Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 32 Filed 07/31/23 Page 1 of 21
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
`
`
`
`
`C.A. No.: 2:22-cv-1776-WSH
`
`
`AMERANTH, INC.,
`
`
`v.
`
`
`DOORDASH, INC.,
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`FOR IMPROPER VENUE, OR ALTERNATIVELY, TO TRANSFER,
`AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 32 Filed 07/31/23 Page 2 of 21
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`
`I. 
`
`Venue Remains Improper in This District .......................................................................... 1 
`
`A. 
`
`
`B. 
`
`
`C. 
`
`
`D. 
`
`Ameranth Misconstrues the Public Statements Regarding
`DashMart................................................................................................................. 1 
`
`Ameranth Conflates the Test for Venue in a Patent Infringement
`Suit with the Test for Personal Jurisdiction ............................................................ 3 
`
`DoorDash Essentials and DoorDash Maintain Corporate
`Separateness ............................................................................................................ 5 
`
`Venue Discovery Should be Denied ....................................................................... 7 
`
`II. 
`
`The Asserted ’130 Patent is Invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 ............................................... 8 
`
`A. 
`
`The Claimed Invention Fails Under Alice Step One ............................................... 9 
`
`1. 
`
`2. 
`
`The Olo Decision is Highly Instructive ...................................................... 9 
`
`The ’130 Patent Claims Are Not Directed to Improvements
`to Web Server Computers ......................................................................... 11 
`
`a. 
`
`b. 
`
`“Parallel Operational Capabilities” ............................................... 11 
`
`“Automatic Reflection” ................................................................ 13 
`
`B. 
`
`The Claimed Invention Fails under Alice Step Two ............................................. 14 
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 32 Filed 07/31/23 Page 3 of 21
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,
`573 U.S. 208 (2014) .................................................................................................9, 11, 14, 15
`
`Ameranth, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC,
`792 F. App’x. 780 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ................................................................................. passim
`
`Andra Grp., LP v. Victoria's Secret Stores, L.L.C.,
`6 F.4th 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ........................................................................................1, 3, 4, 6
`
`Bausch Health Ireland Ltd. v. Mylan Lab'ys Ltd.,
`2022 WL 683084 (D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2022) ................................................................................6, 7
`
`Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
`267 U.S. 333 (1925); 14D ..........................................................................................................4
`
`Celgene Corp. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc.,
`17 F.4th 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ..............................................................................................5, 6
`
`ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc.,
`920 F.3d 759 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..................................................................................................10
`
`In re Cray,
`871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..............................................................................................2, 3
`
`Directory Dividends, Inc. v. SBC Communications, Inc.,
`No. 01-CV-1974, 2003 WL 21961448 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 2003) .................................................4
`
`Galderma Labs, L.P. v. Medinter U.S., LLC et al.,
`No. 18-cv-1892 (D. Del. Oct. 25, 2019) ....................................................................................7
`
`Green Fitness Equip. Co., LLC v. Precor Inc.,
`2018 WL 3207967 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2018) ...........................................................................3
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank,
`792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................15
`
`In re Latex Gloves Prod. Liab. Litig.,
`2001 WL 964105 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2001) ..............................................................................4
`
`Lending Tree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc.,
`656 F. App’x. 991 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ...........................................................................................9
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 32 Filed 07/31/23 Page 4 of 21
`
`
`
`Minn. Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Eco Chem, Inc.,
`757 F.2d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1985)..................................................................................................4
`
`Natera, Inc. v. ArcherDX, Inc.,
`No. 20-125-LPS, 2020 WL 6043929 (D. Del. Oct. 13, 2020), aff’d without
`opinion, No. 2021-1211, 2021 WL 4699180 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 8, 2021) ............................ passim
`
`Patent Holder LLC v. Lone Wolf Distributors, Inc.,
`No. 17-cv-23060, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180699 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2017) ...........................8
`
`Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp.,
`247 F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 2001)...................................................................................................5, 7
`
`Post Consumer Brands, LLC v. Gen. Mills, Inc.,
`No. 4:17-CV-2471 SNLJ, 2017 WL 4865936 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 27, 2017) ..................................6
`
`SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC,
`898 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................15
`
`Secured Mail Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc.,
`873 F.3d 905 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................13
`
`TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC,
`581 U.S. 258 (2017) ...............................................................................................................3, 4
`
`Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Greenlease Holding Co.,
`903 F.3d 333 (3d Cir. 2018).......................................................................................................5
`
`Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC,
`874 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................15
`
`Valeant Pharms. N. Am. LLC v. Mylan Pharms. Inc.,
`978 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2020)..............................................................................................3, 4
`
`Wechsler v. Macke Int'l Trade, Inc.,
`486 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..................................................................................................5
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 32 Filed 07/31/23 Page 5 of 21
`
`
`
`Defendant DoorDash, Inc., (“DoorDash”) hereby files this Reply Memorandum in Support
`
`of its Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 23, “Motion”).
`
`I.
`
`VENUE REMAINS IMPROPER IN THIS DISTRICT
`
`Ameranth has not met its burden of proving venue is proper in this District. Indeed,
`
`Ameranth rests on two theories, neither of which is sufficient to establish venue. First, Ameranth
`
`argues that public statements establish that DoorDash owns and controls the Pittsburgh DashMart
`
`location. Dkt. 28 (“Opp.”) at 8. Ameranth, however, fails to overcome the compelling evidence
`
`Defendant presented to the contrary. Second, Ameranth attempts to save venue by citing cases and
`
`applying the standard for personal jurisdiction in attempting to show that DoorDash Essentials,
`
`LLC (“DoorDash Essentials”) is an alter-ego of DoorDash. That law is outdated, and this Court
`
`cannot exercise venue over DoorDash based on overruled precedent and a complete lack of factors
`
`required by this Circuit to show alter-ego. Under current law, venue is improper in this district.
`
`DoorDash addresses each of Ameranth’s venue positions in detail below and further reiterates the
`
`evidence establishing that DoorDash Essentials and DoorDash maintain corporate separateness.
`
`A. Ameranth Misconstrues the Public Statements Regarding DashMart
`
`
`
`First, Ameranth relies on DoorDash’s Form 10-K for Fiscal Year 2022 to establish that
`
`DoorDash owns and controls the Pittsburgh DashMart location. Specifically, Ameranth cites to
`
`the use of the term “we” such as: "[w]e face certain risks in connection with the operation of
`
`DashMart and Wolt Market, our first-party owned and self-operated convenience and grocery
`
`delivery businesses." (Opp. at 7, citing Dkt. 29-2 at pp. 28, 125). As an initial matter, the statement
`
`makes clear that the convenience stores [DashMarts] are “self-operated.” As a legal matter, the use
`
`of “we” in this financial statement cannot compel the conclusion that the two companies do not
`
`maintain corporate separateness, rather it underscores the entities are separate. See Andra Grp., LP
`
`v. Victoria's Secret Stores, L.L.C., 6 F.4th 1283, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“None of the public filings
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 32 Filed 07/31/23 Page 6 of 21
`
`
`
`cited by Andra demonstrate [parent’s] control, because they are documents covering all of
`
`[parent’s] brands. The documents’ use of “we” does not convey that “we” means [parent]
`
`specifically, but that “we” could include the individual subsidiary brands, like Stores.”) As
`
`explained in its motion, DoorDash Essentials is an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of DoorDash,
`
`and the 10-K statement is intended to communicate consolidated information for DoorDash and
`
`its subsidiaries. See Dkt. 29-2 at 5 (“[We] are referring to DoorDash, Inc. together with its
`
`subsidiaries when we use the terms "DoorDash," the "Company," "we," "our," or "us."); see also
`
`17 CFR § 240.14a-3(b) (explaining that 10-K reports for its registrants and subsidiaries are to be
`
`consolidated). Nothing in the 10-K statement contradicts this point, and Plaintiff presents no
`
`evidence to meet the heavy burden of piercing the corporate veil.1 Moreover, the fact that
`
`DoorDash may “face certain risks” does not compel the conclusion that DoorDash, as the parent,
`
`operates its subsidiary. DoorDash’s declaration confirms, just as the 10-K statement proclaims,
`
`that DashMart stores are self-operated. (Dkt. 23, Ex. 1, Merrigan Declaration at ¶¶ 10-18).
`
`Second, Ameranth cites to DoorDash’s website that includes press releases and jobs for
`
`DashMart.2 (Opp. at 9). That DoorDash utilizes a broad website to cover news of its subsidiaries
`
`
`1 Ameranth perplexingly continues to allege that DoorDash has an engineering team in this
`District, but notably does not allege that venue is proper on this basis. Nor could this be grounds
`for venue. It is undisputed that DoorDash has never maintained a physical engineering office here.
`Rather, Ameranth brazenly accuses DoorDash of “transparent litigation induced and deceptive
`venue avoidance maneuvers” based on an online business article published 10 days after the filing
`of the Complaint that reported DoorDash canceled its plans to open a Pittsburgh engineering office.
`(Opp. at 1). Setting aside the implausibility of a course of action that saw DoorDash hatch such a
`plan, meet with the proper stakeholders, completely withdraw its plans to open a facility, and issue
`press releases reporting the same, and all within 10 days as a result of this lawsuit, Ameranth’s
`attacks are trivial. And even if DoorDash was planning to open a facility on the day the Complaint
`was filed, that plan would not satisfy any of the three Cray factors.
`
`2 Ameranth also points to an independent online blog authored by “Doug H.” for the proposition
`that “evidences that DoorDash, Inc. controls the operations of DashMart.” (Opp. at 10, n. 6). The
`statement is unreliable, at best, and should not be afforded any weight by the Court.
`2
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 32 Filed 07/31/23 Page 7 of 21
`
`
`
`is not evidence that they are a singular entity. See Andra, 6 F.4th at 1288 (rejecting the notion that
`
`“various public filings by [Parent] that speak in broad terms about real estate holdings and
`
`investments,” among other things, is enough to show control of the subsidiary such that imputing
`
`venue on the parent would be proper); see also In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1364 (emphasis added)
`
`(“[T]he mere fact that a defendant has advertised that it has a place of business or has even set up
`
`an office is not sufficient; the defendant must actually engage in business from that location.”).
`
`Third, Ameranth relies on a sign in the Pittsburgh DashMart location stating: “DashMart
`
`by DoorDash” to conclude the store is “owned/operated by DoorDash.” This is demonstrably false.
`
`In its Motion, DoorDash presented overwhelming evidence that DoorDash Essentials owns and
`
`operates DashMart locations, including the Pittsburgh location. Dkt. 23, Ex. 1, ¶¶ 10-18; See also
`
`Green Fitness Equip. Co., LLC v. Precor Inc., 2018 WL 3207967, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2018)
`
`(finding improper venue despite a subsidiary's use of the defendant's logo at several locations in
`
`the district). The sign at best reflects common branding between the parent and subsidiary. The
`
`DashMart sign promotes the DoorDash brand generally, but does not supersede the substantive
`
`evidence establishing DoorDash is separate from that individual store.
`
`B. Ameranth Conflates the Test for Venue in a Patent Infringement Suit with the
`Test for Personal Jurisdiction
`
`Ameranth interchangeably cites cases analyzing venue and personal jurisdiction.
`
`Ameranth’s application is improper because these issues involve different legal tests. Accordingly,
`
`Ameranth cannot establish venue by relying on cases analyzing separate grounds for dismissal.
`
`Before the seminal Supreme Court case on patent venue, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods
`
`Grp. Brands LLC, 581 U.S. 258, (2017), a plaintiff could bring a patent infringement suit in any
`
`venue where personal jurisdiction was proper. “[A]t that point in time, our case law effectively
`
`had equated personal jurisdiction with venue.” Valeant Pharms. N. Am. LLC v. Mylan Pharms.
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 32 Filed 07/31/23 Page 8 of 21
`
`
`
`Inc., 978 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2020). But that is no longer true today. Following TC
`
`Heartland, courts have narrowly construed the patent venue statute, and the Federal Circuit itself
`
`has “consistently” warned that “[c]ourts should be mindful of the specific and unambiguous nature
`
`of venue in applying the statute and be careful not to conflate showings that may be sufficient for
`
`other purposes, e.g., personal jurisdiction or the general venue statute, with the necessary showing
`
`to establish proper venue in patent cases.” Id. at 1380 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
`
`Ameranth’s reliance on scores of cases where a court considered dismissal on other
`
`grounds, such as failure to state a claim or lack of personal jurisdiction, is wholly inapposite. See
`
`e.g., Directory Dividends, Inc. v. SBC Communications, Inc., No. 01-CV-1974, 2003 WL
`
`21961448 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 2003) (cited in Opp. at 9); In re Latex Gloves Prod. Liab. Litig., 2001
`
`WL 964105, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2001) (cited in Opp. at 10).
`
`To impute venue based on DoorDash Essentials’ subsidiary relationship with DoorDash,
`
`the Court would have to either pierce the corporate veil or find that DoorDash Essentials is
`
`DoorDash’s alter ego.3 See Andra, 6 F.4th at 1289 (holding that venue may be imputed under an
`
`alter-ego or veil-piercing theory); Minn. Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Eco Chem, Inc., 757 F.2d 1256, 1265
`
`(Fed. Cir. 1985). It is black-letter law that “where related companies have maintained corporate
`
`separateness, the place of business of one corporation is not imputed to the other for venue
`
`purposes.” Andra, 6 F.4th at 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2021); Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267
`
`U.S. 333, 334–35, (1925); 14D Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
`
`Procedure § 3823 & nn.25–26 (4th ed.) (collecting cases).
`
`
`3 Ameranth made no reference to their new alter-ego theory in their Complaint or First Amended
`Complaint. DoorDash therefore now responds to Ameranth’s extraordinary claim, which includes
`binding Third Circuit and Federal Circuit decisions regarding imputing venue vis-à-vis alter-ego.
`4
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 32 Filed 07/31/23 Page 9 of 21
`
`
`
`Corporate separateness is an issue of regional-circuit law. See Wechsler v. Macke Int'l
`
`Trade, Inc., 486 F.3d 1286, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Under the Third Circuit’s alter-ego doctrine,
`
`courts will disregard the corporate form to “prevent fraud, illegality, or injustice,” “when
`
`recognition of the corporate entity would defeat public policy or shield someone from liability for
`
`a crime,” or “when the parent so dominated the subsidiary that it had no separate existence.”
`
`Celgene Corp. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 17 F.4th 1111, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2021) citing Pearson v.
`
`Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 484 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2001). Among other possible
`
`considerations, the Third Circuit looks at “gross undercapitalization, failure to observe corporate
`
`formalities, nonpayment of dividends, insolvency of the [subsidiary] corporation, siphoning of
`
`funds from the [subsidiary] corporation by the dominant stockholder, nonfunctioning of officers
`
`and directors, absence of corporate records, and whether the corporation is merely a facade for the
`
`operations of the dominant stockholder.” Id. at 484–85 & n.2; see also Trinity Indus., Inc. v.
`
`Greenlease Holding Co., 903 F.3d 333, 365 (3d Cir. 2018).
`
`In the end, this is an inquiry into whether the entities’ separateness “is little more than a
`
`legal fiction”—a “notoriously difficult” burden that must be proved by clear and convincing
`
`evidence. Pearson, 247 F.3d at 485 (emphasis added). Ameranth “must essentially demonstrate
`
`that in all aspects of the business, the two corporations actually functioned as a single entity.” Id.
`
`Ameranth does not, and cannot, make this showing. Applying this correct standard, Ameranth has
`
`failed to establish that venue is proper.
`
`C. DoorDash Essentials and DoorDash Maintain Corporate Separateness
`
`“Where related companies have maintained corporate separateness, the place of business
`
`of one corporation is not imputed to the other for venue purposes.” Supra Section I(B). Ameranth
`
`raises several grounds in arguing that DoorDash and DoorDash Essentials do not maintain
`
`corporate separateness, all of which fail as a matter of law.
`5
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 32 Filed 07/31/23 Page 10 of 21
`
`
`
`Ameranth first argues that DashMart job postings on DoorDash’s corporate website are for
`
`DoorDash, Inc. (Opp. at 10). But DoorDash explained that the two companies coordinate on hiring
`
`efforts and the jobs themselves are for DoorDash Essentials. (Motion at 7, n.2). Besides, this is not
`
`a factor analyzed under the alter-ego doctrine.
`
`Ameranth also argues that “the web page for DashMart is www.doordash.com/dashmart,
`
`which falls under the DoorDash domain name” and various pages on the DashMart web page link
`
`to pages about DoorDash. (Opp. at 11). But, again, broad statements on a parent company’s
`
`corporate website regarding the news of its subsidiaries are commonplace and should not be
`
`considered as a factor for formal corporate separateness. Andra, 6 F.4th at 1288.
`
`Further, Ameranth argues that the DashMart locations use the common DoorDash
`
`trademark. (Opp. at 11). But courts have examined the use of a common trademark between parent
`
`and subsidiary and have rejected the notion that a common use indicates a lack of corporate
`
`separateness. Andra, 6 F.4th at 1288 (holding that “the companies’ shared use of ‘Victoria's Secret’
`
`in their name does not detract from the separateness of their businesses”); see also Post Consumer
`
`Brands, LLC v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-2471 SNLJ, 2017 WL 4865936, at *2 (E.D. Mo.
`
`Oct. 27, 2017) (explaining that the use of a common mark did not impute venue where “neither
`
`[parent] owns the [subsidiary’s] plant nor any other property in the district. No [parent] employees
`
`work at the [subsidiary’s] plant, which, again, is operated by the [subsidiary].)
`
`In short, Ameranth’s allegations “show[] collaboration, not commonality.” Celgene, 17
`
`F.4th at 1126. In Bausch Health Ireland Ltd. v. Mylan Lab'ys Ltd., the court refused to disregard
`
`the corporate form when faced with similar allegations to those raised by Ameranth. 2022 WL
`
`683084, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2022). Specifically, the Bausch Court considered:
`
`
`
`[The companies’] use of one hiring page, one newsroom for press releases, one customer-
`service email address, one Twitter page, one YouTube channel, and one LinkedIn page;
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 32 Filed 07/31/23 Page 11 of 21
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`[The companies’] reporting of consolidated financial and operation status of “Viatris Inc.
`and Subsidiaries;” and
`
`[The companies’] use of its trademarked logos—Viatris, Global Healthcare Gateway®,
`and Partner of Choice—across its products and branding.
`
`Id. Because the plaintiff in that case had not “pled facts to support the conclusion that
`
`[d]efendants are mere alter egos of the others, and there are no allegations of (or evidentiary
`
`support establishing) fraud or injustice that would permit [p]laintiffs to pierce the corporate veil
`
`for any of the [d]efendants,” the court refused to disregard the corporate form and impute the place
`
`of business of one corporation to another for venue purposes. Id. Here, Ameranth presents
`
`barebone allegations that, at most, show that DoorDash, Inc. and DoorDash Essentials collaborate
`
`in their efforts to promote the DoorDash brand.
`
`Critically, Ameranth has failed to plead persuasive facts showing that DoorDash “controls”
`
`or is an “alter-ego” for DoorDash Essentials such that the two corporate forms should be
`
`disregarded by imputing venue from subsidiary to parent. In its Motion and accompanying
`
`Declaration, DoorDash was forthcoming in the operational, financial, and structural relationship
`
`between the two entities. The Declaration and public statements made by DoorDash are not
`
`inconsistent when the common advertising and shared brand affiliation is taken into account, as
`
`other courts have recognized when presented with similar facts. Accordingly, Ameranth has not
`
`demonstrated “that in all aspects of the business, the two corporations actually functioned as a
`
`single entity and should be treated as such. Pearson, F.3d 471 at 485 (3d Cir. 2001).
`
`D. Venue Discovery Should be Denied
`
`Ameranth’s mumbling for venue discovery should be denied. Ameranth has failed to
`
`sufficiently plead allegations regarding alter ego. See Galderma Labs, L.P. v. Medinter U.S., LLC
`
`et al., No. 18-cv-1892, Dkt. No. 98 at 11-14 (D. Del. Oct. 25, 2019) (denying jurisdictional
`
`discovery related to alter ego allegations where plaintiffs “failed to point to any record evidence
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 32 Filed 07/31/23 Page 12 of 21
`
`
`
`relating to most of the factors that the Third Circuit has used to address corporate separateness”;
`
`“what little evidence [p]laintiffs have put forward does not speak impactfully to the prospect that
`
`Anteco’s corporate separateness from Attwill is a ‘legal fiction’”; “[p]laintiffs’ allegations are also
`
`wanting as to the second element of the alter ego test: the requirement that any closeness or
`
`intermingling of the corporate forms promotes fraud, unfairness, or injustice”). Moreover,
`
`Ameranth has failed to specifically address what discovery it seeks, but instead tasks the Court
`
`with deciding what discovery is potentially proper. Patent Holder LLC v. Lone Wolf Distributors,
`
`Inc., No. 17-cv-23060, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180699, at *19 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2017) (rejecting
`
`request for venue-related discovery where plaintiff failed to “set out what discovery it seeks”).
`
`II.
`
`THE ASSERTED ’130 PATENT IS INVALID UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
`
`To the extent this Court finds that venue is proper, this case should still be dismissed on
`
`the merits because Ameranth fails to identify a patent-eligible invention in the claims of the ’130
`
`patent. Ameranth’s Opposition in fact highlights the shortcomings of the patent eligibility
`
`allegations in the First Amended Complaint. Dkt. 14 (“FAC”). Specifically, the “parallel
`
`operational capabilities” and “automatic reflection” claim elements that Ameranth identifies as
`
`purported improvements to conventional web servers and inventive concepts are, according to the
`
`patent itself, neither improvements to web server functionality nor inventive. Ameranth’s reliance
`
`on attorney argument and speculative opinions cannot impart patent eligibility where there is none.
`
`The court in Olo rejected the same arguments with on-point reasoning that Ameranth ignores.4
`
`Ameranth’s proposed claim constructions also would not change the claims’ fundamentally result-
`
`oriented and ineligible nature. The claims continue to be directed to the mere application of an
`
`
`4 See Natera, Inc. v. ArcherDX, Inc., No. 20-125-LPS, 2020 WL 6043929 (D. Del. Oct. 13, 2020),
`aff’d without opinion, No. 2021-1211, 2021 WL 4699180 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 8, 2021) (“Olo”).
`
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 32 Filed 07/31/23 Page 13 of 21
`
`
`
`abstract idea using well-understood, routine and conventional activities.
`
`A. The Claimed Invention Fails Under Alice Step One
`1. The Olo Decision is Highly Instructive
`
`Not surprisingly, Ameranth seeks to distance itself from the decision in Olo at any cost.
`
`To be clear, DoorDash does not contend that this Court is bound by the decision in Olo. However,
`
`“[b]oth [the Federal Circuit] and the Supreme Court have found it sufficient to compare claims at
`
`issue to those claims already found to be directed to an abstract idea in previous cases.” Lending
`
`Tree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 656 F. App’x. 991, 995 (Fed. Cir. 2016). It is beyond dispute that the
`
`Olo court found the related ’651 patent – so much so related that the entire specification is identical
`
`to the ’130 patent at issue – to be invalid under Section 101. The Olo decision is therefore highly
`
`instructive. (See Motion at 15-21). Indeed, the court rejected Olo’s argument that the continuation-
`
`in-part specification materials newly disclosed in the ’651 patent added any innovative concepts
`
`that could save the claims from patent ineligibility. This is precisely the argument Ameranth
`
`attempts here again. It is not, as Ameranth seeks to rewrite history, merely “guilt-by-association.”5
`
`Ameranth’s attempt to distinguish Olo based on the “character as a whole” of the ’130
`
`patent claims is equally unpersuasive. (Opp. at 16-17). Ameranth does not dispute that the ’130
`
`patent, like the ’651 patent, describes its purported invention as automating existing “pen and
`
`paper” tasks (e.g., food orders and reservations). (See Motion at 11, 16). Ameranth also does not
`
`dispute that the patent purports to automate those tasks with an “information management and
`
`communications system” that uses only conventional hardware components and undisclosed
`
`
`5 The court in Olo relied on prior decisions in Domino’s and Apple despite the fact that differences
`between the claims asserted in Olo (claims describing communication conversion between
`devices) and those in Domino’s and Apple (claims describing graphical user interfaces) were more
`readily apparent than the purported differences between the Olo claims and the claims at issue in
`this case (describing a system capable of synchronous communication and messaging).
`9
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 32 Filed 07/31/23 Page 14 of 21
`
`
`
`“commonly known” software programming steps. (See Motion at 12, 15-16); ChargePoint, Inc. v.
`
`SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 767 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (looking to specification to identify focus
`
`of the purported invention).
`
`Ameranth argues that the differences in the preambles of the claims renders Olo irrelevant
`
`because the patent here allegedly does not cover a system. (Opp. at 16). This places form over
`
`substance. The Abstract of the patent, which is titled “Information Management And Synchronous
`
`Communications System,” purports to describe an “information management and synchronous
`
`communications system and method.” (Dkt. 1-1 at Abstract.) Further, the specification of the ’130
`
`patent, like that of the ’651 patent, describes the “Field of the Invention” and the stated objectives
`
`of the invention solely in terms of “an information management and synchronous communications
`
`system and method.” (Dkt. 1-1 at 1:17-27; 2:61-3:17.) Thus, the claims at issue here and in Olo
`
`share the same overall focus– a “system” with components for communicating hospitality-related
`
`information. (See Motion at 16, 22). Cf. Olo (finding the related invalid ’651 patent directed to
`
`abstract idea of “communicating hospitality-related information using a system that is capable of
`
`synchronous communications and messaging.”); Ameranth, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 792 F.
`
`App’x. 780, 786 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Domino's”) (finding the related invalid ’077 patent directed to
`
`abstract idea of “configuring and transmitting hospitality menu related information using a system
`
`that is capable of synchronous communications and automatic formatting”).
`
`Moreover, the claims of the ’130 patent do not have to recite the same elements as the ’651
`
`patent invalidated in Olo. The Federal Circuit rejected a similar argument by Ameranth in
`
`Domino’s. In that case, Ameranth asserted that certain claims of the ’077 patent recite different
`
`elements than the claims at issue in Apple. See Domino’s, 792 F. App’x 786 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The
`
`Federal Circuit, however, agreed with the district court that “notwithstanding the difference from
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 32 Filed 07/31/23 Page 15 of 21
`
`
`
`Apple,” the claims of the ’077 patent suffered from the same ineligibility defects under Alice as
`
`the related patents invalidated in Apple. Id. Likewise, the court in Olo found it sufficient that the
`
`asserted claims “are similar to those of the related patent[s] that have already been found abstract
`
`by the Federal Circuit in [Apple and Domino’s]” to draw comparisons with the related patent
`
`claims for its findings. See Olo at *13 and *15-16.
`
`2. The ’130 Patent Claims Are Not Directed to Improvements to Web Server
`Computers
`
`Ameranth asserts repeatedly that the claims are directed to an “Improved Web Server
`
`Computer,” which is a moniker coined by Ameranth for the “intelligent web server computer with
`
`multi-modes of contact, multi-communications protocols, multi-user and parallel operational
`
`capabilities” as recited in the preamble. (Dkt. 1-1, 21:38-40). But simply calling the web server
`
`computer “improved” does not make it so. Ameranth also argues that DoorDash failed to consider
`
`Dr. Goodrich’s expert declaration. But Dr. Goodrich’s opinions are improper for a motion to
`
`dismiss since his report is not a written instrument under Rule 10(c) and expert opinions are not
`
`facts. Even so, his report does not change the language contained in the patent itself.
`
`a. “Parallel Operational Capabilities”
`
`Ameranth begins by arguing the “parallel operational capabilities” feature recited in the
`
`preamble provides an improvement over conventional web server computers. See, e.g., Opp. at 17
`
`(“The ’130 patent claims improve web server computers with an innovative and improved
`
`computer and network architecture with parallel operational capabilities.”). Ameranth is wrong.
`
`The claims do not explain how the “parallel operation capabilities” are achieved by any
`
`innovative feature recited in claim 1. To the contrary, the dictionary definition cited by Ameranth
`
`in support of its proposed construction for this term “confirms that “parallel operation capabilities”
`
`are already known to improve computer efficiency:
`
`
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 32 Filed 07/31/23 Page 16 of 21
`
`
`
`parallel server n. A computer system that implements some form of parallel
`processing to improve its performance as a server. (FAC at ¶ 18, citing Microsoft
`Computer Dictionary (5th ed. 2002) at p. 391).
`
`Moreover, the portion of the specification that Dr. Goodrich alleges describes the claimed “p