(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2015
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`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
`
` RJR NABISCO, INC., ET AL. v. EUROPEAN
`
` COMMUNITY ET AL.
`
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE SECOND CIRCUIT
` No. 15–138. Argued March 21, 2016—Decided June 20, 2016
`
`The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) pro-
`hibits certain activities of organized crime groups in relation to an
`
`
`
` enterprise. RICO makes it a crime to invest income derived from a
`pattern of racketeering activity in an enterprise “which is engaged in,
`or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce,” 18
`U. S. C. §1962(a); to acquire or maintain an interest in an enterprise
`through a pattern of racketeering activity, §1962(b); to conduct an
`enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity,
`§1962(c); and to conspire to violate any of the other three prohibi-
`tions, §1962(d). RICO also provides a civil cause of action for “[a]ny
`person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation” of
`those prohibitions. §1964(c).
`
`
`Respondents (the European Community and 26 of its member
`states) filed suit under RICO, alleging that petitioners (RJR Nabisco
`and related entities (collectively RJR)) participated in a global mon-
`ey-laundering scheme in association with various organized crime
`groups. Under the alleged scheme, drug traffickers smuggled narcot-
`ics into Europe and sold them for euros that—through transactions
`involving black-market money brokers, cigarette importers, and
`wholesalers—were used to pay for large shipments of RJR cigarettes
`into Europe. The complaint alleged that RJR violated §§1962(a)–(d)
`
`by engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity that included nu-
`merous predicate acts of money laundering, material support to for-
`eign terrorist organizations, mail fraud, wire fraud, and violations of
`the Travel Act. The District Court granted RJR’s motion to dismiss
`on the ground that RICO does not apply to racketeering activity oc-
`curring outside U. S. territory or to foreign enterprises. The Second
`
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`

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`2
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`RJR NABISCO, INC. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`Circuit reinstated the claims, however, concluding that RICO applies
`extraterritorially to the same extent as the predicate acts of racket-
`
`eering that underlie the alleged RICO violation, and that certain
`predicates alleged in this case expressly apply extraterritorially. In
`denying rehearing, the court held further that RICO’s civil action
`does not require a domestic injury, but permits recovery for a foreign
`injury caused by the violation of a predicate statute that applies ex-
`
`traterritorially.
`Held:
`
`
`1. The law of extraterritoriality provides guidance in determining
`RICO’s reach to events outside the United States. The Court applies
`a canon of statutory construction known as the presumption against
`
`extraterritoriality: Absent clearly expressed congressional intent to
`the contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only domestic ap-
`plication. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247,
`255. Morrison and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U. S.
`___, reflect a two-step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality is-
`sues. First, the Court asks whether the presumption against extra-
`
`territoriality has been rebutted—i.e., whether the statute gives a
`clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially. This
`question is asked regardless of whether the particular statute regu-
`lates conduct, affords relief, or merely confers jurisdiction. If, and on-
`ly if, the statute is not found extraterritorial at step one, the Court
`moves to step two, where it examines the statute’s “focus” to deter-
`
`mine whether the case involves a domestic application of the statute.
`If the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United
`States, then the case involves a permissible domestic application
`even if other conduct occurred abroad; but if the relevant conduct oc-
`curred in a foreign country, then the case involves an impermissible
`
`extraterritorial application regardless of whether other conduct oc-
`curred in U. S. territory. In the event the statute is found to have
`
`clear extraterritorial effect at step one, then the statute’s scope turns
`on the limits Congress has or has not imposed on the statute’s foreign
`
`application, and not on the statute’s “focus.” Pp. 7–10.
`
`2. The presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted
`with respect to certain applications of RICO’s substantive prohibi-
`
`tions in §1962. Pp. 10–18.
`
`
`(a) RICO defines racketeering activity to include a number of
`predicates that plainly apply to at least some foreign conduct, such as
`the prohibition against engaging in monetary transactions in crimi-
`nally derived property, §1957(d)(2), the prohibitions against the as-
`sassination of Government officials, §§351(i), 1751(k), and the prohi-
`
`
`bition against hostage taking, §1203(b). Congress has thus given a
`clear, affirmative indication that §1962 applies to foreign racketeer-
`
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`

`
`3
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`Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`
`Syllabus
`ing activity—but only to the extent that the predicates alleged in a
`particular case themselves apply extraterritorially. This fact is de-
`terminative as to §§1962(b) and (c), which both prohibit the employ-
`
`ment of a pattern of racketeering. But §1962(a), which targets cer-
`tain uses of income derived from a pattern of racketeering, arguably
`
`extends only to domestic uses of that income. Because the parties
`have not focused on this issue, and because its resolution does not af-
`fect this case, it is assumed that respondents have pleaded a domes-
`
`
`tic investment of racketeering income in violation of §1962(a). It is
`also assumed that the extraterritoriality of a violation of RICO’s con-
`spiracy provision, §1962(d), tracks that of the RICO provision under-
`
`lying the alleged conspiracy. Pp. 10–14.
`
`
`
`
`(b) RJR contends that RICO’s “focus” is its enterprise element,
`which gives no clear indication of extraterritorial effect. But focus is
`considered only when it is necessary to proceed to the inquiry’s sec-
`
`ond step. See Morrison, supra, at 267, n. 9. Here, however, there is a
`clear indication at step one that at least §§1962(b) and (c) apply to all
`transnational patterns of racketeering, subject to the stated limita-
`tion. A domestic enterprise requirement would lead to difficult line-
`drawing problems and counterintuitive results, such as excluding
`from RICO’s reach foreign enterprises that operate within the United
`States. Such troubling consequences reinforce the conclusion that
`Congress intended the §§1962(b) and (c) prohibitions to apply extra-
`territorially in tandem with the underlying predicates, without re-
`gard to the locus of the enterprise. Of course, foreign enterprises will
`qualify only if they engage in, or significantly affect, commerce direct-
`
`ly involving the United States. Pp. 14–17.
`
`
`(c) Applying these principles here, respondents’ allegations that
`RJR violated §§1962(b) and (c) do not involve an impermissibly extra-
`territorial application of RICO. The Court assumes that the alleged
`pattern of racketeering activity consists entirely of predicate offenses
`that were either committed in the United States or committed in a
`
`foreign country in violation of a predicate statute that applies extra-
`
`
`
`territorially. The alleged enterprise also has a sufficient tie to U. S.
`
`
`
`commerce, as its members include U. S. companies and its activities
`
`
`depend on sales of RJR’s cigarettes conducted through “the U. S.
`
`mails and wires,” among other things. Pp. 17–18.
`
`3. Irrespective of any extraterritoriality of §1962’s substantive pro-
`visions, §1964(c)’s private right of action does not overcome the pre-
`sumption against extraterritoriality, and thus a private RICO plain-
`
`tiff must allege and prove a domestic injury. Pp. 18–27.
`
`
`(a) The Second Circuit reasoned that the presumption against
`extraterritoriality did not apply to §1964(c) independently of its ap-
`
`plication to §1962’s substantive provisions because §1964(c) does not
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`
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`
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`

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`RJR NABISCO, INC. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
`
`
`Syllabus
`regulate conduct. But this view was rejected in Kiobel, 569 U. S., at
`
`___, and the logic of that decision requires that the presumption be
`applied separately to RICO’s cause of action even though it has been
`
`overcome with respect to RICO’s substantive prohibitions. As in oth-
`er contexts, allowing recovery for foreign injuries in a civil RICO ac-
`tion creates a danger of international friction that militates against
`recognizing foreign-injury claims without clear direction from Con-
`gress. Respondents, in arguing that such concerns are inapplicable
`
`here because the plaintiffs are not foreign citizens seeking to bypass
`their home countries’ less generous remedies but are foreign coun-
`tries themselves, forget that this Court’s interpretation of §1964(c)’s
`injury requirement will necessarily govern suits by nongovernmental
`plaintiffs. The Court will not forgo the presumption against extrater-
`
`ritoriality to permit extraterritorial suits based on a case-by-case in-
`
`quiry that turns on or looks to the affected sovereign’s consent. Nor
`will the Court adopt a double standard that would treat suits by for-
`
`eign sovereigns more favorably than other suits. Pp. 18–22.
`
`
`(b) Section 1964(c) does not provide a clear indication that Con-
`gress intended to provide a private right of action for injuries suffered
`outside of the United States. It provides a cause of action to “[a]ny
`person injured in his business or property” by a violation of §1962,
`but neither the word “any” nor the reference to injury to “business or
`property” indicates extraterritorial application. Respondents’ argu-
`ments to the contrary are unpersuasive. In particular, while they are
`correct that RICO’s private right of action was modeled after §4 of the
`
`
`Clayton Act, which allows recovery for injuries suffered abroad as a
`result of antitrust violations, see Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India,
`434 U. S. 308, 314–315, this Court has declined to transplant fea-
`tures of the Clayton Act’s cause of action into the RICO context
`where doing so would be inappropriate. Cf. Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Im-
`rex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 485, 495. There is good reason not to do so
`here. Most importantly, RICO lacks the very language that the
`Court found critical to its decision in Pfizer, namely, the Clayton Act’s
`definition of a “person” who may sue, which “explicitly includes ‘cor-
`
`porations and associations existing under or authorized by . . . the
`
`laws of any foreign country,’ ” 434 U. S., at 313. Congress’s more re-
`cent decision to exclude from the antitrust laws’ reach most conduct
`that “causes only foreign injury,” F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Em-
`pagran S. A., 542 U. S. 155, 158, also counsels against importing into
`RICO those Clayton Act principles that are at odds with the Court’s
`
`current extraterritoriality doctrine. Pp. 22–27.
`
`
`
`(c) Section 1964(c) requires a civil RICO plaintiff to allege and
`prove a domestic injury to business or property and does not allow re-
`
`
`covery for foreign injuries. Respondents waived their domestic injury
`
`
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`
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`4
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`

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`5
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` Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016)
`
`
`Syllabus
`damages claims, so the District Court dismissed them with prejudice.
`Their remaining RICO damages claims therefore rest entirely on in-
`
` jury suffered abroad and must be dismissed. P. 27.
`764 F. 3d 129, reversed and remanded.
`ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
`
`
`and KENNEDY and THOMAS, JJ., joined, and in which GINSBURG, BREY-
`
`ER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined as to Parts I, II, and III. GINSBURG, J., filed
`an opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting from
`
`the judgment, in which BREYER and KAGAN, JJ., joined. BREYER, J.,
`filed an opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting
` from the judgment. SOTOMAYOR, J., took no part in the consideration or
`
`
`
`decision of the case.
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
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` Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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`
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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`
` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 15–138
`_________________
` RJR NABISCO, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
`
`
`EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ET AL.
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
`
`[June 20, 2016]
`
` JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
`The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
`
`Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. §§1961–1968, created four new
`criminal offenses involving the activities of organized
`criminal groups in relation to an enterprise. §§1962(a)–
`(d). RICO also created a new civil cause of action for
`“[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason
`of a violation” of those prohibitions. §1964(c). We are
`asked to decide whether RICO applies extraterritorially—
`that is, to events occurring and injuries suffered outside
`the United States.
`
`
`
`
`
`I
`
`A
`
`RICO is founded on the concept of racketeering activity.
`
`
`The statute defines “racketeering activity” to encompass
`dozens of state and federal offenses, known in RICO par­
`lance as predicates. These predicates include any act
`“indictable” under specified federal statutes, §§1961(1)(B)–
`(C), (E)–(G), as well as certain crimes “chargeable” under
`state law, §1961(1)(A), and any offense involving bank­
`ruptcy or securities fraud or drug-related activity that is
`
`
`
`

`
`RJR NABISCO, INC. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
`
`Opinion of the Court
`“punishable” under federal law, §1961(1)(D). A predicate
`
`
` offense implicates RICO when it is part of a “pattern of
`racketeering activity”—a series of related predicates that
`together demonstrate the existence or threat of continued
`criminal activity. H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tele-
`phone Co., 492 U. S. 229, 239 (1989); see §1961(5) (specify­
`ing that a “pattern of racketeering activity” requires at
`least two predicates committed within 10 years of each
`other).
`RICO’s §1962 sets forth four specific prohibitions aimed
`
`at different ways in which a pattern of racketeering activ-
`ity may be used to infiltrate, control, or operate “a[n] en­
`terprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which
`affect, interstate or foreign commerce.” These prohibitions
`can be summarized as follows. Section 1962(a) makes it
`unlawful to invest income derived from a pattern of rack­
`eteering activity in an enterprise. Section 1962(b) makes
`it unlawful to acquire or maintain an interest in an enter­
`prise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Section
`1962(c) makes it unlawful for a person employed by or
`associated with an enterprise to conduct the enterprise’s
`affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. Finally,
`
`§1962(d) makes it unlawful to conspire to violate any of
`
` the other three prohibitions.1
`——————
`1In full, 18 U. S. C. §1962 provides:
`
`
`
`“(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income
`
`derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or
`through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has partic­
`ipated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United
`
`States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such
`income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in,
`or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged
`in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A
`purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment,
`and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control
`of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful
`
`
`under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser,
`
`
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`2
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`

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`Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Violations of §1962 are subject to criminal penalties,
`
`§1963(a), and civil proceedings to enforce those prohibi­
`tions may be brought by the Attorney General, §§1964(a)–
`(b). Separately, RICO creates a private civil cause of
`action that allows “[a]ny person injured in his business or
`property by reason of a violation of section 1962” to sue in
`
`federal district court and recover treble damages, costs,
`and attorney’s fees. §1964(c).2
`
`——————
`the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices
`in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful
`debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent
`of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either
`in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
`
`“(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racket­
`
`eering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or
`
`maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enter­
`prise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
`foreign commerce.
`
`“(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
`
`with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, inter­
`state or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indi-
`rectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of
`racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
`“(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of
`the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.”
`The attentive reader will notice that these prohibitions concern not
`only patterns of racketeering activity but also the collection of unlawful
`
`
`debt. As is typical in our RICO cases, we have no occasion here to
`address this aspect of the statute.
`2In full, §1964(c) provides:
`“Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a viola­
`
`
`
` tion of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate
`
` United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he
`sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee,
`except that no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been
`actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a
`violation of section 1962. The exception contained in the preceding
`
` sentence does not apply to an action against any person that is crimi­
`nally convicted in connection with the fraud, in which case the statute
`of limitations shall start to run on the date on which the conviction
`becomes final.”
`
`
`
`3
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`4
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`
`
`
`RJR NABISCO, INC. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`B
`
`
`This case arises from allegations that petitioners—RJR
`Nabisco and numerous related entities (collectively RJR)—
`participated in a global money-laundering scheme in
`association with various organized crime groups. Re­
`spondents—the European Community and 26 of its mem­
`ber states—first sued RJR in the Eastern District of New
`
`York in 2000, alleging that RJR had violated RICO. Over
`the past 16 years, the resulting litigation (spread over at
`least three separate actions, with this case the lone survi­
`vor) has seen multiple complaints and multiple trips up
`and down the federal court system. See 2011 WL 843957,
`*1–*2 (EDNY, Mar. 8, 2011) (tracing the procedural his-
`tory through the District Court’s dismissal of the present
`complaint).
`In the interest of brevity, we confine our
`discussion to the operative complaint and its journey to
`
`this Court.
`
`Greatly simplified, the complaint alleges a scheme in
`which Colombian and Russian drug traffickers smuggled
`narcotics into Europe and sold the drugs for euros that—
`through a series of transactions involving black-market
`money brokers, cigarette importers, and wholesalers—
`were used to pay for large shipments of RJR cigarettes
`into Europe.
`In other variations of this scheme, RJR
`allegedly dealt directly with drug traffickers and money
`launderers in South America and sold cigarettes to Iraq in
`violation of international sanctions. RJR is also said to
`have acquired Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation
`for the purpose of expanding these illegal activities.
`
`The complaint alleges that RJR engaged in a pattern of
`racketeering activity consisting of numerous acts of money
`laundering, material support to foreign terrorist organiza­
`tions, mail fraud, wire fraud, and violations of the Travel
`Act. RJR, in concert with the other participants in the
`scheme, allegedly formed an association in fact that was
`engaged in interstate and foreign commerce, and therefore
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
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`Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`constituted a RICO enterprise that the complaint dubs the
`“RJR Money-Laundering Enterprise.” App. to Pet. for
`Cert. 238a, Complaint ¶158; see §1961(4) (defining an
`enterprise to include “any union or group of individuals
`
`associated in fact although not a legal entity”).
`
`Putting these pieces together, the complaint alleges that
`RJR violated each of RICO’s prohibitions. RJR allegedly
`used income derived from the pattern of racketeering to
`invest in, acquire an interest in, and operate the RJR
`Money-Laundering Enterprise in violation of §1962(a);
`acquired and maintained control of the enterprise through
`the pattern of racketeering in violation of §1962(b); oper­
`ated the enterprise through the pattern of racketeering in
`violation of §1962(c); and conspired with other partici­
`pants in the scheme in violation of §1962(d).3 These viola­
`tions allegedly harmed respondents in various ways,
`including through competitive harm to their state-owned
`cigarette businesses, lost tax revenue from black-market
`cigarette sales, harm to European financial institutions,
`currency instability, and increased law enforcement costs.4
`RJR moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that RICO
`
`does not apply to racketeering activity occurring outside
`U. S. territory or to foreign enterprises. The District
`Court agreed and dismissed the RICO claims as imper­
`missibly extraterritorial. 2011 WL 843957, at *7.
`——————
`3The complaint also alleges that RJR committed a variety of state-
`law torts. Those claims are not before us.
`4At an earlier stage of respondents’ litigation against RJR, the Sec­
`ond Circuit “held that the revenue rule barred the foreign sovereigns’
`civil claims for recovery of lost tax revenue and law enforcement costs.”
`
`European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 424 F. 3d 175, 178 (2005)
`
`
`(Sotomayor, J.), cert. denied, 546 U. S. 1092 (2006). It is unclear why
`respondents subsequently included these alleged injuries in their
`
`present complaint; they do not ask us to disturb or distinguish the
`Second Circuit’s holding that such injuries are not cognizable. We
`
`express no opinion on the matter. Cf. Pasquantino v. United States,
`544 U. S. 349, 355, n. 1 (2005).
`
`
`
`5
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`
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`

`
`RJR NABISCO, INC. v. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
`
`Opinion of the Court
` The Second Circuit reinstated the RICO claims. It
`
`
`concluded that, “with respect to a number of offenses that
`constitute predicates for RICO liability and are alleged in
`this case, Congress has clearly manifested an intent that
`they apply extraterritorially.” 764 F. 3d 129, 133 (2014).
`
`“By incorporating these statutes into RICO as predicate
`racketeering acts,” the court reasoned, “Congress has
`clearly communicated its intention that RICO apply to
`extraterritorial conduct to the extent that extraterritorial
`violations of these statutes serve as the basis for RICO
`liability.” Id., at 137. Turning to the predicates alleged in
`the complaint, the Second Circuit found that they passed
`muster. The court concluded that the money laundering
`and material support of terrorism statutes expressly apply
`extraterritorially in the circumstances alleged in the
`complaint. Id., at 139–140. The court held that the mail
`fraud, wire fraud, and Travel Act statutes do not apply
`extraterritorially. Id., at 141. But it concluded that the
`complaint states domestic violations of those predicates
`
`because it “allege[s] conduct in the United States that
`
`satisfies every essential element” of those offenses. Id., at
`142.
`
`RJR sought rehearing, arguing (among other things)
`that RICO’s civil cause of action requires a plaintiff to
`allege a domestic injury, even if a domestic pattern of
`racketeering or a domestic enterprise is not necessary to
`
`make out a violation of RICO’s substantive prohibitions.
`The panel denied rehearing and issued a supplemental
`opinion holding that RICO does not require a domestic
`injury. 764 F. 3d 149 (CA2 2014) (per curiam). If a for­
`eign injury was caused by the violation of a predicate
`statute that applies extraterritorially, the court concluded,
`then the plaintiff may seek recovery for that injury under
`RICO. Id., at 151. The Second Circuit later denied re­
`hearing en banc, with five judges dissenting. 783 F. 3d
`123 (2015).
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`The lower courts have come to different conclusions
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` regarding RICO’s extraterritorial application. Compare
`764 F. 3d 129 (case below) (holding that RICO may apply
`extraterritorially) with United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706
`F. 3d 965, 974–975 (CA9 2013) (holding that RICO does
`not apply extraterritorially; collecting cases). Because of
`this conflict and the importance of the issue, we granted
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`certiorari. 576 U. S. ___ (2015).
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`II
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`The question of RICO’s extraterritorial application
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`really involves two questions. First, do RICO’s substan­
`tive prohibitions, contained in §1962, apply to conduct that
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`occurs in foreign countries? Second, does RICO’s private
`right of action, contained in §1964(c), apply to injuries that
`are suffered in foreign countries? We consider each of
`these questions in turn. To guide our inquiry, we begin by
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`reviewing the law of extraterritoriality.
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`It is a basic premise of our legal system that, in general,
`“United States law governs domestically but does not rule
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` the world.” Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U. S. 437,
`454 (2007). This principle finds expression in a canon of
`statutory construction known as the presumption against
`extraterritoriality: Absent clearly expressed congressional
`intent to the contrary, federal laws will be construed to
`have only domestic application. Morrison v. National
`Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 255 (2010). The ques­
`tion is not whether we think “Congress would have wanted”
`a statute to apply to foreign conduct “if it had thought
`of the situation before the court,” but whether Congress
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`has affirmatively and unmistakably instructed that the
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`statute will do so. Id., at 261. “When a statute gives no
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`clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has
`none.” Id., at 255.
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`There are several reasons for this presumption. Most
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`notably, it serves to avoid the international discord that
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`can result when U. S. law is applied to conduct in foreign
`countries. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
`569 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2013) (slip op., at 4–5); EEOC v.
`Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 248 (1991) (Ar-
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`amco); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S. A., 353 U. S.
`138, 147 (1957). But it also reflects the more prosaic
`“commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates
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`with domestic concerns in mind.” Smith v. United States,
`507 U. S. 197, 204, n. 5 (1993). We therefore apply the
`presumption across the board, “regardless of whether
`there is a risk of conflict between the American statute
`and a foreign law.” Morrison, supra, at 255.
`
`
`Twice in the past six years we have considered whether
`a federal statute applies extraterritorially. In Morrison,
`we addressed the question whether §10(b) of the Securities
`Exchange Act of 1934 applies to misrepresentations made
`in connection with the purchase or sale of securities traded
`only on foreign exchanges. We first examined whether
`§10(b) gives any clear indication of extraterritorial effect,
`and found that it does not. 561 U. S., at 262–265. We
`then engaged in a separate inquiry to determine whether
`the complaint before us involved a permissible domestic
`application of §10(b) because it alleged that some of the
`relevant misrepresentations were made in the United
`States. At this second step, we considered the “‘focus’ of
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`congressional concern,” asking whether §10(b)’s focus is
`“the place where the deception originated” or rather “pur­
`chases and sale of securities in the United States.” Id., at
`266. We concluded that the statute’s focus is on domestic
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`securities transactions, and we therefore held that the
`statute does not apply to frauds in connection with foreign
`securities transactions, even if those frauds involve do­
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`mestic misrepresentations.
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`In Kiobel, we considered whether the Alien Tort Statute
`(ATS) confers federal-court jurisdiction over causes of
`action alleging international-law violations committed
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`overseas. We acknowledged that the presumption against
`extraterritoriality is “typically” applied to statutes “regu­
`
`lating conduct,” but we concluded that the principles
`supporting the presumption should “similarly constrain
`courts considering causes of action that may be brought
`under the ATS.” 569 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5). We
`applied the presumption and held that the ATS lacks any
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`clear indication that it extended to the foreign violations
`alleged in that case. Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 7–14).
`Because “all the relevant conduct” regarding those viola­
`tions “took place outside the United States,” id., at ___
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`(slip op., at 14), we did not need to determine, as we did in
`Morrison, the statute’s “focus.”
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`Morrison and Kiobel reflect a two-step framework for
`analyzing extraterritoriality issues. At the first step, we
`ask whether the presumption against extraterritoriality
`has been rebutted—that is, whether the statute gives a
`clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritori­
`ally. We must ask this question regardless of whether the
`statute in question regulates conduct, affords relief, or
`merely confers jurisdiction. If the statute is not extrater­
`ritorial, then at the second step we determine whether the
`case involves a domestic application of the statute, and we
`do this by looking to the statute’s “focus.” If the conduct
`relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United
`States, then the case involves a permissible domestic
`application even if other conduct occurred abroad; but if
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`the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a foreign
`country, then the case involves an impermissible extrater­
`ritorial application regardless of any other conduct that
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`occurred in U. S. territory.
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`What if we find at step one that a statute clearly does
`have extraterritorial effect? Neither Morrison nor Kiobel
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`involved such a finding. But we addressed this issue in
`Morrison, explaining that it was necessary to consider
`§10(b)’s “focus” only because we found that the statute
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`does not apply extraterritorially: “If §10(b) did apply
`abroad, we would not need to determine which transna­
`tional frauds it applied to; it would apply to all of them
`(barring some other limitation).” 561 U. S., at 267, n.