`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
`
`AMERANTH, INC.
`)
`
`
`)
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`)
`
`
`
`)
`
`v.
`
`) Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-2165-WSH
`)
`
`
`
`) PUBLIC VERSION
`
`DOORDASH, INC.,
`
`EAT'N PARK RESTAURANTS, LLC, and
`)
`)
`EAT'N PARK HOSPITALITY GROUP, INC.,
`
`
`
`)
`
`Defendants.
`
`)
`
`
`
`)
`
`
`PLAINTIFF AMERANTH, INC'S OPPOSITION TO
`DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR IMPROPER
`VENUE, OR ALTERNATIVELY, TO TRANSFER, AND
`FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
`
`
`
`
`Vincent A. Coppola (PA Bar No. 50181)
`PRIBANIC & PRIBANIC
`513 Court Place
`Pittsburgh, PA 15219
`Telephone: (412) 281-8844
`Facsimile: (412) 281-4740
`
`Richard C. Weinblatt (pro hac vice)
`Stamoulis & Weinblatt LLC
`800 N. West Street, Third Floor
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Telephone: (302) 999-1540
`Facsimile: (302) 762-1688
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`Ameranth, Inc.
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`
`
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`
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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 68 Filed 12/05/24 Page 2 of 32
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`
`
`
`I.
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`II.
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1
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`SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT....................................................................................... 1
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`III.
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`ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................ 2
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`A. Venue Is Proper in This District ............................................................................................... 2
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`B. DoorDash Fails to Meet Its Burden to Prove the Claims Are Invalid ...................................... 8
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`1. The FAC's Plausible Factual Allegations Defeat Defendants' Motion ................................. 9
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`2. Defendants' Fail to Apply Ameranth's Proposed Claim Constructions .............................. 12
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`3. Alice Step One: The Network Patents' Claims Improve Technology ................................. 15
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`4. Alice Step Two: The Claims Include Multiple Inventive Concepts ................................... 21
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`VIII. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 25
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`i
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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 68 Filed 12/05/24 Page 3 of 32
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`
`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`3G Licensing, S.A. v. HTC Corp., C.A. No. 17-83-LPS, 2019 WL 2904670 (D. Del.
`July 5, 2019) .................................................................................................................................... 17
`
`Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .......... 8, 12, 22
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) ......................................... 8, 15, 17, 21
`
`Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F. 3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................... 22
`
`American Axle & Mfg., Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, 967 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ................... 15
`
`American Infertility of New York, P.C. v. CNY Fertility, PLLC, 21-CV-5566 (JMF), 2021 WL
`4803539 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2021) ................................................................................................. 12
`
`BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
` .................................................................................................................................................. passim
`
`Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ........................................................... 9, 21, 22
`
`Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc. 927 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ................................................ passim
`
`ClubCom, Inc. v. Captive Media, Inc., No. 02:07cv1462, 2008 WL 2036907 (W.D. Pa. May 9, 2008)
` ........................................................................................................................................................... 3
`
`Data Engine Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, 906 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .......................................... 18
`
`DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .................................. 23, 24
`
`Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................. 8, 15, 17
`
`Fonar Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ................................................... 19
`
`In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ................................................................................... 2
`
`In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172 (C.C.P.A. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936
`(C.C.P.A. 1967) ............................................................................................................................... 19
`
`In re Nintendo Co., 544 F. Appx. 934 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ........................................................................ 1
`
`In re TLI Commc'ns LLC Pat. Litig., 823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016)) ................................................ 11
`
`ii
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`
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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 68 Filed 12/05/24 Page 4 of 32
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`
`
`International Business Machines Corp. v. Expedia, Inc., Civil Action No. 17-1875-LPS-CJB, 2019
`WL 1571680 (D. Del. Apr. 11, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 4635137
`(D. Del. Sept. 24, 2019) ..................................................................................................................... 5
`
`Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................................... 11
`
`Lockhart v. Garzella, No. 3:19-cv-00405, 2020 WL 6146598 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 20, 2020) ................. 3
`
`McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ...................... 8, 9, 15
`
`O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853) ................................................................................ 15
`
`Oberwager v. McKechnie Ltd., 351 F. App'x 708 (3d Cir. 2009) ...................................................... 12
`
`Rates Technology, Inc. v. Mediatrix Telecom, Inc., 688 F.3d 742 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .......................... 20
`
`Rockwell Techs., LLC. v. Spectra-Physics Lasers, Inc., No. Civ.A.00-589 GMS, 2002 WL 531555
`(D. Del. Mar. 26, 2002) ................................................................................................................... 12
`
`SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC .......................................................................................................... 14
`
`Serras v. First Tenn. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 875 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1989) ................................................ 3
`
`TecSec, Inc. v. Adobe Inc., 978 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ............................................................... 15
`
`Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc. v IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .............................................. 18
`
`U.S. v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1298 (2d Cir. 1991) ......................................................................... 4
`
`United States v. Miah, 546 F. Supp. 3d 407 (W.D. Pa 2021) ............................................................. 12
`
`Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................................. 8
`
`Welsh v. Gibbs, 631 F.2d 436 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981, 101 S.Ct. 1517, 67 L.Ed.2d
`816 (1981) ......................................................................................................................................... 3
`
`Statutes
`
`15 U.S.C. § 78ff ..................................................................................................................................... 4
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1400 ................................................................................................................................... 2
`
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ................................................................................................................................. 8, 9
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ................................................................................................................................... 19
`
`Rules
`
`Fed. R. CIV. P. 12 ......................................................................................................................... 3, 8, 22
`
`iii
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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 68 Filed 12/05/24 Page 5 of 32
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`FED. R. CIV. P. 36................................................................................................................................. 20
`
`iv
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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 68 Filed 12/05/24 Page 6 of 32
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Ameranth filed its First Amended Complaint ("FAC") on September 17, 2024 (Dkt. 51),
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`asserting U.S. Patent 11,842,415 (the "'415 patent") and U.S. Patent No. 11,847,587 (the "'587
`
`patent) (collectively, the "Network Patents"). and Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss
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`Amended Complaint for Improper Venue, or Alternatively, to Transfer, and Failure to State a
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`Claim (the "Motion") on October 22, 2024. (Dkt. 57.) Ameranth submits this Opposition in
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`response to Defendants' Motion
`
`II.
`
`SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
`
`Before the Court can turn to Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the
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`Court must address the venue challenge brought by DoorDash, Inc. ("DDI").1 Venue is proper
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`here under the "second prong" of § 1400(b). In addition to Pittsburgh being the nexus of their
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`copying activities, Ameranth's FAC sufficiently pleads DDI has at least one brick-and-mortar
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`place of business (DashMart) in this District where infringement occurs and which DDI owns and
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`controls. Although DDI refutes its own public statements, including but not limited to, its SEC
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`filing and its website, as identified in the FAC, DDI's own press release announcing DashMart
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`identifies DDI, not DoorDash Essentials, LLC ("DDE"), DDI's alter ego. In addition, DDI's
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`copycat research and development is occurring in Pittsburgh, via its multi-year collaboration with
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`Carnegie Mellon University ("CMU"). DDI's venue motion should thus be denied.
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`Defendants ignored that at the motion to dismiss stage, the facts must be viewed in the light
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`most favorable to Ameranth. The FAC pleads multiple plausible facts that, per Federal Circuit
`
`
`1 In re Nintendo Co., 544 F. Appx. 934, 941 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (""[A] trial court must first address
`whether it is a proper and convenient venue before addressing any substantive portion of the
`case.").
`
`
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`
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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 68 Filed 12/05/24 Page 7 of 32
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`
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`precedent, such as Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc.,2 result in dismissal of Defendants' Motion. In
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`addition, contrary to blackletter law, Defendants rely on earlier cases involving vastly different
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`claims from other Ameranth patents without substantively analyzing the actual Network Patents'
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`claims. The Network Patents' claims explicitly recite technological improvements, inventive
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`concepts, and how to engineer and program them. The Network Patents' claimed inventions
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`improve the operation of web server computers and networks and solved the CAP Theorem
`
`Challenge, allowing system designers to be able to successfully implement a distributed database
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`that simultaneously achieves the design goals of consistency, availability, and partition-tolerance.3
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`This results in improved distributed computing systems that are failure tolerant and do not crash
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`and become unavailable due to not being able to efficiently and optimally process a partition and
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`change to the database. Defendants' motion for failure to state a claim should be denied.
`
`III. ARGUMENT
`A.
`Venue Is Proper in This District
`
`The FAC alleges Defendants have committed acts of infringement in this District, personal
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`jurisdiction exists, neither Eat'N Park defendant has challenged venue, and the prima facie
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`evidence of the FAC and DDI's own public statements confirm that the three requirements of Cray
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`are satisfied – (1) DDI has a physical place in this district, (2) that physical place is regular and
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`established, and (3) it is the place of DDI.4 In addition, DDI's own documents and actions
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`contradict its declaration submitted in this case, and all contradictions are to be viewed in
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`
`2 927 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
`3 "Partition-tolerance means that a cluster of nodes must continue to work despite any
`communication breakdowns between nodes in the system." FAC at ¶ 62.
`4 In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (§ 1400(b) requires that "a defendant has"
`a "place of business" that is "regular" and "established."). DDI has not challenged that the FAC
`alleges it has committed acts of infringement in this District.
`
`2
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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 68 Filed 12/05/24 Page 8 of 32
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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Page8of 32Document68- Filed 12/05/24
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`
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`Ameranth's favor.° For example, the Kelsey Merrigan Declaration ("Merrigan Decl.") (Dkt. 62)
`
`x f
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`urther detailed below, DDI's press release announcing DashMart® explicitly identified DDI and
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`made no mention of DDE. Additionally, the Merrigan Decl. tellingly
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`since the declaration is
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`7 (Dkt. 62 at § 2.8)
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`DDIinitially announced and continues to announce that DashMart is "fully owned,
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`operated, and curated by DoorDash." FAC at §§ 12-13. DDI's December6, 2021 press release
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`announcing DashMart states "DoorDash (NYSE: DASH) is iwtroducing ultra-fast grocery
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`deliveries in 10-15 minutes beginning with DashMart in New York City," "Founded in 2013,
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`DoorDashenables local businesses to address consumers' expectations of ease and immediacy and
`
`> ClubCom, Inc. v. Captive Media, Inc., No. 02:07¢ev1462, 2008 WL 2036907, at *3 (W.D.Pa.
`May 9, 2008) ("The court may examinefacts outside the complaint to determine proper venue,but
`must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all factual conflicts in the plaintiff's favor."
`(quotation omitted); Lockhart v. Garzella, No. 3:19-cv-00405, 2020 WL 6146598, at *2 (S.D.
`Ohio Oct. 20, 2020) ("If the court determines that the [Rule 12(b)(3)] motion can be decided
`without a hearing, it 'must consider the pleadings and affidavits in the light most favorable to the
`plaintiff.' Welsh v. Gibbs, 631 F.2d 436, 439 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981, 101 S.Ct.
`1517, 67 L.Ed.2d 816 (1981). If the plaintiffpresents a primafacie case that venueis proper, after
`reviewing the pleadings andthe affidavit(s) so construed, the defendant's motion will be denied,
`notwithstanding contrary allegations made by the defendant. Serras, 875 F.2d at 1214.").
`6
`Merrigan Decl.
`at 4 15.
`7
`8 All emphasis added unless otherwise specified.
`
`(Dkt. 62 at § 2.)
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`
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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 68 Filed 12/05/24 Page 9 of 32
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`
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`thrive in today's convenience economy," the DASH stock symbol is for DDI, and DDI, not DDE,
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`was founded in 2013. 9,10 See Ex. A.11
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`As a publicly traded company, DDI must make truthful SEC disclosures.12 As specified in
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`FAC ¶ 7, DDI's Form 10-K for Fiscal Year 2022 states that "[w]e face certain risks in connection
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`with the operation of DashMart and Wolt Market, our first-party owned and self-operated
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`convenience and grocery delivery businesses." See Ex. B13 at pp. 28, 125; see also Ex. C at p. 25
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`("We face certain risks in connection with our self-operated convenience, grocery, and other retail
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`businesses, including DashMart and Wolt Market."). The 10-K states that "[u]nless the context
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`requires otherwise, we are referring to DoorDash, Inc. together with its subsidiaries when we use
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`the terms 'DoorDash,' the 'Company,' 'we,' 'our,' or 'us.'" Ex. B at p. 5; Ex. C at p. 5. The context
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`of the passage using "we" and "our" at the beginning of this paragraph clearly indicates that DDI
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`is the "first-party"14 which owns and "self-operates" DashMart.15 By use of "first-party" in
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`reference to "owning" DashMart, the language requires that DDI is the owner and operator of
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`DashMart due to the fact that (1) public records show that DDI is in fact the owner, and (2) DDE
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`is not mentioned at all in the entirety of the 10-K.16 Any attempt by DDI to argue that its own
`
`
`9 DDI was formed May 21, 2013, Merrigan Decl. at Ex. A, and DDE was formed August 22, 2019.
`Id. at Ex. C.
`10 Had DDE been the company actually controlling and operating DashMart, the press release
`would have identified DDE, not DDI.
`11 Exhibits cited in this brief are attached to the co-filed Declaration of Richard C. Weinblatt.
`12 U.S. v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1298 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[C]riminal penalties are available against
`one who knowingly makes a false and misleading statement of material fact on a document
`required to be filed by the securities laws." (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78ff )).
`13 This exhibit is a digital printout of the same Form 10-K cited and identified in the FAC at ¶ 7.
`14 Terminology such as "first-party," "second party," etc. refers to parties mentioned in the
`document which uses such terminology
`15 "First-party" must apply to both "own" and "operate," because that is what the passage explicitly
`says.
`16 DDI's 2022 and 2023 SEC Form 10-Ks do not identify DDE as a subsidiary of DDI at Exhibit
`
`
`4
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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 68 Filed 12/05/24 Page 10 of 32
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`
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`statements in the 10-K should just be ignored fail under the logic of the court in Expedia17:
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`[T]he Form 10-K itself notes that Expedia Group is one of the entities that is meant
`to be included when the document uses "we" and "our." And the Form 10-K was
`filed by Expedia Group itself. If Expedia Group includes itself among a group of
`entities that it says operates or controls certain websites or mobile applications, then
`that amounts to some evidence that Expedia Group in fact operates or controls those
`platforms.
`
`Given that DDI owns, operates, and controls DashMart, it makes sense for DashMart job
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`openings to be "at DoorDash, Inc." The FAC identifies two such DashMart job openings "at
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`DoorDash, Inc." and there are many more which show that it is implausible that a "mistake" was
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`made as to DDI being the employer of DashMart employees. See Ex. D. Further, under the adage
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`that a picture is worth 1000 words, DDI's own video of DashMart operations shows all the
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`DashMart workers wearing uniforms with DDI's logo (
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`).18 As DashMart's owner and
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`controller, it also makes sense that the specimen used to obtain DDI's U.S. trademark registration,
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`attached hereto as Exhibit E for DashMart is described by DDI as "Screenshots of Applicant's
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`[i.e., DDI's] mobile application showing use of the applied-for mark."19 FAC at ¶ 5. Further, the
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`use of DDI's trademark on the sign for DashMart also indicates to the public that DDI owns,
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`21.1. Exs. B, C. Since DashMart is "fully owned, operated, and curated by" DDI, FAC at ¶¶ 12-
`13,
` (Dkt. 62 at ¶ 29),
`which means that DDI has control over DashMart, it makes sense for DDI to not identify DDE as
`a subsidiary in its SEC statements. Further, companies are required to make disclosures that are
`material, and DDI's not disclosing DDE confirms that DDE is a non-material aspect of DDI's
`business, and thus, DDE is captive and operated by DDI. If DDE were truly an independently run
`subsidiary, then that would have been a material aspect of DDI's operation and required to be
`disclosed to the SEC.
`17 International Business Machines Corp. v. Expedia, Inc., Civil Action No. 17-1875-LPS-CJB,
`2019 WL 1571680, at *4 (D. Del. Apr. 11, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL
`4635137 (D. Del. Sept. 24, 2019).
`18 "Introducing DashMart" (available at https://youtu.be/Yu-KT7mR_qQ (last accessed Nov. 21,
`2024)).
`19 If the mobile application were not DDI's mobile application, then it would have described the
`specimen as "Screenshots of a mobile application showing use of the applied-for mark" or
`"Screenshots of applicant's related company's mobile application."
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`5
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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 68
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`Page 11 of 32
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`controls, and runs DashMart. See id. at § 3.
`The MeganDec
`ES ©:
`62 at § 17), but in Ameranth I, Ms. Merrigan's declaration assertsPO
`EE ©2s No. 2:22-cv-1776-WSH,Dkt. 23-1 at § 11. This major
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`discrepancy is meaningful, and Ameranth believes DDIis the ownerof the DashMart leases.?°7!
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`Turning to DDI's software engineers working in this district, DDI has a Platform
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`Engineering Team in Pittsburgh. First, DDI issued public statements that it "do[es] have engineers
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`in Pittsburgh." FAC at § 26. Second, DDIintentionally hired engineersto be in Pittsburgh to work
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`on its platform. See FAC at §§ 25-27, 30; Ex. F (describing the Pittsburgh Platform Evolution
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`Team and Pittsburgh job openings for that team). DDI's "Engineering Leader," Matt Ranney,is
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`located in Pittsburgh, and he posted on LinkedIn "a link for our [i-e., DDI's] Pittsburgh site" and
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`included a picture of a physical conference room. FAC at § 30. He also posted that "[w]e are
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`doing distributed systems and other interesting software in Pittsburgh. Come work with us." Jd.
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`Indeed, DDI's Platform Engineering Team in Pittsburgh has collaborated with CMU on the same
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`technology covered by Ameranth's Network Patents. Ex. G. The Merrigan Decl. at § 7f
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`a M
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`s. Merrigan's June 28, 2023 declaration filed in Ameranth I, Case No. 2:22-cv-1776-WSH, Dkt.
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`5 he Cour can
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`interpret as meaning DDI did operate or maintain such an office.
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`
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`20 Similarly, the Merrigan Decl. asserts that
`Bou. 62 at § 23)
`Inconsistencies in Ms. Merrigan's declarations are revealing and are at
`discovery in this case as well as in AmeranthI.
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`least a
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`basis
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`for venue
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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 68 Filed 12/05/24 Page 12 of 32
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` Finally, DDI's contention that it does not require its software engineering team to be in
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`Pittsburgh is false because DDI intentionally sought and hired software engineers for its Pittsburgh
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`Engineering Team. See Ex. F at p. 3; Ex. H; Ex. I at pp. 2-3. Mr. Ranney, acting in his capacity
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`as Pittsburgh Engineering Leader, also posted about what DDI was working on in Pittsburgh and
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`re-posted a job search posting for a software engineer in Pittsburgh. See FAC at ¶ 30; Ex. J at pp.
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`2-3. When DDI advertises a job that does not require an employee be located in a specific location,
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`the job posting states "United States – Remote." Ex. K. For DDI to argue that there is
`
` (Dkt. 62 at ¶ 9)
`
` (id. at ¶ 10)
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`
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`DDI has also had its employee(s) and intern(s) collaborate with CMU and regularly meet
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`at CMU. For example, DDI's Mr. Ranney, worked with DDI's then intern, and CMU software
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`engineering doctoral student, Christopher Meiklejohn, whose 2024 Ph.D. thesis (written while a
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`DDI full-time employee) sought to solve the same technological problem that Ameranth's Network
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`Patents are directed to and solved – the CAP Theorem Challenge. This is confirmed by Mr.
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`Ranney's Instagram post, a DDI blog post, now-Dr. Meiklejohn's thesis proposal which confirmed
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`his joining DDI's Platform Evolution team in Pittsburgh on p. 44, and joint technical papers that
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`included CMU staff, Mr. Ranney and Dr. Meiklejohn as co-authors. Exs. G, L-N. For those multi-
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`year research and development collaborations and meetings to occur, a meeting or conference
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`room was regularly reserved for DDI's use which Ameranth believes venue discovery will confirm.
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`DDI's own public actions and public statements evidence it is the owner, operator, and
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`controller of DashMart, it hired software engineers to work in Pittsburgh, and it publicly
`
`7
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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 68 Filed 12/05/24 Page 13 of 32
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`
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`collaborated with CMU there. DDI now wants the Court to simply ignore these facts and the
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`public perception caused by DDI's own actions and statements to find venue improper. That is not
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`equitable, and the Court should reject DDI's venue motion seeking to evade venue in this district.
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`B.
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`DoorDash Fails to Meet Its Burden to Prove the Claims Are Invalid
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`Determining patent eligibility at the pleading stage is possible "only when there are no
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`factual allegations that, taken as true, prevent resolving the eligibility question as a matter of
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`law."22 The Network Patents' claims are presumed valid and patent eligible,23 Defendants must
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`therefore prove ineligibility under Rule 12(b)(6) and § 101 by clear and convincing evidence,24
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`and "all factual inferences . . . must be weighed in favor of . . . the non-moving party."25
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`Courts follow a two-step framework set forth in Alice for determining whether claims recite
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`eligible subject matter. 26 The first step "is a meaningful one" that "cannot simply ask whether the
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`claims involve a patent-ineligible concept. . . ."27 Rather, the first step asks "whether the claims
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`in these patents focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or are
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`instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invokes generic
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`processes and machinery."28 If the claims are not directed to an abstract idea, that ends the
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`inquiry.29 If the claims are directed to an abstract idea, then at step two, courts consider the patent
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`claims as a whole, as well as the individual claim elements, to determine whether the claims reflect
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`an "inventive concept," i.e., something more than "the application of an abstract idea using
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`
`22 Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
`23 Cellspin, 927 F.3d at 1319.
`24 See id..
`25 Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
`26 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014).
`27 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original).
`28 McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`29 Id. at 1312.
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`conventional and well-understood techniques."30 The Federal Circuit has "cautioned that courts
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`must be careful to avoid oversimplifying the claims by looking at them generally and failing to
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`account for the specific requirements of the claims."31 Yet Defendants did just this, and their
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`conclusory brief fails to meet their burden to invalidate the claims.
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`1.
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`The FAC's Plausible Factual Allegations Defeat Defendants' Motion
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`In Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that "plausible and specific
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`factual allegations [in the complaint] that aspects of the claims are inventive are sufficient [to
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`overcome
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`a motion
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`to
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`dismiss
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`seeking
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`in
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`invalidate
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`the
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`claims
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`under
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`§ 101]. As long as what makes the claims inventive is recited by the claims, the specification need
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`not expressly list all the reasons why this claimed structure is unconventional."32,33
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`For instance, the Federal Circuit in Cellspin found an inventive concept, crediting factual
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`allegations in the amended complaint "that prior art devices . . . were 'inferior'" and the two-step,
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`two-device structure of the invention was unconventional and "provided various benefits over prior
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`systems."34 Similarly, while being entirely ignored and unrebutted by Defendants, Ameranth's
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`FAC confirms, for example:
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`• "The CAP Theorem Challenge states that it is not possible to design a distributed system
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`30 See Cellspin, 927 F.3d at 1316; see also McRO, 837 F.3d at 1312; Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881
`F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
`31 McRO, 837 F.3d at 1313 (quotations omitted).
`32 Cellspin, 927 F.3d at 1317.
`33 Here, the claims explicitly recite technological benefits. For example, claim 1 of the '415 patent
`recites both "a master database comprising data and parameters of the at least one hospitality
`software application integrated with the at least one said web server computer and with a usable
`file structure dictated prior to execution, thus improving efficiency and reliability" and "wherein
`the at least one said web server computer is integrated with the MFCCS and is programmed with
`instructions . . . to enable the at least one said web server computer to further improve its
`efficiency by using less computer resources and less computing time through the avoidance of
`attempting communications modes of contact to hospitality entities and/or users and/or for
`subsequent user hospitality application task requests, likely to fail during the operational period
`of time if attempted again during that time."
`34 Cellspin, 927 F.3d at 1316-17.
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`on a network that achieves all three of these goals 100% of the time. This means that
`distributed database systems on a network were inefficient and could not be optimized for
`all three goals because all three goals (consistency, availability, and partition-tolerance)
`could not be simultaneously achieved. Thus, the technical challenge is to seek/achieve the
`most optimal combination." FAC at ¶ 63.
`
`• "Prior to the Network Patents' claimed inventions in 2005, a technological problem existed
`in distributed database systems because changes to a distributed database created too much
`of a load on the system which resulted in the system and the system's processer not being
`able to efficiently process the changes, which in turn resulted in the database not being
`available to each node or not being available at all. In other words, due to the design of
`the distributed system at the time, the distributed system could crash and be unavailable
`due to not being able to efficiently and optimally process a change to the database." FAC
`at ¶ 64; see also id. at ¶ 65 (DDI recognizing the same technological problem).35
`
`• "The asserted claims of the '415 and '587 patents recite an inventive ordered combination
`and includes each of the following elements:
`• A web server with multi-modes of contact, multi-communications protocols, multi-
`user and parallel operational capabilities[36];
`• at least one hospitality food/drink ordering software application
`• an advanced master database, with its own database API;
`• Middleware/Framework Communications Control Software (MFCCS), which
`enables at least one web server to communicate with at least two remote handheld
`computers and for multiple modes of contact and multiple communications
`protocols; and
`• at least one external software API, which integrates the hospitality software
`application and the MFCCS with the Internet and leverages the advanced master
`database to support learning, updating, and storing multiple communication modes
`of contact and related operational parameters.
`This inventive combination of the above-listed elements in the Network Patents
`overcomes the challenge of simultaneously achieving consistency, availability, and
`partition-tolerance for a distributed database by changing the preconditions inherent in the
`environment for which these goals were typically articulated." FAC at ¶ 85.
`
`• "The Network Patents disclose how the claimed inventions achieve web server
`improvements in both consistency and availability:
`According to various embodiments of the present invention, messaging (e.g.,
`
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`35 Ameranth's FAC explained that DDI recognized the same technological problem – the CAP
`Theorem Challenge – in 2020, FAC at ¶¶ 65, 121, and that "in 2015, DDI's Chief Executive Officer
`acknowledge[d] 'parallel processing' is not something humans can do." Id. at ¶ 68. The FAC also
`identifies additional statements and admissions DDI made which factually confirm that the
`MFCCS and layer approach claimed in the Network Patents improved computers. Id. at ¶ 120.
`36 As discussed on pp. 12-14 infra, the claimed "web server" is specially programmed to perform
`in an unconventional way, and the claimed "said web server computer" differs from a "web server
`computer."
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`wireless text messaging and/or wireless instant messaging) and/or text-to-voice
`functionality may be employed, for instance, in appointment, waitlist, and/or
`reservation operations. Such functionality might, in vario