(Slip Opinion)
`
`OCTOBER TERM, 2017
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
`NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`Syllabus
`
`OIL STATES ENERGY SERVICES, LLC v. GREENE’S
`ENERGY GROUP, LLC, ET AL.
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`No. 16–712. Argued November 27, 2017—Decided April 24, 2018
`Inter partes review authorizes the United States Patent and Trade-
`mark Office (PTO) to reconsider and cancel an already-issued patent
`claim in limited circumstances. See 35 U. S. C. §§311–319. Any per-
`son who is not the owner of the patent may petition for review.
`§311(a). If review is instituted, the process entitles the petitioner
`and the patent owner to conduct certain discovery, §316(a)(5); to file
`affidavits, declarations, and written memoranda, §316(a)(8); and to
`receive an oral hearing before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board,
`§316(a)(10). A final decision by the Board is subject to Federal Cir-
`cuit review. §§318, 319.
` Petitioner Oil States Energy Services, LLC, obtained a patent re-
`lating to technology for protecting wellhead equipment used in hy-
`draulic fracturing. It sued respondent Greene’s Energy Group, LLC,
`in Federal District Court for infringement. Greene’s Energy chal-
`lenged the patent’s validity in the District Court and also petitioned
`the PTO for inter partes review. Both proceedings progressed in par-
`allel. The District Court issued a claim-construction order favoring
`Oil States, while the Board issued a decision concluding that Oil
`States’ claims were unpatentable. Oil States appealed to the Federal
`Circuit. In addition to its patentability arguments, it challenged the
`constitutionality of inter partes review, arguing that actions to re-
`voke a patent must be tried in an Article III court before a jury.
`While the case was pending, the Federal Circuit issued a decision in
`a separate case, rejecting the same constitutional arguments raised
`by Oil States. The court then summarily affirmed the Board’s deci-
`sion in this case.
`Held:
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`2 OIL STATES ENERGY SERVICES, LLC v. GREENE’S ENERGY
`
`GROUP, LLC
`Syllabus
` 1. Inter partes review does not violate Article III. Pp. 5–17.
`
`
`(a) Under this Court’s precedents, Congress has significant lati-
`tude to assign adjudication of public rights to entities other than Ar-
`ticle III courts. Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U. S.
`___, ___. Inter partes review falls squarely within the public-rights
`doctrine. The decision to grant a patent is a matter involving public
`rights. Inter partes review is simply a reconsideration of that grant,
`and Congress has permissibly reserved the PTO’s authority to con-
`duct that reconsideration. Pp. 5–10.
`
`
`
`(i) The grant of a patent falls within the public-rights doctrine.
`United States v. Duell, 172 U. S. 576, 582–583. Granting a patent in-
`volves a matter “arising between the government and others.” Ex
`parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S. 438, 451. Specifically, patents are
`“public franchises.” Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, 533. Addi-
`tionally, granting patents is one of “the constitutional functions” that
`can be carried out by “the executive or legislative departments” with-
`out “ ‘judicial determination.’ ” Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 50–
`51. Pp. 7–8.
`
`
`
`(ii) Inter partes review involves the same basic matter as the
`grant of a patent. It is “a second look at an earlier . . . grant,” Cuozzo
`Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 579 U. S. ___, ___, and it involves the
`same interests as the original grant, see Duell, supra, at 586. That
`inter partes review occurs after the patent has issued does not make
`a difference here. Patents remain “subject to [the Board’s] authority”
`to cancel outside of an Article III court, Crowell, supra, at 50, and
`this Court has recognized that franchises can be qualified in this
`manner, see, e.g., Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U. S.
`409, 421. Pp. 8–10.
`
`
`(b) Three decisions that recognize patent rights as the “private
`property of the patentee,” United States v. American Bell Telephone
`Co., 128 U. S. 315, 370, do not contradict this conclusion. See also
`McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Aultman, 169 U. S. 606, 609;
`Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 197. Nor do they foreclose the kind
`of post-issuance administrative review that Congress has authorized
`here. Those cases were decided under the Patent Act of 1870 and are
`best read as describing the statutory scheme that existed at that
`time. Pp. 10–11.
`
`
`(c) Although patent validity was often decided in 18th-century
`English courts of law, that history does not establish that inter
`partes review violates the “general” principle that “Congress may not
`‘withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its na-
`ture, is the subject of a suit at the common law,” Stern v. Marshall,
`564 U. S. 462, 484. Another means of canceling a patent at that
`time—a petition to the Privy Council to vacate a patent—closely re-
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`3
`
`Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Syllabus
`sembles inter partes review. The parties have cited nothing to sug-
`gest that the Framers were not aware of this common practice when
`writing the Patent Clause, or that they excluded the practice from
`the scope of the Clause. Relatedly, the fact that American courts
`have traditionally adjudicated patent validity in this country does not
`mean that they must forever do so. See post, at 8–10. Historical
`practice is not decisive here because matters governed by the public-
`rights doctrine may be assigned to the Legislature, the Executive, or
`the Judiciary. Ex parte Bakelite Corp., supra, at 451. That Congress
`chose the courts in the past does not foreclose its choice of the PTO
`today. Pp. 12–15.
`
`
`(d) Finally, the similarities between the various procedures used
`in inter partes review and procedures typically used in courts does
`not lead to the conclusion that inter partes review violates Article III.
`This Court has never adopted a “looks like” test to determine if an
`adjudication has improperly occurred outside an Article III court.
`See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553, 563. Pp. 15–16.
`
`
`(e) This holding is narrow. The Court addresses only the consti-
`tutionality of inter partes review and the precise constitutional chal-
`lenges that Oil States raised here. The decision should not be mis-
`construed as suggesting that patents are not property for purposes of
`the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause. Pp. 16–17.
` 2. Inter partes review does not violate the Seventh Amendment.
`When Congress properly assigns a matter to adjudication in a non-
`Article III tribunal, “the Seventh Amendment poses no independent
`bar to the adjudication of that action by a nonjury factfinder.” Gran-
`financiera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U. S. 33, 52–53. Thus, the rejection
`of Oil States’ Article III challenge also resolves its Seventh Amend-
`ment challenge. P. 17.
`639 Fed. Appx. 639, affirmed.
` THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY,
`GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. BREYER,
`J., filed a concurring opinion, in which GINSBURG and SOTOMAYOR, JJ.,
`joined. GORSUCH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
`joined.
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
`ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`No. 16–712
`_________________
`OIL STATES ENERGY SERVICES, LLC, PETITIONER
`v. GREENE’S ENERGY GROUP, LLC, ET AL.
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`[April 24, 2018]
` JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
` The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U. S. C. §100
`et seq., establishes a process called “inter partes review.”
`Under that process, the United States Patent and Trade-
`mark Office (PTO) is authorized to reconsider and to
`cancel an issued patent claim in limited circumstances. In
`this case, we address whether inter partes review violates
`Article III or the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution.
`We hold that it violates neither.
`I
`A
` Under the Patent Act, the PTO is “responsible for the
`granting and issuing of patents.” 35 U. S. C. §2(a)(1).
`When an inventor applies for a patent, an examiner re-
`views the proposed claims and the prior art to determine if
`the claims meet the statutory requirements. See §§112,
`131. Those requirements include utility, novelty, and
`nonobviousness based on the prior art. §§101, 102, 103.
`The Director of the PTO then approves or rejects the
`application. See §§131, 132(a). An applicant can seek
`judicial review of a final rejection. §§141(a), 145.
`
`

`

`2
`
`
`OIL STATES ENERGY SERVICES, LLC v. GREENE’S
`ENERGY GROUP, LLC
`Opinion of the Court
`B
` Over the last several decades, Congress has created
`administrative processes that authorize the PTO to recon-
`sider and cancel patent claims that were wrongly issued.
`In 1980, Congress established “ex parte reexamination,”
`which still exists today. See Act To Amend the Patent and
`Trademark Laws, 35 U. S. C. §301 et seq. Ex parte re-
`examination permits “[a]ny person at any time” to “file a
`request for reexamination.” §302. If the Director deter-
`mines that there is “a substantial new question of patent-
`ability” for “any claim of the patent,” the PTO can reex-
`amine the patent. §§303(a), 304. The reexamination
`process follows the same procedures as the initial exami-
`nation. §305.
` In 1999, Congress added a procedure called “inter partes
`reexamination.” See American Inventors Protection Act,
`§§4601–4608, 113 Stat. 1501A–567 to 1501A–572. Under
`this procedure, any person could file a request for reexam-
`ination. 35 U. S. C. §311(a) (2006 ed.). The Director
`would determine if the request raised “a substantial new
`question of patentability affecting any claim of the patent”
`and, if so, commence a reexamination. §§312(a), 313 (2006
`ed.). The reexamination would follow the general proce-
`dures for initial examination, but would allow the third-
`party requester and the patent owner to participate in a
`limited manner by filing responses and replies. §§314(a),
`(b) (2006 ed.). Inter partes reexamination was phased out
`when the America Invents Act went into effect in 2012.
`See §6, 125 Stat. 299–305.
`
`C
` The America Invents Act replaced inter partes reexami-
`nation with inter partes review, the procedure at issue
`here. See id., at 299. Any person other than the patent
`owner can file a petition for inter partes review. 35
`U. S. C. §311(a) (2012 ed.). The petition can request can-
`
`

`

`
`
`3
`
`Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`cellation of “1 or more claims of a patent” on the grounds
`that the claim fails the novelty or nonobviousness stand-
`ards for patentability. §311(b). The challenges must be
`made “only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents
`or printed publications.” Ibid. If a petition is filed, the
`patent owner has the right to file a preliminary response
`explaining why inter partes review should not be insti-
`tuted. §313.
` Before he can institute inter partes review, the Director
`must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that
`the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of
`the claims challenged.” §314(a). The decision whether to
`institute inter partes review is committed to the Director’s
`discretion. See Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee,
`579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 9). The Director’s
`decision is “final and nonappealable.” §314(d).1
` Once inter partes review is instituted, the Patent Trial
`and Appeal Board—an adjudicatory body within the PTO
`created to conduct inter partes review—examines the
`patent’s validity. See 35 U. S. C. §§6, 316(c). The Board
`sits in three-member panels of administrative patent
`judges. See §6(c). During the inter partes review, the
`petitioner and the patent owner are entitled to certain
`discovery, §316(a)(5); to file affidavits, declarations, and
`written memoranda, §316(a)(8); and to receive an oral
`hearing before the Board, §316(a)(10). The petitioner has
`the burden of proving unpatentability by a preponderance
`of the evidence. §316(e). The owner can file a motion to
`amend the patent by voluntarily canceling a claim or by
`“propos[ing] a reasonable number of substitute claims.”
`§316(d)(1)(B). The owner can also settle with the peti-
`tioner by filing a written agreement prior to the Board’s final
`decision, which terminates the proceedings with respect to
`——————
`1 The Director has delegated his authority to the Patent Trial and
`Appeal Board. See 37 CFR §42.108(c) (2017).
`
`

`

`4
`
`
`OIL STATES ENERGY SERVICES, LLC v. GREENE’S
`ENERGY GROUP, LLC
`Opinion of the Court
`that petitioner. §317. If the settlement results in no
`petitioner remaining in the inter partes review, the Board
`can terminate the proceeding or issue a final written
`decision. §317(a).
` If the proceeding does not terminate, the Board must
`issue a final written decision no later than a year after it
`notices the institution of inter partes review, but that
`deadline can be extended up to six months for good cause.
`§§316(a)(11), 318(a). If the Board’s decision becomes final,
`the Director must “issue and publish a certificate.”
`§318(b). The certificate cancels patent claims “finally
`determined to be unpatentable,” confirms patent claims
`“determined to be patentable,” and incorporates into the
`patent “any new or amended claim determined to be pa-
`tentable.” Ibid.
` A party dissatisfied with the Board’s decision can seek
`judicial review in the Court of Appeals for the Federal
`Circuit. §319. Any party to the inter partes review can be
`a party in the Federal Circuit. Ibid. The Director can
`intervene to defend the Board’s decision, even if no party
`does. See §143; Cuozzo, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 15).
`When reviewing the Board’s decision, the Federal Circuit
`assesses “the Board’s compliance with governing legal
`standards de novo and its underlying factual determina-
`tions for substantial evidence.” Randall Mfg. v. Rea, 733
`F. 3d 1355, 1362 (CA Fed. 2013).
`II
` Petitioner Oil States Energy Services, LLC, and re-
`spondent Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, are both oilfield
`services companies. In 2001, Oil States obtained a patent
`relating to an apparatus and method for protecting well-
`head equipment used in hydraulic fracturing. In 2012, Oil
`States sued Greene’s Energy in Federal District Court for
`infringing that patent. Greene’s Energy responded by
`challenging the patent’s validity. Near the close of discov-
`
`

`

`
`
`5
`
`Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`ery, Greene’s Energy also petitioned the Board to institute
`inter partes review. It argued that two of the patent’s
`claims were unpatentable because they were anticipated
`by prior art not mentioned by Oil States in its original
`patent application. Oil States filed a response opposing
`review. The Board found that Greene’s Energy had estab-
`lished a reasonable likelihood that the two claims were
`unpatentable and, thus, instituted inter partes review.
` The proceedings before the District Court and the Board
`progressed in parallel. In June 2014, the District Court
`issued a claim-construction order. The order construed
`the challenged claims in a way that foreclosed Greene’s
`Energy’s arguments about the prior art. But a few months
`later, the Board issued a final written decision concluding
`that the claims were unpatentable. The Board acknowl-
`edged the District Court’s contrary decision, but nonethe-
`less concluded that the claims were anticipated by the
`prior art.
` Oil States sought review in the Federal Circuit. In
`addition to its arguments about patentability, Oil States
`challenged the constitutionality of inter partes review.
`Specifically, it argued that actions to revoke a patent must
`be tried in an Article III court before a jury. While Oil
`States’ case was pending, the Federal Circuit issued an
`opinion in a different case, rejecting the same constitu-
`tional arguments. MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard
`Co., 812 F. 3d 1284, 1288–1293 (2015). The Federal Cir-
`cuit summarily affirmed the Board’s decision in this case.
`639 Fed. Appx. 639 (2016).
` We granted certiorari to determine whether inter partes
`review violates Article III or the Seventh Amendment.
`582 U. S. ___ (2017). We address each issue in turn.
`III
` Article III vests the judicial power of the United States
`“in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
`
`

`

`6
`
`
`OIL STATES ENERGY SERVICES, LLC v. GREENE’S
`ENERGY GROUP, LLC
`Opinion of the Court
`Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” §1.
`Consequently, Congress cannot “confer the Government’s
`‘judicial Power’ on entities outside Article III.” Stern v.
`Marshall, 564 U. S. 462, 484 (2011). When determining
`whether a proceeding involves an exercise of Article III
`judicial power, this Court’s precedents have distinguished
`between “public rights” and “private rights.” Executive
`Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014)
`(slip op., at 6) (internal quotation marks omitted). Those
`precedents have given Congress significant latitude to
`assign adjudication of public rights to entities other than
`Article III courts. See ibid.; Stern, supra, at 488–492.
` This Court has not “definitively explained” the distinc-
`tion between public and private rights, Northern Pipeline
`Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50, 69
`(1982), and its precedents applying the public-rights doc-
`trine have “not been entirely consistent,” Stern, 564 U. S.,
`at 488. But this case does not require us to add to the
`“various formulations” of the public-rights doctrine. Ibid.
`Our precedents have recognized that the doctrine covers
`matters “which arise between the Government and per-
`sons subject to its authority in connection with the per-
`formance of the constitutional functions of the executive or
`legislative departments.” Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22,
`50 (1932). In other words, the public-rights doctrine ap-
`plies to matters “ ‘arising between the government and
`others, which from their nature do not require judicial
`determination and yet are susceptible of it.’ ” Ibid. (quot-
`ing Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S. 438, 451 (1929)).
`Inter partes review involves one such matter: reconsid-
`eration of the Government’s decision to grant a public
`franchise.
`
`A
` Inter partes review falls squarely within the public-
`rights doctrine. This Court has recognized, and the par-
`
`

`

`
`
`7
`
`Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`ties do not dispute, that the decision to grant a patent is a
`matter involving public rights—specifically, the grant of a
`public franchise. Inter partes review is simply a reconsid-
`eration of that grant, and Congress has permissibly re-
`served the PTO’s authority to conduct that reconsidera-
`tion. Thus, the PTO can do so without violating Article
`III.
`
`1
` This Court has long recognized that the grant of a pa-
`tent is a “ ‘matte[r] involving public rights.’ ” United States
`v. Duell, 172 U. S. 576, 582–583 (1899) (quoting Murray’s
`Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272,
`284 (1856)). It has the key features to fall within this
`Court’s longstanding formulation of the public-rights
`doctrine.
` Ab initio, the grant of a patent involves a matter “aris-
`ing between the government and others.” Ex parte Bake-
`lite Corp., supra, at 451. As this Court has long recog-
`nized, the grant of a patent is a matter between “ ‘the
`public, who are the grantors, and . . . the patentee.’ ”
`Duell, supra, at 586 (quoting Butterworth v. United States
`ex rel. Hoe, 112 U. S. 50, 59 (1884)). By “issuing patents,”
`the PTO “take[s] from the public rights of immense value,
`and bestow[s] them upon the patentee.” United States v.
`American Bell Telephone Co., 128 U. S. 315, 370 (1888).
`Specifically, patents are “public franchises” that the Gov-
`ernment grants “to the inventors of new and useful im-
`provements.” Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, 533
`(1871); accord, Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U. S. 55,
`63–64 (1998). The franchise gives the patent owner “the
`right to exclude others from making, using, offering for
`sale, or selling the invention throughout the United
`States.” 35 U. S. C. §154(a)(1). That right “did not exist
`at common law.” Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 477, 494
`(1851). Rather, it is a “creature of statute law.” Crown
`
`

`

`8
`
`
`OIL STATES ENERGY SERVICES, LLC v. GREENE’S
`ENERGY GROUP, LLC
`Opinion of the Court
`Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261 U. S. 24,
`40 (1923).
` Additionally, granting patents is one of “the constitu-
`tional functions” that can be carried out by “the executive
`or legislative departments” without “ ‘judicial determina-
`tion.’ ” Crowell, supra, at 50–51 (quoting Ex parte Bakelite
`Corp., supra, at 452). Article I gives Congress the power
`“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
`securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
`exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
`ies.” §8, cl. 8. Congress can grant patents itself by stat-
`ute. See, e.g., Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 539, 548–
`550 (1853). And, from the founding to today, Congress has
`authorized the Executive Branch to grant patents that
`meet the statutory requirements for patentability. See 35
`U. S. C. §§2(a)(1), 151; see also Act of July 8, 1870, §31, 16
`Stat. 202; Act of July 4, 1836, §7, 5 Stat. 119–120; Act of
`Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, §1, 1 Stat. 109–110. When the PTO
`“adjudicate[s] the patentability of inventions,” it is “exer-
`cising the executive power.” Freytag v. Commissioner, 501
`U. S. 868, 910 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
`concurring in judgment) (emphasis deleted).
` Accordingly, the determination to grant a patent is a
`“matte[r] involving public rights.” Murray’s Lessee, supra,
`at 284. It need not be adjudicated in Article III court.
`2
` Inter partes review involves the same basic matter as
`the grant of a patent. So it, too, falls on the public-rights
`side of the line.
` Inter partes review is “a second look at an earlier ad-
`ministrative grant of a patent.” Cuozzo, 579 U. S., at ___
`(slip op., at 16). The Board considers the same statutory
`requirements that the PTO considered when granting the
`patent. See 35 U. S. C. §311(b). Those statutory require-
`ments prevent the “issuance of patents whose effects are
`
`

`

`
`
`9
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`Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`to remove existent knowledge from the public domain.”
`Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U. S. 1, 6
`(1966). So, like the PTO’s initial review, the Board’s inter
`partes review protects “the public’s paramount interest in
`seeing that patent monopolies are kept within their legit-
`imate scope,” Cuozzo, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 16) (inter-
`nal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Thus, inter
`partes review involves the same interests as the determi-
`nation to grant a patent in the first instance. See Duell,
`supra, at 586.
` The primary distinction between inter partes review
`and the initial grant of a patent is that inter partes review
`occurs after the patent has issued. But that distinction
`does not make a difference here. Patent claims are granted
`subject to the qualification that the PTO has “the au-
`thority to reexamine—and perhaps cancel—a patent
`claim” in an inter partes review. See Cuozzo, supra, at ___
`(slip op., at 3). Patents thus remain “subject to [the
`Board’s] authority” to cancel outside of an Article III court.
`Crowell, 285 U. S., at 50.
` This Court has recognized that franchises can be quali-
`fied in this manner. For example, Congress can grant a
`franchise that permits a company to erect a toll bridge,
`but qualify the grant by reserving its authority to revoke
`or amend the franchise. See, e.g., Louisville Bridge Co. v.
`United States, 242 U. S. 409, 421 (1917) (collecting cases).
`Even after the bridge is built, the Government can exer-
`cise its reserved authority through legislation or an ad-
`ministrative proceeding. See, e.g., id., at 420–421; Hanni-
`bal Bridge Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 194, 205 (1911);
`Bridge Co. v. United States, 105 U. S. 470, 478–482 (1882).
`The same is true for franchises that permit companies to
`build railroads or telegraph lines. See, e.g., United States
`v. Union Pacific R. Co., 160 U. S. 1, 24–25, 37–38 (1895).
` Thus, the public-rights doctrine covers the matter re-
`solved in inter partes review. The Constitution does not
`
`

`

`10
`
`
`OIL STATES ENERGY SERVICES, LLC v. GREENE’S
`ENERGY GROUP, LLC
`Opinion of the Court
`prohibit the Board from resolving it outside of an Article
`III court.
`
`B
` Oil States challenges this conclusion, citing three deci-
`sions that recognize patent rights as the “private property
`of the patentee.” American Bell Telephone Co., 128 U. S.,
`at 370; see also McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v.
`Aultman, 169 U. S. 606, 609 (1898) (“[A granted patent]
`has become the property of the patentee”); Brown v. Du-
`chesne, 19 How. 183, 197 (1857) (“[T]he rights of a party
`under a patent are his private property”). But those cases
`do not contradict our conclusion.
` Patents convey only a specific form of property right—a
`public franchise. See Pfaff, 525 U. S., at 63–64. And
`patents are “entitled to protection as any other property,
`consisting of a franchise.” Seymour, 11 Wall. at 533 (em-
`phasis added). As a public franchise, a patent can confer
`only the rights that “the statute prescribes.” Gayler,
`supra, at 494; Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 663–664
`(1834) (noting that Congress has “the power to prescribe
`the conditions on which such right shall be enjoyed”). It is
`noteworthy that one of the precedents cited by Oil States
`acknowledges that the patentee’s rights are “derived
`altogether” from statutes, “are to be regulated and meas-
`ured by these laws, and cannot go beyond them.” Brown,
`supra, at 195.2
` One such regulation is inter partes review. See Cuozzo,
`——————
`2 This Court has also recognized this dynamic for state-issued fran-
`chises. For instance, States often reserve the right to alter or revoke a
`corporate charter either “in the act of incorporation or in some general
`law of the State which was in operation at the time the charter was
`granted.” Pennsylvania College Cases, 13 Wall. 190, 214, and n. †
`(1872). That reservation remains effective even after the corporation
`comes into existence, and such alterations do not offend the Contracts
`Clause of Article I, §10. See Pennsylvania College Cases, supra, at 212–
`214; e.g., Miller v. State, 15 Wall. 478, 488–489 (1873).
`
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`Opinion of the Court
`579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3). The Patent Act provides
`that, “[s]ubject to the provisions of this title, patents shall
`have the attributes of personal property.” 35 U. S. C.
`§261. This provision qualifies any property rights that a
`patent owner has in an issued patent, subjecting them to
`the express provisions of the Patent Act. See eBay Inc. v.
`MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S. 388, 392 (2006). Those
`provisions include inter partes review. See §§311–319.
` Nor do the precedents that Oil States cites foreclose the
`kind of post-issuance administrative review that Congress
`has authorized here. To be sure, two of the cases make
`broad declarations that “[t]he only authority competent to
`set a patent aside, or to annul it, or to correct it for any
`reason whatever, is vested in the courts of the United
`States, and not in the department which issued the pat-
`ent.” McCormick Harvesting Machine Co., supra, at 609;
`accord, American Bell Telephone Co., 128 U. S., at 364.
`But those cases were decided under the Patent Act of
`1870. See id., at 371; McCormick Harvesting Machine Co.,
`supra, at 611. That version of the Patent Act did not
`include any provision for post-issuance administrative
`review. Those precedents, then, are best read as a de-
`scription of the statutory scheme that existed at that time.
`They do not resolve Congress’ authority under the Consti-
`tution to establish a different scheme.3
`——————
`3 The dissent points to McCormick’s statement that the Patent Office
`Commissioner could not invalidate the patent at issue because it would
`“ ‘deprive the applicant of his property without due process of law, and
`would be in fact an invasion of the judicial branch.’ ” Post, at 10 (quot-
`ing McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Aultman, 169 U. S. 606, 612
`(1898)). But that statement followed naturally from the Court’s deter-
`mination that, under the Patent Act of 1870, the Commissioner “was
`functus officio” and “had no power to revoke, cancel, or annul” the
`patent at issue. 169 U. S., at 611–612.
`Nor is it significant that the McCormick Court “equated invention
`patents with land patents.” Post, at 10. McCormick itself makes clear
`that the analogy between the two depended on the particulars of the
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`12
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`OIL STATES ENERGY SERVICES, LLC v. GREENE’S
`ENERGY GROUP, LLC
`Opinion of the Court
`C
` Oil States and the dissent contend that inter partes
`review violates the “general” principle that “Congress may
`not ‘withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which,
`from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law,
`or in equity, or admiralty.’ ” Stern, 564 U. S., at 484 (quot-
`ing Murray’s Lessee, 18 How., at 284). They argue that
`this is so because patent validity was often decided in
`English courts of law in the 18th century. For example, if
`a patent owner brought an infringement action, the de-
`fendant could challenge the validity of the patent as an
`affirmative defense. See Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If
`Patents Are Valid? 99 Va. L. Rev. 1673, 1682, 1685–1686,
`and n. 52 (2013). Or, an individual could challenge the
`validity of a patent by filing a writ of scire facias in the
`Court of Chancery, which would sit as a law court when
`adjudicating the writ. See id., at 1683–1685, and n. 44;
`Bottomley, Patent Cases in the Court of Chancery, 1714–
`58, 35 J. Legal Hist. 27, 36–37, 41–43 (2014).
` But this history does not establish that patent validity
`is a matter that, “from its nature,” must be decided by a
`court. Stern, supra, at 484 (quoting Murray’s Lessee,
`supra, at 284). The aforementioned proceedings were
`between private parties. But there was another means of
`——————
`Patent Act of 1870. See 169 U. S., at 609–610. Modern invention
`patents, by contrast, are meaningfully different from land patents. The
`land-patent cases invoked by the dissent involved a “transaction [in
`which] ‘all authority or control’ over the lands has passed from ‘the
`Executive Department.’ ” Boesche v. Udall, 373 U. S. 472, 477 (1963)
`(quoting Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530, 533 (1878)). Their holdings do
`not apply when “the Government continues to possess some measure of
`control over” the right in question. Boesche, 373 U. S., at 477; see id.,
`at 477–478 (affirming administrative cancellations of public-land
`leases). And that is true of modern invention patents under the current
`Patent Act, which gives the PTO continuing authority to review and
`potentially cancel patents after they are issued. See 35 U. S. C. §§261,
`311–319.
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`Opinion of the Court
`canceling a patent in 18th-century England, which more
`closely resembles inter partes review: a petition to the
`Privy Council to vacate a patent. See Lemley, supra, at
`1681–1682; Hulme, Privy Council Law and Practice of
`Letters Patent for Invention From the Restoration to 1794,
`33 L