`(Slip Opinion)
`
`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2017
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`
` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
` LAMAR, ARCHER & COFRIN, LLP v. APPLING
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
` No. 16–1215. Argued April 17, 2018—Decided June 4, 2018
`
`Respondent R. Scott Appling fell behind on his bills owed to petitioner
`law firm Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP, which threatened to with-
`
`draw representation and place a lien on its work product if Appling
`
`did not pay. Appling told Lamar that he could cover owed and future
`legal expenses with an expected tax refund, so Lamar agreed to con-
`
`tinue representation. However, Appling used the refund, which was
`
`for much less than he had stated, for business expenses. When he
`met with Lamar again, he told the firm he was still waiting on the re-
`fund, so Lamar agreed to complete pending litigation. Appling never
`
`paid the final invoice, so Lamar sued him and obtained a judgment.
`Shortly thereafter, Appling and his wife filed for Chapter 7 bank-
`
`ruptcy. Lamar initiated an adversary proceeding against Appling in
`Bankruptcy Court, arguing that his debt to Lamar was nondis-
`chargeable pursuant to 11 U. S. C. §523(a)(2)(A), which bars dis-
`charge of specified debts arising from “false pretenses, a false repre-
`sentation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the
`debtor’s . . . financial condition.” Appling moved to dismiss on the
`ground that his alleged misrepresentations were “statement[s] re-
`specting the debtor’s . . . financial condition,” which §523(a)(2)(B) re-
`quires to be “in writing.” The Bankruptcy Court disagreed and de-
`nied Appling’s motion. Finding that Appling knowingly made two
`false representations on which Lamar justifiably relied and that La-
`
`
`
`mar incurred damages as a result, the court concluded that Appling’s
`debt to Lamar was nondischargeable under §523(a)(2)(A). The Dis-
`trict Court affirmed, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that
`a “statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition” may include
`
`a statement about a single asset. Because Appling’s statements were
`not in writing, the court held, §523(a)(2)(B) did not bar him from dis-
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`2
`
`
`LAMAR, ARCHER & COFRIN, LLP v. APPLING
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`
`
`
`
`charging his debt to Lamar.
`Held: A statement about a single asset can be a “statement respecting
`
`the debtor’s financial condition” under §523(a)(2). Pp. 4–15.
`
`(a) The key word in the relevant statutory phrase here is the prep-
`osition “respecting.” In ordinary usage, “respecting” means “concern-
`ing; about; regarding; in regard to; relating to.” Lamar contends that
`the definitions “about,” “concerning,” “with reference to,” and “as re-
`gards” denote a more limited scope than “related to.” And under that
`more limited meaning, Lamar asserts, a formal financial statement
`providing a detailed accounting of one’s assets and liabilities would
`
`qualify as “a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition,”
`
`but a statement about a single asset would not. But the overlapping
`and circular definitions of these words belie the clear distinction La-
`
`mar attempts to impose. And the firm gives no example of a phrase
`in a legal context similar to the one at issue here in which toggling
`between “related to” and “about” has any pertinent significance.
`
`
`Use of the word “respecting” in a legal context generally has a
`broadening effect, ensuring that a provision’s scope covers not only its
`subject but also matters relating to that subject. Cf. Kleppe v. New
`
`
`Mexico, 426 U. S. 529, 539. Indeed, this Court has typically read the
`phrase “relating to”—one of respecting’s meanings—expansively.
`See, e.g., Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils, 581 U. S. ___,
`
`___. Appling and the United States, as amicus curiae, accordingly
`
`advance an expansive interpretation here. This Court agrees with
`them that, given the ordinary meaning of “respecting,” Lamar’s stat-
`
`
`utory construction must be rejected, for it reads “respecting” out of
`the statute. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 31. Had Con-
`gress intended §523(a)(2)(B) to encompass only statements express-
`
`ing the balance of a debtor’s assets and liabilities, it could have so
`specified—e.g., “statement of the debtor’s financial condition.” The
`Court also agrees that a statement is “respecting” a debtor’s financial
`
`condition if it has a direct relation to or impact on the debtor’s overall
`
`financial status. A single asset has a direct relation to and impact on
`
`aggregate financial condition, so a statement about that asset bears
`on a debtor’s overall financial condition and can help indicate wheth-
`
`er a debtor is solvent or insolvent. A statement about a single asset,
`
`thus, can be a “statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition.”
`Pp. 5–9.
`
`
`(b) Lamar’s interpretation would yield incoherent results. For in-
`
`
`stance, on Lamar’s view, a misrepresentation about a single asset
`made in the context of a formal financial statement or balance sheet
`would constitute a “statement respecting the debtor’s financial condi-
`tion” and trigger §523(a)(2)(B)’s heightened nondischargeability re-
`
`quirements, but the same misrepresentation made on its own, or in
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`3
`
`
`Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`
`Syllabus
`the context of a list of some but not all of the debtor’s assets and lia-
`
`bilities, would not. Lamar does not explain why Congress would
`draw such seemingly arbitrary distinctions. Pp. 9–10.
`
`(c) The statutory history of the phrase “statement respecting the
`debtor’s financial condition” corroborates this Court’s reading. Be-
`tween 1926, when the phrase was introduced, and 1978, when Con-
`
`gress enacted the Bankruptcy Code, Courts of Appeals consistently
`
`construed the phrase to encompass statements addressing just one or
`some of a debtor’s assets or liabilities. When Congress used the ma-
`terially same language in §523(a)(2), it presumptively was aware of
`
`this longstanding judicial interpretation and intended for the phrase
`
`to retain its established meaning. Pp. 10–11.
`
`
`(d) Lamar’s additional arguments are unpersuasive. First, Lamar
`contends that Appling’s construction gives §523(a)(2)(B) an implausi-
`bly broad reach, such that little would be covered by §523(a)(2)(A)’s
`general rule rendering nondischargeable debts arising from “false
`
`pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud.” But §523(a)(2)(A)
`still retains significant function when the phrase “statement respect-
`
`ing the debtor’s financial condition” is interpreted to encompass a
`
`statement about a single asset. See, e.g., Husky Int’l Electronics, Inc.
`v. Ritz, 578 U. S. ___, ___. Second, Lamar asserts that Appling’s in-
`terpretation is inconsistent with the overall principle that the Bank-
`
`ruptcy Code exists to afford relief only to the “ ‘honest but unfortu-
`
`nate debtor.’ ” Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U. S. 213, 217. The text of
`
`§523(a)(2), however, plainly heightens the bar to discharge when the
`fraud at issue was effectuated via a “statement respecting the debt-
`or’s financial condition.” The heightened requirements, moreover,
`
`are not a shield for dishonest debtors. Rather, they reflect Congress’
`
`effort to balance the potential misuse of such statements by both
`
`debtors and creditors. See Field v. Mans, 516 U. S. 59, 76–77.
`Pp. 12–15.
` 848 F. 3d 953, affirmed.
`SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
`C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined, and in
`which THOMAS, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined as to all but Part III–B.
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`
`
`
` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`
` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
`
` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`
`
` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`
`
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
`
`
`_________________
`
` No. 16–1215
`_________________
` LAMAR, ARCHER & COFRIN, LLP, PETITIONER v.
`R. SCOTT APPLING
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`[June 4, 2018]
`
`
` JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.*
`
`The Bankruptcy Code prohibits debtors from discharg-
`
`
`ing debts for money, property, services, or credit obtained
`by “false pretenses, a false representation, or actual
`fraud,” 11 U. S. C. §523(a)(2)(A), or, if made in writing, by
`a materially false “statement . . . respecting the debtor’s
`. . . financial condition,” §523(a)(2)(B).
`
`This case is about what constitutes a “statement re-
`specting the debtor’s financial condition.” Does a state-
`ment about a single asset qualify, or must the statement
`be about the debtor’s overall financial status? The answer
`
`matters to the parties because the false statements at
`issue concerned a single asset and were made orally. So, if
`the single-asset statements here qualify as “respecting the
`debtor’s financial condition,” §523(a)(2)(B) poses no bar to
`
`If,
`discharge because they were not made in writing.
`
`however, the statements fall into the more general category
`of “false pretenses, . . . false representation, or actual
`fraud,” §523(a)(2)(A), for which there is no writing
`——————
` *JUSTICE THOMAS, JUSTICE ALITO, and JUSTICE GORSUCH join all but
`
`Part III–B of this opinion.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`2
`
`
`LAMAR, ARCHER & COFRIN, LLP v. APPLING
`
`Opinion of the Court
`requirement,
`the associated debt will be deemed
`
`nondischargeable.
`
`The statutory language makes plain that a statement
`about a single asset can be a “statement respecting the
`debtor’s financial condition.” If that statement is not in
`
`writing, then, the associated debt may be discharged, even
`
`if the statement was false.
`
`
`
`
`
`I
`
`
`Respondent R. Scott Appling hired petitioner Lamar,
`Archer & Cofrin, LLP (Lamar), a law firm, to represent
`him in a business litigation. Appling fell behind on his
`
`legal bills, and by March 2005, he owed Lamar more than
`$60,000. Lamar informed Appling that if he did not pay
`
`the outstanding amount, the firm would withdraw from
`
`representation and place a lien on its work product until
`the bill was paid. The parties met in person that month,
`and Appling told his attorneys that he was expecting a tax
`refund of “‘approximately $100,000,’” enough to cover his
`
`owed and future legal fees. App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a.
`
`Lamar relied on this statement and continued to represent
`
`Appling without initiating collection of the overdue
`amount.
`
`When Appling and his wife filed their tax return, how-
`ever, the refund they requested was of just $60,718, and
`they ultimately received $59,851 in October 2005. Rather
`than paying Lamar, they spent the money on their
`
`business.
`
`Appling and his attorneys met again in November 2005,
`and Appling told them that he had not yet received the
`refund. Lamar relied on that statement and agreed to
`
`complete the pending litigation and delay collection of the
`
`outstanding fees.
`
`In March 2006, Lamar sent Appling its final invoice.
`Five years later, Appling still had not paid, so Lamar filed
`suit in Georgia state court and obtained a judgment for
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`$104,179.60. Shortly thereafter, Appling and his wife filed
`
`for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
`Lamar initiated an adversary proceeding against Ap-
`
`pling in Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Geor-
`gia. The firm argued that because Appling made fraudu-
`lent statements about his tax refund at the March and
`November 2005 meetings, his debt to Lamar was nondis-
`chargeable pursuant to 11 U. S. C. §523(a)(2)(A), which
`governs debts arising from “false pretenses, a false repre-
`sentation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respect-
`ing the debtor’s . . . financial condition.” Appling, in turn,
`moved to dismiss, contending that his alleged misrepre-
`sentations were “statement[s] . . . respecting [his] financial
`
`condition” and were therefore governed by §523(a)(2)(B),
`such that Lamar could not block discharge of the debt
`
`because the statements were not “in writing” as required
`for nondischargeability under that provision.
`
`The Bankruptcy Court held that a statement regarding
`a single asset is not a “statement respecting the debtor’s
`financial condition” and denied Appling’s motion to dis-
`
`
`miss. 500 B. R. 246, 252 (MD Ga. 2013). After a trial, the
`
`Bankruptcy Court found that Appling knowingly made
`two false representations on which Lamar justifiably
`relied and that Lamar incurred damages as a result. It
`thus concluded that Appling’s debt to Lamar was nondis-
`chargeable under §523(a)(2)(A). 527 B. R. 545, 550–556
`
`(MD Ga. 2015). The District Court affirmed. 2016 WL
`1183128 (MD Ga., Mar. 28, 2016).
`
`
`The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed.
`
`It held that “‘statement[s] respecting the debtor’s . . .
`
`financial condition’ may include a statement about a
`
`single asset.” In re Appling, 848 F. 3d 953, 960 (2017).
`Because Appling’s statements about his expected tax
`refund were not in writing, the Court of Appeals held that
`
`§523(a)(2)(B) did not bar Appling from discharging his
`debt to Lamar. Id., at 961.
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`4
`
`
`LAMAR, ARCHER & COFRIN, LLP v. APPLING
`
`Opinion of the Court
`The Court granted certiorari, 583 U. S. ___ (2018), to
`
`resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to
`whether a statement about a single asset can be a “state-
`ment respecting the debtor’s financial condition.”1 We
`
`agree with the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion and affirm.
`
`II
`
`A
`
`
`
`One of the “main purpose[s]” of the federal bankruptcy
`
`system is “to aid the unfortunate debtor by giving him a
`fresh start in life, free from debts, except of a certain
`
`character.” Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U. S. 605, 617 (1918).
`To that end, the Bankruptcy Code contains broad provi-
`
`sions for the discharge of debts, subject to exceptions. One
`such exception is found in 11 U. S. C. §523(a)(2), which
`provides that a discharge under Chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13 of
`the Bankruptcy Code “does not discharge an individual
`
`debtor from any debt . . . for money, property, services, or
`an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the
`extent obtained by” fraud. This exception is in keeping
`
`with the “basic policy animating the Code of affording
`
`relief only to an ‘honest but unfortunate debtor.’” Cohen
`v. de la Cruz, 523 U. S. 213, 217 (1998).
`
`
`More specifically, §523(a)(2) excepts from discharge
`debts arising from various forms of fraud. Subparagraph
`
`(A) bars discharge of debts arising from “false pretenses, a
`false representation, or actual fraud, other than a state-
`
`
`ment respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition.”
`Subparagraph (B), in turn, bars discharge of debts arising
`
`from a materially false “statement . . . respecting the
`——————
`
`
` 1Compare In re Bandi, 683 F. 3d 671, 676 (CA5 2012) (a statement
` about a single asset is not a statement respecting the debtor’s financial
`
`
`
` condition); In re Joelson, 427 F. 3d 700, 714 (CA10 2005) (same), with
`
`In re Appling, 848 F. 3d 958, 960 (CA11 2017) (a statement about a
`single asset can be a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condi-
`
`
` tion); Engler v. Van Steinburg, 744 F. 2d 1060, 1061 (CA4 1984) (same).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`debtor’s . . . financial condition” if that statement is “in
`writing.”
`
`5
`
`
`
`B
`1
`
`
`“Our interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code starts
`‘where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of
`the statute itself.’” Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N. A.,
`562 U. S. 61, 69 (2011). As noted, the relevant statutory
`text is the phrase “statement respecting the debtor’s fi-
`nancial condition.” Because the Bankruptcy Code does not
`define the words “statement,” “financial condition,” or
`
`“respecting,” we look to their ordinary meanings. See ibid.
`
`There is no dispute as to the meaning of the first two
`terms. A “statement” is “the act or process of stating,
`
`reciting, or presenting orally or on paper; something stated
`
`as a report or narrative; a single declaration or remark.”
`Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2229 (1976)
`(Webster’s). As to “financial condition,” the parties agree,
`as does the United States, that the term means one’s
`overall financial status. See Brief for Petitioner 23; Brief
`for Respondent 25; Brief for United States as Amicus
`
`
`Curiae 12.
`
`
`For our purposes, then, the key word in the statutory
`phrase is the preposition “respecting,” which joins together
`
`“statement” and “financial condition.” As a matter of
`ordinary usage, “respecting” means “in view of: consider-
`
`ing; with regard or relation to: regarding; concerning.”
`Webster’s 1934; see also American Heritage Dictionary
`1107 (1969) (“[i]n relation to; concerning”); Random House
`Dictionary of the English Language 1221 (1966) (“regard-
`ing; concerning”); Webster’s New Twentieth Century
`Dictionary 1542 (2d ed. 1967) (“concerning; about; regard-
`
`ing; in regard to; relating to”).
`
`According to Lamar, these definitions reveal that “‘re-
`
`specting’ can be ‘defined broadly,’” but that the word “isn’t
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`LAMAR, ARCHER & COFRIN, LLP v. APPLING
`
`Opinion of the Court
`always used that way.” Brief for Petitioner 27. The firm
`contends that “‘about,’” “‘concerning,’” “‘with reference
`to,’” and “‘as regards’” denote a more limited scope than
`“‘related to.’” Brief for Petitioner 3, 18, 27. When “re-
`
`specting” is understood to have one of these more limited
`
`meanings, Lamar asserts, a “statement respecting the
`
`debtor’s financial condition” is “a statement that is ‘about,’
`
`or that makes ‘reference to,’ the debtor’s overall financial
`state or well-being.” Id., at 27–28. Under that formula-
`tion, a formal financial statement providing a detailed
`
`accounting of one’s assets and liabilities would qualify, as
`would statements like “‘Don’t worry, I am above water,’”
`and “‘I am in good financial shape.’” Id., at 19, 28. A
`
`statement about a single asset would not.
`
`The Court finds no basis to conclude, however, at least
`
`in this context, that “related to” has a materially different
`meaning than “about,” “concerning,” “with reference to,”
`and “as regards.” The definitions of these words are over-
`
`lapping and circular, with each one pointing to another in
`the group. “Relate” means “to be in relationship: have
`reference,” and, in the context of the phrase “in relation
`
`to,” “reference, respect.” Webster’s 1916; see also id., at
`18a (Explanatory Note 16.2). “About” means “with regard
`to,” and is the equivalent of “concerning.” Id., at 5. “Con-
`cerning” means “relating to,” and is the equivalent of
`“regarding, respecting, about.” Id., at 470. “Reference”
`means “the capability or character of alluding to or bear-
`
`ing on or directing attention to something,” and is the
`equivalent of “relation” and “respect.” Id., at 1907. And
`
`“regard” means “to have relation to or bearing upon: relate
`
`to,” and is the equivalent of “relation” and “respect.” Id.,
`
`at 1911. The interconnected web formed by these words
`
`belies the clear distinction Lamar attempts to impose.
`
`Lamar also fails to put forth an example of a phrase in a
`legal context similar to the one at issue here in which
`toggling between “related to” and “about” has any perti-
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`7
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`nent significance.
`
`Use of the word “respecting” in a legal context generally
`has a broadening effect, ensuring that the scope of a provi-
`sion covers not only its subject but also matters relating to
`
`
`that subject. Cf. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U. S. 529, 539
`(1976) (explaining that the Property Clause, “in broad
`terms, gives Congress the power to determine what are
`‘needful’ rules ‘respecting’ the public lands,” and should
`receive an “expansive reading”).
`
`
`Indeed, when asked to interpret statutory language
`including the phrase “relating to,” which is one of the
`meanings of “respecting,” this Court has typically read the
`relevant text expansively. See, e.g., Coventry Health Care
`
`of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils, 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at
`7) (describing “‘relate to’” as “expansive” and noting that
`
`“Congress characteristically employs the phrase to reach
`any subject that has ‘a connection with, or reference to,’
`the topics the statute enumerates”); Morales v. Trans
`
`World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 378–390 (1992) (ex-
`plaining that “‘relating to’” has a “broad” ordinary mean-
`
`ing and accordingly holding that the Airline Deregulation
`Act of 1978 provision prohibiting the States from enforcing
`any law “‘relating to rates, routes, or services’” of any air
`
`carrier pre-empted any fare advertising guidelines that
`“would have a significant impact upon the airlines’ ability
`to market their product, and hence a significant impact
`
`upon the fares they charge”); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
`
`McClendon, 498 U. S. 133, 139 (1990) (“‘A law “relates to”
`an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the
`phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a
`
`plan.’ Under this ‘broad common-sense meaning,’ a state
`law may ‘relate to’ a benefit plan . . . even if the law is not
`
`specifically designed to affect such plans, or the effect is
`only indirect” (citation omitted)).
`
`Advancing that same expansive approach here, Appling
`contends that a “statement respecting the debtor’s finan-
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`8
`
`
`LAMAR, ARCHER & COFRIN, LLP v. APPLING
`
`Opinion of the Court
`cial condition” is “a statement that has a direct relation to,
`or impact on the balance of all of the debtor’s assets and
`liabilities or the debtor’s overall financial status.” Brief
`for Respondent 17 (internal quotation marks and citations
`
`omitted). “A debtor’s statement describing an individual
`asset or liability necessarily qualifies,” Appling explains,
`because it “has a direct impact on the sum of his assets
`
`
`and liabilities.” Ibid. “Put differently, a debtor’s state-
`ment that describes the existence or value of a constituent
`element of the debtor’s balance sheet or income statement
`qualifies as a ‘statement respecting financial condition.’”
`
`Ibid.
`
`The United States as amicus curiae supporting Appling
`
`
`offers a slightly different formulation.
`In its view, a
`
`“statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition”
`
`includes “a representation about a debtor’s asset that is
`offered as evidence of ability to pay.” Brief for United
`States as Amicus Curiae 11. Although Appling does not
`include “ability to pay” in his proffered definition, he and
`
`the United States agree that their respective formulations
`
`are functionally the same and lead to the same results.
`
`See Tr. of Oral Arg. 50–52, 58. That is so because to es-
`
`tablish the requisite materiality and reliance, a creditor
`opposing discharge must explain why it viewed the debtor’s
`false representation as relevant to the decision to extend
`money, property, services, or credit. If a given statement
`did not actually serve as evidence of ability to pay, the
`
`creditor’s explanation will not suffice to bar discharge.
`
`But if the creditor proves materiality and reliance, it will
`be clear the statement was one “respecting the debtor’s
`financial condition.” Whether a statement about a single
`asset served as evidence of ability to pay thus ultimately
`always factors into the §523(a)(2) inquiry at some point.
`
`We agree with both Appling and the United States that,
`given the ordinary meaning of “respecting,” Lamar’s pre-
`
`ferred statutory construction—that a “statement respecting
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`9
`
`
`Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`the debtor’s financial condition” means only a statement
`that captures the debtor’s overall financial status—must
`be rejected, for it reads “respecting” out of the statute. See
`TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 31 (2001) (“[A] statute
`
`
`ought . . . to be so construed that . . . no clause, sentence,
`
`or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant” (inter-
`nal quotation marks omitted)). Had Congress intended
`
`§523(a)(2)(B) to encompass only statements expressing the
`balance of a debtor’s assets and liabilities, there are several
`
`ways in which it could have so specified, e.g., “statement
`
`disclosing the debtor’s financial condition” or “statement of
`the debtor’s financial condition.”2 But Congress did not
`use such narrow language.
`We also agree that a statement is “respecting” a debtor’s
`
`
`financial condition if it has a direct relation to or impact
`on the debtor’s overall financial status. A single asset has
`
`a direct relation to and impact on aggregate financial
`
`condition, so a statement about a single asset bears on a
`debtor’s overall financial condition and can help indicate
`whether a debtor is solvent or insolvent, able to repay a
`given debt or not. Naturally, then, a statement about a
`single asset can be a “statement respecting the debtor’s
`
`financial condition.”
`
`2
`Further supporting the Court’s conclusion is that
`
`
`Lamar’s interpretation would yield incoherent results. On
`
`Lamar’s view, the following would obtain: A misrepresen-
`tation about a single asset made in the context of a formal
`financial statement or balance sheet would constitute a
`
`“statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition” and
`——————
`2Congress in fact used just such “statement of” language elsewhere in
`
`the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., 11 U. S. C. §329(a) (“statement of the
`compensation paid”); §521(a)(1)(B)(iii) (“statement of the debtor’s
`
`financial affairs”); §707(b)(2)(C) (“statement of the debtor’s current
`monthly income”).
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`10
`
`
`LAMAR, ARCHER & COFRIN, LLP v. APPLING
`
`Opinion of the Court
`trigger §523(a)(2)(B)’s heightened nondischargeability
`
`requirements, but the exact same misrepresentation made
`on its own, or in the context of a list of some but not all of
`the debtor’s assets and liabilities, would not. Lamar does
`not explain why Congress would draw such seemingly
`arbitrary distinctions, where the ability to discharge a
`debt turns on the superficial packaging of a statement
`rather than its substantive content.
`
`In addition, a highly general statement like, “I am above
`water,” would need to be in writing to foreclose discharge,
`whereas a highly specific statement like, “I have $200,000
`of equity in my house,” would not. This, too, is inexplica-
`bly bizarre.
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`Lastly, the statutory history of the phrase “statement
`respecting the debtor’s financial condition” corroborates
`our reading of the text. That language can be traced back
`to a 1926 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 that
`prohibited discharge entirely to a debtor who had “ob-
`tained money or property on credit, or obtained an exten-
`sion or renewal of credit, by making or publishing, or
`causing to be made or published, in any manner whatso-
`ever, a materially false statement in writing respecting his
`financial condition.” Act of May 27, 1926, §6, 44 Stat.
`663–664.
`
`
`When Congress again amended this provision in 1960, it
`retained the “statement in writing respecting . . . financial
`condition” language. See Act of July 12, 1960, Pub. L. 86–
`
`621, §2, 74 Stat. 409. Congress then once more preserved
`
`that language when it rewrote and recodified the provision
`in the modern Bankruptcy Code as §523(a)(2)(B).
`
`Given the historical presence of the phrase “statement
`respecting the debtor’s financial condition,” lower courts
`had ample opportunity to weigh in on its meaning. Be-
`tween 1926, when the phrase was introduced, and 1978,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`11
`
`
`Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`when Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code, Courts of
`
`Appeals consistently construed the phrase to encompass
`
`statements addressing just one or some of a debtor’s assets
`or liabilities.3 When Congress used the materially same
`
`language in §523(a)(2), it presumptively was aware of the
`
`longstanding judicial interpretation of the phrase and
`intended for it to retain its established meaning. See
`
`
`Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580 (1978) (“Congress is
`presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial
`
`interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation
`
`when it re-enacts a statute without change”); Bragdon v.
`Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, 645 (1998) (“When administrative
`
`and judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of
`
`an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same
`
`language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter,
`the intent to incorporate its administrative and judicial
`interpretations as well”).
`
`
`
`——————
` 3See, e.g., Tenn v. First Hawaiian Bank, 549 F. 2d 1356, 1358 (CA9
`
`
`1977) (per curiam) (“[A]ppellants’ recordation of the deed which they
`knew was false for the purpose of obtaining an extension of credit on
`
`the basis of an asset that they did not own was a false statement of
`
` financial condition” (citing Scott v. Smith, 232 F. 2d 188, 190 (CA9
`
`
`1956))); In re Butler, 425 F. 2d 47, 49, 52 (CA3 1970) (affirming holding
` that a corporation’s false statements as to select accounts receivable
`
`qualified as statements respecting financial condition); Shainman v.
`Shear’s of Affton, Inc., 387 F. 2d 33, 38 (CA8 1967) (“A written state-
`ment purporting to set forth the true value of a major asset of a corpo-
`ration, its inventory, is a statement respecting the financial condition of
`
`that corporation. . . . There is nothing in the language or legislative
`
`history of this section of the [Bankruptcy] Act to indicate that it was
`intended to apply only to complete financial statements in the account-
`
`ing sense”); Albinak v. Kuhn, 149 F. 2d 108, 110 (CA6 1945) (“No cases
`
`have been cited to us, and none has been found by careful examination,
`
`which confines a statement respecting one’s financial condition as
`
`
`limited to a detailed statement of assets and liabilities”); In re Weiner,
`
`103 F. 2d 421, 423 (CA2 1939) (holding that a debtor’s false statement
`
`
`about “an asset” that was pledged as collateral was a statement re-
`specting financial condition).
`
`
`
`
`

`

`12
`
`
`LAMAR, ARCHER & COFRIN, LLP v. APPLING
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` III
`In addition to its plain-text arguments discussed and
`
`rejected above, see supra, at 5–7, Lamar contends that
`Appling’s rule undermines the purpose of §523(a)(2) in two
`
`ways. Neither argument is persuasive.
`A
`
`First, Lamar contends that Appling’s construction gives
`§523(a)(2)(B) an implausibly broad reach, such that little
`would be covered by §523(a)(2)(A)’s general rule rendering
`
`nondischargeable debts arising from “false pretenses, a
`
`false representation, or actual fraud.” That is not so.
`Decisions from this Court and several lower courts consid-
`ering the application of §523(a)(2)(A) demonstrate that the
`
`provision still retains significant function when the phrase
`
`“statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition” is
`
`interpreted to encompass a statement about a single asset.
`
`Section 523(a)(2)(A) has been applied when a debt arises
`
`from “forms of fraud, like fraudulent conveyance schemes,
`that can be effected without a false representation.”
`Husky Int’l Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, 578 U. S. ___, ___
`(2016) (slip op., at 3).4 It also has been used to bar the
`discharge of debts resulting from misrepresentations
`
`about the value of goods, property, and services.5
`——————
`4See also, e.g., In re Tucker, 539 B. R. 861, 868 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Idaho
`
`
`2015) (holding nondischargeable under §523(a)(2)(A) a debt arising
`from the overpayment of social security disability benefits to an indi-
`
`vidual who failed to report changes to his employm