Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 28 Filed 07/20/23 Page 1 of 38
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
`
`
`AMERANTH, INC.
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`v.
`
`
`
`DOORDASH, INC.
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`)
`)
`) Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-1776-WSH
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PLAINTIFF AMERANTH, INC'S OPPOSITION TO
`DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR IMPROPER VENUE, OR
`ALTERNATIVELY, TO TRANSFER, AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
`
`
`
`
`Vincent A. Coppola
`PRIBANIC & PRIBANIC
`513 Court Place
`Pittsburgh, PA 15219
`Telephone: (412) 281-8844
`Facsimile: (412) 281-474
`
`Richard C. Weinblatt (pro hac vice)
`Stamoulis & Weinblatt LLC
`800 N. West Street, Third Floor
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Telephone: (302) 999-1540
`Facsimile: (302) 762-1688
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`Ameranth, Inc.
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 28 Filed 07/20/23 Page 2 of 38
`
`
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
`
`SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................................... 2
`
`III.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS.................................................................................................................. 3
`
`A. Venue ............................................................................................................................................... 3
`
`B. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion...................................................................................................................... 4
`
`C. Patentability Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the Presumption of Validity...................................... 4
`
`IV.
`
`ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 5
`
`A. Venue Is Proper in This District .................................................................................................... 5
`
`1. DoorDash Has Committed and Continues to Commit Acts of Patent Infringement in
`Pittsburgh ...................................................................................................................................... 5
`
`a. DoorDash Has a Regular and Established Place of Business in This District .................. 6
`
`2.
`
`In the Alternative, the Court Should Permit Venue Discovery or Transfer the Case to
`Delaware .................................................................................................................................... 12
`
`B. DoorDash Fails to Meet Its Burden to Prove the Claims Are Invalid ..................................... 12
`
`1. Alice Step One: DoorDash Misconstrues the Claims and Fails to Show That They Are
`Directed to an Abstract Idea .................................................................................................... 14
`
`a. DoorDash Improperly Generalizes the Claims ................................................................. 16
`
`b. A Proper Alice Step One Analysis Confirms The '130 Patent Claims Are Directed to the
`Improved Web Server Computers and Are Patent-Eligible ..................................................... 19
`
`c. The Claims Are Not Purely Functional and the "How" is in the Claims as Confirmed by
`POSITA Dr. Goodrich ................................................................................................................. 24
`
`2. Alice Step Two: DoorDash Fails to Prove a Lack of an Inventive Concept—Which POSITA
`Dr. Goodrich Confirmed Exists............................................................................................... 25
`
`C. DoorDash's Continued Infringement Of The '130 Claims Has Been Willful ........................ 29
`
`VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 30
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 28 Filed 07/20/23 Page 3 of 38
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ................. 5, 22
`
`ACS Hosp. Systems, Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ................................. 22
`
`AlexSam, Inc. v. Cigna Corp., Case No. 2:20-cv-00081-JRG-RSP, 2020 WL 7233403 (E.D. Tex. Oct.
`26, 2020) ................................................................................................................................................ 19
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) .................................................... passim
`
`Arch v. American Tobacco Co., 984 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1997) ........................................................ 9
`
`Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ..................................... 28
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...................................................................................................... 4
`
`BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
` .......................................................................................................................................................... 17, 26
`
`Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) .............................................................................. 4
`
`Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................................................. 5, 16, 25
`
`BillJCo, LLC v. Cisco Sys. Inc., No. 21-CV-00181-JRG, 2021 WL 6618529 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 30,
`2021) ...................................................................................................................................................... 30
`
`Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, 998 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ... 17
`
`BlackBerry Ltd. v. Nokia Corp., No. 17-CV-155-RGA, 2018 WL 1401330 (D. Del. Mar. 20, 2018)
` ................................................................................................................................................................ 30
`
`Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 1998) ............................................................ 10
`
`Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 927 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ........................................................... 5
`
`ClubCom, Inc. v. Captive Media, Inc., No. 02:07cv1462, 2008 WL 2036907 (W.D. Pa. May 9, 2008)
` ................................................................................................................................................................ 11
`
`Communication Interface Techs., LLC v. Albertson's LLC, Civ. No. 4:20-CV-550-SDJ, 2021 WL
`4453580 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2021) ................................................................................................... 17
`
`Cooperative Ent., Inc. v. Kollective Tech., Inc., 50 F.4th 127 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ............................ 22, 23
`
`Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018)....................... 13
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 28 Filed 07/20/23 Page 4 of 38
`
`
`
`
`Cosmokey Sols. GMBH & Co. KG v. Duo Sec. LLC, 15 F.4th 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ....................... 21
`
`Data Engine Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, 906 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ........................................... 15
`
`Directory Dividends, Inc. v. SBC Communications, Inc., No. Civ.A. 01-CV-1974, 2003 WL
`21961448 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 2003) .......................................................................................................... 9
`
`Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001) ................................................................................. 9
`
`Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .................................................. passim
`
`Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) .................................................................................................... 4
`
`Fellner v. Philadelphia Toboggan Coasters, Inc., 2005 WL 2660351 (E.D. Pa. Oct.18, 2005) ....... 11
`
`Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., 579 U.S. 93 (2016) ............................................................................ 30
`
`Health Discovery Corp. v. Intel Corp., 577 F. Supp. 3d 570 (W.D. Tex. 2021)................................. 13
`
`Heft v. AAI Corp., 355 F.Supp.2d 757 (M.D. Pa. 2005)........................................................................ 11
`
`Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 3353 (1960) .................................................................................................. 1
`
`Hooper v. Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc., 2:16-cv-123, 2016 WL 7212586 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2016) ... 9, 10
`
`In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................................................................ 4, 6, 12
`
`In re EMC Corp., 501 Fed. Appx. 973 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .......................................................................... 1
`
`In re Enter. Litig., 735 F. Supp. 2d 277 (W.D. Pa. 2010) ........................................................................ 9
`
`In re Latex Gloves Prod. Liab. Litig., 2001 WL 964105 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2001) ........................... 10
`
`In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172 (C.C.P.A. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936
`(C.C.P.A. 1967) .................................................................................................................................... 27
`
`In re Nintendo Co., 544 F. Appx. 9341 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ......................................................................... 2
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., No. 6:16-CV-196-JRG, 2016 WL 4591794, (E.D.
`Tex. Aug. 24, 2016) .............................................................................................................................. 19
`
`International Business Machines Corp. v. Expedia, Inc., Civil Action No. 17-1875-LPS-CJB, 2019
`WL 1571680 (D. Del. Apr. 11, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 4635137
`(D. Del. Sept. 24, 2019) .......................................................................................................................... 7
`
`Javelin Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs. Ltd., No. CV 16-224-LPS, 2017 WL 5953296 (D. Del. Dec. 1,
`2017) ...................................................................................................................................................... 12
`
`Kinetic Instruments, Inc. v. Lares, 802 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ................................................... 9
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 28 Filed 07/20/23 Page 5 of 38
`
`
`
`
`Lockhart v. Garzella, No. 3:19-cv-00405, 2020 WL 6146598 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 20, 2020) ................... 8
`
`Luminati Networks Ltd. v. Code200, UAB, No. 2:19-CV-00396-JRG, 2021 WL 467591 (E.D. Tex.
`Fed. 9, 2021) ......................................................................................................................................... 19
`
`Mallinckrodt IP v. B. Braun Medical Inc., C.A. No. 17-365-LPS, 2017 WL 6383610 (D. Del. Dec.
`14, 2017) ................................................................................................................................................ 12
`
`Maxell, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., No. 5:19-CV-00036-RWS, 2020 WL 8269548 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2020)
` ................................................................................................................................................................ 26
`
`McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ................... 14, 24, 27
`
`Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc., 851 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ....................................... 30
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 564 U.S. 91 (2011) .......................................................................... 16
`
`Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93 (3d Cir. 2004) ................................................................. 8
`
`Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Eco Chem, Inc., 757 F.2d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ....................... 9
`
`Mirror Imaging, LLC v. PNC Bank, No. W-21-CV-00518-ADA, 2022 WL 229363 (W.D. Tex. Jan.
`26, 2022) ................................................................................................................................................ 13
`
`Natera, Inc. v. ArcherDX, Inc., C.A. No. 20-125-LPS, 2020 WL 6043929 (D. Del. Oct. 13, 2020),
`aff'd sub nom. Ameranth, Inc. v. Olo Inc., 2021-1211, 2021 WL 4699180 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 8, 2021)
`(mem.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2814 (2022) .............................................................................. passim
`
`Neonode Smartphone LLC v. Samsung Elecs Co., 6:20-CV-00507-ADA (W.D. Tex. June 27, 2023)
` ................................................................................................................................................................ 30
`
`Personalized Media Solutions, LLC v. Netflix Inc., 1:20-cv-3708-GHW, 2020 WL 4345781
`(S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2020) ..................................................................................................................... 15
`
`Rates Technology, Inc. v. Mediatrix Telecom, Inc., 688 F.3d 742 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ........................... 15
`
`Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014) ..................................................................................... 20
`
`Serras v. First Tenn. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 875 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1989) ................................................... 8
`
`Slyce Acquisition v. Syte - Visual Conception, No. W-19-CV-00257-ADA, 2020 WL 278481 (W.D.
`Tex. Jan. 10, 2020) ............................................................................................................................... 13
`
`SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ................................................... 18
`
`Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ............................................. 19
`
`TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) .................................. 4
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 28 Filed 07/20/23 Page 6 of 38
`
`
`
`
`TecSec, Inc. v. Adobe Inc., 978 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ........................................................... 17, 24
`
`Thales Visionix, Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................................... 14
`
`Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc. v IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ................................................ 15
`
`U.S. v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1298 (2d Cir. 1991) ............................................................................. 6
`
`Uniloc USA, Inc. v. ADP, LLC, 772 Fed. Appx. 890 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ................................................ 24
`
`Weisner v. Google LLC, 51 F.4th 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ...................................................................... 15
`
`Welsh v. Gibbs, 631 F.2d 436 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981, 101 S.Ct. 1517, 67 L.Ed.2d
`816 (1981) ................................................................................................................................................ 8
`
`Statutes
`
`15 U.S.C. § 78ff ........................................................................................................................................... 6
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1400 ..................................................................................................................................... 3, 5
`
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ............................................................................................................................. 2, 4, 5, 14
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ......................................................................................................................................... 27
`
`35 U.S.C. § 282 ................................................................................................................................... 13, 22
`
`Rules
`
`Fed. Cir. R. 36 ........................................................................................................................................... 15
`
`FED. R. CIV. P. 12 ............................................................................................................................... passim
`
`v
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 28 Filed 07/20/23 Page 7 of 38
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Venue is proper in the WDPA. DoorDash has a physical location in this District—
`
`DashMart—where infringement occurs and where its employees work on and use the infringing
`
`platform. (Dkt. 14 ("FAC") at ¶¶ 2, 5-11). Seeking to avoid venue via its new litigation-inspired
`
`declaration, DoorDash now tries to disavow its official statements to the SEC that its DashMart
`
`locations are owned and operated by DoorDash, Inc. and to remove itself from all of its own public
`
`documents and statements clearly showing it controls DashMart. Indeed, postings for DashMart
`
`jobs "at DoorDash, Inc." have within only the last few weeks been altered to be at "DoorDash
`
`Essentials, LLC." Further, DoorDash has an engineering team in this District that works on and
`
`uses the infringing platform, and DoorDash cancelled its physical Pittsburgh Engineering Office
`
`on January 20, 2023, immediately after Ameranth filed its complaint (id. at ¶ 8). Such transparent
`
`litigation induced and deceptive venue avoidance maneuvers should compel denial of DoorDash's
`
`attempt to deprive this Court of venue, which is to be examined at the time Ameranth filed its
`
`complaint and all facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to Ameranth. In re EMC Corp.,
`
`501 Fed. Appx. 973, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ("[T]he relevant inquiry is the state of affairs at the time
`
`'when suit was instituted.'" (quoting Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343 (1960)).
`
`Further showing its "talk out of both sides of its mouth" approach, DoorDash has obtained
`
`dozens of patents to protect its own strategic intellectual property in the same technology field and
`
`sought to protect the same technology as Ameranth's U.S. Patent No. 11,276,130 (the "'130
`
`patent"). But DoorDash apparently values patents only for itself and is otherwise content to deny
`
`those same rights to much smaller companies like Ameranth. For example, since the 2005 filing
`
`of the continuation-in-part application that became '130 patent, DoorDash has aggressively
`
`pursued at least twelve of its own patents (2018-2021) and maintained to the Patent Office that
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 28 Filed 07/20/23 Page 8 of 38
`
`
`
`
`such innovations were patent-eligible under § 101. Yet, it takes the opposite position before this
`
`Court by denigrating the same Ameranth innovations in the exact same field of technology that it
`
`has copied in its patents and had stated were patent-eligible because they improved computers.
`
`(FAC at ¶¶ 78-82.)
`
`DoorDash's contention that the '130 patent claims are directed to the same system as in the
`
`earlier Ameranth patents fails and is a sufficient basis to the deny its Motion. It is indisputable
`
`that the claims of the '130 patent are directed to an intelligent web server computer with multi-
`
`modes of contact, multi-communications protocols, multi-user and parallel operational
`
`capabilities, which is confirmed by the intrinsic record and the claim constructions. Further,
`
`DoorDash's application of the case law deceptively omits the law that controls motions to dismiss
`
`and the concomitant and inviolable presumption of validity/eligibility for the '130 patent claims,
`
`which may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. DoorDash also ignores the
`
`applicable legal burden, which is not for Ameranth to prove validity, but for DoorDash to prove
`
`invalidity. It failed to adhere to these tenets and its Motion should be denied.
`
`II.
`
`SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
`
`DoorDash moves to dismiss Ameranth's FAC for allegedly improper venue under Fed. R.
`
`Civ. P. 12(b)(3), or alternatively, to transfer, and failure to state a claim. Because DoorDash has
`
`argued venue is improper, this Court must first determine whether it has jurisdiction over this
`
`matter prior to addressing the substantive merits of DoorDash's patent-eligibility and willfulness
`
`arguments.1 Ameranth has pled facts showing that DoorDash has at least one established brick-
`
`and-mortar place of business—DashMart—in this District which DoorDash owns and controls and
`
`
`1 "[A] trial court must first address whether it is a proper and convenient venue before addressing
`any substantive portion of the case." In re Nintendo Co., 544 F. Appx. 934, 941 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 28 Filed 07/20/23 Page 9 of 38
`
`
`
`
`where infringement occurs, or, in the alternative, as explained herein, DoorDash Essentials, LLC
`
`is an alter-ego of DoorDash. Thus, venue is proper under the "second prong" of § 1400(b), and
`
`the Court should deny DoorDash's Motion. In the alternative, to the extent the Court concludes
`
`that venue may not be proper, Ameranth should be permitted to conduct venue discovery, and to
`
`the extent the Court concludes venue is not proper, the case should be transferred to Delaware.
`
`The record must be viewed in the light most favorable to Ameranth. Yet, DoorDash ignored
`
`this and failed to address the improvements in the '130 patent's claimed web server computer, and
`
`it failed to accept the compelling factual content recited in Ameranth's FAC, which incorporates
`
`expert and inventor declarations, and the prosecution history. The record contains sufficient factual
`
`allegations to defeat DoorDash's Motion under Alice. Instead of performing a proper Alice
`
`assessment, DoorDash incorrectly argues ad nauseam that this Court should simply copy and apply
`
`a prior district court's analysis from the Olo case as to another patent, even though the '130 patent
`
`claims, the facts, prosecution history, claim constructions, and the allegations in the FAC are vastly
`
`different and which must be reviewed by this court de novo.
`
`Although DoorDash would like the Court to believe otherwise, willful infringement
`
`allegations can be based on post-filing conduct. Ameranth's post-suit willfulness claim should
`
`stand and DoorDash's Motion should be denied
`
`III. LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`A.
`
`Venue
`
`In patent cases, venue is proper (1) "in the judicial district where the defendant resides" or
`
`(2) "where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established
`
`place of business." 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). A defendant domestic corporation "resides" in the state
`
`in which it is incorporated. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct.
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 28 Filed 07/20/23 Page 10 of 38
`
`
`
`
`1514, 1520 (2017). If an action is brought in a district other than the one in which the defendant
`
`"resides," the plaintiff must establish that the defendant has a "regular and established" place of
`
`business in the district. In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Although "no
`
`precise rule has been laid down and each case depends on its own facts," the Federal Circuit has
`
`set forth a three-part test for evaluating whether a defendant has a "regular and established place
`
`of business" in the district: "(1) there must be a physical place in the district; (2) it must be a regular
`
`and established place of business; and (3) it must be the place of the defendant." Id. at 1362.
`
`B.
`
`Rule 12(b)(6) Motion
`
`In deciding Rule 12(b)(6) motions, courts look at the allegations of the complaint to
`
`determine if "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face" are alleged, Bell
`
`Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and a claim is facially plausible "when the
`
`plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
`
`defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A
`
`court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences
`
`in favor of the plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). DoorDash ignored this.
`
`C.
`
`Patentability Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the Presumption of Validity
`
`35 U.S.C. § 101 provides that a patent may be obtained for "any new and useful process,
`
`machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof’.
`
`Current Supreme Court precedent instructs a court to "first determine whether the claims at issue
`
`are directed to a patent ineligible concept." Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct.
`
`2347, 2355 (2014). Only if the threshold determination is met at the first step does the court move
`
`to the second step of the inquiry and "consider the elements of each claim both individually and
`
`'as an ordered combination' to determine whether the additional elements 'transform the nature of
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 28 Filed 07/20/23 Page 11 of 38
`
`
`
`
`the claim' into a patent-eligible application." Id. at 2355. "[W]hether a claim element or
`
`combination of elements is well-understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in the
`
`relevant field is a question of fact. Any fact, such as this one, that is pertinent to the invalidity
`
`conclusion must be proven by clear and convincing evidence." Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d
`
`1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882
`
`F.3d 1121, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ("Whether the claim elements or the claimed combination are
`
`well-understood, routine, conventional is a question of fact.").
`
`A patent is presumed valid and patent-eligible, and a party challenging patent-eligibility of a
`
`patented claim has the burden to overcome that presumption. Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., 927
`
`F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (ruling the district court was wrong to conclude "that issued patents
`
`are presumed valid but not presumed patent eligible . . . ."). As explained in the FAC at ¶¶ 23-24, all
`
`12 Federal Circuit Judges and the U.S. Solicitor General on three occasions have acknowledged that
`
`§ 101 law is confusing and needs clarification from either the U.S. Supreme Court or Congress. § 101
`
`law remains a very controversial area of patent law.
`
`IV. ARGUMENT
`
`A.
`
`Venue Is Proper in This District
`
`Venue is proper under § 1400(b) because DoorDash has "committed acts of infringement"
`
`in this District "and it has a regular and established place of business" in Pittsburgh.2
`
`1.
`
`DoorDash Has Committed and Continues to Commit Acts of Patent
`Infringement in Pittsburgh
`
`DoorDash's brief does not substantively dispute that it has committed acts of patent
`
`infringement in Pittsburgh, and only relegates to a footnote a general denial of infringement. (Dkt.
`
`
`2 DoorDash is incorporated in Delaware (Dkt. 23-1 ("Merrigan Decl.") at ¶ 3), so DoorDash does
`not "reside in" Pennsylvania under TC Heartland.
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 28 Filed 07/20/23 Page 12 of 38
`
`
`
`
`23 at 1 n.1.)
`
`a.
`
`DoorDash Has a Regular and Established Place of Business in
`This District
`
`Seeking to avoid venue here, DoorDash contends, based solely on the Merrigan
`
`Declaration created for this litigation, that it does not have a regular and established place of
`
`business in this District. (Merrigan Decl. at ¶¶ 5-6.) However despite its illusory and newly
`
`contrived assertions of separateness, DoorDash's own public statements consistently made before
`
`and after Ameranth filed its complaint and FAC, web site, SEC Filings, and documents contradict
`
`the declaration and confirm that DoorDash has a regular place of business in this District that
`
`satisfies the requirements of Cray. And, the sign on the Pittsburgh DashMart shows that it is
`
`"DashMart by DOORDASH", i.e., owned/operated by DoorDash, and includes DoorDash's
`
`trademark. Ex. A.3,4
`
`DoorDash's Form 10-K for Fiscal Year 2022, which was signed February 24, 2023, states
`
`that "[w]e face certain risks in connection with the operation of DashMart and Wolt Market, our
`
`first-party owned and self-operated convenience and grocery delivery businesses." Ex. B at pp.
`
`28, 125 (emphasis added). An SEC disclosure must be made truthfully. U.S. v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d
`
`1285, 1298 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[C]riminal penalties are available against one who knowingly makes
`
`a false and misleading statement of material fact on a document required to be filed by the
`
`securities laws." (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78ff )). DoorDash was manifestly motivated to truthfully
`
`disclose the nature of its control over DashMart, and to have performed an investigation to confirm
`
`the truth of the statements made in its Form 10-K. Those statements therefore must compel the
`
`conclusion that DoorDash operates DashMart without regard to maintenance of any corporate or
`
`
`3 Exhibits cited in this brief are attached to the co-filed Declaration of Richard C. Weinblatt.
`4 Exhibit A is a digital printout of the same article and link cited in the FAC at ¶ 6.
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 28 Filed 07/20/23 Page 13 of 38
`
`
`
`
`organizational separation sufficient to defeat venue over DoorDash in the WDPA where a
`
`DashMart facility is located and operated by DoorDash. The 10-K states that "[u]nless the context
`
`requires otherwise, we are referring to DoorDash, Inc. together with its subsidiaries when we use
`
`the terms 'DoorDash,' the 'Company,' 'we,' 'our,' or 'us.'" Id. at 5. The passage quoted at the
`
`beginning of this paragraph includes both "we" and "our." However, the context of the passages
`
`clearly indicates that DoorDash is the "first-party" which owns and "self-operates" the DashMarts.
`
`By use of "first-party" in reference to "owning" DashMarts, the language requires that DoorDash
`
`is the owner of DashMarts (via DoorDash Essentials LLC), and not vice versa, due to the fact that
`
`public records show that DoorDash, Inc. is in fact the owner.5 Since DoorDash is therefore the
`
`owner of DashMarts, the passage above also requires that DoorDash is the operator of DashMarts.
`
`No other construction of the passage is coherent. "First-party" must apply to both "own" and
`
`"operate," because that is what the passage explicitly says. DoorDash, Inc. owns and operates
`
`DashMarts per admission in the DoorDash 10-K. Any attempt by DoorDash to argue that its
`
`statements in the 10-K should be ignored fail under the logic of the court in Expedia:
`
`[T]he Form 10-K itself notes that Expedia Group is one of the entities that is meant
`to be included when the document uses "we" and "or." …. If Expedia Group
`includes itself among a group of entities that it says operates or controls certain
`websites or mobile applications, then that amounts to some evidence that Expedia
`Group in fact operates or controls those platforms.
`
`International Business Machines Corp. v. Expedia, Inc., Civil Action No. 17-1875-LPS-CJB, 2019
`
`WL 1571680, at *4 (D. Del. Apr. 11, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL
`
`4635137 (D. Del. Sept. 24, 2019). Further, DoorDash cannot create a litigation induced declaration
`
`stating one thing after filing an SEC statement stating the other without having the inconsistency
`
`
`5 DoorDash Essentials LLC cannot be the "first-party" under any rational reading of the passage
`due, inter alia, to the fact that it is not mentioned at all in the entirety of the 10-K. Terminology
`such as "first-party," "second party" etc. refers to parties mentioned in the document which uses
`such terminology.
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01776-WSH Document 28 Filed 07/20/23 Page 14 of 38
`
`
`
`
`construed against it. See Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[W]hen
`
`the court does not hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff need only
`
`establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction and the plaintiff is entitled to have its
`
`allegations taken as true and all factual disputes drawn in its favor."); see also Lockhart v. Garzella,
`
`No. 3:19-cv-00405, 2020 WL 6146598, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 20, 2020) ("If the court determines
`
`that the [Rule 12(b)(3)] motion can be decided without a hearing, it 'must consider