Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 72 Filed 12/17/24 Page 1 of 22
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
`
`
`
`AMERANTH, INC.,
`
`
`v.
`
`
`DOORDASH, INC.,
`EAT’N PARK RESTAURANTS, LLC, and
`EAT’N PARK HOSPITALITY GROUP, INC.,
`
`
`
`
`C.A. No.: 2:23-cv-2165
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
`AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR IMPROPER VENUE, OR ALTERNATIVELY,
`TO TRANSFER, AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 72 Filed 12/17/24 Page 2 of 22
`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 72
`Filed 12/17/24
`Page 2 of 22
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Venueis Improper For Defendant DDI.............0.eeccecceeecceseceeeceesceeceeeseeeeeeeeseeeseeceseeeseeeees 2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Cc.
`
`Ameranth Failed to Demonstrate Lack of “Corporate
`Separateness” Between DDI and DDE and Therefore DDE’s Place
`of Business Cannot Be Attributed to DDI..0........ecccceccceccccccescceceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeseeeseees 2
`
`
`
`A Speculative Conference Room DoesNotEstablish Venue........................:06+- 6
`
`The Court Should NOT Permit Venue-Related Discovery...................c:cccccceeceeeeeeeseeeeeeeees 7
`
`The Asserted Claims Are Invalid Under § 10] .0....0....ccccccececceceesceeecceesceeseeeeseeeseeeeseeeseeeees 8
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`Ameranth Failed to Include Plausible, Factual Allegations That
`Are Material to the Section 101 Amalysis..........0.....cecccecccescceeeceeeeeeeeeeseeeseeeeeeesees 8
`Ameranth Failed to Demonstrate the Relevance of Its Proposed
`Constructions ...........cecccecceeccesceeseesceeseesseesecsaeessceseessecseeeaeesaeesaceseceaeeseseseseseeneseaeeeeeens 9
`Alice Step One: The Asserted Claims Are Directed to an Abstract
`Thea... cece eeeeeeeeceeseeeceeseeseeseeeseesseeseeesecsaeessesseessecsecesecsaeeseceaeeeseeeeeseeeseeeeeneenseenseeaes 11
`Alice Step Two: The Asserted Claims Do Not Recite an Inventive
`COmCept«nee eeeeeceeecceeeceeeeseeeesceeeeseeeeeseeeesaeeeseseeeesaeeeeaeeeeaeeeeaeceeseeceeeseseeeeeseeeereeaees 14
`
`

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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 72 Filed 12/17/24 Page 3 of 22
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`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Ameranth, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, LLC,
`792 Fed. Appx. 780 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .......................................................................................11
`
`Ameranth, Inc. v. Olo Inc.,
`No. 1:20-cv-00518-JLH, Dkt. 1-2 (D. Del. Apr. 16, 2020) (Ex. C) ........................................10
`
`Andra Grp., LP v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, L.L.C.,
`6 F.4th 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ................................................................................................2, 3
`
`Dropbox, Inc. v. Synchronoss Techs., Inc.,
`815 Fed. Appx. 529 (Fed. Cir. 2020) .......................................................................................11
`
`Elec. Commc'n Techs., LLC v. ShoppersChoice.com, LLC,
`958 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2020)............................................................................................9, 10
`
`Galderma Lab’ys, L.P. v. Medinter US, LLC,
`2019 WL 13114421 (D. Del. Oct. 25, 2019) .........................................................................7, 8
`
`GreatGigz Sols., LLC v. Maplebear Inc.,
`2021 WL 4691145 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2021) ............................................................................7
`
`Impact Engine, Inc. v. Google LLC,
`2024 WL 3287126 (Fed. Cir. July 3, 2024) .............................................................................10
`
`International Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Expedia, Inc.,
`2019 WL 1571680 (D. Del. Apr. 11, 2019) ...............................................................................3
`
`Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.,
`896 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................12
`
`Loyal-T Sys. LLC v. Am. Express Co.,
`2024 WL 4381835 (D.N.J. Oct. 3, 2024)...............................................................................6, 7
`
`Natera, Inc. v. ArcherDX, Inc.,
`2020 WL 6043929 (D. Del. Oct. 13, 2020) ..................................................................... passim
`
`Pers. Audio, LLC v. Google, Inc.,
`280 F. Supp. 3d 922 (E.D. Tex. 2017) .......................................................................................6
`
`In re Rosenberg,
`813 Fed. Appx. 594 (Fed. Cir. 2020) .......................................................................................15
`
`ii
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 72 Filed 12/17/24 Page 4 of 22
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`
`
`Sanderling Mgmt. Ltd. v. Snap Inc.,
`65 F.4th 698 (Fed. Cir. 2023) ....................................................................................................9
`
`Simio, LLC v. FlexSim Software Prods., Inc.,
`983 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2020)..............................................................................................8, 9
`
`Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,
`839 F.3d 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................11
`
`Univ. of Fla. Rsch. Found., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
`916 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019)................................................................................................14
`
`USC IP P'ship, L.P. v. Meta Platforms, Inc.,
`2023 WL 5606977 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 30, 2023) ..........................................................................10
`
`Vaxcel Int'l Co. v. Minka Lighting, Inc.,
`2018 WL 6930772 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2018) ..............................................................................7
`
`VirnetX Inc. v. Apple, Inc.,
`909 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................13
`
`Xodus Med., Inc. v. Allen Med. Sys.,
`2018 WL 2338763 (W.D. Pa. May 22, 2018) ............................................................................3
`
`Statutes
`
`28 U.S.C. §1400(b) ......................................................................................................................3, 6
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)................................................................................................................3, 8
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 ...........................................................................................................................13
`
`
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`
`
`
`
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`
`
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`
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`
`
`iii
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 72 Filed 12/17/24 Page 5 of 22
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`
`
`TABLE OF EXHIBITS
`
`Exhibit
`A
`
`B
`
`C
`
`Description
`Bausch Health Ireland Ltd. v. Mylan Lab’ys Ltd., et al., No. 21-cv-00573-
`WSH, Dkt. 45 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2021)
`Ameranth, Inc. v. Olo Inc., No. 1:20-cv-00518-JLH, Dkt. 12 (D. Del. Aug. 5,
`2020)
`Ameranth, Inc. v. Olo Inc., No. 1:20-cv-00518-JLH, Dkt. 1-2 (D. Del. Apr. 16,
`2020)
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 72 Filed 12/17/24 Page 6 of 22
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`
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`Venue is improper in this District because DoorDash, Inc. (“DDI”) has no “regular and
`
`established physical place of business” there and Ameranth has failed to meet its burden to
`
`demonstrate otherwise. The DashMart store in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania—the primary basis for
`
`Ameranth’s venue claim—is irrelevant
`
`Essentials, LLC (“DDE”), not DDI. And it is undisputed that
`
` DoorDash
`
`
`
`. Ameranth calls DDE an “alter ego” of DDI but has alleged no facts
`
`to support that theory. In fact, Ameranth alleges no facts to demonstrate that DDI and DDE have
`
`not maintained “corporate separateness,” the relevant test for venue. Nor has Ameranth identified
`
`any physical location within this District that is DDI’s “regular and established place of business,”
`
`because there is none. Rather, Ameranth asks the Court to rely on alleged “public perception” and
`
`notions of “equit[y]” with no support in the law. (Plaintiff’s Opposition Brief, “Oppo.” at 6). But
`
`public perception and equity are irrelevant to venue—the question is whether DDI has a “regular
`
`and established place of business” and the answer is “no.”
`
`A related patent with the same specification as the Asserted Patents was invalidated in
`
`Ameranth v. Olo, and Ameranth fails to distinguish the Olo decision. Most notably, Ameranth
`
`contends that the Asserted Claims require a “Middleware Framework Communications Controller
`
`System” (MFCCS) and “a layer architecture,” which Ameranth asserts is “nowhere” in claim 1 of
`
`the ’651 patent. (Oppo. at 20). But in Olo, Ameranth argued just the opposite—that the ’651 patent
`
`claims required the same MFCCS and layer architecture—and the Olo court described those
`
`components as “high-level results-focused ideas” which are insufficient to confer patent eligibility.
`
`See generally Natera, Inc. v. ArcherDX, Inc. (hereinafter, “Olo”), 2020 WL 6043929 (D. Del. Oct.
`
`13, 2020) (joint opinion for Ameranth, Inc. v. Olo Inc. and two unrelated cases), aff’d sub nom.
`
`without opinion, Ameranth, Inc. v. Olo Inc., 2021 WL 4699180 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 8, 2021), cert.
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 72 Filed 12/17/24 Page 7 of 22
`
`
`
`denied, 142 S. Ct. 2814 (2022). Thus, the Olo decision confirms that the Asserted Patents are
`
`directed to ineligible subject matter.
`
`I.
`
`VENUE IS IMPROPER FOR DEFENDANT DDI
`
`A.
`
`Ameranth Failed to Demonstrate Lack of “Corporate Separateness” Between
`DDI and DDE and Therefore DDE’s Place of Business Cannot Be Attributed
`to DDI
`
`The sworn testimony of
`
` Kelsey Merrigan, establishes that the Pittsburgh
`
`DashMart
`
`. (Defendants’ Opening
`
`Brief, “Op. Br.” (Dkt. 60) at 9-11 (citing Merrigan Decl. at ¶¶ 12-20)).
`
`. (Id.)
`
`. (Id.) Moreover,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`. (Id., ¶ 19.) Ameranth does not dispute any of these facts.
`
`Ameranth also does not dispute that,
`
` whether the Pittsburgh DashMart
`
`can be attributed to DDI turns on whether DDE and DDI have maintained their “corporate
`
`separateness.” Andra Grp., LP v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, L.L.C., 6 F.4th 1283, 1289 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2021) (“where related companies have maintained corporate separateness, the place of business of
`
`one corporation is not imputed to the other for venue purposes”). Ameranth’s Opposition does not
`
`even mention the “corporate separateness” standard, let alone present facts demonstrating its
`
`absence. And this is likely because Ms. Merrigan’s undisputed sworn statements demonstrate that
`
`such corporate separateness has been maintained. (Op. Br. at 9 (citing Merrigan Decl. at ¶¶ 20-
`
`23)). Therefore, the Pittsburgh DashMart,
`
`
`
` cannot be “imputed to [DDI] for the purposes of patent venue statute.” Andra Grp., 6 F.4th
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 72 Filed 12/17/24 Page 8 of 22
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`
`
`at 1290 (“[T]he fact that related entities work together in some aspects . . . is insufficient to show
`
`ratification” of one entity’s business location as the other’s); Xodus Med., Inc. v. Allen Med. Sys.,
`
`2018 WL 2338763, at *1-2 (W.D. Pa. May 22, 2018).
`
`Ameranth adopts a “throw everything at the wall and see what sticks” strategy, but every
`
`allegation aligns with DDI’s position and Ms. Merrigan’s testimony.
`
`First, Ameranth argues that DoorDash has publicly stated that DashMart is “owned,
`
`operated and curated by DoorDash” and is “first-party owned and self-operated.” (Oppo. at 3-4.)
`
`But Ameranth’s suggestion that “DoorDash” owns and controls DashMart is consistent with Ms.
`
`Merrigan’s sworn statements
`
`
`
`. (Merrigan Decl. at ¶¶ 13, 14, 24, 29.)
`
`Ameranth relies on International Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Expedia, Inc. to argue that the Court
`
`should attribute general statements in DoorDash’s 10-K to the parent company DDI. (Oppo. at 4-
`
`5.) But Expedia is distinguishable on both the law and the facts. First, Expedia concerns a different
`
`legal standard in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, whereas DoorDash’s venue argument is
`
`brought under 28 U.S.C. §1400(b). (International Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Expedia, Inc., 2019 WL
`
`1571680, at *2-4 (D. Del. Apr. 11, 2019)). The Federal Circuit has made clear that, under §1400(b),
`
`statements in public filings directed to “we” are not imputed to the parent company because “we”
`
`could also encompass subsidiaries:
`
`None of the public filings cited by Andra demonstrate LBI’s control, because they
`are documents covering all of LBI’s brands. The documents’ use of “we” does
`not convey that “we” means LBI specifically, but that “we” could include the
`individual subsidiary brands, like Stores.
`
`Andra Grp., 6 F.4th at 1288 (emphasis added). The Expedia case is therefore not applicable.
`
`Second, even if the legal standards were the same, Expedia is factually distinguishable.
`
`The Expedia Court found that the statement, “we operate . . . technology platforms,” in Expedia
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 72 Filed 12/17/24 Page 9 of 22
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`
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`Group’s 10-K was sufficient evidence that “Expedia Group in fact operates or controls those
`
`platforms.” However, DDI’s 10-K does not contain such a statement. (See Oppo. at 4-5; Dkt. 67-
`
`2.) Instead, DDI’s 10-K merely refers to DashMart as a “first-party owned and self-operated”
`
`business without indicating which DoorDash entity owns or operates it. (Oppo. at 4.)
`
`Next, Ameranth points to purported discrepancies between Ms. Merrigan’s two
`
`declarations to suggest that “
`
`.” (Oppo. at 6.) But no
`
`discrepancy exists, and both declarations directly refute Ameranth’s position. The first declaration
`
`states: “
`
`states, “
`
`Thus, both declarations state that
`
`” (Oppo. at 6); and the second declaration
`
`” (Dkt. 62, ¶ 17.)
`
`.
`
`Ameranth’s remaining arguments are irrelevant. For example, Ameranth states that: (1)
`
`DoorDash’s public statements “made no mention of DDE” (Oppo. at 3); (2) the Merrigan
`
`Declaration “
`
`” (Oppo. at 3); (3)
`
`the “DoorDash” logo appears on the uniforms of DashMart workers as well as the sign for a
`
`DashMart location (Oppo. at 5; see Merrigan Decl. ¶25); (4) listings for DashMart job openings
`
`state “at DoorDash, Inc.” despite Ms. Merrigan’s sworn testimony that
`
`
`
` (Oppo. at 5; see Merrigan Decl.
`
`¶¶20, 27); and (5) DDI owns the trademark “DoorDash” (Oppo. at 5; see Merrigan Decl. ¶25.) But
`
`again, none of these alleged “facts” is inconsistent with
`
`
`
`. And nothing undermines corporate separateness between
`
`the two companies—the relevant inquiry here.
`
`Ameranth also misleadingly quotes a portion of Ms. Merrigan’s statement—“
`
`
`
`” —to suggest that Ms. Merrigan concealed the fact
`
`4
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`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 72 Filed 12/17/24 Page 10 of 22
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`
`
`that “
`
`.” (Oppo. at 6 n.21 (quoting Merrigan Decl.
`
`¶23)). But Ms. Merrigan explained, in a portion omitted by Ameranth, that
`
`.” (Merrigan Decl. ¶23). DDI and DDE thus
`
`
`
`
`
`,
`
`and Ameranth’s misrepresentation of Ms. Merrigan’s statement through selective quotation further
`
`undermines Ameranth’s credibility.
`
`B.
`
`DDI Has No Office in This District from Where DDI Engineers Work
`
`Ameranth’s attempt to establish venue based on a purported DDI software engineering
`
`team located in Pittsburgh (Oppo. at 6-7) fails because DDI does not have a “regular and
`
`established place of business” within this District and Ameranth has not demonstrated otherwise.
`
`First, Ameranth repeats its argument that “DDI intentionally hired engineers to be in
`
`Pittsburgh” and “for its Pittsburgh Engineer Team.” (Oppo. 6-7). This is both untrue and irrelevant.
`
`As Ms. Merrigan stated,
`
`
`
` (Merrigan Decl. ¶8; First Merrigan Decl.
`
`¶7). Ameranth ignores Ms. Merrigan’s testimony, and instead relies on outdated materials
`
`
`
`. (See Oppo. at 6 (citing Amended Compl.
`
`for Patent Infringement (Dkt. 51) (“FAC”), ¶30); Merrigan Decl. ¶11 (addressing FAC, ¶30); see
`
`also Dkt. 67-6 (apparently expired webpages); Dkt. 67-8 (apparently expired LinkedIn pages);
`
`Dkt. 67-9 (Oct. 2021 Blog Post); Dkt. 67-10 (LinkedIn Post from “3yr” Ago)). None of these
`
`outdated materials are relevant because
`
`
`
`. (Op. Br. at 5-9; Merrigan Decl. ¶¶5-11).
`
`Second, Ameranth again points to purported discrepancies between Ms. Merrigan’s two
`
`declarations to infer that “DDI did operate or maintain [] an office” in this District at the time of
`
`Ms. Merrigan’s first declaration in June 2023. (Oppo. at 6). This is again untrue. Ms. Merrigan’s
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 72 Filed 12/17/24 Page 11 of 22
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`
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`first declaration states: “
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`” (First
`
`Merrigan Decl. ¶¶5-7). Moreover, Ameranth’s (untrue) allegation that
`
` is contradicted by Ms. Merrigan’s sworn testimony that “
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`” (Merrigan Decl. ¶7.)
`
`See Pers. Audio, LLC v. Google, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 3d 922, 930 (E.D. Tex. 2017) (“venue under §
`
`1400(b) should be analyzed based on the facts and circumstance that exist on the date suit is filed”)
`
`(citing In re Cray, 871 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
`
`C.
`
`A Speculative Conference Room Does Not Establish Venue
`
`Finally, Ameranth asserts new allegations that were not in any of its prior and current
`
`pleadings. Based on a paper co-authored by several DoorDash engineers and a Ph.D. student from
`
`Carnegie Mellon University (“CMU”) (who allegedly interned at DoorDash and became a
`
`DoorDash employee) (Dkt. 67-7), and a picture purportedly posted on Instagram by one of the
`
`DoorDash employees showing the CMU campus (Dkt. 67-12), Ameranth deduces that DDI and
`
`Carnegie Mellon University have “multi-year research and development collaborations” and that
`
`“a meeting or conference room was regularly reserved for DDI’s use.” (Oppo. at 7). Such far-
`
`fetched and baseless speculations are insufficient to meet Ameranth’s “burden of establishing
`
`proper venue.” See Loyal-T Sys. LLC v. Am. Express Co., 2024 WL 4381835, at *9 (D.N.J. Oct.
`
`3, 2024). Moreover, even if a CMU meeting room was regularly reserved for meetings between
`
`DDI employees and CMU staff—a fact which has no support in the record—it would not constitute
`
`a “regular and established place of business” of DDI because, if anything, it would be a place of
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 72 Filed 12/17/24 Page 12 of 22
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`
`
`business of CMU. See Merrigan Decl. ¶6 (“
`
`
`
`
`
`”); GreatGigz Sols., LLC v. Maplebear Inc., 2021
`
`WL 4691145, at *3-4 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2021) (finding retail partner stores to not be Instacart’s
`
`places of business despite allegation of Instacart’s use of those locations for “training, supervision,
`
`and options for applying for new employee roles”); Vaxcel Int’l Co. v. Minka Lighting, Inc., 2018
`
`WL 6930772, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2018) (finding evidence that Defendant Minka Lighting “set
`
`up product displays, provide after-sales services, or train store employees” at third party locations
`
`was insufficient to show that those locations are “places that Minka has ‘establish[ed] or ratif[ied]’
`
`and over which Minka has exercised ‘attributes of possession or control.’”)).
`
`II.
`
`THE COURT SHOULD NOT PERMIT VENUE-RELATED DISCOVERY
`
`In the Conclusion section of its Opposition, Ameranth states that, “[i]f the court desires
`
`more facts as to the venue dispute, Ameranth requests venue discovery.” (Oppo. at 25.). Ameranth
`
`makes this statement without a separate request for venue discovery1, citing the standard for venue
`
`discovery, or identifying any facts it expects to learn through any venue discovery.2 However, the
`
`
`1 DDI was unable to locate any Local Rule regarding the manner in which venue discovery must
`be requested. However, it is DDI’s understanding from its review of prior cases in this Court that,
`to be granted venue discovery, a separate, stand-alone, request must be made. See, e.g., Bausch
`Health Ireland Ltd. v. Mylan Lab’ys Ltd., et al., No. 21-cv-00573-WSH, Dkt. 45 (W.D. Pa. Nov.
`16, 2021) (Ex. A).
`2 While Ameranth lists in its Conclusion section several types of discovery it suggests taking “[i]f
`the court desires,” it fails to identify any facts it expects, or even hopes, to learn through such
`discovery. See Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Accord Healthcare Inc., 2019 WL 2502535, at *4 (D.
`Del. June 17, 2019) (“Novartis points to no facts supporting a reasonable expectation that
`discovery would lead to evidence sufficient to satisfy any of Cray’s requirements.”). In addition,
`to the extent that the types of discovery Ameranth identifies would be aimed at the “corporate
`separateness” issue, Ameranth has “failed to point to any record evidence relating to most of the
`factors that the Third Circuit has used to address corporate separateness.” Galderma Lab’ys, L.P.
`v. Medinter US, LLC, 2019 WL 13114421, at *6 (D. Del. Oct. 25, 2019) (denying venue discovery
`request into the “alter ego” theory); Loyal-T Sys., 2024 WL 4381835, at *9 (denying venue
`discovery request when “futile and unsupported by specific allegations or submitted evidence”).
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 72 Filed 12/17/24 Page 13 of 22
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`
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`law is clear that “a court should not just permit venue discovery as a matter of course; before
`
`allowing the discovery to proceed, the court must be satisfied that there is some indication that
`
`venue in the forum is appropriate as to the defendant.” Galderma Lab’ys, 2019 WL 13114421, at
`
`*3. “To show that discovery is warranted, a party must, at a minimum, state a non-frivolous basis
`
`for venue and do so with reasonable particularity.” Id. (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan
`
`Pharms. Inc., 2017 WL 3980155, at *21 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017)). Here, Ameranth has failed to
`
`state a non-frivolous basis for venue discovery and, for that reason (among others), Ameranth’s
`
`suggestion that venue discovery be permitted “[i]f the court desires” should be rejected. See
`
`Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Accord Healthcare Inc., 2019 WL 2502535, at *3 (D. Del. June 17,
`
`2019) (“Novartis’ contentions regarding the single employee do not justify further discovery (nor
`
`do they, based on what Novartis has discovered to date, satisfy Novartis’ burden to show that
`
`venue is proper here.”); Galderma Lab’ys, 2019 WL 13114421, at *6 (denying venue discovery
`
`where plaintiff failed to establish a “prima facie” case of proper venue).
`
`III. THE ASSERTED CLAIMS ARE INVALID UNDER § 101
`
`A.
`
`Ameranth Failed to Include Plausible, Factual Allegations That Are Material
`to the Section 101 Analysis
`
`Ameranth opposes Defendants’ motion based on the factual allegations in the FAC. (Oppo.
`
`at 9-12.) But under Rule 12(b)(6), courts “disregard” conclusory allegations that the Asserted
`
`Claims “provide[] a technological solution to a technological problem” and that various
`
`disclosures and limitations are unconventional. (See, e.g., Dkt. 51, ¶¶ 71, 85, 90-91, 99). Simio,
`
`LLC v. FlexSim Software Prods., Inc., 983 F.3d 1353, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2020). In addition,
`
`Ameranth’s numerous attempts to recharacterize the Asserted Patents contradict the specification.
`
`(See, e.g., FAC at ¶¶ 63-65, 71, 77, 85-87, 89, 91-92, 96, 98-103). “When there is a conflict
`
`between the . . . complaint[] . . . and the intrinsic evidence of the patent itself, the Court must
`
`8
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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 72 Filed 12/17/24 Page 14 of 22
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`resolve that conflict in favor of the patent itself and is not obligated to credit the plaintiff’s
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`contradictory allegation.” Olo, at *8. Thus, Ameranth’s allegations cannot save the Asserted
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`Patents from invalidation.
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`B.
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`Ameranth Failed to Demonstrate the Relevance of Its Proposed Constructions
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`The Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that the plaintiff bears the burden to explain how
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`any “construction could affect the [Section 101] analysis.” Elec. Commc'n Techs., LLC v.
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`ShoppersChoice.com, LLC, 958 F.3d 1178, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 2020); see also Simio, 983 F.3d at 1365
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`(plaintiff failed to explain “how it might benefit from any particular term’s construction under an
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`Alice § 101 analysis”); Sanderling Mgmt. Ltd. v. Snap Inc., 65 F.4th 698, 704 (Fed. Cir. 2023)
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`(similar). Yet Ameranth seeks to flip the burden and suggests that Defendants failed to “fully
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`consider[]” its proposed constructions for 11 terms in the Asserted Patents. (Oppo. at 12.) This is
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`false. Defendants explained that “these constructions confirm that each of the claimed components
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`is ‘well-understood, routine, conventional’ or ‘purely functional’” and identified specific
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`deficiencies with respect to two exemplary constructions which also applied to the other
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`constructions. (Op. Br. at 23-24 & n.5).
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`Ameranth mischaracterizes both Dr. Goodrich’s declaration and Defendants’ position with
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`respect to the term “web server computer.” (Oppo. at 12-13). Dr. Goodrich unequivocally opines
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`that “a POSITA would understand that a ‘web server’ is a term of art that connotes a specialized
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`computing device with specialized software.” (D.I. 51-3 at ¶39.) But as explained in the Opening
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`Brief, this contradicts the specification, the term’s inclusion in a dictionary (published three years
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`before the Asserted Patents’ priority date) and the term’s reference in the ’850 patent filed six years
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`earlier before the priority date, which all confirm that a “web server computer” is a conventional
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`element. (Op. Br. at 22-23 (citing ’415 patent at 6:60-7:15, 13:10-15, Dkt. 51-3 at ¶ 39; Dkt. 58-5
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`at 5:33-55)).
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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 72 Filed 12/17/24 Page 15 of 22
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`Ameranth asserts that Defendants failed to consider Dr. Goodrich’s subsequent testimony
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`regarding “said web server computer,” which must perform the high-level functions recited in the
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`preamble, namely: “multi-modes of contact, multi-communications protocols, multi-user, and
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`parallel operational capabilities.” (Oppo. at 13). Ameranth is wrong. The recitation of “high-level,
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`broadly articulated, result-defined information-processing functionality” cannot supply an
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`inventive concept. Impact Engine, Inc. v. Google LLC, 2024 WL 3287126, at *6-7 (Fed. Cir. July
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`3, 2024); Elec. Commc’n Techs., 958 F.3d at 1183 (claim lacks inventive concept where it is
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`“specified at a high level of generality, is specified in functional terms, and merely invokes well-
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`understood, routine, conventional components and activity to apply the abstract idea identified”).
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`Ameranth disputes that the “parallel operational capabilities” required by the Asserted
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`Claims are conventional because the claims require “a specific architecture—the MFCSS which is
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`defined as . . . ‘Ameranth’s Middleware Framework Communications Control Software’ as shown
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`in Figure 10.” (Oppo. at 14-15 (emphasis in original)). Ameranth contends that “linking the claims
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`to a patent figure evidencing structure in the claims” “impart[s] patent eligibility” under O’Reilly
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`v. Morse. (Id. at 15 & n.47 (citing 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1853))). This mirrors Ameranth’s arguments
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`in the Olo case, which focused on the “critical role of Figure 10” and “Ameranth’s
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`Middleware/Framework.” Ameranth, Inc. v. Olo Inc., No. 1:20-cv-00518-JLH, Dkt. 12 at 11, 18
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`(D. Del. Aug. 5, 2020) (Ex. B); Ameranth, Inc. v. Olo Inc., No. 1:20-cv-00518-JLH, Dkt. 1-2 at
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`¶¶35-38 (D. Del. Apr. 16, 2020) (Ex. C). But unlike the “detailed technical drawings and
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`corresponding descriptions” in O’Reilly (56 U.S. at 113), the MFCCS is never referenced or
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`described in the specification, and thus is a “a purely functional ‘black box’” that cannot provide
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`an inventive concept. USC IP P'ship, L.P. v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 2023 WL 5606977, at *3 (Fed.
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`Cir. Aug. 30, 2023). Indeed, the Olo court explained that Figure 10 and its associated text are just
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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 72 Filed 12/17/24 Page 16 of 22
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`“high level results-focused ideas” that “do not . . . change the Section 101 outcome.” Olo, at *8.
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`Thus, Ameranth’s attempt to limit the claims to “Ameranth’s” MFFCS is meritless.
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`C.
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`Alice Step One: The Asserted Claims Are Directed to an Abstract Idea
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`Ameranth disputes that the Asserted Claims are directed to the abstract idea of
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`“communicating hospitality-related information using a system that is capable of multiple modes
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`of communication” in view of what each Asserted Claim is purportedly “directed to.” (Oppo. at
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`16-17.) These statements, however, are simply a “series of legal conclusion[s] about the § 101
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`analysis” that courts “are not bound to accept as true” in resolving a motion to dismiss. Dropbox,
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`Inc. v. Synchronoss Techs., Inc., 815 Fed. Appx. 529, 538 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
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`Ameranth contends that “communicating hospitality-related information using a system
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`that is capable of multiple modes of communication” is too “high level” of an abstraction and is
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`“untethered from the language of the claims.” (Oppo. at 17.) By contrast, Ameranth asserts that its
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`allegations as to what each Asserted Claim is “directed to” are “tethered to the actual claim
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`language” and show that the Asserted Claims are not representative of each other.3 (Oppo. at 16.)
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`But these allegations list various technical components and aspirational features of the Asserted
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`Claims, and thus “largely restate[] the claims in different words” instead of “captur[ing] the ‘basic
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`thrust’ of the Asserted Claims.” Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1150
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`(Fed. Cir. 2016).
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`In Ameranth, Inc. v. Olo Inc., Ameranth similarly characterized the asserted claims of the
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`’651 patent in terms of the claims’ specific components. Olo, at *7. But as the Olo court explained,
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`3 Ameranth frivolously asserts that Defendants waived any arguments with respect to claim 15 of
`the ’415 patent because Ameranth stated that Defendants infringe “at least” certain claims of the
`Asserted Patents and included a single allegation in the FAC regarding what claim 15 was
`purportedly “directed to.” (Oppo. n.54.) But claim 15 is not asserted, and Ameranth is aware that
`“a district court [does] not have jurisdiction to determine the patent eligibility” of non-asserted
`claims. Ameranth, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, LLC, 792 Fed. Appx. 780, 785 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 72 Filed 12/17/24 Page 17 of 22
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`“the invention is not directed to those components. The specification identifies the provision of an
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`improved information management synchronous communication system and method as a principle
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`object of the invention.” Id. Thus, the Olo court held that the claims were directed to
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`“communicating hospitality-related information using a system that is capable of synchronous
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`communications and messaging.” Id. Defendants’ proposed abstract idea for the Asserted
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`Claims—“communicating hospitality-related information using a system that is capable of
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`multiple modes of communication”—describes the claims at the same level of abstraction as the
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`Olo court and is tailored to the claims’ “multi-mode” focus.
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`Ameranth argues that the claims are not abstract because they “explicitly recite
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`programming details. (Oppo. at 18-19 (emphasis in original).) But these purported “programming
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`details,” which include selecting a “mode of contact,” “automatically choos[ing]” an entity based
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`on availability and “intelligently execut[ing] and support[ing] completion of the hospitality
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`application task requests,” are “result-based functional aspirations” that do not explain how these
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`results are achieved. (Oppo. at 18-19.) Ameranth disputes this characterization on the basis that:
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`(1) its expert drafted source code to implement the purported “programming details” recited in the
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`claims; and (2) the specification purportedly includes “prose, flowcharts, examples, figures,
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`programming
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`languages, and/or pseudocode” which provide software algorithms for
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`implementing aspects of the Asserted Claims. (Oppo. at 19-20). But, whether someone is capable
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`of writing source code which allegedly implements portions of a claim does not change the fact
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`that each claimed function is “recited only at the broadest, functional level, without explaining
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`how that is accomplished, let alone providing a technical means for performing that function.”
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`Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Moreover, the Olo
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`court already rejected Ameranth’s contention that the specification provides sufficient technical
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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 72 Filed 12/17/24 Page 18 of 22
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`details to survive Alice step 1, explaining that “Figure 10 and the new text of the specification
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`about it . . . is just more high level results-focused ideas” which “do not . . . change the Section
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`101 outcome.” Olo, at *8.
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`Ameranth asserts that