UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`_______________________________________________
`
`CRUSOE ENERGY SYSTEMS, LLC
`
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`UPSTREAM DATA INC.
`
`Patent Owner
`
`Case PGR2023-00052
`
`Patent No. 11,574,372
`
`_________________________
`
`PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
`FOR POST GRANT REVIEW
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`b.
`
`I.
`II.
`
`Page
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`’372 PATENT .................................................................................................. 2
`A. Overview of ’372 Patent ....................................................................... 2
`B.
`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art ......................................................... 5
`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ............................................................................ 5
`IV. BOARD SHOULD NOT INSTITUTE ON ANY GROUNDS
`UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), 112(b) OR 112(f) .............................................. 5
`A. Ground 1 (indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b)) ............................ 5
`1.
`Petitioner Does Not Apply Correct Legal Framework ............... 5
`2.
`“Blockchain Mining Devices” .................................................... 9
`a.
`“Blockchain Mining Devices” is Not Indefinite
`Because Intrinsic Evidence Provides Reasonable
`Certainty ......................................................................... 10
`Petitioner’s “Alternative” Constructions Ignore
`Claim Language and Rely on Extrinsic Evidence .......... 12
`Petitioner’s “First Construction” Violates Nautilus ....... 15
`c.
`Petitioner’s “Second Construction” is Incorrect. ........... 21
`d.
`Claims and Specification are Consistent ........................ 25
`e.
`“Mining Processor” ................................................................... 27
`3.
`“Adapted to Mine Transactions” .............................................. 33
`4.
`B. Ground 2 (written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)) .................. 38
`1.
`“Blockchain Mining Devices” .................................................. 38
`C. Ground 3 (indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C § 112(f)) ............................ 42
`1.
`“Controller” Denotes a Known Class of Structures ................. 42
`2.
`“Controller” is Not a Nonce Word............................................ 51
`3.
`Petitioner Improperly Sweeps In Claims Without
`“Controller” ............................................................................... 54
`Specification Discloses Sufficient Structure for
`“Controller” Claims .................................................................. 57
`i
`
`4.
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`Claim 13 .......................................................................... 57
`a.
`Claim 14 .......................................................................... 59
`b.
`Claim 15 .......................................................................... 60
`c.
`Claim 16 .......................................................................... 61
`d.
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) CONSIDERATIONS ..................................................... 62
`V.
`VI. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 64
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Amazon.com, Inc. v. AC Technologies S.A.,
`IPR2015-01803, Paper 10 (PTAB March 8, 2016) ............................................ 51
`Animal Care Sys., Inc. v. Hydropac/Lab Prod., Inc.,
`No. 13-CV-00143-MSK-BNB, 2015 WL 535566 (D. Colo. 2015) ................... 36
`Apex v. Raritan Computer, Inc.,
`325 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .................................................................... 43, 49
`Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Marchon Eyewear, Inc.,
`672 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .......................................................................... 35
`Barkan Wireless IP Holdings, L.P. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`No. 2:18-CV-28-JRG, 2019 WL 49790 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2019) ..................... 53
`In re Cohn,
`438 F.2d 989 (CCPA 1971) .......................................................................... 25, 26
`Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp.,
`812 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .......................................................................... 17
`Dionex Softron GmbH v.Agilent Techs., Inc.,
`811 F. App’x 630 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ............................................................... 55, 56
`Goss Int'l Ams., Inc. v. Graphic Mgmt.,
`739 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (N.D. Ill. 2010) ................................................................ 52
`Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL Inc.,
`766 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................................................................ 8
`Intex Recreation Corp. v. Team Worldwide Corp.,
`PGR2019-00015, Paper 41 (PTAB. Apr. 29, 2020) ........................................... 50
`Liebel–Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ............................................................................ 55
`Markem–Imaje v. Zipher Ltd.,
`2011 WL 5837087 (D.N.H. Nov. 21, 2011) ....................................................... 52
`iii
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`Maxell Ltd. v. Huawei Device USA Inc.,
`297 F. Supp. 3d 668 (E.D. Tex. 2018) ................................................................ 53
`Ex Parte Miyazaki,
`89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1207 (BPIA 2008), 2008 WL 5105055 .................................... 6, 7
`MTD Products Inc. v. Iancu,
`933 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ...................................................................passim
`Nature Simulation Systems Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc.,
`50 F.4th 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ............................................................................. 9
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`572 U.S. 898 (2014) .....................................................................................passim
`Nevro Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corporation,
`955 F.3d 35 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ........................................................................ 7, 8, 9
`Personalized Media Commc'ns, LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`952 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2020) .......................................................................... 14
`Ruckus Wireless, Inc. v. Innovative Wireless Solutions, LLC,
`824 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ...................................................................... 14, 29
`S3 Inc. v. NVIDIA Corp.,
`259 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001) .................................................................... 59, 60
`Sound View Innovations, LLC v. Facebook, Inc.,
`No. 16-cv-116 (RGA), 2017 WL 2221177 (D. Del. May 19, 2017) .................. 53
`Subotincic et al. v. Ontario Inc.,
`2012 WL 3112005 (C.D. Cal., June 14, 2012) ............................................. 51, 52
`Sysmex Corp. v. Beckman Coulter, Inc.,
`Civil Action No. 19-1642-RGA-CJB, 2021 WL 125970 (D. Del.,
`Apr. 6, 2021) ................................................................................................. 52, 53
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entertainment America LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .......................................................................... 55
`Va. Innovation Scis., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`Civil Action No. 4:18-cv-474, 2019 WL 4259020 (E.D. Tex. Sept.
`9, 2019) ............................................................................................................... 53
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`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 ................................................................................... 42, 50, 58, 61
`Zeroclick, LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`891 F.3d 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .......................................................................... 42
`Statutes
`5 U.S.C. § 282(b) ....................................................................................................... 6
`35 U.S.C. § 112 .................................................................................................passim
`35 U.S.C. § 314(A) .................................................................................................. 62
`Other Authorities
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) ............................................................................................ 6, 7
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) .......................................................................... 1, 53, 54, 63
`37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b) ................................................................................................ 6
`IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical and Electronics Terms ........................ 47, 52
`Wiley Electrical and Electronics Engineering Dictionary ....................................... 44
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`PATENT OWNER EXHIBIT LIST
`
`Exhibit No.
`2001
`
`2101
`2102
`
`2103
`
`Description
`Declaration of Mr. Yakov Zolotorev in Support of Motion for Pro
`Hac Vice Admission
`Declaration of Dr. Fengqi You
`Declaration of Vernon Kasdorf (Exhibit 1004 in PGR2023-
`00039)
`Declaration of Dr. Fengqi You (Exhibit 2001 in PGR2023-
`00039)
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`This is Petitioner’s second-string attack on the ’372 patent. No doubt
`
`realizing the weakness of its prior art and § 101 challenge (co-pending PGR2023-
`
`00039), Petitioner now burdens the Board with a spaghetti bowl of § 112
`
`allegations, none of which have merit. The first ground comprises indefiniteness
`
`arguments based on claim interpretations that Petitioner itself repeatedly admits are
`
`incorrect. To conjure these constructions Petitioner first expressly ignores the
`
`intrinsic evidence and then demonstrates that, when the specification is considered,
`
`its constructions are wrong. These contortions are necessary so that Petitioner can
`
`create confusion in support of its legally unsound “alternative constructions”
`
`theory. The written description challenge in the second ground simply ignores
`
`portions of the specification that disprove Petitioner’s arguments. Petitioner’s
`
`overreach continues in the third ground. Petitioner argues that the term “controller”
`
`is functional even though it is universally recognized as a known class of structures
`
`and not a nonce word. In fact, Petitioner was required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)
`
`to identify this term as functional in its first petition but did not, underscoring the
`
`baselessness of the third ground. Moreover, Petitioner advances yet another
`
`unsupported legal theory to stretch its 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 arguments from the four
`
`dependent claims that recite “controller” to eleven claims that do not include this
`
`limitation.
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`II.
`
`’372 PATENT
`A.
`Overview of ’372 Patent
`The ’372 patent claims priority to provisional application 62/456,380, filed
`
`on February 8, 2017. EX1001. The patent “relates to blockchain mining at an oil or
`
`gas facility.” Id., 1:6-7. The ’372 patent explains that “[i]n upstream production of
`
`oil and gas, natural gas may be produced … as a by-product of oil production, for
`
`example from an oil well.” Id., 6:51-54. This form of natural gas is referred to as
`
`undesirable casinghead gas, casing gas or simply raw gas. Id., 4:62-63, 8:66-9:3.
`
`The prior art knew some ways to utilize casinghead gas. For example, it was
`
`known to consume it as “on-site fuel for equipment or for instrumentation
`
`pressure.” EX1001, 6:56-58. If there was a significant gas volume beyond what
`
`could be consumed onsite, gas could be sold to market through a connection to a
`
`pipeline network or liquified for transportation. Id., 6:59-64. If a grid connection
`
`was available, casinghead gas could be used to generate electricity for sale to the
`
`power grid. Id., 6:63-67.
`
`However, gas “may be located at a remote oil and gas site” that lacks
`
`“accessible infrastructure such as an external pipeline network (sales line) or
`
`external power grid to sell into” and may be “hundreds of kilometers outside of the
`
`nearest town.” Id., 7:46-49, 8:20-23. In such cases “it may not be economically
`
`feasible” to take the gas or electricity to market, “for example due to significant
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`capital expense required or when the volume of gas is insufficient to pay out the
`
`investment.” Id., 7:49-54, 8:11-23. As is known in the art, the gas is “stranded.”
`
`Id., 7:54-56; EX21021, ¶31.
`
`In such cases, a common solution is to vent or flare (burn) the stranded gas.
`
`EX1001, 1:11-13, 7:61-8:10. However, this solution creates greenhouse gas
`
`emissions, wastes the potential energy of the gas, requires capital expenditure, and
`
`may pose health risks. Id.
`
`The novel solution taught by the ’372 patent used stranded gas to power
`
`portable blockchain mining devices instead of flaring the gas. Id., 2:18-24.
`
`“A blockchain is a form of database, which may be saved as a distributed
`
`ledger in a network of nodes that maintains a continuously-growing list of records
`
`called blocks.” Id., 11:45-47. “The administration of BITCOIN currency is
`
`currently the primary use for blockchain technology.” Id., 11:57-60. “Maintaining a
`
`blockchain database is referred to as mining, which refers to the distributed
`
`computational review process performed on each block of data in a block-chain.”
`
`Id., 13:5-7. “Those involved in BITCOIN mining are rewarded for their effort with
`
`newly created BITCOINs and transaction fees.” Id., 13:9-13.
`
`1 Exhibits 2102 and 2103 cited herein are also cited in PGR2023-00039 as Exhibits
`
`2001 and 1004, respectively.
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`Blockchain mining (also referred to as crypto mining) differs from many
`
`other types of computing as it is “intentionally designed to be resource-intensive
`
`and difficult so that the number of blocks found each day by miners remains
`
`steady.” Id., 13:29-33, 13:44-48. This intentionally energy-intensive problem
`
`comprises “a cryptographic hashing algorithm.” Id., 13:49-52. Since the energy
`
`cost of crypto mining is the primary operating cost, the prior art mines were
`
`located primarily in places with low-cost hydroelectric power such as China or the
`
`Pacific Northwest in the United States. Id., 14:4-20; EX1009, 105; EX2102, ¶36.
`
`Decentralizing blockchain mining away from hydroelectric power to make
`
`use of stranded gas at remote oil and gas production facilities required innovative
`
`solutions disclosed in the ’372 patent. For example, unlike existing crypto mines
`
`which could depend on reliable power sources (e.g., a hydroelectric power plant),
`
`the ’372 patent’s bitcoin mine had to solve the problem of variable casehead gas
`
`production. EX2102, ¶37. The ’372 patent discloses solving this problem by, for
`
`example, the mining controller modulating the mining power load (also referred to
`
`as the hashrate) in real time to respond “to variations in a supply or production rate
`
`of natural gas.” EX1001, 17:61-18:15; EX2102, ¶37. In addition, crypto mining
`
`power levels may be adjusted to a daily minimum or maximum gas production rate
`
`as different strategies to mitigate the variable production. EX1001, 18:34-19:13;
`
`EX2102, ¶37.
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`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`B.
`This Petition and related declaration propose two alternative levels of
`
`ordinary skill in the art, where the second alternative does not require any formal
`
`education or any experience in the field of oil or gas production. While Patent
`
`Owner disagrees with the Petition’s treatment of the level of ordinary skill in the
`
`art, the Patent Owner and Dr. You applied Petitioner’s articulation and confirmed
`
`the analysis detailed below would not change based on disagreements over the
`
`level of ordinary skill in the art. EX2101, ¶¶16-17.
`
`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`Various issues relating to the meaning of certain claim terms challenged by
`
`Petitioner as indefinite or subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 are addressed below. In
`
`addition, Patent Owner addressed claim construction of terms proposed for
`
`construction by Petitioner in co-pending PGR2023-00039. PGR2023-00039, Paper
`
`6 at 4-9.
`
`IV. BOARD SHOULD NOT INSTITUTE ON ANY GROUNDS UNDER 35
`U.S.C. § 112(A), 112(B) OR 112(F)
`A.
`Ground 1 (indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b))
`1.
`Petitioner Does Not Apply Correct Legal Framework
`While paying lip service to the legal standard articulated by the Supreme
`
`Court in Nautilus, Petitioner’s actual analysis is premised on an incorrect and
`
`outdated pre-Nautilus framework. Petition, 10-12. Section 112 requires “that a
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`patent’s claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform
`
`those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.”
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 910 (2014). However,
`
`Petitioner erroneously relies on a pre-Nautilus decision in Ex Parte Miyazaki, 89
`
`U.S.P.Q.2d 1207 (BPIA 2008), 2008 WL 5105055 at *5, which held that during
`
`patent prosecution indefiniteness rejections were proper “if a claim is amenable to
`
`two or more plausible claim constructions.” See Petition at 10 (citing Miyazaki), 12
`
`(arguing indefiniteness because “multiple different interpretations of the term
`
`‘blockchain mining devices’ are possible”).
`
`The Miyazaki court explained that it was adopting a lower standard for
`
`indefiniteness rejections: “we adopt this lower threshold standard of ambiguity for
`
`indefiniteness for claims during prosecution in keeping with the USPTO’s broadest
`
`reasonable interpretation standard for claim construction.” 2008 WL 5105055 at
`
`*6. However, since 2018 (ten years after Miyazaki) the Patent Office no longer
`
`applies BRI (broadest reasonable interpretation) to claim construction: “In 2018,
`
`the office revised 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100(b) and 42.200(b) to change the claim
`
`construction standard used in post-grant trial proceedings to review a claim of a
`
`patent, or a claim proposed in a motion to amend, from the broadest reasonable
`
`construction standard to the same claim construction standard that would be used
`
`to construe the claim in a civil action under 5 U.S.C. § 282(b)—that is, in a district
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`court.” Approach to Indefiniteness Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 in AIA Post-Grant
`
`Proceedings, USPTO Memorandum, Jan. 6, 2021 at 4 (hereinafter, the “Jan. 6,
`
`2021 Memorandum”).
`
`Accordingly, the BRI rationale underpinning Miyazaki’s lower threshold for
`
`indefiniteness rejections was abrogated by the PTAB’s 2018 shift to the Phillips
`
`claim construction standard in post-issuance proceedings. See 37 C.F.R. §
`
`42.100(b). Moreover, the Jan. 6, 2021 Memorandum changed the PTAB’s prior
`
`“long-standing approach for assessing indefiniteness” to the Nautilus standard:
`
`“the Board shall follow Nautilus in AIA post-grant proceedings.” Id. at 2, 5.
`
`Therefore, Petitioner’s reliance on pre-Nautilus authority like Miyazaki is
`
`misplaced; nor should the Board be guided by PTAB indefiniteness decisions
`
`predating the Jan. 6, 2021 Memorandum.
`
`Petitioner’s theory that “multiple different interpretations” of a claim term
`
`indicate indefiniteness also is contrary to Federal Circuit precedent. See, e.g.,
`
`Petition, 12 (“multiple different interpretations” render a claim term indefinite.)
`
`The Federal Circuit has expressly rejected this approach and reversed a district
`
`court’s conclusion that a term was indefinite if it could be “reasonably construed…
`
`to mean one of two things.” Nevro Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corporation, 955 F.3d
`
`35, 40-41 (Fed. Cir. 2020). The Federal Circuit held that “[t]he test is not merely
`
`whether a claim is susceptible to different interpretations.” Id. at 41 (emphasis
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`added). Rather, the test is what Nautilus stated: “whether the claims, viewed in
`
`light of the specification and prosecution history, ‘inform those skilled in the art
`
`about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.’” Id., citing Nautilus,
`
`572 U.S. at 910.
`
`Petitioner also misinterprets the Federal Circuit’s Interval Licensing
`
`decision. Petition, 10-11. In that case the Federal Circuit analyzed the Supreme
`
`Court’s Nautilus decision and recognized that “[t]he claims, when read in light of
`
`the specification and the prosecution history, must provide objective boundaries for
`
`those of skill in the art.” Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1371
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2014). In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit cited several
`
`portions of Nautilus, including footnote 8, which it characterized in a parenthetical
`
`as “indicating that there is an indefiniteness problem if the claim language ‘might
`
`mean several different things and no informed and confident choice is available
`
`among the contending definitions.’” Id. As indicated in Interval Licensing, the
`
`quote in Nautilus footnote 8 comes from a district court decision. Id. However, the
`
`Supreme Court cited this decision as an example of “lower court confusion” under
`
`the old indefiniteness standard rather than any part of the new standard. Nautilus,
`
`Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 911, fn. 8 (2014). Accordingly,
`
`contrary to Petitioner, Interval Licensing’s mention of Nautilus footnote 8 cannot
`
`be read as a new or additional indefiniteness test. Rather, as the Federal Circuit
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`affirmed in the subsequent Nevro decision discussed above, indefiniteness is
`
`guided by Nautilus and there is no “multiple different interpretations” standard.
`
`955 F.3d at 40-41.
`
`The faulty “alternative constructions” legal theory of indefiniteness is the
`
`only basis of Ground 1. It not only frames Petitioner’s arguments but was likewise
`
`expressly applied by Petitioner’s expert: “I understand that, if a claim term is
`
`amenable to two or more plausible constructions, any claim containing that term is
`
`indefinite.” EX1024, ¶ 18. This renders his opinions unreliable as a matter of law.
`
`See Nature Simulation Systems Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc., 50 F.4th 1358, 1363-64 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2022) (Reversing determination of indefiniteness where District Court applied
`
`an incorrect legal standard based on approach suggested by defendant’s expert.)
`
`The Board should not institute this legally flawed and factually unsupported
`
`ground.
`
`“Blockchain Mining Devices”
`2.
`As set forth below, Petitioner has presented no credible evidence that this
`
`term is indefinite under any legal framework, whether Nautilus or the incorrect
`
`framework advocated by Petitioner.
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`a.
`
`“Blockchain Mining Devices” is Not Indefinite
`Because Intrinsic Evidence Provides Reasonable
`Certainty
`The ’372 patent claims read in light of the specification inform a POSITA
`
`about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty. Nautilus, 572 U.S. at
`
`910. For example, claim 1 recites that blockchain mining devices are connected to
`
`a generator and comprise a mining processor and a network interface connected to
`
`receive and transmit data through the internet to a network that stores or has access
`
`to a blockchain database. EX1001, 19:59-65; EX2101, ¶31. The specification
`
`teaches that “each blockchain mining device 12 may be composed of suitable
`
`components” including “a network interface” and “one or a plurality of mining
`
`processors.” EX1001, 15:21-25. The use of the word “each” informs a POSITA
`
`that there may be more than one blockchain mining device but each comprises
`
`mining processor(s) and a network interface, consistent with the independent
`
`claims. EX2101, ¶31.
`
`The specification further informs a POSITA that a blockchain mining device
`
`illustrated in, e.g., Fig. 4, can comprise a number of additional components, such
`
`as a power meter 72, a step-down transformer 80, “a controller 86, network
`
`equipment 88 such as a modem and a network switch.” EX1001, 16:32-39, see
`
`also 17:23-29; EX2101, ¶32. This is “an example layout” with components that
`
`“may make up a mining device 12.” EX1001, 16:32-33.
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`An exemplary system may also include a “portable enclosure 98 suitable for
`
`transporting blockchain mining device 12 between locations” where “[t]he
`
`blockchain mining device 12 may be located in a portable enclosure 98, for
`
`example an intermodal transport container as shown.” EX1001, 15:41-47; EX2101,
`
`¶33. A containerized version of a blockchain mining device is illustrated in Fig. 6.
`
`Id. An enclosure is not recited in the independent claims but there are dependent
`
`claims, e.g., claim 17, directed to this aspect of the invention. EX1001, claim 17;
`
`EX2101, ¶33.
`
`Petitioner argues that “it is unclear whether the blockchain mining device
`
`includes the mining server (e.g., spondooliestech SP35 servers), the controller, the
`
`cooling system, the intermodal transport container, or a subset thereof.” Petition,
`
`13. Contrary to Petitioner, there is no lack of clarity in the claims or the
`
`specification. The plain claim language of the independent claims informs a
`
`POSITA that a blockchain mining device comprises a mining processor and a
`
`specialized network interface that communicates with a blockchain database.
`
`EX1001, claim 1; EX2101, ¶34. Thus, to the extent Petitioner’s term “mining
`
`server” refers to the recited “mining processor,” the claim language does require
`
`each blockchain mining device to have a mining processor. EX1001, claim 1. To
`
`the extent Petitioner has something else in mind for “mining server,” the claim
`
`language does not require it. In fact, Petitioner’s argument glosses over the
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`inconvenient fact that the term “mining server” appears nowhere in the claims or
`
`specification of the ’372 patent. Therefore, any confusion Petitioner has regarding
`
`that term is of Petitioner’s own making. Dependent claims recite additional
`
`blockchain mining device components such as a controller and a cooling system
`
`(e.g., claim 16), and a container (e.g., claim 20) but these are not required by the
`
`independent claims. Thus, in each instance the claim language is clear as to what
`
`the blockchain mining device includes. EX2101, ¶34.
`
`This conventional claiming structure delineates the scope of the invention
`
`for each claim with reasonable certainty. EX2101, ¶35. Contrary to Petitioner, it is
`
`not at all “unclear” what the blockchain mining device comprises in each claim.
`
`For example, it is clear that the blockchain mining device in independent claim 1 is
`
`not required to have a controller or to be housed in an intermodal transport
`
`container, though the claim would cover that configuration if all the claim
`
`requirements are satisfied. Id. When a dependent claim recites a container then it is
`
`required. Id. Likewise, where a dependent claim recites a controller (e.g., claim
`
`16), a POSITA understands that the metes and bounds of that claim include this
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`limitation while the independent claims are not so limited. Id.
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`b.
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`Petitioner’s “Alternative” Constructions Ignore
`Claim Language and Rely on Extrinsic Evidence
`In view of the clarity provided by the intrinsic record, a POSITA would not
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`consider either of the two supposed “different interpretations” proposed by
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`Petitioner. Petition, 12; EX2101, ¶36. In fact, as further discussed below, Petitioner
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`has manufactured these “interpretations” of its own faulty construction in co-
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`pending PGR2023-00039 to create ambiguity where there is none.
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`First, Petitioner’s “interpretations” are of its own claim construction rather
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`than the claim language informed by the specification. Petition, 11-12. However,
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`that construction (proposed by Petitioner in PGR2023-00039) - “any computing
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`device that is capable of performing blockchain mining without regard to processor
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`speed or power” - is incorrect because it conflates a “blockchain mining device”
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`with a mere processor (“any computing device”) and adds an unsupported
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`limitation “without regard to processor speed or power.” EX2101, ¶37; PGR2023-
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`00039 Paper 6 (POPR) at 4-7. Accordingly, Petitioner’s indefiniteness theory is
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`flawed because its “alternative interpretations” are of its incorrect claim
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`construction rather than the claim language in view of the specification as required
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`by Nautilus.
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`The contrived nature of these two new constructions of Petitioner’s previous
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`construction is evident from the fact that its expert did not mention any ambiguity
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`when opining regarding the meaning of “blockchain mining devices” in PGR2023-
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`00039. EX2103, ¶¶49-50. Nor did he express any concern regarding which
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`meaning of this claim term (or of Petitioner’s construction) was applicable in
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`opining that this limitation was allegedly met in the prior art. See e.g., EX2103,
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`¶¶102-103. Like its expert, Petitioner was also entirely confident in construing this
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`limitation and locating it in the prior art in that petition.
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`Second, Petitioner’s “alternative interpretations” of its own construction are
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`divorced from the intrinsic record discussed above. Petitioner’s first “alternative”
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`is “a plurality of mining servers (e.g., spondooliestech SP35 servers) housed
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`together (e.g., in a portable shipping container).” Petition, 12. Notably, this
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`“interpretation” or “construction” recites extrinsic terminology such as “mining
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`servers” and “spondooliestech SP35 servers.”
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`In fact, Petitioner does not even attempt to justify its “first construction” as
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`based on the intrinsic record. Rather, Petitioner relies on EX1006, a document
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`describing an alleged prior art system called CryptoKube, as its sole source of
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`support for “mining server,” “spondooliestech SP35 servers,” and “mobile data
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`center” (a term Petitioner uses in its “second construction”). Petition, 12-14. This
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`approach flips claim construction on its head because it ignores the intrinsic
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`evidence in favor of a construction based on extrinsic evidence. See Personalized
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`Media Commc'ns, LLC v. Apple Inc., 952 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“When
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`construing claim terms, we first look to, and primarily rely on, the intrinsic
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`evidence, including the claims themselves, the specification, and the prosecution
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`history of the patent, which is usually dispositive.”); Ruckus Wireless, Inc. v.
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`Innovative Wireless Solutions, LLC, 824 F.3d 999, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Legal
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`error arises when a court relies on extrinsic evidence that contradicts the intrinsic
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`record.”).
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`Moreover, the “housed together (e.g., in a portable shipping container)”
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`language appears nowhere in the independent claims but is the subject matter of
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`certain dependent claims such as claim 16. EX2101, ¶40. On the other hand, the
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`“first construction” omits elements of the claimed “blockchain mining devices”
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`that are recited in the independent claims such as a specialized network interface
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`that communicates with a blockchain database. EX1001, 19:59-65; EX2101, ¶41.
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`For these reasons, a POSITA would dismiss this first “interpretation” or
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`“construction” because it:
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` recites terms not used in claims or specification;
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` is overinclusive (reciting elements from dependent claims);
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` is underinclusive (ignoring express claim language in independent
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`claims);
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` is “interpreting” an incorrect claim construction rather than the
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`actual claim language in view of the specification. EX2101, ¶41.
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`Petitioner’s “First Construction” Violates Nautilus
`c.
`Petitioner’s effort to contrive an alternative “first construction” is contrary to
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`Nautilus’s holding that “a patent’s claims [are] viewed in light of the specification
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`and prosecution history.” Nautilus, 572 U.S. at 910. Aside from extrinsic evidence,
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`Petitioner relies on dependent claims 16 and 17 to support the “first construction.”
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`Petition, 14-15. However, Petitioner then shows that this “construction” is contrary
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`to the specification: “both the specification and prosecution history demand the
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`second construction.” Petition, 16. Thus, Petitioner exposes a fundamental flaw in
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`how it arrives at the “first construction” – it takes two dependent claims and
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`deliberately analyzes them in isolation from the specification and prosecution
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`history to fit its flawed “alternative constructions” legal theory. Petition, 14-15.
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`Unsurprisingly, Petitioner misinterprets these claims because it willfully
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`disregards the intrinsic record. Claim 16 recites “a controller is connected to
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`operate a cooling system to maintain the blockchain mining devices within a
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`predetermined operating range of temperature.” EX1001, claim 16. As established
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`above, the specification describes embodim