`Roche v. Evaporated Milk,
`87 LED 1185 (1943)..................................
`Russell v. Lane,
`890 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1989)....................
`Slack v. McDaniel,
`529 U.S. 473 (2000)...................................
`Steering Comm. v. Mead Corp.,
`614 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1980)...................
`Trevino v. Johnson,
`168 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999)....................
`United States v. McIntosh, 2018 U.S. App.
`LEXIS 3095 (10th Cir.2018).....................
`United States v. Schwartz, 2016 U.S. App.
`LEXIS 24190 (3d Cir. 2016)....................
`Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. of New York,
`212 U.S. 19 (1909)....................................
`
`25
`
`18
`
`14
`
`26
`
`18
`
`11
`
`18
`
`16
`
`14
`
`18
`
`19
`
`18
`
`27
`
`
`
`vm
`
`Wilkinson v. Dotson,
`544 U.S. 180 (2009)
`Constitutional Provisions:
`U.S. Const, amend. V.
`Statutes:
`28 U.S.C. § 455........ ..............
`28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)...............
`28 U.S.C. § 1291....................
`28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)................
`28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)................
`28 U.S.C. § 2255....................
`Rules:
`Sup.Ct.R. 10...........................
`Sup.Ct.R. 20.1........................
`Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) or 60(b)(4)
`11th Cir.R. 31.1......................
`11th Cir.R. 41-1......................
`
`16
`
`4, 13, 25-29
`
`2, 4, 6, 12, 18-22
`............ 3, 12, 13
`passim
`3, 4, 10
`passim
`2, 5-6, 14, 16, 18-20, 28
`
`30
`10, 11
`passim
`9, 15
`5, 9
`
`
`
`1
`RELIEF REQUESTED
`Petitioner Kapordelis respectfully urges this
`Court to issue a writ of mandamus directing Eleventh
`Circuit Judges Grant and Lagoa to exercise non
`discretionary jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
`on this basis order a merits review of the ripe recusal
`orders in the underlying habeas proceeding.
`If this Court reaches the unlikely conclusion
`that the Eleventh Circuit orders on review actually
`reflect a sub silentio holding that the aforementioned
`recusal arguments are not re viewable under § 1291
`because a COA was not granted under § 2253(c) to
`review the final order in the proceeding, Petitioner
`Kapordelis urges in the alternative that this Court
`issue a writ of certiorari to the Eleventh Circuit Court
`of Appeals in order to review the "circuit split" which
`results from that conclusion, where every U.S. Court
`of Appeals to have considered this issue---to include
`the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals-"has concluded
`that a COA is not required to appeal from otherwise
`ripe recusal orders in habeas proceedings.
`
`
`
`2
`
`ORDERS BELOW
`
`On August 12, 2021, Circuit Judge Grant issued
`an order denying a Certificate of Appealability
`("COA") to proceed on review of the district court's
`final order denying Rule 60(b)(4) relief in this 28
`U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding. There is no reference in this
`order to Kapordelis's request to appeal from the
`district court's recusal orders. This unpublished order
`is reprinted and presented at App.l. On September
`24, 2021, Circuit Judges Grant and Lagoa issued an
`order denying reconsideration of Judge Grant's order
`denying a COA. There is no reference in this order to
`Kapordelis's request to appeal from the district
`court's recusal orders. This unpublished order is
`reprinted and presented at App.2. On December 8,
`2021, Circuit Judges Grant and Lagoa issued an order
`denying Kapordelis's motion to recall the
`improvidently issued mandate. This unpublished
`order is reprinted and presented at App.3. On May 13,
`2020, the district court entered a final judgment
`denying Rule 60(b)(4) relief and denying a COA to
`appeal from that judgment. (See Criminal Record,
`"CR", Case No. 04-cr-00249-CAP, N.D.GA)(CR-653).
`On April 1, 2021, the district court entered an order
`denying Kapordelis's motion to reconsider the final
`judgment. (CR-658). On January 18, 2019, the district
`court denied Kapordelis's 28 U.S.C. § 455 recusal
`motion (CR-640). (CR-643).
`
`On May 13, 2020, the district court denied
`Kapordelis's motion for reconsideration of the order
`denying recusal. (CR-653). On June 1, 2021,
`
`
`
`3
`Kapordelis filed a Notice of Appeal which targeted
`both the final order disposing of the Rule 60(b)(4)
`claims and the order denying recusal. (CR-660). This
`motion is reprinted and presented at App.4.
`JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
`This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
`1651(a) and Supreme Court Rule 20 to issue an
`extraordinary writ compelling Circuit Judges Grant
`and Lagoa to exercise non-discretionary appellate
`jurisdiction set forth by Congress at 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
`The order on review was issued by Eleventh Circuit
`Judge Grant on August 12, 2021. App.l. The order
`denying rehearing of the order on review was issued
`by Eleventh Circuit Judges Grant and Lagoa on
`September 24, 2021. App.2. On December 9, 2021,
`this Court issued an order granting an extension of
`time to file until January 24, 2022. App.3.
`
`Should the Court construe the instant pro se
`petition as a request for a writ of certiorari as opposed
`to a writ of mandamus (See REASONS WHY, § IV,
`infra), jurisdiction is provided at 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)
`and Supreme Court Rule 12.
`
`
`
`4
`
`CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
`AND RULES
`
`Amendment V to the Constitution-
`
`"No person...shall be compelled in any
`criminal case to be a witness against
`himself, nor deprived of life, liberty, or
`property, without due process of law...."
`
`28 U.S.C. $ 1651:
`
`"The Supreme Court and all courts
`established by Act of Congress may use
`all writs necessary or appropriate in
`aid of their respective jurisdictions and
`agreeable to the usages and principles
`of law."
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1291, in relevant part:
`
`"The courts of appeal (other than the
`United States Court of Appeals for the
`Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction
`of appeals from all final decisions of the
`district courts of the United States...,
`except where a direct review may be
`had by the Supreme Court."
`
`28 U.S.C. $ 455(a) and (b)(1):
`
`"(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate
`[magistrate judge] of the United States
`shall disqualify himself in any pro-
`
`
`
`5
`ceeding in which his impartiality might
`reasonably be questioned, (b) He shall
`also disqualify himself in the following
`circumstances- (l) Where he has a per
`sonal bias or prejudice concerning a
`party."
`
`28 U.S.C. $ 2253(c):
`
`"Unless a circuit justice or judge issues
`a certificate of appealability, an appeal
`may not be taken to the Court of
`Appeals from---(A) the final order in a
`habeas corpus proceeding in which the
`detention complained of arises out of
`process issued by a State court; or (B)
`the final order in a proceeding under §
`2255."
`
`Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4)-
`
`"(b) Grounds for Relief From a Final
`Judgment, Order, or proceeding. On
`motion and just terms, the court may
`relieve a party or its legal repre
`sentative from a final judgment, order,
`or proceeding for the following reasons^
`D (4) the judgment is void>‘D."
`Eleventh Circuit Rule 41~l(b)-
`
`"(b) A mandate once issued shall not be
`recalled except to prevent injustice.”
`
`
`
`6
`
`STATEMENT OF THE CASE
`
`A. District Court Proceedings
`
`Kapordelis filed the underlying civil action in
`the district court pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), Federal
`Rules of Civil Procedure. Kapordelis v. United States,
`Civil Case No. l:ll-cv-280-CAP / Crim. Case No. 2^04-
`cr-249-CAP (Criminal Record, "CR"), Northern Dis
`trict of Georgia. (CR-650, amended motion). Rule
`60(b)(4) allows a prisoner to reopen his 28 U.S.C. §
`2255 proceedings if "the final judgment is void."
`Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4). In his motion, Kapordelis
`argued that his 2255 judgment was void as a result of
`three due process defects in the integrity of the 2255
`proceedings. Also before the district court was
`Kapordelis's motion to recuse the district judge from
`the Rule 60(b)(4) proceedings (CR-640/645) for
`reasons of extrajudicial and pervasive bias. Statutory
`law requires a district judge's disqualification "in any
`proceeding" where his impartiality "might reasonably
`be questioned," or where the judge "has a personal
`bias or prejudice concerning a party." See 28 U.S.C.
`§§ 455(a) and (b)(l). (Note: Because the merit of the
`underlying Rule 60(b) arguments and recusal
`arguments are irrelevant for purposes of justifying
`this petition for writ of mandamus, they will not be
`addressed here.)
`
`The district judge issued an order denying his
`recusal from the Rule 60(b)(4) proceedings (CR-643),
`and he subsequently issued a final judgment denying
`the Rule 60(b) motion and denying Kapordelis's mo-
`
`
`
`7
`tion to reconsider the previous order denying recusal.
`(CR-653). The district judge also denied Kapordelis's
`Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion to amend, vacate or modify
`the final judgment in the Rule 60(b)(4) proceeding,
`and he denied a COA with respect to all Rule 60(b)(4)
`claims. (CR-658).
`B. Kapordelis's Notice of Appeal
`Kapordelis filed a timely notice of appeal (CR-
`660) which targeted both the final order denying the
`Rule 60(b)(4) claims and the order denying the district
`judge's recusal. Kapordelis made clear in his notice
`that "^jurisdiction for appellate review from recusal
`orders is authorized, as a matter of right, under 28
`U.S.C. § 1291! as such, a COA is not required." App.4.
`In support of his position on jurisdiction, Kapordelis
`advanced in his notice of appeal many of the same
`arguments presented {infra) in this petition for writ
`of mandamus. Id.
`C. Eleventh Circuit Proceedings
`The instant appeal was docketed as Kapordelis
`v. United States, Appeal No. 21-11921 (llth Cir.
`2021). (Docket Entry, "DE", 06/02/21). Kapordelis
`subsequently filed a pro se Application for Certificate
`of Appealability, explaining in detail why his Rule
`60(b)(4) claims deserved to be reviewed on their merit.
`(DE-06/14/21, at 1-53). In his application, Kapordelis
`advised the Court that, "[njotwithstanding whether a
`COA issues, [he] has a right pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
`1291 to appellate review of recusal orders in the
`
`
`
`8
`instant Rule 60(b)(4) proceeding, and he awaits a
`briefing schedule in this regard." {Id. at 53).
`
`On August 12, 2021, Circuit Judge Grant issued
`a single-judge order denying a COA with respect to
`the Rule 60(b)(4) claims. App.l. This order neither
`mentions nor addresses Kapordelis's request to
`appeal from the ripe recusal orders, nor does it refer
`the recusal matter to a three-judge panel for the
`requisite review on the merits. Attached to Judge
`Grant's order was a notice from the Clerk of Court
`informing Kapordelis that the order "is issued as the
`mandate of the court."
`
`In response, and through pro bono counsel,
`Kapordelis filed a motion to reconsider Judge Grant's
`administrative order, pursuant to 11th Cir. Rule 27-
`2. (DE-09/02/21). In this motion, Kapordelis again
`informed the court that appellate review of recusal
`orders is authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and does
`not require a COA, and he requested either "a briefing
`schedule" or "a delay in issuance of the mandate in
`this appeal until after the parties have fully briefed
`the recusal arguments 0 and a three-judge panel has
`considered these arguments on the merits." {Id. at 6-
`7). On September 24, 2021, Circuit Judges Grant and
`Lagoa issued an order summarily denying recon
`sideration. This order neither mentions nor addresses
`Kapordelis's request to appeal from the ripe recusal
`orders based on jurisdiction set forth at 28 U.S.C. §
`1291. App.2
`
`
`
`9
`On November 2, 2021, Kapordelis filed two pro
`se motions with the Eleventh Circuit: a Motion to
`Recall the Mandate in order to Prevent Injustice,
`pursuant to 11th Cir. Rule 41- 1(b) and (c); and, an
`Opening Appellant Brief addressing the recusal
`arguments, pursuant to 11th Cir. Rule 31.1. In his
`motion to recall the mandate, Kapordelis argued that
`he had a statutory and constitutional right to appeal
`from the ripe recusal orders notwithstanding whether
`a COA was issued to appeal from the final order
`denying the Rule 60(b)(4) claims. Once again,
`Kapordelis offered in support many of the same
`arguments presented {infra) in this petition for writ
`of mandamus. (Note: a copy of the recall motion can
`be found at Appendix E to Kapordelis’s Supreme
`Court application for an extension of time to file,
`Application No. 21A214).
`
`Rather than properly file the motion to recall the
`mandate and thereby trigger judicial review, as
`required under Eleventh Circuit rules, the Clerk of
`Court instead issued a notice informing Kapordelis
`that "[t]he Court has received your motion to 'Recall
`Mandate,"' and that "no further actions will be taken
`in this case." (DE-11/02/21). In response to this notice,
`Kapordelis urged Chief Circuit Judge Pryor to
`investigate what appeared to be a failure by the clerk
`to comply with Eleventh Circuit rules. (DE-11/15/21).
`Two days later, and perhaps due to Judge Pryor's
`intervention, the clerk filed (backdated to November
`2, 2021) Kapordelis's motion to recall the mandate,
`and he acknowledged the earlier notice as having
`been issued in error. The recall motion was then
`
`
`
`10
`summarily denied by Circuit Judges Grant and
`Lagoa. (DE-12/08/21).
`Kapordelis's petition for writ of mandamus
`timely follows this Court's order granting an ex
`tension of time to file until January 24, 2022. App.3.
`As noted in Kapordelis's application for an extension,
`more time was required because, among other things,
`
`"[i]f the Eleventh Circuit refuses to
`recall the mandate, and by extension
`refuses to exercise appellate juris
`diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to
`review the ripe recusal orders, Kap-
`ordelis would be in a legitimate
`position to request from the Supreme
`Court a Petition for Writ of Mandamus,
`pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), in
`order to compel the Eleventh Circuit to
`perform as Congress has directed, in
`aid of this Court's appellate jurisdiction
`on the matter of recusal."
`(Supreme Court Application No. 21A214, at 5).
`REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS WRIT
`INTRODUCTION AND RULE 20.1 STATEMENT
`A writ of mandamus is appropriate for excep
`tional circumstances of the kind present here: The
`unlawful repudiation by certain Eleventh Circuit
`judges of their duty to (i) exercise non-discretionary
`appellate jurisdiction set forth by Congress at 28
`
`
`
`11
`U.S.C. § 1291, and (ii) refer this case to a three-judge
`merits panel for review of appealable recusal orders
`issued by the district court judge.
`
`In general, a writ of mandamus may issue in this
`Court's discretion when there are no other adequate
`means to attain the desired relief and when the
`petitioner's right is clear and indisputable. See
`Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Columbia, 542
`U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004); Sup. Ct. R. 20.1. These hur
`dles, however, "are not insuperable." Cheney, 542
`U.S. at 381. The traditional use of the writ in aid of
`appellate jurisdiction "has been to confine an inferior
`court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction
`or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its
`duty to do so." Roche v. Evaporated Milk, 81 LED
`1185, 1190 (1943).
`
`Kapordelis contends that his unique circum
`stances justify issuance of a writ of mandamus that
`compels Eleventh Circuit judges Grant and Lagoa to
`exercise the non*discretionary jurisdiction set forth by
`Congress at 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The following argu
`ments inform.
`
`I. THERE IS NO OTHER ADEQUATE MEANS TO
`ATTAIN THE DESIRED RELIEF.
`
`In Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238 (1980), this
`Court held that "[t]he Due Process Clause entitles a
`person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in
`both civil and criminal cases." Id. at 242. Congress
`clearly appreciated the gravity of this constitutional
`
`
`
`12
`
`right, where it established under 28 U.S.C. § 455 a
`framework to make certain that district court judges
`conflicted by bias or the appearance of bias could be
`disqualified "in any proceeding." Equally important
`here, Congress established at 28 U.S.C. § 1291 the
`jurisdiction for non-discretionary appellate review of
`recusal orders (and other non-final orders) after a
`final order is issued to dispose of all claims/issues in
`a district court proceeding. Finally, Congress estab
`lished at 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) the jurisdiction for
`discretionary review by this Court through the
`certiorari process.
`
`Kapordelis followed the law when seeking in
`good faith to disqualify the district judge in his Rule
`60(b)(4) proceeding for reasons of extrajudicial and
`pervasive bias. To wit: (i) he promptly filed a motion
`to recuse the judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and
`455; (ii) once the final order was issued to dispose of
`all Rule 60(b)(4) claims on their merit, he filed a
`notice of appeal which specifically targeted the
`recusal orders; (iii) he paid in full the filing fee for the
`appeal, thus ensuring under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 that a
`three-judge "merits" panel would review the ripe
`recusal orders notwithstanding whether a COA was
`granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) to appeal
`from the final order disposing of the Rule 60(b)(4)
`claims! and, (iv) he filed a motion seeking to recall the
`improvidently issued mandate, i.e., a mandate which
`closed the appeal before a requisite merits review of
`the recusal arguments could take place.
`
`
`
`13
`Where it is clear and indisputable that Judges
`Grant and Lagoa had appellate jurisdiction under §
`1291 to refer the recusal issue to a three-judge merits
`panel for proper review (see Section II, infra),
`Kapordelis is left with no choice but to secure a writ
`of mandamus directing these judges to lawfully
`exercise this prescribed jurisdiction. Indeed, only if
`these judges exercise their non-discretionary juris
`diction under § 1291 can the Supreme Court be asked
`to lawfully exercise its discretionary jurisdiction
`under § 1254(l). Put differently, Kapordelis cannot
`file a legitimate petition for writ of certiorari con
`cerning all arguments in Appeal No. 21-11921-C (to
`include the recusal arguments) unless and until the
`Eleventh Circuit determines whether the district
`judge was actually biased.
`II. THE RIGHT TO RELIEF IS CLEAR AND
`INDISPUTABLE.
`A. Jurisdiction for appellate review of ripe
`recusal orders is established at 28 U.S.C. §
`1291.
`"Only Congress may determine a lower court's
`subject-matter jurisdiction." Kontrick v. Ryan, 540
`U.S. 443, 454 (2004). Equally important, Congress
`has "the sole power of creating the [judicial] tribunals
`(inferior to the Supreme Court)...and of investing
`them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or
`exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them
`in the exact degrees and character which to Congress
`may seem proper for the public good." Ankenbrandt v.
`
`
`
`14
`
`Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 698 (l992)(quoting Cary v.
`Curtis, 44 U.S. 236 (1845)).
`
`Under statutory law, U.S. Courts of Appeal
`(other than the Court of Appeals for the Federal
`Circuit) "have jurisdiction of appeals from all final
`decisions of the district courts of the United States...."
`28 U.S.C. § 1291. And, the Eleventh Circuit has made
`clear that an appeal from a final judgment brings up
`for review all preceding non-final orders. Kirkland v.
`NatlMortg. Network, Inc., 884 F.2d 1367, 1370 (llth
`Cir. 1989). Relevant here, recusal decisions will not be
`addressed until the litigation is final. Steering Comm,
`v. Mead Corp., 614 F.2d 958, 960-61 (5th Cir. 1980).
`Also relevant, the general rule in the Eleventh Circuit
`is that "an appellate court has jurisdiction to review
`only the judgments, orders, or portions thereof which
`are specified in an appellant's notice of appeal.”
`Osterneck v. E. T. Barwick Industries, Inc., 825 F.2d
`1521 (llth Cir. 1987).
`
`In a recent case where a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 litigant
`sought mandamus relief from the Eleventh Circuit for
`purposes of disqualifying the district judge before the
`2255 proceeding had concluded, the circuit judge
`denied the writ because "[t]he appellant has the
`adequate remedy of appealing the district court's
`denial of his recusal motion as soon as the court
`enters a final judgment in his § 2255 proceeding." In
`re Collins, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 13421 *3, No. 18-
`19724-C (llth Cir. May 2018)(citing to Jackson v.
`Motel 6Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1004 (llth
`Cir. 1997)). It is crucial to note the trigger identified
`
`
`
`15
`in Collins for purposes of securing appellate review of
`recusal decisions in a collateral proceeding: the entry
`of final judgment, not the entry of a final judgment
`AND issuance of a COA to appeal from the final order
`denying relief on the merits of the habeas arguments.
`It is clear and indisputable that the recusal
`orders in Kapordelis's case were appealable to the
`Eleventh Circuit based on the non-discretionary
`jurisdiction set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 1291, because (i)
`a final judgment had been issued which settled all the
`pending Rule 60(b)(4) claims
`on
`the merits; (ii)
`Kapordelis specifically targeted the recusal orders in
`his notice of appeal; (iii) Kapordelis paid the filing fee
`required to appeal; (iv) Kapordelis filed an opening
`brief in accordance with Eleventh Circuit rules. See
`11th Cir. R. 31.1 (directing an appellant to file an
`opening brief within 40 days of the issuance of an
`order resolving an application for COA).
`B. The COA provisions at 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)
`do not effect § 1291's appellate jurisdiction
`to review ripe recusal (or similar) orders.
`It is easy to understand why Circuit Judges
`Grant and Lagoa never posited in their order(s) that
`Kapordelis's recusal arguments could not be reviewed
`pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because a COA was
`denied with respect to the Rule 60(b)(4) claims: This
`position would be contrary to (l) Supreme Court
`holdings in similar circumstances; (2) the conclusions
`(some authoritative and some persuasive) reached by
`every U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals to have
`
`
`
`16
`
`specifically addressed this issue; and, (3) persuasive
`Eleventh Circuit case law directly on point.
`
`1. Supreme Court holdings support this
`contention.
`
`Congress established appellate jurisdiction
`when enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and this jurisdiction
`did not simply evaporate when it enacted § 2253(c)'s
`COA requirements. Instead, § 2253(c) constrains or
`modifies § 1291's jurisdiction to "the exact degree and
`character which to Congress [seemed] for the public
`good." Ankenbrandt (supra). The dispositive question
`begged, is this: To what degree or in what character
`does § 2253(c) constrain or modify § 1291's juris
`diction when it comes to appealable recusal orders?
`
`Sections 2253(c)(1)(A) and (B) of Title 28 provide
`that unless a circuit justice or judge issues a COA, an
`appeal may not be taken from the "final order in a
`habeas corpus proceeding" whether the detention
`complained of arises out of a State court or a 28 U.S.C.
`§ 2255 proceeding. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253(c)(1)(A) and (B).
`These provisions "govern final orders that dispose of
`the merits of a habeas corpus proceeding---a
`proceeding challenging the lawfulness of the
`prisoner's detention." See, generally, Slack v.
`McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000); Wilkinson v.
`Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78-83 (2005).
`
`An appealable order that merely denies a motion
`to recuse a district court judge from a 2255 or 2254
`proceeding, like an appealable order relating to the
`
`
`
`1
`
`17
`appointment of counsel, falls outside the statutory
`requirement for a COA because it has nothing to do
`with the "merits" of the habeas corpus proceeding. In
`Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180 (2009), this Court held
`that orders relating to appointment of counsel fall
`outside statutory requirement for a COA. Id. at 183.
`Although the predicate for the holding in Bell is not
`relevant under Kapordelis's circumstances (Kapor-
`delis's issue is a collateral recusal decision, not a
`collateral decision relating to the appointment of
`counsel), the Bell holding was based on a strict
`reading of the language in 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A)
`that limits the COA requirement to "final orders that
`dispose of the merits of a habeas corpus proceeding."
`Id. (emphasis added). Thus, by applying Bell to
`Kapordelis's circumstances, it is clear the district
`court's recusal decision is not subject to the juris
`dictional constraints in § 2253(c). See Bracy v.
`Superintendent, RockviewSCI, 986 F.3d 274, 282 (3d
`Cir. 2021)("Harblson used 'the merits' to distinguish
`'final orders' that conclude the habeas corpus
`proceeding itself from those orders that merely
`resolve a collateral issue").
`2. Every U.S. Court of Appeals to have
`considered this issue agrees that a COA is
`not needed to appeal from ripe recusal
`orders.
`Fortunately, one need not rely on the previous
`legal argument to conclude that a COA is not required
`to appeal from recusal orders that have been rendered
`appealable through issuance of a final judgment in a
`
`
`
`18
`
`§ 2255 or § 2254 proceeding, where every U.S. Circuit
`Court of Appeals to have considered this issue has
`reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Ohle v. United
`States, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 28074 (2d Cir. 2018)
`("To the extent a COA may not be required as to the
`decision denying the recusal motion, that aspect of the
`appeal is dismissed for lack of an arguable basis in
`law or fact."); United States v. Schwartz, 2016 U.S.
`App. LEXIS 24190 (3d Cir. 2016)(no COA required in
`a Rule 60(b) habeas corpus proceeding to appeal from
`the denial of a motion to recuse district judge, citing
`to Harbison v. Bell)', Rice v. McKenzie, 581 F.2d 1114,
`1118 (4th Cir. 1978) (vacating district court's denial
`of a habeas petition because the district court abused
`its discretion in denying recusal motion); Trevino v.
`Johnson, 168 F.3d 173, 176-78 (5th Cir. 1999)
`(accepting jurisdiction to hear appeal from recusal
`order under 28 U.S.C. § 455, where the issue did not
`constitute an appeal of the merits of the final order
`denying habeas relief "While we lack jurisdiction to
`consider a district court's order denying habeas relief
`without issuing a COA, we do have jurisdiction to
`consider whether a district court judge properly
`declined to stand recused and therefore had the
`authority to deny a habeas petition."); Kemp v. United
`States, 52 Fed. App'x 731, 732 (6th Cir. 2002)(appeal
`from recusal order not mooted based on decision to not
`issue a COA to review the § 2255 grounds of error);
`Russell v. Lane, 890 F.2d 947, 947 (7th Cir. 1989)
`(finding jurisdiction to consider whether a district
`court abused its discretion in denying recusal motion,
`because "federal procedural law governing recusal
`entitles [the petitioner] to have his habeas corpus
`
`
`
`19
`
`petition heard by a[n] unbiased judge"); Nelson v.
`United St