(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2013
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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` OCTANE FITNESS, LLC v. ICON HEALTH & FITNESS,
`INC.
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
` No. 12–1184. Argued February 26, 2014—Decided April 29, 2014
`
`The Patent Act’s fee-shifting provision authorizes district courts to
`award attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in “exceptional cases.” 35
`
` U. S. C. §285. In Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc.,
`393 F. 3d 1378, 1381, the Federal Circuit defined an “exceptional
`case” as one which either involves “material inappropriate conduct”
`or is both “objectively baseless” and “brought in subjective bad faith.”
`Brooks Furniture also requires that parties establish the “exception-
`
` al” nature of a case by “clear and convincing evidence.” Id., at 1382.
`Respondent ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., sued petitioner Octane
`
`
` Fitness, LLC, for patent infringement. The District Court granted
`summary judgment to Octane. Octane then moved for attorney’s fees
`
` under §285. The District Court denied the motion under the Brooks
`Furniture framework, finding ICON’s claim to be neither objectively
`
`baseless nor brought in subjective bad faith. The Federal Circuit af-
`firmed.
`
`Held: The Brooks Furniture framework is unduly rigid and impermissi-
`bly encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district courts.
`
`Pp. 7–12.
`(a) Section 285 imposes one and only one constraint on district
`
`
`courts’ discretion to award attorney’s fees: The power is reserved for
`“exceptional” cases. Because the Patent Act does not define “excep-
`
`tional,” the term is construed “in accordance with [its] ordinary
`meaning.” Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U. S. ___, ___. In 1952, when Con-
`
`
`gress used the word in §285 (and today, for that matter),
`“[e]xceptional” meant “uncommon,” “rare,” or “not ordinary.” Web-
`ster’s New International Dictionary 889 (2d ed. 1934). An “excep-
`tional” case, then, is simply one that stands out from others with re-
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` 2 OCTANE FITNESS, LLC v. ICON HEALTH & FITNESS, INC.
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`Syllabus
`spect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position (con-
`sidering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the un-
`reasonable manner in which the case was litigated. District courts
`may determine whether a case is “exceptional” in the case-by-case
`exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the circum-
`
`
`
` stances. Cf. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U. S. 517. Pp. 7–8.
`(b) The Brooks Furniture framework superimposes an inflexible
`framework onto statutory text that is inherently flexible. Pp. 8–11.
`
`(1) Brooks Furniture is too restrictive in defining the two catego-
`ries of cases in which fee awards are allowed. The first category—
`cases involving litigation or certain other misconduct—appears to ex-
`
`tend largely to independently sanctionable conduct. But that is not
`the appropriate benchmark. A district court may award fees in the
`
`rare case in which a party’s unreasonable, though not independently
`sanctionable, conduct is so “exceptional” as to justify an award. For
`litigation to fall within the second category, a district court must de-
`termine that the litigation is both objectively baseless and brought in
`subjective bad faith. But a case presenting either subjective bad
`faith or exceptionally meritless claims may sufficiently set itself
`apart from mine-run cases to be “exceptional.” The Federal Circuit
`
`imported this second category from Professional Real Estate Inves-
`
`tors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U. S. 49, but that
`case’s standard finds no roots in §285’s text and makes little sense in
`
`the context of the exceptional-case determination. Pp. 8–10.
`(2) Brooks Furniture is so demanding that it would appear to
`render §285 largely superfluous. Because courts already possess the
`inherent power to award fees in cases involving misconduct or bad
`
`
`faith, see Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S.
`240, 258–259, this Court has declined to construe fee-shifting provi-
`sions narrowly so as to avoid rendering them superfluous. See, e.g.,
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`Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412, 419. Pp. 10–11.
`
`(3) Brooks Furniture’s requirement that proof of entitlement to
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`fees be made by clear and convincing evidence is not justified by
`§285, which imposes no specific evidentiary burden. Nor has this
`Court interpreted comparable fee-shifting statutes to require such a
`burden of proof. See, e.g., Fogerty, 510 U. S, at 519. P. 11.
`496 Fed. Appx. 57, reversed and remanded.
`SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
`
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`C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, and KAGAN,
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`
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`JJ., joined, and in which SCALIA, J., joined except as to footnotes 1–3.
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`Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
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` No. 12–1184
`_________________
`OCTANE FITNESS, LLC, PETITIONER v. ICON
`
`
`
` HEALTH & FITNESS, INC.
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`
`[April 29, 2014]
`
`
` JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.*
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`Section 285 of the Patent Act authorizes a district court
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`to award attorney’s fees in patent litigation. It provides,
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`in its entirety, that “[t]he court in exceptional cases may
`award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”
`35 U. S. C. §285. In Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Du­
`
`tailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F. 3d 1378 (2005), the United States
`Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that “[a] case
`may be deemed exceptional” under §285 only in two lim-
`ited circumstances: “when there has been some material
`inappropriate conduct,” or when the litigation is both
`“brought in subjective bad faith” and “objectively base-
`less.” Id., at 1381. The question before us is whether the
`Brooks Furniture framework is consistent with the statu-
`tory text. We hold that it is not.
`I
`A
`
`Prior to 1946, the Patent Act did not authorize the
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`awarding of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in
`——————
` * JUSTICE SCALIA joins this opinion except as to footnotes 1–3.
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`2 OCTANE FITNESS, LLC v. ICON HEALTH & FITNESS, INC.
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`Opinion of the Court
` patent litigation. Rather, the “American Rule” governed:
`
`“‘[E]ach litigant pa[id] his own attorney’s fees, win or
`lose . . . .’” Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U. S. ___,
`___ (2013) (slip op., at 9). In 1946, Congress amended the
`Patent Act to add a discretionary fee-shifting provision,
`then codified in §70, which stated that a court “may in its
`discretion award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevail-
`ing party upon the entry of judgment in any patent case.”
`
`35 U. S. C. §70 (1946 ed.).1
`Courts did not award fees under §70 as a matter of
`
`course. They viewed the award of fees not “as a penalty
`for failure to win a patent infringement suit,” but as ap-
`propriate “only in extraordinary circumstances.” Park-In-
`Theatres, Inc. v. Perkins, 190 F. 2d 137, 142 (CA9 1951).
`
`The provision enabled them to address “unfairness or bad
`faith in the conduct of the losing party, or some other
`equitable consideration of similar force,” which made a
`case so unusual as to warrant fee-shifting. Ibid.; see also
`Pennsylvania Crusher Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 193 F.
`2d 445, 451 (CA3 1951) (listing as “adequate justifica-
`tion[s]” for fee awards “fraud practiced on the Patent
`Office or vexatious or unjustified litigation”).
`
`Six years later, Congress amended the fee-shifting
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`provision and recodified it as §285. Whereas §70 had
`specified that a district court could “in its discretion award
`reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party,” the
`revised language of §285 (which remains in force today)
`
`provides that “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award
`reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” We have
`observed, in interpreting the damages provision of the
`Patent Act, that the addition of the phrase “exceptional
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`——————
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` 1This provision did “not contemplat[e] that the recovery of attorney’s
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` fees [would] become an ordinary thing in patent suits . . . .” S. Rep. No.
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`79–1503, p. 2 (1946).
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` Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Opinion of the Court
`
` cases” to §285 was “for purposes of clarification only.”2
`General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U. S. 648, 653,
`
`n. 8 (1983); see also id., at 652, n. 6. And the parties agree
`that the recodification did not substantively alter the
`meaning of the statute.3
`
`For three decades after the enactment of §285, courts
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`applied it—as they had applied §70—in a discretionary
`manner, assessing various factors to determine whether a
`given case was sufficiently “exceptional” to warrant a fee
`award. See, e.g., True Temper Corp. v. CF&I Steel Corp.,
`601 F. 2d 495, 508–509 (CA10 1979); Kearney & Trecker
`Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F. 2d 579, 597 (CA7
`1971); Siebring v. Hansen, 346 F. 2d 474, 480–481 (CA8
`1965).
`In 1982, Congress created the Federal Circuit and vested
`
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`it with exclusive appellate jurisdiction in patent cases.
`28 U. S. C. §1295. In the two decades that followed, the
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`Federal Circuit, like the regional circuits before it, in-
`structed district courts to consider the totality of the cir-
`cumstances when making fee determinations under §285.
`See, e.g., Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chemical Co., 736
`
`F. 2d 688, 691 (1984) (“Cases decided under §285 have
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`noted that ‘the substitution of the phrase “in exceptional
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`cases” has not done away with the discretionary feature’”);
`——————
` 2The Senate Report similarly explained that the new provision was
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`“substantially the same as” §70, and that the “ ‘exceptional cases’ ”
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`language was added simply to “expres[s] the intention of the [1946]
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`statute as shown by its legislative history and as interpreted by the
`courts.” S. Rep. No. 82–1979, p. 30 (1952).
`
`3See Brief for Petitioner 35 (“[T]his amendment was not intended to
`create a stricter standard for fee awards, but instead was intended to
`clarify and endorse the already-existing statutory standard”); Brief for
`Respondent 17 (“When it enacted §285, as the historical notes to this
`provision make clear, Congress adopted the standards applied by courts
`interpreting that statute’s predecessor, §70 of the 1946 statute. Con-
`gress explained that §285 ‘is substantially the same as the correspond-
`ing provision in’ §70”).
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`3
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`4 OCTANE FITNESS, LLC v. ICON HEALTH & FITNESS, INC.
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`Opinion of the Court
`Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Danbury Phar­
`macal, Inc., 231 F. 3d 1339, 1347 (2000) (“In assessing
`
`whether a case qualifies as exceptional, the district court
`must look at the totality of the circumstances”).
`
`In 2005, however, the Federal Circuit abandoned that
`holistic, equitable approach in favor of a more rigid and
`mechanical formulation. In Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v.
`Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F. 3d 1378 (2005), the court held
`that a case is “exceptional” under §285 only “when there
`has been some material inappropriate conduct related to
`the matter in litigation, such as willful infringement,
`fraud or inequitable conduct in procuring the patent,
`misconduct during litigation, vexatious or unjustified
`litigation, conduct that violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, or like
`infractions.” Id., at 1381. “Absent misconduct in conduct
`
`of the litigation or in securing the patent,” the Federal
`Circuit continued, fees “may be imposed against the pa-
`tentee only if both (1) the litigation is brought in subjec-
`tive bad faith, and (2) the litigation is objectively base-
`less.” Ibid. The Federal Circuit subsequently clarified
`that litigation is objectively baseless only if it is “so unrea-
`sonable that no reasonable litigant could believe it would
`
`succeed,” iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F. 3d 1372, 1378
`(2011), and that litigation is brought in subjective bad
`faith only if the plaintiff “actually know[s]” that it is objec-
`tively baseless, id., at 1377.4
`
`——————
` 4In Kilopass Technology, Inc. v. Sidense Corp., 738 F. 3d 1302 (CA
`
`
` Fed 2013)—decided after our grant of certiorari but before we heard
`oral argument in this case—the Federal Circuit appeared to cut back on
`
` the “subjective bad faith” inquiry, holding that the language in iLOR
`was dictum and that “actual knowledge of baselessness is not required.”
`738 F. 3d, at 1310. Rather, the court held, “a defendant need only
`
`prove reckless conduct to satisfy the subjective component of the §285
`
` analysis,” ibid., and courts may “dra[w] an inference of bad faith from
`circumstantial evidence thereof when a patentee pursues claims that
`are devoid of merit,” id., at 1311. Most importantly, the Federal Circuit
`stated that “[o]bjective baselessness alone can create a sufficient
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`Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Finally, Brooks Furniture held that because “[t]here is a
`presumption that the assertion of infringement of a duly
`granted patent is made in good faith[,] . . . the underlying
`improper conduct and the characterization of the case as
`exceptional must be established by clear and convincing
`evidence.” 393 F. 3d, at 1382.
`B
`The parties to this litigation are manufacturers of exer-
`
`cise equipment. The respondent, ICON Health & Fitness,
`Inc., owns U. S. Patent No. 6,019,710 (’710 patent), which
`discloses an elliptical exercise machine that allows for
`adjustments to fit the individual stride paths of users.
`
`ICON is a major manufacturer of exercise equipment, but
`it has never commercially sold the machine disclosed in
`the ’710 patent. The petitioner, Octane Fitness, LLC, also
`manufactures exercise equipment, including elliptical
`machines known as the Q45 and Q47.
`ICON sued Octane, alleging that the Q45 and Q47
`
`infringed several claims of the ’710 patent. The District
`Court granted Octane’s motion for summary judgment,
`concluding that Octane’s machines did not infringe ICON’s
`patent. 2011 WL 2457914 (D Minn., June 17, 2011).
`
`Octane then moved for attorney’s fees under §285. Apply-
`ing the Brooks Furniture standard, the District Court
`
`denied Octane’s motion. 2011 WL 3900975 (D Minn.,
`Sept. 6, 2011). It determined that Octane could show
`neither that ICON’s claim was objectively baseless nor
`that ICON had brought it in subjective bad faith. As to
`objective baselessness, the District Court rejected Octane’s
`——————
`
`
`inference of bad faith to establish exceptionality under §285, unless the
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`circumstances as a whole show a lack of recklessness on the patentee’s
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`part.” Id., at 1314. Chief Judge Rader wrote a concurring opinion that
`
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`sharply criticized Brooks Furniture, 738 F. 3d, at 1318–1320; the court,
`
`
`he said, “should have remained true to its original reading of” §285, id.,
`
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`at 1320.
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`5
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` 6 OCTANE FITNESS, LLC v. ICON HEALTH & FITNESS, INC.
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`Opinion of the Court
`argument that the judgment of noninfringement “should
`have been a foregone conclusion to anyone who visually
`inspected” Octane’s machines. Id., *2. The court ex-
`plained that although it had rejected ICON’s infringement
`arguments, they were neither “frivolous” nor “objectively
`baseless.” Id., *2–*3. The court also found no subjective
`bad faith on ICON’s part, dismissing as insufficient both
`“the fact that [ICON] is a bigger company which never
`commercialized the ’710 patent” and an e-mail exchange
`between two ICON sales executives, which Octane had
`offered as evidence that ICON had brought the infringe-
`ment action “as a matter of commercial strategy.”5 Id., *4.
`
`
`ICON appealed the judgment of noninfringement, and
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`Octane cross-appealed the denial of attorney’s fees. The
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`Federal Circuit affirmed both orders. 496 Fed. Appx. 57
`(2012). In upholding the denial of attorney’s fees, it re-
`jected Octane’s argument that the District Court had
`“applied an overly restrictive standard in refusing to find
`the case exceptional under §285.” Id., at 65. The Federal
`Circuit declined to “revisit the settled standard for excep-
`tionality.” Ibid.
`
`We granted certiorari, 570 U. S. __ (2013), and now
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`reverse.
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`
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`——————
`5One e-mail, sent from ICON’s Vice President of Global Sales to two
`employees, read: “ ‘We are suing Octane. Not only are we coming out
`
`
`with a greater product to go after them, but throwing a lawsuit on top
`of that.’ ” 2011 WL 3900975, *4. One of the recipients then forwarded
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`that e-mail to a third party, along with the accompanying message:
`“ ‘Just clearing the way and making sure you guys have all your guns
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`
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`loaded!’ ” Ibid. More than a year later, that same employee sent an
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`e-mail to the Vice President of Global Sales with the subject, “‘I heard we
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`are suing Octane!’ ” Ibid. The executive responded as follows: “ ‘Yes—
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`
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`old patent we had for a long time that was sitting on the shelf. They
`are just looking for royalties.’ ” Ibid. The District Court wrote that “in
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`the light most favorable to Octane, these remarks are stray comments
`by employees with no demonstrated connection to the lawsuit.” Ibid.
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`7
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` Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` II
`The framework established by the Federal Circuit in
`
`Brooks Furniture is unduly rigid, and it impermissibly
`encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district
`
`courts.
`
`
`A
`
`
`Our analysis begins and ends with the text of §285: “The
`court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney
`
`fees to the prevailing party.” This text is patently clear.
`It imposes one and only one constraint on district courts’
`discretion to award attorney’s fees in patent litigation: The
`power is reserved for “exceptional” cases.
`
`The Patent Act does not define “exceptional,” so we
`construe it “‘in accordance with [its] ordinary meaning.’”
`Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 6);
`see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U. S. 593, ___ (2010) (slip
`op., at 6) (“In patent law, as in all statutory construction,
`‘[u]nless otherwise defined, “words will be interpreted as
`taking their ordinary, contemporary, common mean-
`ing”’”). In 1952, when Congress used the word in §285
`(and today, for that matter), “[e]xceptional” meant “un-
`common,” “rare,” or “not ordinary.” Webster’s New Inter-
`national Dictionary 889 (2d ed. 1934); see also 3 Oxford
`English Dictionary 374 (1933) (defining “exceptional” as
`“out of the ordinary course,” “unusual,” or “special”);
`Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 435 (11th ed.
`2008) (defining “exceptional” as “rare”); Noxell Corp. v.
`
`Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Restaurant, 771 F. 2d 521, 526
`(CADC 1985) (R. B. Ginsburg, J., joined by Scalia, J.)
`
`
`(interpreting the term “exceptional” in the Lanham Act’s
`
`identical fee-shifting provision, 15 U. S. C. §1117(a), to
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`mean “uncommon” or “not run-of-the-mill”).
`
`We hold, then, that an “exceptional” case is simply one
`that stands out from others with respect to the substan-
`tive strength of a party’s litigating position (considering
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`8 OCTANE FITNESS, LLC v. ICON HEALTH & FITNESS, INC.
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`Opinion of the Court
`both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the
`
`unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.
`District courts may determine whether a case is “excep-
`tional” in the case-by-case exercise of their discretion,
`considering the totality of the circumstances.6 As in the
`
`comparable context of the Copyright Act, “‘[t]here is no
`
`precise rule or formula for making these determinations,’
`but instead equitable discretion should be exercised ‘in
`light of the considerations we have identified.’” Fogerty v.
`
`Fantasy, Inc., 510 U. S. 517, 534 (1994).
`B
`1
`
`The Federal Circuit’s formulation is overly rigid. Under
`
`the standard crafted in Brooks Furniture, a case is “excep-
`tional” only if a district court either finds litigation-related
`misconduct of an independently sanctionable magnitude
`
`or determines that the litigation was both “brought in
`subjective bad faith” and “objectively baseless.” 393 F. 3d,
`at 1381. This formulation superimposes an inflexible
`
`
`framework onto statutory text that is inherently flexible.
`
`
`For one thing, the first category of cases in which the
`Federal Circuit allows fee awards—those involving litiga-
`tion misconduct or certain other misconduct—appears to
`extend largely to independently sanctionable conduct. See
`ibid. (defining litigation-related misconduct to include
`“willful infringement, fraud or inequitable conduct in
`procuring the patent, misconduct during litigation, vexa-
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`——————
`6In Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U. S. 517 (1994), for example, we
`
`explained that in determining whether to award fees under a similar
`
`provision in the Copyright Act, district courts could consider a “nonex-
`clusive” list of “factors,” including “frivolousness, motivation, objective
`unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components of the case)
`and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of
`compensation and deterrence.” Id., at 534, n. 19 (internal quotation
`marks omitted).
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` Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Opinion of the Court
`tious or unjustified litigation, conduct that violates Fed. R.
`
`Civ. P. 11, or like infractions”). But sanctionable conduct
`is not the appropriate benchmark. Under the standard
`announced today, a district court may award fees in the
`rare case in which a party’s unreasonable conduct—while
`
`not necessarily independently sanctionable—is nonethe-
`less so “exceptional” as to justify an award of fees.
`
`The second category of cases in which the Federal Cir-
`
`cuit allows fee awards is also too restrictive. In order for a
`
`case to fall within this second category, a district court
`must determine both that the litigation is objectively
`baseless and that the plaintiff brought it in subjective bad
`faith. But a case presenting either subjective bad faith or
`
`
`exceptionally meritless claims may sufficiently set itself
`apart from mine-run cases to warrant a fee award. Cf.
`Noxell, 771 F. 2d, at 526 (“[W]e think it fair to assume
`that Congress did not intend rigidly to limit recovery of
`fees by a [Lanham Act] defendant to the rare case in
`which a court finds that the plaintiff ‘acted in bad faith,
`vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons’ . . . .
`
`Something less than ‘bad faith,’ we believe, suffices to
`
`
`mark a case as ‘exceptional’”).
`
`ICON argues that the dual requirement of “subjective
`bad faith” and “objective baselessness” follows from this
`Court’s decision in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc.
`v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U. S. 49 (1993)
`(PRE), which
`involved an exception to the Noerr-
`Pennington doctrine of antitrust law. It does not. Under
`the Noerr-Pennington doctrine—established by Eastern
`Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
`Inc., 365 U. S. 127 (1961), and Mine Workers v. Penning­
`ton, 381 U. S. 657 (1965)—defendants are immune from
`antitrust liability for engaging in conduct (including litiga-
`tion) aimed at influencing decisionmaking by the govern-
`ment. PRE, 508 U. S., at 56. But under a “sham excep-
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`tion” to this doctrine, “activity ‘ostensibly directed toward
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` 10 OCTANE FITNESS, LLC v. ICON HEALTH & FITNESS, INC.
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`Opinion of the Court
`influencing governmental action’ does not qualify for
`Noerr immunity if it ‘is a mere sham to cover . . . an at-
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`tempt to interfere directly with the business relationships
`of a competitor.’” Id., at 51. In PRE, we held that to
`qualify as a “sham,” a “lawsuit must be objectively base-
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`less” and must “concea[l] ‘an attempt to interfere directly
`with the business relationships of a competitor . . . .’” Id.,
`at 60–61 (emphasis deleted). In other words, the plaintiff
`must have brought baseless claims in an attempt to
`thwart competition (i.e., in bad faith).
`In Brooks Furniture, the Federal Circuit imported the
`PRE standard into §285. See 393 F. 3d, at 1381. But the
`PRE standard finds no roots in the text of §285, and it
`makes little sense in the context of determining whether a
`case is so “exceptional” as to justify an award of attorney’s
`fees in patent litigation. We crafted the Noerr-Pennington
`doctrine—and carved out only a narrow exception for
`“sham” litigation—to avoid chilling the exercise of the
`First Amendment right to petition the government for the
`redress of grievances. See PRE, 508 U. S., at 56 (“Those
`who petition government for redress are generally im-
`mune from antitrust liability”). But to the extent that
`patent suits are similarly protected as acts of petitioning,
`it is not clear why the shifting of fees in an “exceptional”
`case would diminish that right. The threat of antitrust
`liability (and the attendant treble damages, 15 U. S. C.
`§15) far more significantly chills the exercise of the right
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`to petition than does the mere shifting of attorney’s fees.
`In the Noerr-Pennington context, defendants seek immun-
`ity from a judicial declaration that their filing of a lawsuit
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`was actually unlawful; here, they seek immunity from a
`far less onerous declaration that they should bear the
`costs of that lawsuit in exceptional cases.
`2
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`Opinion of the Court
`demanding that it would appear to render §285 largely
`superfluous. We have long recognized a common-law
`exception to the general “American rule” against fee-
`shifting—an exception, “inherent” in the “power [of] the
`courts” that applies for “‘willful disobedience of a court
`order’” or “when the losing party has ‘acted in bad faith,
`vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons . . . .’”
`Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421
`U. S. 240, 258–259 (1975). We have twice declined to
`construe fee-shifting provisions narrowly on the basis that
`doing so would render them superfluous, given the back-
`ground exception to the American rule, see Christiansburg
`Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412, 419 (1978); Newman
`v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400, 402, n. 4
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`(1968) (per curiam), and we again decline to do so here.
`3
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`Finally, we reject the Federal Circuit’s requirement that
`patent litigants establish their entitlement to fees under
`§285 by “clear and convincing evidence,” Brooks Furniture,
`393 F. 3d, at 1382. We have not interpreted comparable
`fee-shifting statutes to require proof of entitlement to fees
`by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Fogerty, 510
`U. S., at 519; Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S.
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`384 (1990); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 558
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`(1988). And nothing in §285 justifies such a high standard
`of proof. Section 285 demands a simple discretionary
`inquiry; it imposes no specific evidentiary burden, much
`less such a high one. Indeed, patent-infringement litiga-
`tion has always been governed by a preponderance of the
`evidence standard, see, e.g., Béné v. Jeantet, 129 U. S. 683,
`688 (1889), and that is the “standard generally applicable
`in civil actions,” because it “allows both parties to ‘share
`the risk of error in roughly equal fashion,’” Herman &
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`MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U. S. 375, 390 (1983).
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` 12 OCTANE FITNESS, LLC v. ICON HEALTH & FITNESS, INC.
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`Opinion of the Court
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`For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the United
`States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is reversed,
`and the case is remanded for further proceedings con-
`sistent with this opinion.
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`It is so ordered.