Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 59 Filed 10/22/24 Page 1 of 34
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`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
`
`
`
`
`C.A. No.: 2:23-cv-2165
`
`
`
`
`
`AMERANTH, INC.,
`
`
`v.
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`DOORDASH, INC.,
`EAT’N PARK RESTAURANTS, LLC, and
`EAT’N PARK HOSPITALITY GROUP, INC.,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED
`COMPLAINT FOR IMPROPER VENUE, OR ALTERNATIVELY, TO TRANSFER,
`AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 59 Filed 10/22/24 Page 2 of 34
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`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
`
`BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................ 1
`
`III.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD ......................................................................................................... 3
`
`A.
`B.
`
`Improper Venue ...................................................................................................... 3
`Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted ................................ 3
`
`IV.
`
`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 4
`
`A.
`
`Venue is Improper for DDI under § 1400(b) .......................................................... 4
`
`1.
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`DDI Does Not “Reside” In This District .................................................... 4
`DDI Does Not Have A “Regular And Established Place Of
`Business” In This District ........................................................................... 5
`If The Court Decides To Transfer The Case Against DDI, It
`Should Be Transferred To The District of Delaware ................................ 13
`If The Court Transfers The Case Against DDI, The Case
`Against Eat’n Park Should Be Stayed ...................................................... 13
`
`B.
`
`The Asserted Claims Are Invalid Under § 101 ..................................................... 14
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Alice Step One: The Asserted Claims Are Directed to an
`Abstract Idea ............................................................................................. 15
`Alice Step Two: The Asserted Claims Do Not Recite an
`Inventive Concept ..................................................................................... 18
`Ameranth’s Conclusory Allegations And Proposed
`Constructions Confirm That The Asserted Claims Are
`Directed To Ineligible Subject Matter ...................................................... 22
`
`
`
`i
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`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 59 Filed 10/22/24 Page 3 of 34
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`In re Ameranth Cases,
`2018 WL 11433300 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2018), aff’d in part, vacated in part
`on other grounds, 792 F. App’x 780 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ...............................................................2
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
`
`573 U.S. 208 (2014) ...........................................................................................4, 15, 18, 19, 23
`
`Ameranth, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC,
`792 Fed. App’x 780 (Fed. Cir. 2019).....................................................................15, 17, 21, 22
`
`Ameranth, Inc. v. DoorDash, Inc.,
`No. 22-cv-01776-WSH ....................................................................................................1, 2, 13
`
`Andra Grp., LP v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, L.L.C.,
`6 F.4th 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ............................................................................................10, 11
`
`Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc.,
`842 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2016)....................................................................................15, 17, 21
`
`AptusTech LLC v. Trimfoot Co., LLC,
`2020 WL 1190070 (E.D.Tex. Mar. 12, 2020) ...........................................................................6
`
`Audatex N. Am., Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc.,
`703 F. App’x 986 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ..........................................................................................20
`
`In re Bilski,
`545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593
`(2010) .........................................................................................................................................4
`
`Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Aurobindo Pharma USA Inc.,
`2018 WL 5109836 (D. Del. Oct. 18, 2018) .............................................................................11
`
`Celgene Corp. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc.,
`17 F.4th 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ..................................................................................................7
`
`ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc.,
`920 F.3d 759 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..................................................................................................17
`
`Chewy, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp.,
`94 F.4th 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2024) ................................................................................................20
`
`Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n,
`776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..................................................................................................4
`
`ii
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`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 59 Filed 10/22/24 Page 4 of 34
`
`
`
`Correct Transmission LLC v. ADTRAN, Inc.,
`2021 WL 1967985 (W.D. Tex. May 17, 2021) .........................................................................5
`
`In re Cray Inc.,
`871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017)......................................................................................3, 5, 6, 7
`
`Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish Network Corp.,
`951 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2020)................................................................................................16
`
`CyWee Group Ltd. v. Huawei Device Co. Ltd.,
`2018 WL 4002776 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2018) ........................................................................14
`
`Dali Wireless, Inc. v. Ericsson Inc.,
`2023 WL 1423990 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2023) ..................................................................13, 14
`
`Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
`578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009).......................................................................................................3
`
`Galderma Lab’ys, L.P. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.,
`290 F. Supp. 3d 599 (N.D. Tex. 2017) ......................................................................................7
`
`Gesture Tech. Partners, LLC v. Lenovo Grp. Ltd. et al.,
`No. 6-21-cv-00122, Dkt. 43 (W.D. Tex.) (Dec. 29, 2021) ........................................................7
`
`Glob. Locating Sys., LLC v. ShadowTrack 247, LLC,
`2020 WL 3513535 (W.D. N.C. 2020) .....................................................................................23
`
`GreatGigz Sols., LLC v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,
`2022 WL 1037114 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2022) ..........................................................................14
`
`GreatGigz Sols., LLC v. Maplebear Inc.,
`2021 WL 4691145 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2021) ......................................................................7, 14
`
`Impact Engine, Inc. v. Google LLC,
`2024 WL 3287126 (Fed. Cir. July 3, 2024) .......................................................................16, 24
`
`Infinity Comput. Prod., Inc. v. OKI Data Ams., Inc.,
`2018 WL 1035793 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2018) ...........................................................................10
`
`IngenioShare, LLC v. Epic Games, Inc.,
`2022 WL 827808 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2022) ...........................................................................6
`
`Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA),
`792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................20
`
`Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Corp.,
`850 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................22
`
`iii
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`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 59 Filed 10/22/24 Page 5 of 34
`
`
`
`Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co.,
`200 F. Supp. 3d 565 (W.D. Pa. 2016) ........................................................................................3
`
`Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.,
`896 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................18
`
`Magnacoustics, Inc. v. Resonance Tech. Co.,
`132 F.3d 49 (Fed. Cir. 1997)......................................................................................................3
`
`Natera, Inc. v. ArcherDX, Inc.,
`2020 WL 6043929 (D. Del. Oct. 13, 2020), aff’d sub nom without opinion,
`Ameranth, Inc. v. Olo Inc., 2021 WL 4699180 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 8, 2021), cert.
`denied, 142 S. Ct. 2814 (2022) ........................................................................................ passim
`
`In re Nintendo of Am., Inc.,
`756 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................13
`
`Pebble Tide LLC v. Arlo Techs., Inc.,
`2020 WL 509183 (D. Del. Jan. 31, 2020) ................................................................................23
`
`Pers. Audio, LLC v. Google, Inc.,
`280 F. Supp. 3d 922 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2017) ..........................................................................6
`
`RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., Ltd.,
`855 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................18
`
`SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC,
`898 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................24
`
`Secured Mail Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc.,
`873 F.3d 905 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................22
`
`Silicon Tech., Inc. v. United Refractories, Inc.,
`632 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Pa. 1985) .................................................................................................6
`
`Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi. Transit Auth.,
`873 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................4
`
`Talsk Rsch., Inc. v. Evernote Corp.,
`2017 WL 4269004 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2017) ......................................................................5, 12
`
`TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC,
`137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) ...........................................................................................................3, 4
`
`In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Pat. Litig.,
`823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016)......................................................................................18, 19, 23
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 59 Filed 10/22/24 Page 6 of 34
`
`
`
`Trinity Info Media, LLC v. Covalent, Inc.,
`72 F.4th 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2023) ................................................................................................16
`
`Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC,
`874 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................20
`
`Univ. of Fla. Res. Found., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
`916 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..........................................................................................19, 20
`
`VeriPath, Inc. v. Didomi,
`842 F. App’x 640 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ..........................................................................................21
`
`Westech Aerosol Corp. v. 3M Co.,
`927 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..................................................................................................3
`
`X2Y Attennuators, LLC v. Intel Corp.,
`No. 17-cv-00164, Dkt. 71 (W.D. Pa) (June 25, 2018) ...............................................................7
`
`Xodus Med., Inc. v. Allen Med. Sys., Inc.,
`2018 WL 2338763 (W.D. Pa. May 22, 2018) ....................................................................10, 11
`
`Statutes
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) ............................................................................................................... passim
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) .......................................................................................................................13
`
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ...................................................................................................................... passim
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 .............................................................................................................................1
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`v
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 59 Filed 10/22/24 Page 7 of 34
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`
`
`TABLE OF EXHIBITS
`
`Exhibit
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`5
`
`Description
`X2Y Attennuators, LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 17-cv-00164, Dkt. 71 (W.D. Pa)
`(June 25, 2018)
`Gesture Tech. Partners, LLC v. Lenovo Grp. Ltd. et al., No. 6-21-cv-00122,
`Dkt. 43 (W.D. Tex.) (Dec. 29, 2021)
`San Francisco Chronicle Article entitled “Work from home, hybrid model
`adapted by Bay Area’s DoorDash, more,” dated November 7, 2022
`U.S. Patent No. 9,009,060
`U.S. Patent No. 6,384,850
`
`vi
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 59 Filed 10/22/24 Page 8 of 34
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`
`
`Defendants DoorDash, Inc. (“DDI”) and Eat’n Park Restaurants, LLC (“Eat’n Park
`
`Restaurants”) and Eat’n Park Hospitality Group, Inc. (“Eat’n Park Hospitality”) (collectively
`
`“Eat’n Park”) move to dismiss Plaintiff Ameranth, Inc.’s (“Ameranth”) Amended Complaint (Dkt.
`
`51) for improper venue under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3), or alternatively, to transfer the claims
`
`against DDI to the District of Delaware and stay the claims against Eat’n Park. Additionally,
`
`Defendants move to dismiss all claims for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Venue is improper as to Defendant DDI. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), a patent infringement
`
`case may be brought only in the judicial district (1) where the defendant resides, or (2) where the
`
`defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.
`
`There is no dispute as to the first prong, as DDI is a Delaware company and therefore does not
`
`“reside” in this District. The second prong is also not met at least because, as demonstrated by the
`
`Declaration of Kelsey Merrigan (“Merrigan Decl.”) submitted herewith, DDI does not operate or
`
`maintain any “regular and established place of business” within this District.
`
`In addition, if the Court declines to dismiss and/or transfer based on lack of venue, the
`
`Court should dismiss this case in its entirety pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because, like five other
`
`related Ameranth patents that have already been invalidated under Section 101, the patents asserted
`
`in this case likewise claim only high-level, functional, and result-oriented ideas and fail to provide
`
`any inventive concepts that transform such ideas into patentable subject matter.1
`
`II.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`Prior to filing this action, Ameranth filed another action before this Court captioned
`
`Ameranth, Inc. v. DoorDash, Inc., No. 22-cv-01776-WSH (“Ameranth I”), in which Ameranth
`
`
`1 On October 17, 2024, the parties met and conferred regarding Defendants’ motion but were
`unable to resolve their disputes.
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 59 Filed 10/22/24 Page 9 of 34
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`
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`alleges that DDI infringes U.S. Patent No. 11,276,130 (the “’130 patent”). (Ameranth I, Dkt. 1.)
`
`DDI timely moved to dismiss in Ameranth I for improper venue, or alternatively, to transfer, and
`
`for failure to state a claim as the ’130 patent is invalid under Section 101. (Ameranth I, Dkt. 21.)
`
`DDI’s motion in Ameranth I is still pending.
`
`The Amended Complaint in this case alleges that DDI infringes two patents related to and
`
`sharing a common specification2 with the ’130 patent at issue in Ameranth I—U.S. Patent Nos.
`
`11,842,415 (the “’415 patent”) and 11,847,587 (the “’587 patent”) (collectively, the “Asserted
`
`Patents”). Ameranth alleges infringement of claims 1 and 9 of the ’415 patent and claims 1 and 7
`
`of the ’587 patent (collectively, the “Asserted Claims”). These three patents are part of a larger
`
`family of patents (Dkt. 51 at ¶ 35; Dkt. 51-1 at (60); Dkt. 51-2 at (60)), and the Southern District
`
`of California and the District of Delaware have already concluded that five other patents within
`
`that family are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for claiming patent-ineligible subject matter in
`
`decisions affirmed by the Federal Circuit. See In re Ameranth Cases, 2018 WL 11433300 (S.D.
`
`Cal. Sept. 25, 2018), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 792 F. App’x 780, 787 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2019); Natera, Inc. v. ArcherDX, Inc. (hereinafter, “Olo”), 2020 WL 6043929 (D. Del. Oct.
`
`13, 2020) (joint opinion for Ameranth, Inc. v. Olo Inc. and two unrelated cases), aff’d sub nom
`
`without opinion, Ameranth, Inc. v. Olo Inc., 2021 WL 4699180 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 8, 2021), cert.
`
`denied, 142 S. Ct. 2814 (2022).
`
`In addition, in a flawed attempt to bolster its position on venue, the Amended Complaint
`
`in this case also alleges infringement by Eat’n Park, a merchant that uses “DDI products and
`
`services” comprising the “DoorDash platform” (“the DDI Platform”). (See, e.g., Dkt. 51 at ¶¶ 21.)
`
`
`2 References to the specification will only be made to the ’415 patent to avoid cumulative citations.
`
`2
`
`

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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 59 Filed 10/22/24 Page 10 of 34
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`
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`III. LEGAL STANDARD
`
`A.
`
`Improper Venue
`
`Venue in patent infringement actions is governed exclusively under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
`
`TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1519-21 (2017). “Any civil
`
`action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where [1] the defendant
`
`resides, or [2] where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and
`
`established place of business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). Under the first prong of § 1400(b), “a domestic
`
`corporation ‘resides’ only in its State of incorporation.” TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1517. Personal
`
`jurisdiction alone cannot establish residence under § 1400(b). See id. Under the second prong,
`
`three requirements must be met to show that a defendant has a regular and established place of
`
`business in a district: “(1) there must be a physical place in the district; (2) it must be a regular and
`
`established place of business; and (3) it must be the place of the defendant” (collectively, the “Cray
`
`Factor(s)”). In re Cray, 871 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “If any statutory requirement is not
`
`satisfied, venue is improper under § 1400(b).” Id. “[T]he plaintiff has the burden of establishing
`
`proper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).” Westech Aerosol Corp. v. 3M Co., 927 F.3d 1378, 1381-
`
`82 (Fed. Cir. 2019). “[I]n an action involving multiple defendants[,] venue . . . must be met as to
`
`each defendant.” Magnacoustics, Inc. v. Resonance Tech. Co., 132 F.3d 49 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
`
`B.
`
`Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted
`
`A complaint must allege facts “sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim
`
`for relief.’” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v.
`
`Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). A “‘plausible claim for relief’ in a patent infringement case
`
`necessarily requires a valid patent; otherwise there can be no infringement.” Intell. Ventures I LLC
`
`v. Erie Indem. Co., 200 F. Supp. 3d 565, 569 (W.D. Pa. 2016). “[T]he 12(b)(6) stage is a proper
`
`one at which to examine patent eligibility under § 101.” Id.
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 59 Filed 10/22/24 Page 11 of 34
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`
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`“Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter under § 101 is an issue of law.”
`
`In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593
`
`(2010). In Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, the Supreme Court established a two-step test for
`
`determining eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014). At Alice Step One, the
`
`court must “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to . . . patent-ineligible concepts,”
`
`such as an abstract idea. Id. If this standard is met, then the court proceeds to Step Two, which
`
`requires consideration of “the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered
`
`combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into
`
`a patent eligible application.’” Id. (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc.,
`
`566 U.S. 66, 78–79 (2012)). When the claims are “substantially similar and linked to the same
`
`abstract idea,” the court may use a representative claim for its two-step Alice analysis. Content
`
`Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2014); see also Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi. Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1368 n.7 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2017) (concluding that claims “should rise or fall together” when they “contain only minor
`
`differences in terminology but require performance of the same basic process”).
`
`IV. ARGUMENT
`
`A.
`
`Venue is Improper for DDI under § 1400(b)
`
`1.
`
`DDI Does Not “Reside” In This District
`
`There is no dispute that DDI is a Delaware company organized and existing under the laws
`
`of the State of Delaware. (Dkt. 51 at ¶ 2; Merrigan Decl. at ¶ 4.) Thus, DDI does not “reside” in
`
`the Western District of Pennsylvania such that venue is improper under the first prong of § 1400(b).
`
`See TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1517 (“[A] domestic corporation ‘resides’ only in its State of
`
`incorporation for purposes of the patent venue statute.”).
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 59 Filed 10/22/24 Page 12 of 34
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`
`
`2.
`
`DDI Does Not Have A “Regular And Established Place Of Business” In
`This District
`
`DDI’s principal place of business is 303 2nd Street South Tower, San Francisco, CA 94107.
`
`(Merrigan Decl. at ¶ 5.) DDI does
`
` (Id., ¶ 6.) Nor does DDI
`
` (Id., ¶ 7.)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`In view of these undisputed facts, Ameranth alleges that venue is proper based on: (a)
`
`activities within this District that are tied to neither a “physical place” nor a “regular and
`
`established place of business” (and thus fails Cray Factors 1 and 2); and (b) business locations of
`
`entities other than DDI (which fails Cray Factor 3). Specifically, Ameranth relies on allegations
`
`relating to (i) Dashers (Dkt. 51 at ¶¶ 21, 23, 32); (ii) engineers (id., ¶¶ 24-31); (iii) a single
`
`DashMart location (id., ¶¶ 2-14); and (iv) local third-party owned and operated restaurants such as
`
`Eat’n Park (id., ¶¶ 15-17, 21-24). For the reasons discussed below, however, none of those
`
`allegations are sufficient to establish venue.
`
`a)
`
`Plaintiff’s Allegations Regarding Dashers Do Not Establish
`Venue
`
`“Dashers” are individuals who facilitate the delivery of goods via the DDI Platform.
`
`(Merrigan Decl. at ¶ 12.)
`
`
`
` (See Merrigan Decl. at ¶ 12.) For that reason alone, their activities in this
`
`District cannot establish venue for DDI. Talsk Rsch., Inc. v. Evernote Corp., 2017 WL 4269004,
`
`at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2017) (“The Federal Circuit’s decision in Cray leaves no room for Plaintiff
`
`to argue that the handful of non-employee, independent contractors present in this District
`
`constitute a ‘regular and established place of business’ for Defendant within the meaning of §
`
`1400(b).”); Correct Transmission LLC v. ADTRAN, Inc., 2021 WL 1967985, at *3 (W.D. Tex.
`
`5
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`

`

`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 59 Filed 10/22/24 Page 13 of 34
`
`
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`May 17, 2021) (“[S]ince ADTRAN engaged Palco as an independent contractor, its facility cannot
`
`be ADTRAN’s regular and established place of business.”); AptusTech LLC v. Trimfoot Co., LLC,
`
`2020 WL 1190070, at *5 (E.D.Tex. Mar. 12, 2020) (“[T]he Court joins the vast number of other
`
`district courts . . . that have held an independent retailer, or a distributor, does not satisfy the
`
`requirement that the defendant has a regular and established place of business in the forum.”). In
`
`addition, Dashers do not operate out of any “regular and established” physical business location
`
`but instead provide delivery services moving from place to place. For this additional reason,
`
`Dashers cannot establish venue. See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362-3 (“[T]he place in question must
`
`be settled certainly, or fixed permanently.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Silicon
`
`Tech., Inc. v. United Refractories, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1, 2 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (sales activity within
`
`the district insufficient to establish venue without a regular and established place of business).
`
`b)
`
`Plaintiff’s Allegations Regarding Engineers Residing In
`Pittsburgh Do Not Establish Venue
`
` (Merrigan Decl. at ¶ 8.) Regardless of
`
`
`
`the number, however, the mere presence of these employees within this District cannot establish
`
`venue because
`
`at ¶¶ 7, 8, 11.)
`
` (Merrigan Decl.
`
` (Merrigan
`
`Decl. at ¶ 8) and thus cannot be used to establish venue under § 1400(b). See, e.g., IngenioShare,
`
`LLC v. Epic Games, Inc., 2022 WL 827808, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2022) (finding no venue
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`where twenty remote employees were located in the district without any office of the defendant);
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`see also Pers. Audio, LLC v. Google, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 3d 922, 936 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2017)
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`(“The fact that [Defendant] may allow its employees to work from the Eastern District of Texas
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`does not establish proper venue in this district.”).
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`6
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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 59 Filed 10/22/24 Page 14 of 34
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`Ameranth alleges that, because “the employees work at their own homes in the Pittsburgh
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`area and not in an office provided by DDI, DDI has established or ratified the employees’ homes
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`as DDI’s places of business.” (Dkt. 51, ¶ 29.) However, to satisfy § 1400(b), a home from which
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`a remote employee works “must be a place of the defendant, not solely a place of the defendant’s
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`employee.”3 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363. And courts have consistently found that employees’
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`home offices are not business locations of their employer and do not establish venue under
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`§ 1400(b). See, e.g., id. (affirming that defendant’s employees’ homes are “not places of the
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`defendant”); Celgene Corp. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 17 F.4th 1111, 1123-25 (Fed. Cir. 2021)
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`(same); X2Y Attennuators, LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 17-cv-00164, Dkt. 71 at 2 (W.D. Pa. June 25,
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`2018) (no venue based on employee’s home office) (Ex. 1); Galderma Lab’ys, L.P. v. Teva
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`Pharms. USA, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 599, 610 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (same); GreatGigz Sols., LLC v.
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`Maplebear Inc., 2021 WL 4691145, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2021) (same); Gesture Tech.
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`Partners, LLC v. Lenovo Grp. Ltd. et al., No. 6-21-cv-00122, Dkt. 43 at 4-5 (W.D. Tex.) (Dec. 29,
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`2021) (finding no venue where, despite having fifty remote employees working within the district,
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`the “facts of th[e] case d[id] not justify a finding that the referenced work-from-home employees
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`[were] working from a place of the Defendants.”) (Ex. 2). This is particularly true when the
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`defendant does not “condition[] employment on an employee’s continued residence in the district.”
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`In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363 (“[I]f an employee can move his or her home out of the district at his
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`or her own instigation, without the approval of the defendant, that would cut against the
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`employee’s home being considered a place of business of the defendant.”); see also Celgene, 17
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`F.4th at 1123-1124.
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`
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` (Merrigan Decl. at ¶ 8.) Ameranth’s baseless
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`3 All emphasis added, unless otherwise noted.
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`7
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 59 Filed 10/22/24 Page 15 of 34
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`
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`allegations that DDI has a “Pittsburg-located DoorDash Platform Engineering Team,” “specif[ies]
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`the Pittsburgh area as the location of employment,” and “requires its engineering team members
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`to be located in the Pittsburgh area” (Dkt. 51, ¶¶ 28, 29, 31) are simply untrue. (Merrigan Decl. at
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`¶¶ 8-10.)
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`Ameranth also alleges, citing a YouTube video, that “one Pittsburgh team member, Matt
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`Ranney, . . . has used his home office . . . to publicly represent DDI nationwide on technical subject
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`matter . . . thus clearly establishing his home office location as a DDI physical place of business
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`in this district.” (Dkt. 51, ¶ 29.) However, nothing in that video establishes Mr. Ranney’s home
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`office as a DDI physical place of business. Instead, as shown below, the video depicts Mr. Ranney
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`giving an interview from a rock-and-roll themed room decorated with guitars, string lights, and a
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`Led Zeppelin poster, and free of any DoorDash logo or the look and feel of a DoorDash office.
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` (Merrigan Decl. at ¶ 8.)
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`
`
`
`
`
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` (Id., ¶¶ 8, 10.)
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`Ameranth also erroneously alleges that DDI “directs, ratifies or establishes in person/team
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`meetings” by encouraging employees within this District to gather in person for “moments that
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`matter.” (Dkt. 51, ¶ 28.) These allegations are based on statements made by a former employee of
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`8
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 59 Filed 10/22/24 Page 16 of 34
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`
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`DDI in an article published in the San Francisco Chronicle. (Id.) However, those statements were
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`about DDI’s employees generally—
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` (Merrigan Decl. at ¶ 9;
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`see also Ex. 3 at 3-4.) In addition, nowhere was it stated that DDI “directs, ratifies or establishes”
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`any such in-person meetings as alleged by Ameranth. (Merrigan Decl. at ¶ 9; see also Ex. 3 at 3-
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`4.) In fact, according to that same article, DDI encourages employees to gather in DoorDash
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`offices
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` (Ex. 3 at 4 (“We’ve been encouraging
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`teams to take advantage of our beautiful office space rather than rent conference rooms in some
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`hotels.”); Merrigan Decl. at ¶¶ 6-7.)
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`c)
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`Plaintiff’s Allegations Regarding The DashMart In This District
`Do Not Establish Venue
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`DashMarts are physical stores and warehouses that sell consumer goods commonly found
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`in convenience stores, grocery stores and takeaway restaurants, such as pre-packaged or prepared
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`foods, beverages and household items. (Merrigan Decl. at ¶ 15.) The DashMart store to which the
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`Amended Complaint refers—like all DashMart stores—
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`DoorDash Essentials LLC (“DDE”),
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` (Merrigan Decl. at ¶¶ 13-20.)
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` (Id., ¶ 16.)
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` (Id., ¶ 17.)
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` (Id., ¶¶ 20, 27, 30.)
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`¶¶ 18, 19.)
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`,
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` (Id.,
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`
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`Under these facts, Ameranth cannot impute the DashMart location in this District to DDI
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`for venue purposes unless Ameranth demonstrates that DDE and DDI have not maintained
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` (Id., ¶ 19.)
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`9
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`

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`Case 2:23-cv-02165-WSH Document 59 Filed 10/22/24 Page 17 of 34
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`“corporate separateness”:
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`A threshold inquiry when determining whether the place of business of one
`company can be imputed to another, related company is whether they have
`maintained corporate separateness. If corporate separateness has not been
`maintained, the place of business of one corporation may be imputed to the other
`for venue purposes. But where related companies have maintained corporate
`separateness, the place of business of one corporation is not imputed to the other
`for venue purposes.
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`Andra Grp., LP v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, L.L.C., 6 F.4th 1283, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Ameranth
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`cannot make such a showing because
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` (Merrigan Decl. at ¶ 21.)
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` (Id., ¶ 22, 23.)
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` (Id., ¶ 24.) Therefore, the DashMart location in this District,
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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` (id., ¶ 24), cannot be “imputed to [DDI] for the purposes of patent
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`venue statute.” Andra Grp., 6 F.4th at 1289 (finding no venue where the entities “have maintained
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`corporate separateness”); see also Xodus Med., Inc. v. Allen Med. Sys., Inc., 2018 WL 2338763, at
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`*3 (W.D. Pa. May 22, 2018) (“Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the existing and formal corporate
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`distinctions between the Defendant and its parent should be disregarded here for compelling
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`equitable reasons so as to permit the Hill-Rom facility in Monroeville be treated as a ‘physical
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`presence’ of its subsidiary, the Defendant.”); Infinity Comput. Prod., Inc. v. OKI Data Ams., Inc.,
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`2018 WL 1035793, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2018) (refusing to impute subsidiary’s presence in the
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`district to its parent to find venue).
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`In an attempt to blur the line between DDE and DDI, Ameranth alleges that (1) “the sign
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`on the Pittsburgh DashMart states ‘Das