UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`_________________
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`iAPARTMENTS, INC.,
`Petitioner
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`v.
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`EDST LLC,
`Patent Owner
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`Case PGR2022-00059
`Patent 11,189,118
`_________________
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`PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
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`Case PGR2022-00059
`Attorney Docket No: 54577-0007PS1
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1 
`I. 
`II.  THE ’118 PATENT ........................................................................................... 3 
`III.  CLAIMS 1-20 HAVE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (GROUND 1) .................. 6 
`A.  The Office already decided the written description issue raised in the
`Petition, and Petitioner does not justify a do-over ........................................ 6 
`B.  The ’118 Patent’s specification shows “possession” of the limitations
`Petitioner contests ....................................................................................... 12 
`C.  Petitioner’s contrary arguments do not outweigh clear written description
`support ......................................................................................................... 15 
`IV.  THE CAHILL-DEROS GROUND FAILS (GROUND 2) .............................. 21 
`A.  Petitioner makes no real attempt to show that Cahill or Deros discloses a
`“property management platform” ............................................................... 21 
`1.  Petitioner ignores a fundamental aspect of the claimed “property
`management platform”........................................................................... 22 
`2.  Petitioner’s terse analysis is an improper notice pleading ..................... 26 
`B.  Petitioner fails to establish that the Cahill and Deros combination teaches
`“a Long Range (LoRa) wide area network (LoRaWAN) communication
`link” ............................................................................................................. 28 
`1.  Petitioner’s motivation is inadequate and nonsensical .......................... 29 
`2.  Deros does not teach a smart hub with LoRa, as asserted in Petitioner’s
`combination ............................................................................................ 33 
`C.  Petitioner does not fully address the “smart hub” limitations .................... 37 
`V.  THE KRAUS GROUNDS FAIL (GROUNDS 3-5) ........................................ 40 
`A.  Petitioner’s reliance on Deros for the LoraWAN features works no better
`with Kraus than with Cahill (Ground 3) ..................................................... 40 
`1.  Petitioner’s one-paragraph discussion on motivation fails to persuade 41 
`2.  Deros does not teach a smart hub with LoRa, as asserted in Petitioner’s
`combination ............................................................................................ 42 
`B.  Petitioner’s vague and ambiguous mapping to the claimed “property
`management system” makes institution untenable (Grounds 3-5) ............. 43 
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`C.  Petitioner does not substantiate its assumption that Kraus’s brief disclosure
`on generating signals satisfies multiple claim limitations (Grounds 3-5) .. 46 
`D.  Petitioner’s Kraus-Ho combination falls short of the claimed LoRaWAN
`features and lacks sufficient motivation (Grounds 4-5).............................. 49 
`1.  Petitioner is wrong: Ho does not “disclose” a LoRaWAN link between
`a smart hub and a property management platform ................................ 49 
`2.  Accounting for Ho’s true disclosure, Petitioner’s Kraus-Ho
`combination diverges from the claimed LoRaWAN first interface ...... 53 
`3.  Petitioner’s generic motivation analysis is divorced from its mapping to
`the Challenged Claims and also ignores the specific details of Kraus
`and Ho .................................................................................................... 55 
`E.  Petitioner makes no effort to show Ho is prior art (Grounds 4-5) .............. 57 
`VI.  CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 60 
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`Case PGR2022-00059
`Attorney Docket No: 54577-0007PS1
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`EXHIBITS
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`US Patent Publication No. 2019/0371096, Fisher
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`US Patent Publication No. 2016/0241543, Jung, et al.
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`US Patent Publication No. 2017/0046893, Tseng, et al.
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`US Patent Application No. 16/162,262
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`EX2001
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`EX2002
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`EX2003
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`EX2004
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`Case PGR2022-00059
`Attorney Docket No: 54577-0007PS1
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`I. INTRODUCTION
`Petitioner iApartment’s Petition is riddled with conclusory assertions and
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`unfinished proofs that make post grant review untenable. Time and time again,
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`Petitioner declares that the prior art discloses a claim limitation without even
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`attempting to explain why that is so. This is not how post grant reviews work.
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`In these proceedings, the petitioner bears the burden of proof from the start to
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`show at least a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in establishing
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`unpatentability. Conclusory assertions are not assumed true, and the Board does not
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`simply take the petitioner’s word for it. And yet, that is exactly what Petitioner
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`would have the Board do here—bypass its requirements that the petitioner must
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`explain how the challenged claim is construed and how the construed claim is
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`unpatentable. In short, Petitioner has not made the necessary showing.
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`For example, when analyzing the Challenged Claims1 against the Cahill
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`reference (EX1005) in Ground 2 and the Kraus reference (EX1006) in Grounds 3-5,
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`Petitioner makes blanket statements that the references disclose the claimed
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`“property management platform” without any meaningful explanation or analysis of
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`what that claim term means and why its meaning embraces what the references
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`1 Claims 1-20.
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`1
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`describe.2 See infra Sections IV.A (Cahill) and V.B (Kraus). As another example,
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`when addressing the claimed “smart hub,” Petitioner assumes, without actually
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`proving, that Cahill and Kraus disclose the detailed limitations of “receiv[ing]
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`control information” and “transmit[ting] a command derived from the control
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`information.” See infra Sections IV.C (Cahill) and V.C (Kraus). Far from
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`disclosing these limitations, as is required for Petitioner to make its case, Cahill and
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`Kraus are silent in this regard.
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`While illustrative, these examples are not comprehensive of the Petition’s
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`litany of errors. Elsewhere, the Petition:
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` Fails to support its proposed combination of Cahill-Deros and Kraus-
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`Deros, and Kraus-Ho with legally sufficient motivation rationales (see
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`infra Section IV.B, V.A and V.D);
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` Makes no effort to establish that Ho’s teachings are actually prior art
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`(see infra Section V.E).
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`All of these fundamental flaws in the Petition are beyond repair. The efficient
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`timeline Congress implemented for post grant review does not permit petitioners to
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`make wholesale changes to the grounds initially put forward. But impermissible
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`wholesale changes are exactly what Petitioner would need to even potentially redress
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`2 All emphasis added.
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`2
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`the many problems that plague its Petition. Institution is not warranted, deserved,
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`or even feasible.
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`II. THE ’118 PATENT
`Patent Owner EDST, LLC is one in a group of companies that provides
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`technology solutions purpose-built for multi-family residential properties, such as
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`apartments, based on the inventions of the ’118 Patent. At the heart of this solution
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`is a unique smart hub. The smart hub receives control information from a property
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`management platform through a wide area network (WAN) communication link and
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`transmits commands to a door lock through a non-WAN communication link. See
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`EX1001, Figure 1 (annotated below).
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`At the time of the ’118 Patent, conventional keyless entry systems utilized one
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`of two types of locks: “online door locks” or “offline door locks.” EX1001, 1:43-
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`44. These “online” door locks could be controlled to lock and unlock both remotely
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`(e.g., through an internet connection) and locally (e.g., by a device such as a
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`smartphone or fob). Id., 1:44-48. Conventional “offline” door locks3 were typically
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`controlled locally by a device placed in proximity to the lock. Id., 1:49-52.
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`Conventional online and offline door locks both had disadvantages. Online
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`door locks, for example, required a network communication infrastructure (such as
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`Wi-Fi, or the like), which increased capital costs, installation costs, and operating
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`costs. Id. at 1:52-58.
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`Though less costly than online door locks, conventional offline door locks
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`“require[d] an individual, such as a property manager or property maintenance
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`personnel, to connect . . . an external device . . . to the offline door lock and then use
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`software or another utility provided by the external device to disable access
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`credentials.” Id., 1:67-2:6. This proved a slow and cumbersome process, as it
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`required one or more individuals to physically come to the lock’s location to alter
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`credentials. Id., 1:59-2:20. The need for in-person access, and the concomitant
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`3 The conventional offline door locks referenced are distinct from the “offline door
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`locks” recited in the Challenged Claims.
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`4
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`delays, posed an inconvenience to residents and visitors. It also introduced security
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`risks. For instance, access by certain individuals could not be revoked in a timely
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`manner in the event such individuals were to become violent or abusive. Id., 1:59-
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`2:20, 19:22-31.
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`The ’118 Patent’s inventors set out to solve the various problems with
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`conventional offline and online entry systems. Their solution—the ’118 Patent’s
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`unique smart hub, which provides a communication interface between a property
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`management platform and one or more door locks installed at a multi-family
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`residential property. Id., 2:34-37. For the first time, with this unique smart hub,
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`entry systems at multi-family properties could leverage the remote credential
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`management functionality lacking from conventional offline locks without
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`incurring the costs and complications associated with conventional online locks.
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`In other words, the ’118 Patent’s smart hub enables users of the management
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`platform (such as property managers) to disable, enable, or otherwise change access
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`credentials for each of the door locks on the system, all without requiring the use of
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`a costly Wi-Fi communications infrastructure. Id. at 2:34-37, 18:23-24.
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`Patent Owner EDST, LLC, by and through its wholly owned subsidiary Quext
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`IoT, LLC, has successfully marketed and sold products featuring smart thermostat
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`hubs and smart locks that embody the Challenged Claims since 2020. These patent-
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`practicing products are installed in or contracted to be installed in 20 different
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`properties representing nearly 15,600 doors throughout the United States.
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`See https://onequext.com/product/iot.
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`III. CLAIMS 1-20 HAVE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (GROUND 1)
`Petitioner invites the Board to revisit a written description issue that was
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`addressed on the record during examination. The Board should decline to do so.
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`The fact that Petitioner turns a blind eye to express disclosure in the ’118 Patent does
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`not justify re-litigating what the Office already decided.
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`A. The Office already decided the written description issue raised in
`the Petition, and Petitioner does not justify a do-over
`The limitations Petitioner objects to represent a core functionality of the ’118
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`Patent’s system that is disclosed throughout the specification and figures. As
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`detailed below, an experienced primary examiner fully considered these limitations
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`and concluded that their written description in the ’118 Patent is sufficient.
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`The limitations questioned by Petitioner are:
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` “the smart hub [comprising]. . . a second communication interface
`configured to communicatively couple . . . to a user device associated
`with an occupant of the unit via a non-LoRaWAN communication link”
`(Element [1c]); and
` “the smart hub configured to be communicatively coupled to a user
`device associated with an occupant of the unit via the non-LoRaWAN
`communication link” (Elements [11c], [17c]).
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`Petitioner does not dispute that Examiner Pendleton, an experienced primary
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`examiner, carefully considered these “user device” limitations and determined that
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`they have written description support. Verifying written description support under
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`35 U.S.C. § 112 is a fundamental part of examining an application. Accordingly,
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`the Office’s examination procedures require examiners to analyze written
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`description support for the claims and amendments to any application. See MPEP §
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`2163 (establishing “policies and procedures to be followed by Office personnel in
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`the evaluation of any patent application for compliance with the written description
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`requirement 35 U.S.C. § 112”). Thus, Examiner Pendleton was duty bound to
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`consider written description when examining the Challenged Claims, including the
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`“user device” limitations. Petitioner gives no explanation for why Examiner
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`Pendleton failed to do his job.
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`In fact, the record shows that Examiner Pendleton did exactly what was
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`required of him. As Petitioner acknowledges, the “user device” limitations were
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`added to each independent claim by amendment. See Petition, 29. They were not
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`overlooked, a fact made clear by the sequence of events.
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`First, the Applicant submitted the amendment with the “user device”
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`limitations to Examiner Pendleton as a written proposal in an agenda “for the
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`Examiner Interview scheduled for Thursday, January 28, 2021.” The amendment
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`was the “SECOND PROPOSAL” of two alternatives presented for the examiner’s
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`consideration.
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`EX1004, 117-121, Interview Agenda (“FIRST PROPOSAL” and “SECOND
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`PROPOSAL”).
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`Next, the Applicant’s representative, David Lukach, and Examiner Pendleton
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`“discussed . . . the first and second proposed amendments” during the Interview, and
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`Examiner Pendleton approved the second proposal with the “user device”
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`limitations. See EX1004, 115-116, Applicant-Initiated Interview Summary, dated
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`February 2, 2021. As detailed in the Examiner’s Interview Summary, the purpose
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`of the “user device” limitations was to clarify that the term “smart hub” was not
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`intended to read on “the occupant’s user device.” Id.
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`After the Interview, the Applicant submitted an Office Action Response
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`proposing an amendment formally introducing the “user device” limitations.
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`EX1004, 95-106, Office Action Response, dated February 15, 2021 (excerpt below).
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`As part of the Response, under the heading “Claim Amendments,” the Applicant
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`affirmatively argued that “[s]upport for the claim amendment may be found in the
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`Specification.” Id., 98.
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`Despite agreeing that the “user device” limitations clarified the term “smart
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`hub,” Examiner Pendleton remained critical. Instead of allowing the claims, he
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`continued to scrutinize them and, as a result, issued another Office Action with new
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`rejections. EX1004, 62-80, Non-Final Office Action, dated March 18, 2021. The
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`Office Action acknowledged that the amendment with the “user device” limitations
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`had been considered and entered but also applied new prior art. Id. Notably absent
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`from the Office Action, however, are any rejections for lack of written description.
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`In the same Office Action, Examiner Pendleton also considered and found
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`written description support for a dependent claim amendment premised on there
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`being the communicative coupling described in the “user device” limitations. The
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`dependent claim, claim 7, clarifies that “communicatively coupling the one or more
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`processors to the user device enables user interaction with the smart hub.” See,
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`EX1004, 104, Office Action Response, dated February 15, 2021. Had there been no
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`written description support for the “user device” limitations, there would likewise
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`had been no support for the amendment to dependent claim 7.
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`Thus, the prosecution record shows that an experienced primary examiner,
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`charged with ensuring claim amendments possess written description support,
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`thoroughly examined the “user device” limitations. To wit, Examiner Pendleton
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`considered these limitations on multiple separate occasions—before the Interview
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`in the agenda, during the Interview, and after the Interview, when analyzing the
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`amendments and affirmative arguments for support, prior to issuing a subsequent
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`Office Action. In each instance, he found written description support.
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`Given that Examiner Pendleton considered and concluded that the “user
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`device” limitations had written description support, the Board’s precedent under 35
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`U.S.C. § 325(d) tasks Petitioner with identifying an error in the prosecution record.
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`See Advanced Bionics LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Gerate GmbH,
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`IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (Part 2 of the
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`two-part framework). But Petitioner has not even attempted to explain how
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`Examiner Pendleton erred. Nor has Petitioner provided any new evidence that might
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`reveal an error.4 Without such an explanation or evidence, Petitioner’s arguments
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`are just an invitation to second guess the Office because it disagrees with the
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`Examiner. See Advanced Bionics at 9 (“If reasonable minds can disagree regarding
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`the purported treatment of the art or arguments, it cannot be said that the Office erred
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`in a manner material to patentability.”). Such invitations are routinely denied, and
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`this one should be, too. See Prism Pharma. Co., Ltd. v. Choongwae Pharma. Corp.,
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`4 Petitioner’s expert parroting back arguments from the Petition is not entitled
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`weight, and thus, presents no “new evidence.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert
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`testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is
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`based is entitled to little or no weight.”).
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`IPR2014-00315, Paper 14 (PTAB Jul. 8, 2014) (informative opinion) (petition
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`denied under § 325(d), refusing to revisit examiner’s determination of written
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`description in a priority document); Hospira Inc. v. Genentech Inc., IPR2017-00739,
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`Paper 16 (PTAB July 27, 2017) (denying institution where Petitioner brought no
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`new evidence to justify reaching a different conclusion from the examiner’s on
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`written description in a priority document).
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`B.
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`The ’118 Patent’s specification shows “possession” of the
`limitations Petitioner contests
`It is unsurprising that Examiner Pendleton repeatedly considered the “user
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`device” limitations and found them sufficiently supported. These limitations reflect
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`a core aspect of the ’118 Patent—that the smart thermostat hub bi-directionally
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`communicates with all manner of smart devices, the claimed “user devices”
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`included, via the non-LoRaWAN communication link. Consistent with its
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`significance, this communication functionality is described in the very first
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`paragraph of the Summary. The Summary explains that the “Smart thermostat hubs
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`may comprise . . . a second communication interface that facilitates bi-directional
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`communication between the thermostat smart hub and the smart devices present
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`within a unit of the multi-family residential property.” EX1001, 2:27-33; see also,
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`5:64-6:14, 6:61-7:6.5 The bi-directional communication is discussed throughout the
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`’118 Patent, including that the second communication interface can be non-
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`LoRaWAN. Id.
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`When the ’118 Patent broadly describes that the smart hub’s second
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`communication interface is configured to communicate with “smart devices,” it is
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`disclosing an interface configured to communicatively couple with “user devices,”
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`just as the limitations in the Challenged Claims require. This is so because the ’118
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`Patent expressly states that “user devices” include devices that are smart, such as a
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`“smartphone” and a “smart watch.” EX1001, 10:28-33. The Applicant cited this
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`very passage to Examiner Pendleton as support for the amendment that included the
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`“user device” limitations. See EX1004, 98, Office Action Response, dated February
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`15, 2021 (citing Paragraph [0040] of the as-filed specification).
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`It is telling that Petitioner does not dispute the fact that the ’118 Patent
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`describes specific examples of “user devices” that are “smart devices.” Nor does
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`Petitioner dispute that, at the time of the ’118 Patent in 2018, “user devices” like
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`smart phones were known in the art as “smart devices.” See, e.g., US 2019/0371096
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`5 The ’118 Patent is a continuation of US Application No. 16/162,262, and its
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`specification and figures are materially identical to those of the ’262 application.
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`See, EX1001, 1:6-9; see also, EX1004, [0005], [0028] and [0030].
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`(EX2001), ¶[0112] (“a smart device, such as a smart phone”) (cited by the
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`Examiner); US 2016/0241543 (EX2002), Abstract (“a personal smart device used
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`by an individual such as a smart phone”); and US 2017/0046893 (EX2003), [0040]
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`(“the operation apparatus 63 can be a smart phone, a smart watch, a smart bracelet,
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`a tablet computer” and “the operation apparatus 63 (e.g. a smart device)”)
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`(considered by the Examiner).
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`Yet another fact left unaddressed by Petitioner is that the ’118 Patent expressly
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`states that the smart hub and the user devices are configured to use the same
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`communication protocols. The user devices are configured to communicate via
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`“Bluetooth, ZigBee,” (EX1001, 10:28-33), and likewise, the smart hub’s second
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`communication interface is “configured to communicatively couple” via “ZigBee
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`communication links, a Bluetooth communication links [sic], and the like,” (id.,
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`6:61-7:6). Thus, the second communication interface of the smart hub is configured
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`to communicatively couple to the user devices at least via Bluetooth and ZigBee.
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`These portions of the ’118 Patent (and others) show the “user device”
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`limitations—a conclusion endorsed by Examiner Pendleton during prosecution.
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`Petitioner’s ignoring clear disclosure from the ’118 Patent is not a showing that the
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`Examiner erred. And, Petitioner’s failing to consider anything but verbatim
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`disclosure of the “user device” limitations also does not satisfy Petitioner’s burden
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`of proof. “[I]n haec verba support” has never been the standard, Purdue Pharma
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`L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2000), the law on written
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`description requires only sufficient disclosure to demonstrate “possession,” Ariad
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`Pharms, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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`C.
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`Petitioner’s contrary arguments do not outweigh clear written
`description support
`Petitioner appears to assume a distinction between the claimed “user devices”
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`and the “smart devices,” i.e., that the two are mutually exclusive, because of
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`references in the ’118 Patent to both “user devices 140” and “smart devices 120.”
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`But, such a mutual exclusivity is not present in the ’118 Patent. The reference to
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`“user devices 140” says nothing about the types of devices, smart or not. Instead,
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`“user devices 140” are simply the “resident’s” devices. EX1001, 10:28-33.
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`Additionally, the “smart devices 120” are just a subset of the smart devices
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`contemplated in the ’118 Patent. The reference to “smart devices 120” is expressly
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`identified as one example (“e.g.,”) of the smart devices with which the smart hub
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`can communicate. The ’118 patent does not exclude communication between the
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`smart hub and other devices that are also smart—e.g., a resident’s smart phone,
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`which is also a user device.
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`EX1001, 6:61-7:6 (annotated).
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`Beyond a few instances in its Detailed Description (e.g., EX1001, 4:22, 6:36,
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`7:2), the ’118 Patent repeatedly uses the term “smart devices” generally, without
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`referencing the specific “smart devices 120” labeled in Figure 1. The term “smart
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`devices” appears a total of 41 other times in a manner not limited to the particular
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`“smart devices 120.” Id., 1:13-19, 2:24-33 and 48-56, 3:22-25 and 42-45, 4:8-12,
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`6:40-44 and 61-7:6, 7:22-25, 8:24-31 and 53-61, 9:5-11, 13:44-50, 14:25-46, 16:6-
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`10, 17:55-62, 18:51-62, 19:34-38, 20:4-8 and 48-53, 21:12-21 and 48-66, 21:66-
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`22:7, 22:10-15, 27:37-45. In other words, the described coupling between the smart
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`device hub and the “smart devices” is a coupling to any of the smart devices
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`contemplated in the ’118 Patent, not just “smart devices 120,” as Petitioner
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`apparently contends.
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`Petitioner is also wrong when it says:
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`Petition, 33. In reality, Figure 1 hurts Petitioner’s case. It demonstrates a smart hub
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`communicating with all manner of smart devices. Specifically, Figure 1 illustrates
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`communication links 114 between the smart device hub 110 and three categories of
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`devices: user devices 140, smart devices 120, and third party devices 160. EX1001,
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`7:3-4, 6:61-7:6.
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`
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`Petitioner makes much of the fact that Figure 1 represents the communication links
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`114 as a single lightning bolt symbol. But the specification plainly describes that
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`the coupling this lightning bolt symbol represents is a plurality of “non-LoRaWAN
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`communication links 114.” EX1001, 7:3-4 and 6:61-7:6. Figure 1 is consistent with
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`this description, as Petitioner’s annotations highlight below. The lightning bolt
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`symbol representing communication links 114 is not constrained to any particular
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`category of device. Indeed, unlike other communication links (lightning bolt and
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`arrows) in this same figure (e.g., the lightning bolt circled by Petitioner in blue), the
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`symbol for communication links 114 (circled by Petitioner in red) does not touch
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`any of the boxes representing the three categories of devices (i.e., user devices 140,
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`smart devices 120 and third party devices 160).6 This different depiction indicates
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`a difference in the nature of communication links 114.
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`Petitioner’s annotations also show that direct communicative coupling
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`between the smart hub and the smart devices of the user devices is not the only
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`
`
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`6 Communication link 112 also does not touch the adjacent smart hub 110, and is
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`expressly said to represent information relayed from the gateways 136 “to one or
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`more smart hubs.” EX1001, 6:14-19.
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`support for the “user device” limitations. The “user device” limitations find further
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`written description support in the ’118 Patent’s examples of indirect communicative
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`coupling between the smart hub and user devices.7 Referencing Petitioner’s
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`annotations, Figure 1 shows this indirect communicative coupling via the non-
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`LoRaWAN communication links 114 between the smart hub 110 and smart devices
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`120 in red and the unlabeled non-LoRaWAN communication link between the user
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`devices 140 and smart devices 120 in blue.
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`
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`7 Dependent claim 7, which depends from claim 1, makes clear that indirect
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`communicatively coupling was contemplated to be within the scope of claim 1 by
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`expressly claiming an instance where the communicative coupling is direct.
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`As an additional example of written description support, Figure 11 of the ’118
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`Patent explains the indirect communicative coupling underscored by Petitioner’s
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`annotations to Figure 1. EX1001, 24:5-20; see also id., 11:10-40.
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`
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`In Figure 11, the offline lock stores an access log that “comprise[s] access credential
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`information associated with access credentials presented to the sensor” of the lock.
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`Id., 24:5-11. The user devices present access credential information to the offline
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`lock, and the offline lock then communicates an access log based on the access
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`credentials from the user devices to the smart hub via the non-LoRaWAN
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`communication link. Id., 24:14-20. Accordingly, the user devices communicate
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`with, and are thus communicatively coupled to, the smart hub by interfacing with an
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`intermediary—the offline lock.
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`In the end, Petitioner’s strained arguments against written description support
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`fail. Here, the simplest explanation is the right one. The ’118 Patent’s specification
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`says that the smart hub is communicatively coupled to smart devices, and user
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`devices like smartphones and smart watches are specific types of smart devices. No
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`additional disclosure was required to support the “user device” limitations, which
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`simply require a communicative coupling between user devices and a smart hub.
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`The Examiner understood as much during prosecution, and Petitioner’s
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`unsubstantiated request to revisit the issue should be denied.
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`IV. THE CAHILL-DEROS GROUND FAILS (GROUND 2)
`Ground 2 is based on Cahill in combination with Deros. Petitioner relies on
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`Cahill and/or Deros for multiple claim features but has not carried its burden on
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`those features. Therefore, the Cahill-Deros Ground fails.
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`A.
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`Petitioner makes no real attempt to show that Cahill or Deros
`discloses a “property management platform”
`The Cahill-Deros Ground points to Cahill or Deros as disclosing the claimed
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`“property management platform.” Petitioner’s nearly non-existent analysis fails to
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`address this claim feature adequately, and amounts to an improper notice pleading.
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`Petitioner’s failure to show that Cahill or Deros discloses the claimed “property
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`management platform” is fatal to the Cahill-Deros Ground.
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`Petitioner ignores a fundamental aspect of the claimed
`“property management platform”
`The Board’s rules “place an affirmative burden on petitioners to ‘set forth: . .
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`1.
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`. How the challenged claim is to be construed.’” OrthoPediatrics Corp. v. K2M,
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`Inc., IPR2018-01548, Paper 9, 10 (March 1, 2019) (quoting Medicines Co. v. Mylan,
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`Inc., 853 F.3d 1296, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2017); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3)). “This burden
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`continues by requiring petitioners to adequately explain ‘[h]ow the construed claim
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`is unpatentable.’” Id. (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)) (emphasis in original).
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`Despite accepting the burden when requesting post grant review, Petitioner does not
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`attempt to satisfy it. See Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge, Ltd.,
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`821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“While the Board’s requirements are strict
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`ones, they are requirements of which petitioners are aware when they seek to
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`institute an IPR.”). This flaw permeates the Petition, and it is particularly striking
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`for the “property management platform” features in each of independent claims 1,
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`11, and 17.
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`Petitioner asserts that it is applying the plain meaning of the claims, except
`
`where terms are expressly construed. The plain meaning of the claim term “property
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`management platform” is revealed by its words. Simply put, there must be a
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`platform that facilitates property management tasks or functions, a fact confirmed
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`by the ’118 Patent’s specification. E.g., EX1001, 2:40-59, 8:26-31, 8:43-49, 9:5-11,
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`9:36-42. Petitioner ignores the ’118 Patent’s consistent and repeated reference to
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`“property management functionalities” as separate from “security” functionalities
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`relating to offline door lock