No. 17-571
`
`In the Supreme Court of the United States
`
`
`FOURTH ESTATE PUBLIC BENEFIT CORPORATION,
`PETITIONER
`
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`WALL-STREET.COM, LLC, ET AL.
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS
`
`
`
`DAVID A. GELLER
`1221 S. 21st Avenue
`Hollywood, FL 33020
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PETER K. STRIS
` Counsel of Record
`BRENDAN S. MAHER
`ELIZABETH BRANNEN
`RACHANA A. PATHAK
`DOUGLAS D. GEYSER
`VICTOR O’CONNELL
`JOHN STOKES
`STRIS & MAHER LLP
`725 S. Figueroa Street
`Suite 1830
`Los Angeles, CA 90017
`(213) 995-6800
`peter.stris@strismaher.com
`
`Counsel for Respondents
`
`236733.2
`
`
`
`

`

`QUESTION PRESENTED
`
`Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act limits the circum-
`stances under which a copyright owner may initiate an in-
`fringement action. In particular:
`
`[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in
`any United States work shall be instituted until pre-
`registration or registration of the copyright claim has
`been made in accordance with this title. In any case,
`however, where the deposit, application, and fee re-
`quired for registration have been delivered to the Cop-
`yright Office in proper form and registration has been
`refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a civil ac-
`tion for infringement if notice thereof, with a copy of
`the complaint, is served on the Register of Copyrights.
`17 U.S.C. 411(a).
`In this case, petitioner sued respondents after peti-
`tioner applied for registration of its copyright claim but
`before the Copyright Office “regist[ered]” the claim or
`“refused” registration. The question presented is:
`Whether a copyright-infringement suit may be “insti-
`tuted” before “registration of the copyright claim has
`been made” or “refused” by the Copyright Office.
`
`
`
`236733.2
`
`(I)
`
`

`

`
`
` II
`
`RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
`
`Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 29.6, respondent Wall-
`Street.com, LLC certifies that it has no parent company
`and that no publicly held company owns 10% or more of
`its stock.
`
`
`
`236733.2
`
`

`

`
`
` III
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`Question presented ....................................................................... I
`Rule 29.6 statement ..................................................................... II
`Introduction ................................................................................... 1
`Statement ...................................................................................... 2
`A. Statutory background ............................................... 2
`B. Procedural history .................................................. 12
`Summary of argument ............................................................... 14
`Argument ..................................................................................... 18
`I. The Copyright Act clearly requires the Register
`of Copyrights to approve or refuse a claim
`before an infringement suit may be brought .............. 18
`A. The unambiguous text of Section 411(a)
`forecloses petitioner’s application approach ........ 19
`B. Many other provisions in the Act foreclose
`petitioner’s application approach........................... 25
`C. Petitioner’s reliance on the phrase “makes
`registration” is misplaced ....................................... 29
`D. Petitioner’s scavenger hunt through the Act
`is unavailing at every turn ...................................... 32
`II. The history of Section 411(a)’s enactment
`confirms that the Register must approve or
`refuse a claim before suit may be brought .................. 38
`III. If petitioner wants the law changed or more
`funding for the Copyright Office, it should
`address Congress or the Copyright Office, not
`this Court ........................................................................ 42
`Conclusion ................................................................................... 52
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`236733.2
`
`

`

`
`
` IV
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases:
`
`Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
`552 U.S. 214 (2008) ......................................................... 43
`Clark v. Martinez,
`543 U.S. 371 (2005) ......................................................... 27
`Clark v. Rameker,
`134 S. Ct. 2242 (2014)..................................................... 25
`Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp,
`606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010) .......................................... 13
`Duncan v. Walker,
`533 U.S. 167 (2001) ......................................................... 26
`EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc. v. MP3tunes,
`LLC,
`844 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2016) ............................................. 35
`Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc.,
`132 S. Ct. 2034 (2012)..................................................... 19
`Hall v. United States,
`566 U.S. 506 (2012) ......................................................... 23
`Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.,
`137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017)..................................................... 43
`Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc.,
`755 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2014) ........................................ 25
`Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative
`Traders,
`564 U.S. 135 (2011) ......................................................... 30
`Kregos v. Assoc. Press,
`795 F. Supp. 1325 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ............................... 50
`La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors
`Angel Fire,
`416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005), abrogated
`in part on other grounds by Reed Elsevier,
`Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010) ................... 12, 26
`Lawrence v. Florida,
`549 U.S. 327 (2007) ......................................................... 37
`Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp.,
`137 S. Ct. 734 (2017) ...................................................... 19
`
`
`236733.2
`
`

`

`
`
` V
`
`Cases—Continued:
`
`Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI
`
`Consulting, Inc.,
`138 S. Ct. 883 (2018) ...................................................... 21
`Mohasco Corp. v. Silver,
`447 U.S. 807 (1980) ......................................................... 44
`N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc.,
`137 S. Ct. 929 (2017) ...................................................... 38
`Olem Shoe Corp. v. Wash. Shoe Corp.,
`591 F. App’x 873 (11th Cir. 2015) ................................. 25
`Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.,
`134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014)..................................................... 51
`Positive Black Talk Inc. v. Cash Money
`Records Inc.,
`394 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2004) .......................................... 13
`Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust,
`136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016)............................................... 18, 19
`Reed Elsevieri Inc. v. Muchnick,
`559 U.S. 154 (2010) ................................................ passim
`Reves v. Ernst & Young,
`507 U.S. 170 (1993) ......................................................... 30
`Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
`323 U.S. 134 (1944) ................................................... 25, 35
`Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc.,
`137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017)......................................... 19, 25, 35
`TRW Inc. v. Andrews,
`534 U.S. 19 (2001)........................................................... 26
`Vacheron & Constantin Le Coultre Watches,
`Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co.,
`260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958) .................................. passim
`Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC,
`799 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2015) .......................................... 35
`W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey,
`499 U.S. 83 (1991)........................................................... 44
`Statutes:
`
`17 U.S.C. 102 ........................................................................... 3
`17 U.S.C. 106 ........................................................................... 3
`
`
`236733.2
`
`

`

`
`
` VI
`
`Statutes—Continued:
`
`17 U.S.C. 205 ................................................................... 28, 37
`17 U.S.C. 405 ......................................................................... 36
`17 U.S.C. 406 ......................................................................... 29
`17 U.S.C. 407 ......................................................................... 37
`17 U.S.C. 408 ................................................................ passim
`17 U.S.C. 409 ......................................................... 3, 15, 20, 28
`17 U.S.C. 410 ................................................................ passim
`17 U.S.C. 411 ................................................................ passim
`17 U.S.C. 412 ......................................................... 7, 29, 32, 33
`17 U.S.C. 504 ........................................................................... 7
`17 U.S.C. 505 ........................................................................... 7
`17 U.S.C. 705 ......................................................................... 28
`17 U.S.C. 708 ......................................................................... 31
`28 U.S.C. 1914 ....................................................................... 46
`Artists’ Rights and Theft Prevention Act of
`2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218 ........................... 8
`Copyright Act of 1970, 17 U.S.C. 13 ................................... 39
`Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. 101 ............................... 2, 8
`Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 .................................... 12
`Other Authorities:
`
`37 C.F.R. 202.16.................................................................... 26
`46 Fed. Reg. 28,846 (May 29, 1981) .............................. 35, 36
`Benjamin Kaplan, Study No. 17: The
`Registration of Copyright (1958) ................... 5, 9, 41, 49
`Black’s Law Dictionary (revised
`4th ed. 1968).................................................. 14, 19, 31, 34
`Caruthers Berger, Study No. 18: Authority of
`the Register of Copyrights to Reject
`Applications for Registration (1959) ................. passim
`Copyright Law Revision: Report of the
`Register of Copyrights on the General
`Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law
`(Comm. Print 1961) ......................................................... 3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`236733.2
`
`

`

`
`
` VII
`
`Other Authorities—Continued:
`
`Dotan Oliar & Nicholas Matich, Copyright
`Preregistration: Evidence and Lessons
`from the First Seven Years, 2005-2012, 55
`Ariz. L. Rev. 1073 (2013) ................................................. 8
`Dotan Oliar, Nathaniel Pattison & K. Ross
`Powell, Copyright Registrations: Who,
`What, When, Where, and Why, 92 Tex. L.
`Rev. 2211 (2014) ............................................................... 6
`H.R. Rep. No. 388, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) ... 12, 24, 49
`H.R. Rep. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
`(1988) ............................................................................... 45
`H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
`(1976) ...................................................................... passim
`H.R. Rep. No. 7083, 59th Cong., 2d Sess.
`(1907) ................................................................................. 5
`Hearing on Oversight of the U.S. Copyright
`Office Before the Subcommittee on Courts,
`Intellectual Property, and the Internet,
`Committee on the Judiciary U.S. House of
`Representatives, 113th Cong. ......................................... 4
`Preregistration of Certain Unpublished
`Copyright Claims, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,286
`(July 22, 2005)....................................................... 8, 27, 49
`S. Rep. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) .......... passim
`S. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) .................... 16
`U.S. Copyright Office, Annual Report of the
`Register of Copyrights (1991) ......................................... 4
`U.S. Copyright Office, Annual Report of the
`Register of Copyrights (2009) ......................................... 5
`U.S. Copyright Office, Annual Report of the
`Register of Copyrights (2011) ......................................... 5
`U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of U.S.
`Copyright Office Practices (3d ed. 2017) ..................... 24
`U.S. Copyright Office, Fees,
`https://www.copyright.gov/about/fees.html .................. 2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`236733.2
`
`

`

`
`
` VIII
`
`Other Authorities—Continued:
`
`U.S. Copyright Office, Fiscal 2017 Annual
`Report ............................................................................... 6
`U.S. Copyright Office, Forms,
`https://www.copyright.gov/forms/ .................................. 3
`U.S. Copyright Office, General Guide to the
`Copyright Act of 1976 (1977) ........................................ 25
`U.S. Copyright Office, Preregister Your Work,
`https://www.copyright.gov/prereg/ ................................ 8
`U.S. Copyright Office, Registration
`Processing Times,
`https://www.copyright.gov/registration/
`docs/processing-times-faqs.pdf ...................................... 5
`U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Improving
`Productivity In Copyright Registration
`(1982) ........................................................................... 4, 35
`U.S. Judicial Conference, District Court
`Miscellaneous Fee Schedule (2016) ............................. 47
`Webster’s Third New International
`Dictionary (1971) ..................................................... 19, 31
`William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright (2017) ............. 24, 51
`
`
`236733.2
`
`

`

`In the Supreme Court of the United States
`
`
`
`No. 17-571
`
`FOURTH ESTATE PUBLIC BENEFIT CORPORATION,
`PETITIONER
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`WALL-STREET.COM, LLC, ET AL.
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS
`
`
`In Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act, Congress im-
`posed a simple administrative prerequisite for filing a cop-
`yright-infringement suit: an action may be instituted only
`once “registration * * * has been made” or “registration
`has been refused.” 17 U.S.C. 411(a). That is it—registra-
`tion or refusal. An application for registration is obvi-
`ously neither. This case accordingly begins and ends with
`the plain text.
`Petitioner’s quixotic effort to argue otherwise would
`require this Court to jettison that text. Petitioner says
`that “registration” has nothing to do with the Register;
`instead, a copyright owner alone makes registration
`merely by filing an application. But petitioner’s effort to
`
`236733.2
`
`(1)
`
`

`

`
`
` 2
`
`equate “registration” with “an application for registra-
`tion” defies ordinary meaning and would render superflu-
`ous multiple provisions in the Copyright Act.
`When a statute’s language is as clear as Section 411(a),
`no plumbing of Congressional intent or searching of the
`Congressional record is necessary—but here the har-
`mony between text, history, and policy is satisfying. Con-
`gress’s choice to condition the right to sue upon the ad-
`ministrative finality of registration or refusal was no mis-
`take; it was the result of two decades of formal study of
`copyright reform. Ultimately, Congress was choosing be-
`tween making copyright registration mandatory, making
`it permissive, or eliminating a public registration system
`entirely. It chose the middle ground, with a nudge: mak-
`ing registration permissive but encouraging promptness.
`Petitioner wants a different regime—one narrowly fo-
`cused on making life as easy as possible for copyright
`plaintiffs. But its policy arguments amount to an insist-
`ence that Congress simply cannot have meant what it
`said. It did, and for good reason. Petitioner’s myopic pol-
`icy preferences fail to account for the systemic benefits of
`registration. And upon inspection, its parade of horribles
`is mere tilting at windmills. In the end, only Congress is
`suited to resolve the policy tradeoffs inherent in any sys-
`tem of copyright registration. And it decided an applica-
`tion alone could not unlock the courthouse doors.
`
`STATEMENT
`
`A. Statutory Background
`1. The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. 101 et seq.,
`comprises the most recent wholesale revision of U.S. cop-
`yright law. It embodies the heady idea that a carefully bal-
`anced system of copyright sanctions and incentives can
`promote creation, growth, and advancement of our civil
`
`
`236733.2
`
`

`

`
`
` 3
`
`society. Put another way, the copyright laws exist to ben-
`efit the public at large: “As reflected in the Constitution,
`the ultimate purpose of copyright legislation is to foster
`the growth of learning and culture for the public welfare,
`and the grant of exclusive rights to authors for a limited
`time is a means to that end.” Copyright Law Revision:
`Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revi-
`sion of the U.S. Copyright Law 5 (Comm. Print 1961)
`(“1961 Report”).
`a. Under the Copyright Act, copyright owners have
`certain “exclusive rights” in “original works of authorship
`fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” 17 U.S.C.
`102, 106. “Registration is not a condition of copyright pro-
`tection,” 17 U.S.C. 410(a), but Congress provided multiple
`incentives to encourage creators to promptly apply.
`To that end, the Act specifically addresses both the ap-
`plication process and the standards for the Register to use
`in making registration determinations:
`Section 409, titled “Application for copyright registra-
`tion,” provides that “[t]he application for copyright regis-
`tration shall be made on a form prescribed by the Regis-
`ter of Copyrights.” The basic application forms are avail-
`able on the Copyright Office website. See U.S. Copyright
`Office, Forms, https://www.copyright.gov/forms/. The
`forms request routine information such as the author’s
`name and title of the work. None of the five basic forms
`exceeds two pages. Fees for basic registrations range
`from $35-$85, depending on the type of work and form of
`application (i.e., paper vs. online). See U.S. Copyright Of-
`fice, Fees, https://www.copyright.gov/about/fees.html.
`Section 410, titled “Registration of claim and issuance
`of certificate,” governs the Register’s registration deci-
`sion. The Register must “register the claim” if, “after ex-
`amination, the Register of Copyrights determines that
`* * * the material deposited constitutes copyrightable
`
`
`236733.2
`
`

`

`
`
` 4
`
`subject matter and that the other legal and formal re-
`quirements of this title have been met.” 17 U.S.C. 410(a).
`The Register must “refuse registration” if she “deter-
`mines that * * * the material deposited does not consti-
`tute copyrightable subject matter or that the claim is in-
`valid for any other reason.” 17 U.S.C. 410(b).1
`b. The time it takes for the Copyright Office to process
`a claim has fluctuated over the years, varying with factors
`like new technology and staffing cuts (or additions). At the
`time Congress drafted the Copyright Act, processing
`times were considerably shorter—no more than a few
`weeks for claims not involving correspondence. U.S. Gov’t
`Accountability Office, Improving Productivity In Copy-
`right Registration 3 (1982) (“GAO Report”) (ranging from
`1-2 weeks in 1957 to 5-6 weeks in 1981).
`The Copyright Office occasionally has sought fee in-
`creases to cope with increased workloads. For example,
`the Office cut processing times for routine claims in half
`(from 12 weeks to 6) using extra funding from the Copy-
`right Fees and Technical Amendments Act of 1989. U.S.
`Copyright Office, Annual Report of the Register of Copy-
`rights 1 (1991).
`And in 2014, the Register testified to Congress that
`“[t]he registration program has been decimated by
`budget cuts and early retirement packages and has forty-
`eight vacancies out of a staff of 180 experts. * * * The
`pendency time for processing registration claims is a
`source of constant concern.” Hearing on Oversight of the
`U.S. Copyright Office Before the Subcommittee on
`
`1 “The effective date of a copyright registration” is not the date of
`approval but rather the date that the “application, deposit, and fee,
`which are later determined by the Register of Copyrights or by a
`court of competent jurisdiction to be acceptable for registration, have
`all been received in the Copyright Office.” 17 U.S.C. 410(d).
`
`
`236733.2
`
`

`

`
`
` 5
`
`Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet, Commit-
`tee on the Judiciary U.S. House of Representatives, 113th
`Cong. 9 (2014) (Statement of Maria A. Pallante, Register
`of Copyrights and Director of the U.S. Copyright Office).2
`Given chronic understaffing and budget cuts, pro-
`cessing times are far longer today than when the Act was
`passed. See U.S. Copyright Office, Registration Pro-
`cessing Times, https://www.copyright.gov/registration/do
`cs/processing-times-faqs.pdf. But the Copyright Office of-
`fers expedited processing through which an author may
`obtain registration within a matter of days (typically five)
`in exchange for an additional fee. See U.S. Copyright Of-
`fice, Special Handling: (Circular 10) 2 (2017).
`c. Congress wanted to encourage registration for good
`reason. Registration provides multiple benefits to copy-
`right owners, the public, and the copyright system, includ-
`ing the litigation process. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 352, 100th
`Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1988); H.R. Rep. No. 7083, 59th Cong.,
`2d Sess. 8 (1907) (registration operates “[f]or the protec-
`tion of the public itself”).
`Among other benefits, registration increases infor-
`mation available to the public, allows the Copyright Office
`to enforce other requirements of copyright law, gives au-
`thors a permanent record of their claims, expands the Li-
`brary of Congress’s collection of works, weeds out im-
`proper claims, and assists courts should litigation arise.
`See, e.g., 1961 Report at 72-73; Benjamin Kaplan, Study
`
`
`2 Petitioner highlights the average 309-day processing time from
`2009. Br. 11-12. This cherry-picked statistic misleads through omis-
`sion—that figure jumped from 81 days in 2007 due to a “steep learn-
`ing curve following implementation of reengineered processes and
`new information technology systems.” U.S. Copyright Office, Annual
`Report of the Register of Copyrights 47 (2009). By 2011, it had fallen
`back to 94 days. See U.S. Copyright Office, Annual Report of the Reg-
`ister of Copyrights 21 (2011).
`
`
`236733.2
`
`

`

`
`
` 6
`
`No. 17: The Registration of Copyright 41-45 (1958) (the
`“Kaplan Study”); Dotan Oliar, Nathaniel Pattison & K.
`Ross Powell, Copyright Registrations: Who, What, When,
`Where, and Why, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 2211, 2216-2220 (2014)
`(discussing market-based advantages for authors to ob-
`tain registration). Because the registration process re-
`quires a deposit of the work, it supplies the Library of
`Congress with a substantial body of original works. E.g.,
`U.S. Copyright Office, Fiscal 2017 Annual Report 10
`(“The Office forwarded more than 658,045 copies of works
`with a value of almost $41 million to the Library’s collec-
`tions in fiscal 2017.”).
`In Congress’s view, early registration is important:
`“To be most useful and reliable as a source of information,
`registration should be made shortly after the first public
`dissemination of the work.” 1961 Report at 74.
`d. Although “registration is not a condition of copy-
`right protection” (17 U.S.C. 410(a)), Congress provided
`multiple incentives for copyright owners to seek registra-
`tion as early as possible. E.g., S. Rep. No. 100-352 at 23.
`Most directly, Congress forbade suit to invoke the Act’s
`remedies until “registration” “has been made” or “has
`been refused”:
`
`[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in
`any United States work shall be instituted until pre-
`registration or registration of the copyright claim has
`been made in accordance with this title. In any case,
`however, where the deposit, application, and fee re-
`quired for registration have been delivered to the Cop-
`yright Office in proper form and registration has been
`refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a civil ac-
`tion for infringement if notice thereof, with a copy of
`the complaint, is served on the Register of Copyrights.
`The Register may, at his or her option, become a party
`to the action with respect to the issue of registrability
`
`
`236733.2
`
`

`

`
`
` 7
`
`of the copyright claim by entering an appearance
`within sixty days after such service, but the Register’s
`failure to become a party shall not deprive the court of
`jurisdiction to determine that issue.
`17 U.S.C. 411(a). “A certificate of registration satisfies the
`requirements” of Section 411. 17 U.S.C. 411(b)(1).
`A copyright owner who promptly seeks registration
`also gains additional potential remedies in an infringe-
`ment lawsuit. Although statutory damages and attorney’s
`fees are generally recoverable (see 17 U.S.C. 504, 505),
`they are disallowed for infringement before the “effective
`date” of registration. 17 U.S.C. 412. And the certificate of
`registration “constitute[s] prima facie evidence of the va-
`lidity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certif-
`icate” if the certificate is “made before or within five years
`after first publication of the work.” 17 U.S.C. 410(c).
`e. Although Congress created a variety of strong in-
`centives to promptly seek registration, it also concluded
`that in some circumstances the burdens of pre-suit regis-
`tration outweigh the benefits. And in those circumstances,
`carefully weighing the tradeoffs, Congress expressly sof-
`tened the registration prerequisite.
`First, the 1976 Act included a provision to address live
`broadcasts—where it is simply impracticable to make
`registration, and thereby engage the Act’s protections,
`before transmission. See 17 U.S.C. 411(c). Under that pro-
`vision, a copyright owner may sue without registration if
`she (1) notifies the infringer of the broadcast and of her
`“intention to secure copyright in the work”; and (2)
`“makes registration for the work * * * within three
`months after its first transmission.” Id. This accommoda-
`tion allows an injunction “to prevent the unauthorized use
`of the material included in the ‘live’ transmission.” H.R.
`Rep. No. 94-1476 at 157.
`
`
`236733.2
`
`

`

`
`
` 8
`
`Second, in 2005, Congress added a “preregistration”
`process to increase protection for “class[es] of works that
`the Register determines ha[ve] had a history of infringe-
`ment” before publication. See 17 U.S.C. 408(f); Artists’
`Rights and Theft Prevention Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
`9, Tit. I, § 104(b), 119 Stat. 218, 222. Currently, the classes
`of works eligible for preregistration are: motion pictures,
`sound recordings, musical compositions, literary works,
`computer programs, and advertising or marketing photo-
`graphs. See U.S. Copyright Office, Preregister Your
`Work, https://www.copyright.gov/prereg/.
`Preregistration represented a compromise between
`representatives of record companies and motion picture
`studios, who wanted to eliminate entirely “the registra-
`tion requirement in cases of pre-release infringement,”
`and the Copyright Office, which resisted any weakening
`of the registration prerequisite. Preregistration of Cer-
`tain Unpublished Copyright Claims, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,286,
`42,286 (July 22, 2005); see, e.g., Dotan Oliar & Nicholas
`Matich, Copyright Preregistration: Evidence and Les-
`sons from the First Seven Years, 2005-2012, 55 Ariz. L.
`Rev. 1073, 1084-1086 (2013).
`2. The Copyright Act of 1976 represented a hard-
`fought, wholesale revision of the copyright laws, and cul-
`minated from two decades of study. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-
`1476 at 47-48. Among other topics, registration alterna-
`tives were specifically—and heavily—studied. See, e.g.,
`Kaplan Study; Caruthers Berger, Study No. 18: Author-
`ity of the Register of Copyrights to Reject Applications for
`Registration (1959) (the “Berger Study”). As the enacted
`text shows, Congress ultimately retained a permissive
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`registration system, but one that encouraged copyright
`owners to seek registration as soon as possible.3
`a. The Kaplan Study provided an overview of our coun-
`try’s copyright-law history and exhaustively surveyed the
`alternative registration schemes of other countries, in-
`cluding countries without “any official registration or re-
`cordation.” Kaplan Study at 60; see also id. at 40 (policy-
`makers must “ask what are the benefits and countervail-
`ing disadvantages or demerits of a registration scheme on
`the present American lines”).
`It concluded by raising several policy questions that
`would need to be resolved (id. at 64) and remarking that
`because the United States was likely to retain optional
`registration, “there will be particular need” to provide “in-
`centives and sanctions * * * to bring about the desired
`registration.” Id. at 65.
`The Berger Study expressly addressed the effect of
`registration and its refusal. Berger Study at 94-98. It dis-
`cussed the “unsettled question” “whether a claimant who
`has fulfilled the procedural requirements (deposit, appli-
`cation, and fee) for registration but has been refused reg-
`istration on the ground that the copyright claim is invalid,
`must first secure registration by a mandamus action
`against the Register before he can maintain a suit for in-
`fringement; or whether he may sue for infringement with-
`out registration and have the validity of his claim deter-
`mined in that suit.” Id. at 97.
`The Berger Study noted that the Register’s refusal
`has value for the public and courts: it “serves to inform
`applicants and the public of the scope of the copyright
`law” and assists “courts insofar as they give weight to the
`
`
`3 These studies were two of many that Congress funded to address
`“most of the major substantive issues in copyright revision.” H.R.
`Rep. No. 94-1476 at 1.
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`probative value of registration and the interpretation of
`the law by the Copyright Office.” Id. at 95. The study
`therefore concluded by framing one of the main questions
`for debate as: “Should registration, or application there-
`for, be a prerequisite to an action for infringement?” Id.
`at 98 (emphasis added).
`b. Building on these studies, the Copyright Office re-
`ported recommendations to Congress. See 1961 Report at
`iii-iv. Regarding the broad question whether registration
`should be mandatory or optional, the Office suggested a
`compromise under which “registration should not be re-
`quired to sustain a copyright * * * , but that strong in-
`ducements to make registration within a reasonable time
`should be provided.” Id. at 73. Regarding “[r]egistration
`as a prerequisite to suit,” the Office recommended retain-
`ing “the requirement of registration” because “the regis-
`tration process identifies unfounded claims and assists the
`courts in establishing presumptive facts and applying the
`law.” Id. at 75.
`But the Office also recommended “one important mod-
`ification” (ibid.)—the Office endorsed a system in which
`either registration or refusal was sufficient to permit suit.
`Specifically, the Office recommended a partial reversal of
`Judge Learned Hand’s ruling in Vacheron & Constantin
`Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F.2d
`637 (2d Cir. 1958). Vacheron held that the prior law re-
`quired “acceptance by the Register” before suit could be
`filed. 260 F.2d at 641. Thus, according to Vacheron, the
`law prohibited suit “when the Register of Copyrights had
`refused” the claim. Id. at 639. The copyright owner in-
`stead had to first seek mandamus to reverse the Regis-
`ter’s refusal.
`The Office agreed with Judge Hand that the current
`law required acceptance by the Register before suit, but
`it described Vacheron as “unfortunate” for requiring a
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`copyright owner to first seek mandamus while infringe-
`ment might “continue[].” 1961 Report at 75. Accordingly,
`“[w]here a claimant has deposited the required copies, ap-
`plication, and fee, and registration has been refused,
`* * * he should be entitled to maintain a suit against an
`infringer.” Ibid.
`c. Congress followed the Office’s recommendations. As
`the House and Senate Committee Reports explain, the
`first sentence of the revised Section 411(a) “restates the
`present statutory requirement that registration must be
`made before a suit for copyright infringement is insti-
`tuted.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 at 157. The second and
`third sentences, however, “alter the present law as inter-
`preted in Vacheron” to permit suit by “a rejected claimant
`who has properly applied for registration” so that she may
`challenge the registration issue as part of the infringe-
`ment suit and without mandamus. Ibid.
`The enacted text accordingly mak