`(Slip Opinion)
`
`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2019
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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`
`
`
`
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
` DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY ET AL. v.
`
`
`
`
` REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
`CALIFORNIA ET AL.
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE NINTH CIRCUIT
` No. 18–587. Argued November 12, 2019—Decided June 18, 2020*
`
`In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a memo-
`
`randum announcing an immigration relief program known as Deferred
`Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), which allows certain unauthor-
`ized aliens who arrived in the United States as children to apply for a
`
`two-year forbearance of removal. Those granted such relief become
`
`eligible for work authorization and various federal benefits. Some
`700,000 aliens have availed themselves of this opportunity.
`
`Two years later, DHS expanded DACA eligibility and created a re-
`lated program known as Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and
`
`Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA). If implemented, that program
`
`would have made 4.3 million parents of U. S. citizens or lawful perma-
`
`nent residents eligible for the same forbearance from removal, work
`
`eligibility, and other benefits as DACA recipients. Texas, joined by 25
`other States, secured a nationwide preliminary injunction barring im-
`plementation of both the DACA expansion and DAPA. The Fifth Cir-
`cuit upheld the injunction, concluding that the program violated the
`Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which carefully defines eligi-
`bility for benefits. This Court affirmed by an equally divided vote, and
`
`
`
`
`
`——————
`
`*Together with No. 18–588, Trump, President of the United States, et
`
`al. v. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People et al.,
`
`on certiorari before judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for
`the District of Columbia Circuit, and No. 18–589, Wolf, Acting Secretary
`
`
`of Homeland Security, et al. v. Batalla Vidal et al., on certiorari before
`
`judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v.
`REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL.
`
`Syllabus
`
`the litigation then continued in the District Court.
`
`
`In June 2017, following a change in Presidential administrations,
`
`DHS rescinded the DAPA Memorandum, citing, among other reasons,
`
`the ongoing suit by Texas and new policy priorities. That September,
`the Attorney General advised Acting Secretary of Homeland Security
`
`Elaine C. Duke that DACA shared DAPA’s legal flaws and should also
`
`
`
`be rescinded. The next day, Duke acted on that advice. Taking into
`consideration the Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court rulings and the At-
`torney General’s letter, Duke decided to terminate the program. She
`explained that DHS would no longer accept new applications, but that
`
`existing DACA recipients whose benefits were set to expire within six
`months could apply for a two-year renewal. For all other DACA recip-
`ients, previously issued grants of relief would expire on their own
`
`terms, with no prospect for renewal.
`
`
`Several groups of plaintiffs challenged Duke’s decision to rescind
`
`
`DACA, claiming that it was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the
`Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and infringed the equal protec-
`
`tion guarantee of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. District
`Courts in California (Regents, No. 18–587), New York (Batalla Vidal,
`
`No. 18–589), and the District of Columbia (NAACP, No. 18–588) all
`ruled for the plaintiffs. Each court rejected the Government’s argu-
`
`ments that the claims were unreviewable under the APA and that the
`INA deprived the courts of jurisdiction. In Regents and Batalla Vidal,
`
`the District Courts further held that the equal protection claims were
`adequately alleged, and they entered coextensive nationwide prelimi-
`nary injunctions based on the conclusion that the plaintiffs were likely
`
`to succeed on their APA claims. The District Court in NAACP took a
`
`different approach. It deferred ruling on the equal protection chal-
`
`lenge but granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their
`
`APA claim, finding that the rescission was inadequately explained.
`The court then stayed its order for 90 days to permit DHS to reissue a
`
`
`memorandum rescinding DACA, this time with a fuller explanation of
`
`
`the conclusion that DACA was unlawful. Two months later, Duke’s
`
`
`
`successor, Secretary Kirstjen M. Nielsen, responded to the court’s or-
`der. She declined to disturb or replace Duke’s rescission decision and
`instead explained why she thought her predecessor’s decision was
`sound. In addition to reiterating the illegality conclusion, she offered
`
`several new justifications for the rescission. The Government moved
`for the District Court to reconsider in light of this additional explana-
`tion, but the court concluded that the new reasoning failed to elaborate
`
`meaningfully on the illegality rationale.
`
`
`
`
`The Government appealed the various District Court decisions to
`
`the Second, Ninth, and D. C. Circuits, respectively. While those ap-
`
`
`peals were pending, the Government filed three petitions for certiorari
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`before judgment. Following the Ninth Circuit affirmance in Regents,
`this Court granted certiorari.
`
`
`Held: The judgment in No. 18–587 is vacated in part and reversed in
`part; the judgment in No. 18–588 is affirmed; the February 13, 2018
`
`order in No. 18–589 is vacated, the November 9, 2017 order is affirmed
`in part, and the March 29, 2018 order is reversed in part; and all of the
`cases are remanded.
`No. 18–587, 908 F. 3d 476, vacated in part and reversed in part; No. 18–
`
`588, affirmed; and No. 18–589, February 13, 2018 order vacated, No-
`vember 9, 2017 order affirmed in part, and March 29, 2018 order re-
`versed in part; all cases remanded.
`THE CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to
`
`
`Part IV, concluding:
`
`1. DHS’s rescission decision is reviewable under the APA and is
`
`
`within this Court’s jurisdiction. Pp. 9–13.
`
`(a) The APA’s “basic presumption of judicial review” of agency ac-
`
`
`tion, Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140, can be rebut-
`ted by showing that the “agency action is committed to agency discre-
`tion by law,” 5 U. S. C. §701(a)(2). In Heckler v. Chaney, the Court held
`
`that this narrow exception includes an agency’s decision not to insti-
`tute an enforcement action. 470 U. S. 821, 831–832. The Government
`
`
`contends that DACA is a general non-enforcement policy equivalent to
`
`
`the individual non-enforcement decision in Chaney. But the DACA
`
`
`Memorandum did not merely decline to institute enforcement proceed-
`
`ings; it created a program for conferring affirmative immigration re-
`
`lief. Therefore, unlike the non-enforcement decision in Chaney,
`DACA’s creation—and its rescission—is an “action [that] provides a
`
`focus for judicial review.” Id., at 832. In addition, by virtue of receiving
`
`deferred action, 700,000 DACA recipients may request work authori-
`
`
`zation and are eligible for Social Security and Medicare. Access to such
`
`
`benefits is an interest “courts often are called upon to protect.” Ibid.
`
`DACA’s rescission is thus subject to review under the APA. Pp. 9–12.
`(b) The two jurisdictional provisions of the INA invoked by the
`
`
`Government do not apply. Title 8 U. S. C. §1252(b)(9), which bars re-
`view of claims arising from “action[s]” or “proceeding[s] brought to re-
`move an alien,” is inapplicable where, as here, the parties do not chal-
`lenge any removal proceedings. And the rescission is not a decision “to
`
`commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders”
`within the meaning of §1252(g). Pp. 12–13.
`2. DHS’s decision to rescind DACA was arbitrary and capricious un-
`
`
`der the APA. Pp. 13–26.
`(a) In assessing the rescission, the Government urges the Court to
`
`
`consider not just the contemporaneous explanation offered by Acting
`Secretary Duke but also the additional reasons supplied by Secretary
`
`
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v.
`REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL.
`
`Syllabus
`Nielsen nine months later. Judicial review of agency action, however,
`
`is limited to “the grounds that the agency invoked when it took the
`
`action.” Michigan v. EPA, 576 U. S. 743, 758. If those grounds are
`
`inadequate, a court may remand for the agency to offer “a fuller expla-
`nation of the agency’s reasoning at the time of the agency action,” Pen-
`
`
`
`sion Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp., 496 U. S. 633, 654
`
`
`(emphasis added), or to “deal with the problem afresh” by taking new
`
`agency action, SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 201. Because Sec-
`retary Nielsen chose not to take new action, she was limited to elabo-
`
`rating on the agency’s original reasons. But her reasoning bears little
`relationship to that of her predecessor and consists primarily of imper-
`
`missible “post hoc rationalization.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
`
`
`
`Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 420. The rule requiring a new decision
`
`before considering new reasons is not merely a formality. It serves
`
`important administrative law values by promoting agency accounta-
`bility to the public, instilling confidence that the reasons given are not
`
`simply convenient litigating positions, and facilitating orderly review.
`Each of these values would be markedly undermined if this Court al-
`
`lowed DHS to rely on reasons offered nine months after the rescission
`and after three different courts had identified flaws in the original ex-
`planation. Pp. 13–17.
`
`
`
`(b) Acting Secretary Duke’s rescission memorandum failed to con-
`
`sider important aspects of the problem before the agency. Although
`Duke was bound by the Attorney General’s determination that DACA
`
`
`is illegal, see 8 U. S. C. §1103(a)(1), deciding how best to address that
`
`determination involved important policy choices reserved for DHS.
`Acting Secretary Duke plainly exercised such discretionary authority
`in winding down the program, but she did not appreciate the full scope
`of her discretion. The Attorney General concluded that the legal de-
`
`fects in DACA mirrored those that the courts had recognized in DAPA.
`The Fifth Circuit, the highest court to offer a reasoned opinion on
`DAPA’s legality, found that DAPA violated the INA because it ex-
`tended eligibility for benefits to a class of unauthorized aliens. But the
`defining feature of DAPA (and DACA) is DHS’s decision to defer re-
`moval, and the Fifth Circuit carefully distinguished that forbearance
`component from the associated benefits eligibility. Eliminating bene-
`fits eligibility while continuing forbearance thus remained squarely
`
`
`within Duke’s discretion. Yet, rather than addressing forbearance in
`her decision, Duke treated the Attorney General’s conclusion regard-
`ing the illegality of benefits as sufficient to rescind both benefits and
`forbearance, without explanation. That reasoning repeated the error
`in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc.
`
`
`v. State Farm— treating a rationale that applied to only part of a policy
`
`as sufficient to rescind the entire policy. 463 U. S. 29, 51. While DHS
`
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`was not required to “consider all policy alternatives,” ibid., deferred
`action was “within the ambit of the existing” policy, ibid.; indeed, it
`
`was the centerpiece of the policy. In failing to consider the option to
`retain deferred action, Duke “failed to supply the requisite ‘reasoned
`
`analysis.’ ” Id., at 57.
`
`
`
`That omission alone renders Duke’s decision arbitrary and capri-
`
`cious, but it was not the only defect. Duke also failed to address
`
`whether there was “legitimate reliance” on the DACA Memorandum.
`
`Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 742. Certain
`features of the DACA policy may affect the strength of any reliance
`interests, but those features are for the agency to consider in the first
`
`
`instance. DHS has flexibility in addressing any reliance interests and
`could have considered various accommodations. While the agency was
`
`not required to pursue these accommodations, it was required to assess
`
`the existence and strength of any reliance interests, and weigh them
`
`against competing policy concerns. Its failure to do so was arbitrary
`and capricious. Pp. 17–26.
`THE CHIEF JUSTICE, joined by JUSTICE GINSBURG, JUSTICE BREYER,
`
`
`and JUSTICE KAGAN, concluded in Part IV that respondents’ claims fail
`
`to establish a plausible inference that the rescission was motivated by
`animus in violation of the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth
`Amendment. Pp. 27–29.
` ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part IV.
`
`GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined that opinion in full, and SO-
`
`
`TOMAYOR, J., joined as to all but Part IV. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion
`concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
`part. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and
`
`
`dissenting in part, in which ALITO and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. ALITO, J.,
`
`and KAVANAUGH, J., filed opinions concurring in the judgment in part
`
`
`and dissenting in part.
`
`
`
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`
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`
` Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
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`
`
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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`
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
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`
` corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
` Nos. 18–587, 18–588, and 18–589
`_________________
` DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
`
`
`ET AL., PETITIONERS
`
`v.
`
`REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
`
`
`
`
` CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`
`18–587
`
`
`
`DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE
`
`UNITED STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS
`
`18–588
`v.
`
`NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
`
`OF COLORED PEOPLE, ET AL.; AND
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE
`
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
`
`DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
`
`
`
`
`
`
`CHAD WOLF, ACTING SECRETARY OF HOMELAND
`
`SECURITY, ET AL., PETITIONERS
`
`18–589
`v.
`
`MARTIN JONATHAN BATALLA VIDAL, ET AL.
` ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED
`
`STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
` [June 18, 2020]
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`
` DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v.
`REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL.
`Opinion of the Court
`
`
`
`CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
`Court, except as to Part IV.
`
`In the summer of 2012, the Department of Homeland Se-
`
`curity (DHS) announced an immigration program known as
`Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA. That
`program allows certain unauthorized aliens who entered
`the United States as children to apply for a two-year for-
`
`bearance of removal. Those granted such relief are also
`
`eligible for work authorization and various federal benefits.
`Some 700,000 aliens have availed themselves of this
`opportunity.
`
`Five years later, the Attorney General advised DHS to
`rescind DACA, based on his conclusion that it was unlaw-
`ful. The Department’s Acting Secretary issued a memoran-
`dum terminating the program on that basis. The termina-
`tion was challenged by affected individuals and third
`
`parties who alleged, among other things, that the Acting
`
`Secretary had violated the Administrative Procedure Act
`(APA) by failing to adequately address important factors
`bearing on her decision. For the reasons that follow, we
`
`conclude that the Acting Secretary did violate the APA, and
`
`that the rescission must be vacated.
`I
`A
`
`In June 2012, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued
`
`a memorandum announcing an immigration relief program
`
`for “certain young people who were brought to this country
`
`as children.” App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 18–587, p. 97a
`(App. to Pet. for Cert.). Known as DACA, the program ap-
`plies to childhood arrivals who were under age 31 in 2012;
`have continuously resided here since 2007; are current stu-
`dents, have completed high school, or are honorably dis-
`charged veterans; have not been convicted of any serious
`
`crimes; and do not threaten national security or public
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`safety. Id., at 98a. DHS concluded that individuals who
`meet these criteria warrant favorable treatment under the
`immigration laws because they “lacked the intent to violate
`the law,” are “productive” contributors to our society, and
`“know only this country as home.” Id., at 98a–99a.
`“[T]o prevent [these] low priority individuals from being
`
`
`
`removed from the United States,” the DACA Memorandum
`instructs Immigration and Customs Enforcement to “exer-
`cise prosecutorial discretion[] on an individual basis . . . by
`deferring action for a period of two years, subject to re-
`newal.” Id., at 100a. In addition, it directs U. S. Citizen-
`ship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to “accept applica-
`
`tions to determine whether these individuals qualify for
`
`work authorization during this period of deferred action,”
`id., at 101a, as permitted under regulations long predating
`
`DACA’s creation, see 8 CFR §274a.12(c)(14) (2012) (permit-
`ting work authorization for deferred action recipients who
`
`establish “economic necessity”); 46 Fed. Reg. 25080–25081
`(1981) (similar). Pursuant to other regulations, deferred ac-
`tion recipients are considered “lawfully present” for pur-
`
`
`poses of, and therefore eligible to receive, Social Security
`and Medicare benefits. See 8 CFR §1.3(a)(4)(vi); 42 CFR
`§417.422(h) (2012).
`
`In November 2014, two years after DACA was promul-
`gated, DHS issued a memorandum announcing that it
`
`would expand DACA eligibility by removing the age cap,
`shifting the date-of-entry requirement from 2007 to 2010,
`
`and extending the deferred action and work authorization
`period to three years. App. to Pet. for Cert. 106a–107a. In
`the same memorandum, DHS created a new, related pro-
`gram known as Deferred Action for Parents of Americans
`
`and Lawful Permanent Residents, or DAPA. That program
`would have authorized deferred action for up to 4.3 million
`parents whose children were U. S. citizens or lawful perma-
`nent residents. These parents were to enjoy the same for-
`bearance, work eligibility, and other benefits as DACA
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`
` DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v.
`REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL.
`Opinion of the Court
`
`
`
`recipients.
`
`
`Before the DAPA Memorandum was implemented, 26
`States, led by Texas, filed suit in the Southern District of
`Texas. The States contended that DAPA and the DACA
`expansion violated the APA’s notice and comment require-
`
`ment, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and the
`Executive’s duty under the Take Care Clause of the Consti-
`
`tution. The District Court found that the States were likely
`
`to succeed on the merits of at least one of their claims and
`entered a nationwide preliminary injunction barring imple-
`mentation of both DAPA and the DACA expansion. See
`
`Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677–678 (2015).
`
`A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
`cuit affirmed the preliminary injunction. Texas v. United
`
`States, 809 F. 3d 134, 188 (2015). In opposing the injunc-
`tion, the Government argued that the DAPA Memorandum
`reflected an unreviewable exercise of the Government’s en-
`
`forcement discretion. The Fifth Circuit majority disagreed.
`
`It reasoned that the deferred action described in the DAPA
`Memorandum was “much more than nonenforcement: It
`would affirmatively confer ‘lawful presence’ and associated
`
`
`benefits on a class of unlawfully present aliens.” Id., at 166.
`From this, the majority concluded that the creation of the
`DAPA program was not an unreviewable action “committed
`to agency discretion by law.” Id., at 169 (quoting 5 U. S. C.
`§701(a)(2)).
`
`
`The majority then upheld the injunction on two grounds.
`It first concluded the States were likely to succeed on their
`procedural claim that the DAPA Memorandum was a sub-
`stantive rule that was required to undergo notice and com-
`ment. It then held that the APA required DAPA to be set
`
`aside because the program was “manifestly contrary” to the
`INA, which “expressly and carefully provides legal designa-
`tions allowing defined classes” to “receive the benefits” as-
`
`sociated with “lawful presence” and to qualify for work
`
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`authorization, 809 F. 3d, at 179–181, 186 (internal quota-
`tion marks omitted). Judge King dissented.
`
`This Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s judgment by an
`equally divided vote, which meant that no opinion was is-
`
`sued. United States v. Texas, 579 U. S. ___ (2016) (per cu-
`riam). For the next year, litigation over DAPA and the
`DACA expansion continued in the Southern District of
`
`Texas, while implementation of those policies remained
`
`enjoined.
`
`Then, in June 2017, following a change in Presidential
`
`administrations, DHS rescinded the DAPA Memorandum.
`In explaining that decision, DHS cited the preliminary in-
`junction and ongoing litigation in Texas, the fact that
`
`DAPA had never taken effect, and the new administration’s
`immigration enforcement priorities.
`
`Three months later, in September 2017, Attorney
`General Jefferson B. Sessions III sent a letter to Acting Sec-
`retary of Homeland Security Elaine C. Duke, “advis[ing]”
`that DHS “should rescind” DACA as well. App. 877. Citing
`the Fifth Circuit’s opinion and this Court’s equally divided
`
`affirmance, the Attorney General concluded that DACA
`shared the “same legal . . . defects that the courts recog-
`
`nized as to DAPA” and was “likely” to meet a similar fate.
`Id., at 878. “In light of the costs and burdens” that a rescis-
`sion would “impose[] on DHS,” the Attorney General urged
`DHS to “consider an orderly and efficient wind-down
`
`process.” Ibid.
`
`The next day, Duke acted on the Attorney General’s ad-
`
`vice. In her decision memorandum, Duke summarized the
`
`
`history of the DACA and DAPA programs, the Fifth Circuit
`opinion and ensuing affirmance, and the contents of the At-
`
`torney General’s letter. App. to Pet. for Cert. 111a–117a.
`
`“Taking into consideration the Supreme Court’s and the
`
`Fifth Circuit’s rulings” and the “letter from the Attorney
`General,” she concluded that the “DACA program should be
`terminated.” Id., at 117a.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v.
`REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL.
`Opinion of the Court
`Duke then detailed how the program would be wound
`
`down: No new applications would be accepted, but DHS
`would entertain applications for two-year renewals from
`DACA recipients whose benefits were set to expire within
`six months. For all other DACA recipients, previously is-
`sued grants of deferred action and work authorization
`
`would not be revoked but would expire on their own terms,
`with no prospect for renewal. Id., at 117a–118a.
`B
`
`
`Within days of Acting Secretary Duke’s rescission an-
`nouncement, multiple groups of plaintiffs ranging from in-
`
`dividual DACA recipients and States to the Regents of the
`University of California and the National Association for
`the Advancement of Colored People challenged her decision
`in the U. S. District Courts for the Northern District of Cal-
`ifornia (Regents, No. 18–587), the Eastern District of New
`York (Batalla Vidal, No. 18–589), and the District of Co-
`lumbia (NAACP, No. 18–588). The relevant claims are that
`the rescission was arbitrary and capricious in violation of
`the APA and that it infringed the equal protection guaran-
`
`tee of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.1
`All three District Courts ruled for the plaintiffs, albeit at
`
`
`different stages of the proceedings.2 In doing so, each court
`
`rejected the Government’s threshold arguments that the
`
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` 1Plaintiffs also raised notice and comment claims, which uniformly
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`failed below, and assorted due process challenges, some of which sur-
`vived motions to dismiss. Those claims are not before us.
`2In a related challenge not at issue here, the District Court for the
`District of Maryland granted partial summary judgment in favor of the
`Government. Casa de Maryland v. United States Dept. of Homeland Se-
`curity, 284 F. Supp. 3d 758 (2018). After the Government filed petitions
`for certiorari in the instant cases, the Fourth Circuit reversed that deci-
`sion and vacated Acting Secretary Duke’s rescission as arbitrary and ca-
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`pricious. Casa de Maryland v. United States Dept. of Homeland Security,
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`924 F. 3d 684 (2019), cert. pending, No. 18–1469. The Fourth Circuit has
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`since stayed its mandate.
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`Opinion of the Court
`claims were unreviewable under the APA and that the INA
`deprived the court of jurisdiction. 298 F. Supp. 3d 209,
`223–224, 234–235 (DC 2018); 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1029–
`1033 (ND Cal. 2018); 295 F. Supp. 3d 127, 150, 153–154
`(EDNY 2017).
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`In Regents and Batalla Vidal, the District Courts held
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`that the equal protection claims were adequately alleged.
`298 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1315 (ND Cal. 2018); 291 F. Supp. 3d
`260, 279 (EDNY 2018). Those courts also entered coexten-
`sive nationwide preliminary injunctions, based on the con-
`clusion that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the mer-
`its of their claims that the rescission was arbitrary and
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`capricious. These injunctions did not require DHS to accept
`new applications, but did order the agency to allow DACA
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`recipients to “renew their enrollments.” 279 F. Supp. 3d, at
`1048; see 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 437 (EDNY 2018).
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`In NAACP, the D. C. District Court took a different
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`course. In April 2018, it deferred ruling on the equal pro-
`tection challenge but granted partial summary judgment to
`the plaintiffs on their APA claim, holding that Acting Sec-
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`retary Duke’s “conclusory statements were insufficient to
`explain the change in [the agency’s] view of DACA’s lawful-
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`ness.” 298 F. Supp. 3d, at 243. The District Court stayed
`its order for 90 days to permit DHS to “reissue a memoran-
`dum rescinding DACA, this time providing a fuller expla-
`nation for the determination that the program lacks statu-
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`tory and constitutional authority.” Id., at 245.
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`Two months later, Duke’s successor, Secretary Kirstjen
`M. Nielsen, responded via memorandum. App. to Pet. for
`Cert. 120a–126a. She explained that, “[h]aving considered
`the Duke memorandum,” she “decline[d] to disturb” the re-
`scission. Id., at 121a. Secretary Nielsen went on to articu-
`late her “understanding” of Duke’s memorandum, identify-
`ing three reasons why, in Nielsen’s estimation, “the
`decision to rescind the DACA policy was, and remains,
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`sound.” Ibid. First, she reiterated that, “as the Attorney
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` DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v.
`REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL.
`Opinion of the Court
`General concluded, the DACA policy was contrary to law.”
`Id., at 122a. Second, she added that, regardless, the agency
`had “serious doubts about [DACA’s] legality” and, for law
`enforcement reasons, wanted to avoid “legally questiona-
`ble” policies. Id., at 123a. Third, she identified multiple
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`policy reasons for rescinding DACA, including (1) the belief
`that any class-based immigration relief should come from
`Congress, not through executive non-enforcement; (2)
`DHS’s preference for exercising prosecutorial discretion on
`“a truly individualized, case-by-case basis”; and (3) the im-
`portance of “project[ing] a message” that immigration laws
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`would be enforced against all classes and categories of al-
`iens. Id., at 123a–124a. In her final paragraph, Secretary
`Nielsen acknowledged the “asserted reliance interests” in
`DACA’s continuation but concluded that they did not “out-
`weigh the questionable legality of the DACA policy and the
`other reasons” for the rescission discussed in her memoran-
`dum. Id., at 125a.
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`The Government asked the D. C. District Court to revise
`its prior order in light of the reasons provided by Secretary
`Nielsen, but the court declined. In the court’s view, the new
`memorandum, which “fail[ed] to elaborate meaningfully”
`on the agency’s illegality rationale, still did not provide an
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`adequate explanation for the September 2017 rescission.
`315 F. Supp. 3d 457, 460, 473–474 (2018).
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`The Government appealed the various District Court de-
`cisions to the Second, Ninth, and D. C. Circuits, respec-
`tively. In November 2018, while those appeals were pend-
`ing, the Government simultaneously filed three petitions
`for certiorari before judgment. After the Ninth Circuit af-
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`firmed the nationwide injunction in Regents, see 908 F. 3d
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`476 (2018), but before rulings from the other two Circuits,
`we granted the petitions and consolidated the cases for ar-
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`gument. 588 U. S. ___ (2019). The issues raised here are
`(1) whether the APA claims are reviewable, (2) if so,
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`Opinion of the Court
`whether the rescission was arbitrary and capricious in vio-
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`lation of the APA, and (3) whether the plaintiffs have stated
`an equal protection claim.
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`II
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`The dispute before the Court is not whether DHS may
`rescind DACA. All parties agree that it may. The dispute
`is instead primarily about the procedure the agency fol-
`lowed in doing so.
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`The APA “sets forth the procedures by which federal
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`agencies are accountable to the public and their actions
`subject to review by the courts.” Franklin v. Massachusetts,
`505 U. S. 788, 796 (1992). It requires agencies to engage in
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`“reasoned decisionmaking,” Michigan v. EPA, 576 U. S.
`743, 750 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted), and di-
`rects that agency actions be “set aside” if they are “arbi-
`trary” or “capricious,” 5 U. S. C. §706(2)(A). Under this
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`“narrow standard of review, . . . a court is not to substitute
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`its judgment for that of the agency,” FCC v. Fox Television
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`Stations, Inc., 556 U. S. 502, 513 (2009) (internal quotation
`marks omitted), but instead to assess only whether the de-
`cision was “based on a consideration of the relevant factors
`and whether there has been a clear error of judgment,” Cit-
`izens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402,
`416 (1971).
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`But before determining whether the rescission was arbi-
`trary and capricious, we must first address the Govern-
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`ment’s contentions that DHS’s decision is unreviewable
`under the APA and outside this Court’s jurisdiction.
`A
`The APA establishes a “basic presumption of judicial
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`review [for] one ‘suffering legal wrong because of agency ac-
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`tion.’” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140
`(1967) (quoting §702). That presumption can be rebutted
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`by a showing that the relevant statute “preclude[s]” review,
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` DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v.
`REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL.
`Opinion of the Court
`§701(a)(1), or that the “agency action is committed to
`agency discretion by law,” §701(a)(2). The latter exception
`is at issue here.
`To “honor the presumption of review, we have read the
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`exception in §701(a)(2) quite narrowly,” Weyerhaeuser Co.
`v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 586 U. S. ___, ___
`(2018) (slip op., at 12), confining it to those rare “adminis-
`trative decision[s] traditionally left to agency discretion,”
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`Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U. S. 182, 191 (1993). This limited cat-
`egory of unreviewable actions includes an agency’s decision
`not to institute enforcement proceedings, Heckler v.
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`Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 831–832 (1985), and it is on that ex-
`ception that the Government primarily relies.
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`In Chaney, several death-row inmates petitioned the
`Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to take