Case 6:23-cv-00320-ADA Document 45 Filed 12/01/23 Page 1 of 23
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`PROXENSE, LLC,
`Plaintiff,
`
`vs.
`GOOGLE LLC,
`Defendant.
`
`Case No. 6:23-cv-00320-ADA
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`PLAINTIFF PROXENSE, LLC’s RESPONSIVE CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Page 1 of 23
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`GOOGLE EXHIBIT 1019
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`

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`Case 6:23-cv-00320-ADA Document 45 Filed 12/01/23 Page 2 of 23
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`I.
`II.
`III.
`IV.
`V.
`
`VI.
`
`B.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`Introduction. ........................................................................................................................ 1
`The Claimed Inventions ...................................................................................................... 1
`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art ....................................................................................... 2
`Agreed Constructions .......................................................................................................... 3
`Construction of Disputed Terms ......................................................................................... 3
`A.
`Family A .................................................................................................................. 3
`1.
`“integrated device” (730: 1, 15) ...................................................... 4
`2.
`“persistently storing … a plurality of codes and other data
`values…comprising a device ID code … and a secret decryption
`value”… (730:1, 15; 954: 1, 22) ...................................................... 7
`(a) “an access message … [allowing / allows] the user [access
`to an application / to access an application]”
`(730:1, 15; 954:1, 22); ..................................................................... 9
`(b) “an access message … [allowing / allows] the user to
`complete a financial transaction (905:1, 13) ................................... 9
`“wherein the biometric data and the scan data are both based
`on a fingerprint scan by the user” (730:5) ..................................... 12
`Family B ................................................................................................................ 15
`1.
`“receiver-decoder circuit” (042:10; 289:14) .................................. 15
`2.
`“personal digital key” (042:10; 289:14) ........................................ 17
`Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 18
`
`
`3.
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`
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`4.
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`
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`
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`
`
`i
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`

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`Case 6:23-cv-00320-ADA Document 45 Filed 12/01/23 Page 3 of 23
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`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`342 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ................................................................................................... 3
`
`
`Brown v. 3M,
`265 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ................................................................................................. 12
`
`
`Exxon Chem. Pats., Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp.,
`64 F.3d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ................................................................................................... 10
`
`
`Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.,
`766 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ................................................................................................... 6
`
`
`Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ................................................................................. 14, 15, 16, 17
`
`
`Linear Technology Corp. v. International Trade Commission,
`566 F.3d 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ................................................................................................. 16
`
`
`Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.,
`395 F.3d 1364 (Fed.Cir.2005) ................................................................................................... 10
`
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-tech Systems, Inc.,
`357 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ................................................................................................... 6
`
`
`NTP, Inc. v. Rsch. In Motion, Ltd.,
`418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ................................................................................................... 6
`
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ......................................................................................... 3, 4, 15
`
`
`Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
`789 F. 3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .................................................................................................. 8
`
`
`Tinnus Enterprises, LLC v. Telebrands Corp.,
`733 F. App'x 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .......................................................................................... 14
`
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ............................................................................................................................ 12
`
`
`
`
`ii
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`I.
`
`Introduction.
`
`The Court has already construed half of the terms that Defendant Google LLC (“Google”)
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`now seeks to re-construe. In the earlier case Proxense, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et
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`al., 6:21-cv-00210-ADA (W.D. Tex.) (hereinafter, “Proxense v. Samsung”), this Court agreed with
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`Proxense’s proposed constructions for three of the terms that Google now seeks to re-construe in
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`this proceeding. See id. ECF No. 43 (Claim Construction Order); ECF 149 (Claim Construction
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`Opinion). Google’s rationale for its proposed constructions of previously construed terms provides
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`no new credible evidence or argument that challenges the Court’s previous determinations. Indeed,
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`Google raises some of the same arguments this Court rejected in the Proxense v. Samsung case.
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`Proxense requests that the Court simply adopt its prior rulings on these terms. For the terms that
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`this Court did not previously construe, Proxense requests that they be given their plain and ordinary
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`meaning as they are rooted in the intrinsic record and are neither complicated nor highly technical.
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`In contrast, Google’s proposed constructions impermissibly change the meaning of claims, add
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`claim limitations, inject unnecessary and confusing language into the claims, or assert that claim
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`terms are indefinite, when they are easily discernible to a person of ordinary skill. The Court
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`should adopt its prior constructions from Proxense v. Samsung and construe the remaining
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`disputed terms according their plain and ordinary meaning.
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`II.
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`The Claimed Inventions
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`The inventions set forth in the patents-in-suit (U.S. Patent Nos. 8,352,730 (the “730
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`Patent”), 8,886,954 (the “954 Patent”), and 9,298,905 (the “905 Patent”) (collectively, “Family
`
`A”) and U.S. Patent Nos. 8,646,042 (the “042 Patent”), 9,679,289 (the “289 Patent”) and
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`10,073,960 (the “960 Patent”) (collectively, “Family B”) allow users to carry, control, and protect
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`1
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`their personal data on devices like mobile phones, which enables secure transactions and
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`authentication using those devices. Biometric authentication and use of remote (e.g., web-based)
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`applications requires trust between the user and the service provider. The user must trust that the
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`service provider can and will protect personal data and that the service provider will not abuse
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`such data. Utilizing online services—including social media, office, productivity, financial, travel,
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`and other similar services—requires the user to trust that the service provider will safeguard the
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`personally identifying information that a user provides using the service. Such information could
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`include biometric data used, for example, as a means of verifying an authorized user’s identity.
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`Safeguarding and limiting the information that is shared with multiple service providers is a
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`necessity. The inventions of the patents-in-suit address these issues by providing ways to use
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`biometric information securely to access and/or utilize private, sensitive information.
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`Family A is directed to inventions ensuring biometric data privacy while enabling
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`biometric authentication. The claimed inventions improve on the prior art by providing for
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`multiple levels of authentication, such that a user is verified as properly in possession of a
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`biometric access instrumentality, and also biometrically verified as authorized to access sensitive
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`and/or secure resources. Family B is directed to inventions that improve the capabilities and
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`flexible arrangements of multiple devices and instrumentalities that are used to provide means of
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`authorized access to access sensitive and/or secure resources while retaining security.
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`III. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`Proxense submits that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have a bachelor’s degree
`
`in computer or electrical engineering (or an equivalent degree) with at least three years of
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`experience in the field of encryption and security (or an equivalent). This level of skill is
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`2
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`approximate, and more experience would compensate for less formal education, and vice versa.
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`See Rubin Decl. ¶ 22.
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`IV. Agreed Constructions
`
`The parties have agreed to the following constructions from the Court’s Claim
`
`Construction Order in Proxense v. Samsung:
`
`Term
`
`Patents
`
`Agreed Construction
`
`“ID code”/“device ID code”
`
`“access message”
`
`“persistently storing . . . a
`tamper proof format written
`to a storage element on the
`integrated device that is
`unable to be subsequently
`altered”
`“hybrid device”
`
`“enablement signal”
`
`730 Patent, claims 1, 15;
`954 Patent, claims 1, 22;
`905 Patent, claims 1, 13
`
`730 Patent, claims 1, 15;
`954 Patent, claims 1, 22;
`905 Patent, claims 1, 13
`
`730 Patent, claims 1, 15
`
`a unique code identifying a
`device
`
`a signal or notification
`enabling or announcing
`access
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning.
`No construction necessary
`
`042 Patent, claim 10;
`289 Patent, claim 14
`
`042 Patent, claim 10;
`289 Patent, claim 14;
`960 Patent, claim 14
`
`a device comprising an
`integrated personal digital
`key (PDK) and an integrated
`receiver-decoder circuit
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning.
`No construction necessary
`
`
`
`V.
`
`
`
`Construction of Disputed Terms
`A.
`Family A
`
`A claim term is presumed to have its plain and ordinary meaning as understood by a person
`
`of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the invention in the context of the patent.
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade
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`
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`3
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`Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Here, an examination of the specification and the
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`claim language of the Family A terms reveals there is no need to construe the terms beyond their
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`plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`1.
`“integrated device” (730: 1, 15)
`Proxense’s Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning. No
`construction necessary.
`
`Indefinite
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`Google’s Construction
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`The “starting point” to the inquiry of how POSITA understands the plain and ordinary
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`
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`meaning of a claim term is based on the understanding that “inventors are typically persons skilled
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`in the field of the invention and that patents are addressed to and intended to be read by others of
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`skill in the pertinent art.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. A POSITA is deemed to read the claim term
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`“not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the
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`context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Id.
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`Given the specification and the claim language of the 730 Patent, it is clear that the term
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`“integrated device” is not indefinite, and that it should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. In
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`the context of the entire patent, an “integrated device” is a “device” that is integrated with a
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`biometric key. See Rubin Decl. ¶¶ 24, 28-35. Contrary to Google’s assertions that neither the
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`intrinsic evidence nor the claim language defines the scope of the term (Op. Br. at 4; Black Decl.
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`at ¶ 30), each instance of an “integrated device” described within the specification includes
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`functionality that incorporates a biometric key such that the integration with the biometric key is
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`what renders the device at issue “integrated”:
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`Integrated Device
`“an integrated device that persistently (or
`permanently) stores biometric data for a user
`in a tamper-resistant format” 730 Patent,
`Abstract
`
`Biometric Key
`“a biometric key persistently (or permanently)
`stores a code such as a device identifier (ID)
`and biometric data for a user in a tamper-
`resistant format.” 730 Patent, 1:60-62
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`“Once the user has been verified by the
`integrated device, a code can be wirelessly
`transmitted for authentication.” 730 Patent,
`Abstract
`
`“Once the user has been verified by the
`integrated device, the code can be wirelessly
`transmitted to indicate that the user has been
`successfully verified.”
`1:64-67
`“The trusted key authority checks a list of
`enrolled integrated devices for a match.” 730
`Patent, Abstract
`
`“Biometric key 100 can authenticate a user
`for various purposes.” 730 Patent, 3:36-37
`
`“Biometric key 100 comprises control module
`210 . . . control module 210 provides a
`verification code upon successful verification
`of the user.” 730 Patent, 3:55-58
`
`“The trusted key authority checks a list of
`enrolled biometric keys to determine whether
`the code is valid.” 730 Patent, 2:2-4
`
`The 730 Patent details “a biometric key persistently (or permanently) stores a code such as
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`a device identifier (ID) and biometric data for a user.” 730 Patent, 1:60-62. The same functionality
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`is detailed in the Abstract of the 730 Patent with regards to an “integrated device.” Claim 1 of the
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`730 Patent recites “storing biometric data of the user . . . and a device ID code . . . written to a
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`storage element on the integrated device.” As the claimed integrated device is performing the
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`same function as a biometric key, the integrated device can be a device integrated with a biometric
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`key. See Rubin Decl. ¶¶ 28-35.
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`The claim language provides additional clarity to the meaning of the term. Claims 1 and
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`15 of the 730 Patent recite storing “biometric data of the user … and a device ID code … written
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`to a storage element.” Claim 1 thus recites the integrated device has a “storage element” storing
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`“biometric data” and “a device ID code.” Claim 15 recites the same for the biometric key. The
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`plain language of claims 1 and 15 of the 730 Patent, therefore, demonstrate that the claimed “integrated
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`device” integrates or includes a biometric key. See Rubin Decl. ¶¶ 29-30. Throughout the
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`specification, the patent recites functionality for a biometric key and those particular functions
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`are listed as requirements to the claimed “integrated device.” See Rubin Decl. ¶¶ 28-30.
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`Therefore, there exists “objective boundaries for those of skill in the art” to understand the meaning
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`of the “integrated device” term from the intrinsic record. Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766
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`F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014). It would not be relevant to a POSITA nor for any purposes
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`related to the invention whether a device integrates a biometric key or a biometric key integrates
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`itself into a device. See Rubin Decl. ¶ 27. Google provides no reason why that difference in
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`phrasing alone could render this term indefinite to a POSITA.
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`Further, the above-described plain and ordinary meaning of “integrated device” is
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`consistent with the statement made in the 954 and 905 Patents that “[a] device having an integrated
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`biometric key 100 is occasionally referred to herein as an ‘integrated device.’” 954 Patent, 4:8-
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`10; 905 Patent, 4:10-12. A POSITA would have this understanding already from the context of
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`the 730 Patent. Rubin Decl. ¶ 32. This aligns with the premise that a claim term must be
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`interpreted consistently across all patents derived from the same parent application. NTP, Inc. v.
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`Rsch. In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Where multiple patents “derive from
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`the same parent application and share many common terms, we must interpret the claims
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`consistently across all asserted patents.”); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-tech Systems, Inc.,
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`357 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that statements made during the prosecution of a
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`later issued sibling patent are relevant to an earlier issue patent from the same family).
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`Accordingly, a POSITA would have understood the term “integrated device” the same way across
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`all three patents and would have clearly understood the scope of the 730 Patent standing alone.
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`Rubin Decl. ¶ 32.
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`Google’s errors and contradictory positions are further revealed by it agreeing with the
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`Court’s “plain and ordinary meaning” construction of a term that already includes the term
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`“integrated device,” but then arguing that “integrated device” alone is indefinite. In Proxense v.
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`Samsung, this Court held that the term: “persistently storing . . . a tamper proof format written to
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`a storage element on the integrated device that is unable to be subsequently altered” should be
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`given its plain and ordinary meaning. Google has agreed to that construction in this
`
`proceeding. Google cannot now have it both ways. It cannot on the one hand claim to accept the
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`Court’s prior construction that a term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, while
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`claiming on the other hand that a narrower term contained within the larger term is indefinite.
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`Likewise, Google agreed to a construction of “hybrid device” for a different patent family that
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`includes two instances of the term “integrated.” See supra p. 3. In short, there is no need to look
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`beyond the plain and ordinary meaning of “integrated device.” The context of the term within the
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`claims along with the specification provides sufficient meaning of the term to a POSITA. Thus,
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`Proxense respectfully requests the Court to reject Google’s arguments and give this term its plain
`
`and ordinary meaning.
`
`2.
`“persistently storing … a plurality of codes and other data values
`comprising a device ID code … and a secret decryption value”
`(730:1, 15; 954: 1, 22)
`
`
`
`Proxense’s Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning. No
`construction necessary.
`
`Google does not identify a specific term that is allegedly indefinite. Rather, it points to a
`
`Google’s Construction
`
`Indefinite
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`phrase within the claims it believes has multiple interpretations and improperly concludes it to be
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`invalid. However, these phrases are not ambiguous, and they should be given their plain and
`
`ordinary meaning. Indeed, the Court already held in Proxense v. Samsung that “no construction
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`is necessary” for this identical claim term, and that it should “receive [its] plain and ordinary
`
`meaning.” Proxense v. Samsung, ECF 149 at 14–15.
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`In its brief, Google creates multiple unreasonable interpretations of the claim term and
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`confuses them with their plain and ordinary meaning. It takes a simple phrase that a POSITA can
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`Case 6:23-cv-00320-ADA Document 45 Filed 12/01/23 Page 11 of 23
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`easily understand and places parentheses around certain portions to make it appear that the phrase
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`can have multiple meanings. Op. Br. at 9-10. However, there is no mystery as to what the term
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`requires: a plurality of codes and other data values are stored; within this storage is also (1) a device
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`ID code uniquely identifying an integrated device1 and (2) a secret decryption value. It is that
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`simple. The multiple interpretations Google presents are deliberately confusing, unreasonable,
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`and go beyond the scope of what a POSITA would comprehend the claim term to mean.
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`Google’s attempt to compare the use of “persistently storing” to the more specific term of
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`art of “molecular weight” as discussed in Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F. 3d 1335,
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`1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2015), is a deliberate red herring that illustrates Google’s incorrect position.
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`As the Teva Court found, “[t]here are three different measures of molecular weight,” wherein
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`“[e]ach measure is calculated in a different manner” and where each reference to “molecular
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`weight” could be a reference to a separate, scientific understanding of that term. Id. 1338. There
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`are no different understandings of “persistently storing” in this instance; especially not as it
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`pertains to a unique scientific term of measurement. In fact, the 730 Patent equates “persistently”
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`with “permanently”—which is the natural understanding of the term “persistently.” Google’s
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`arguments simply attempt to inject confusion where none exists. Indeed, as the Court observed in
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`Proxense v. Samsung, a specification of the 730 Patent “clearly defines ‘persistently storing’ as
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`storing in non-volatile memory” and that the term need not be assigned any meaning apart from
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`its plain and ordinary understanding. Proxense v. Samsung, ECF 149 at 14.
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`Accordingly, Proxense respectfully requests this Court to reject Google’s arguments and
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`give these terms their plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`
`1 730 Patent, claim 15 instead requires the device ID code to uniquely identify a biometric key and
`954 Patent, claim 22 requires the device ID code to uniquely identify an integrated hardware
`device.
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`3.
`(a) “an access message … [allowing / allows] the user [access to an
`application / to access an application]” (730:1, 15; 954:1, 22);
`(b) “an access message … [allowing / allows] the user to complete a
`financial transaction (905:1, 13)
`Proxense’s Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning. No
`construction necessary beyond adopting the
`Court’s previous construction of
`“access message” and “ID code”
`in Proxense v. Samsung.
`
`
`
`Google’s Construction
`730 and 954 Patents
`a signal or notification allowing the user to
`access an application
`
`905 Patent
`a signal or notification allowing the user to
`complete a financial transaction
`This Court previously construed “access message” in Proxense v. Samsung as “a signal or
`
`notification enabling or announcing access,” which Google does not dispute and has accepted. Op.
`
`Br. at 3, 11. Google is now attempting to unnecessarily construe the words and phrases that come
`
`after “access message” (hereinafter the “Disputed Access Message Terms”). A POSITA would
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`recognize that the additional words and phrases are clear, non-technical, and should be given their
`
`plain and ordinary meaning. Therefore, no construction of these terms is necessary.
`
`To be clear, the Disputed Access Message Terms are not as succinct as Google represented
`
`in its claim construction brief. Proxense only shortened the terms in its title headings for
`
`conciseness. However, these are the full, unabbreviated terms Google would like construed:
`
`730 Patent, claim 1: “an access message from the agent allowing the user access to an
`application”
`
`730 Patent, claim 15: “an access message from the agent allowing the user to access an
`application”
`
`
`954 Patent, claim 1: “an access message from the trusted authority indicating that the
`trusted authority successfully authenticated the one or more codes
`and other data values sent to the third party and allowing the user
`access to the application”
`
`
`954 Patent, claim 22: “an access message from the trusted authority indicating that the
`trusted authority successfully authenticated the one or more codes
`and other data values to the third party and allows the user to
`access an application”
`
`
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`
`905 Patent, claim 1: “an access message from the third party trusted authority-
`indicating that the third-party trusted authority successfully
`authenticated the ID code, allowing the user to complete a
`financial transaction”
`
`
`905 Patent, claim 13: “an access message from the third-party trusted authority
`indicating that the third-party trusted authority successfully
`authenticated the ID code and allows the user to complete a
`financial transaction”
`
`
`First, even if it is appropriate to construe these terms beyond their plain and ordinary
`
`meaning, Google’s constructions are inappropriate as they eliminate required claim language. For
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`example, Google’s proposed construction for claim 1 of the 905 Patent is “a signal or notification
`
`allowing the user to complete a financial transaction.” However, the construction completely
`
`disregards the highlighted portion of the term below:
`
`an access message from the third party trusted authority-indicating that the third-
`party trusted authority successfully authenticated the ID code, allowing the user to
`complete a financial transaction
`
`The construction of a claim term must consider all words and phrases that are part of the
`
`term, but Google’s constructions fail to do so. Exxon Chem. Pats., Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d
`
`1553, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“We must give meaning to all the words in [the] claims.”); Merck &
`
`Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed.Cir.2005) (“A claim construction
`
`that gives meaning to all the terms of the claim is preferred over one that does not do so.”).
`
`Google’s omission of these terms is telling. Google completely ignores the highlighted section of
`
`the actual term because it is easily understood by a POSITA and should be given its plain and
`
`ordinary meaning, like the remainder of how that term is used throughout the claims at issue. The
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`same plain and ordinary meaning should be applied to the unhighlighted portion of the term and
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`the full scope of the other Disputed Access Message Terms.
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`Second, even if it is appropriate to construe these terms beyond their plain and ordinary
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`meaning, Google’s construction for the 730 and 954 Patents fails as the same construction is
`
`applied to terms that are completely different. More specifically, Google’s proposed terms in the
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`954 Patent include the language “from the trusted authority indicating that the trusted authority
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`successfully authenticated the one or more codes and other data values sent to the third party” that
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`is not part of the terms of the 730 Patent. This additional language makes the 954 Patent terms
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`vastly different from the 730 Patent. Google cannot attempt to give these terms the same
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`construction. See, e.g., Proxense v. Samsung, CCF 149 at 13 (holding that it “is contrary to
`
`fundamental tenets of claim construction” and “an end-run around the limitations set by this Court
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`on claim terms to be construed” for a party to “give three or more distinct claim terms identical,
`
`redundant constructions across several patents”).
`
`Third, Google’s proposed constructions for the Disputed Access Message Terms
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`inappropriately modify the Court’s previous construction of “access message” by eliminating the
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`“announcing access” portion of the construction. Contrary to Google’s assertions that
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`“announcing access” is “clearly not what is required” by the claim language (Op. Br. at 12), the
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`words “allowing” and “allows” as used in this context can be understood to mean both “causes
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`access to be permitted” and “announces that access is permitted.” The latter would permit the
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`application to move to a next step or inform (e.g., check appropriate age before granting access) a
`
`party that access was permitted (e.g., pop up a window to inform a user). As this Court already
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`held, the access message “can have the effect of moving the user to the next step of providing
`
`information (like providing the user’s age), which is more than just enabling access.” Proxense
`
`v. Samsung, ECF. No. 149 at 21 (emphasis added).
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`Moreover, the term “access message” appears in claims 1 and 22 of the 954 Patent where
`
`it “indicat[es] that the trusted authority successfully authenticated the one or more codes and other
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`Case 6:23-cv-00320-ADA Document 45 Filed 12/01/23 Page 15 of 23
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`data values,” and in claims 1 and 13 of the 905 Patent where it “indicat[es] that the third-party
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`trusted authority successfully authenticated the ID code.” Claim 12 of the 730 Patent (not asserted)
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`recites the steps of receiving an “access message” and allowing access “in response to a positive
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`access message” as entirely separate steps. These examples are most consistent with a construction
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`that the access message can be “indicating” (i.e. announcing) that access is enabled, but that can
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`also have an enabling function. This Court already found that “language of ‘indicates’ suggests
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`that [the access message] can serve to notify the user of access, not just enable access.” Proxense
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`v. Samsung, ECF. No. 149 at 21-22. There is no need to depart from this holding.
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`Fourth, Google’s proposed terms are unnecessarily long and attempt to shoehorn multiple
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`terms into one. For example, the 905 Patent Disputed Access Message Terms include both the
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`“access message” and “ID code” terms that this Court previously construed in Proxense v.
`
`Samsung. Finally, the words and phrases of the terms are “not technical terms of art, and do not
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`require elaborate interpretation.” Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001). A jury will
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`not have difficulty understanding the meaning of these words and phrases and they should simply
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`be afforded their plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`To eliminate all the unnecessary confusion presented by Google, Proxense respectfully
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`requests this Court to reject Google’s proposed constructions and to give the Disputed Access
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`Message Terms their plain and ordinary meaning in view of the Court’s previous constructions of
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`“access message” and “ID Code” in Proxense v. Samsung.
`
`4.
`“wherein the biometric data and the scan data are both based on a
`fingerprint scan by the user” (730:5)
`
`Proxense’s Construction
`Adopts the Court’s Construction in
`Proxense v. Samsung:
`
`
`Google’s Construction
`Indefinite or invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 4
`
`alternatively:
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`12
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`Case 6:23-cv-00320-ADA Document 45 Filed 12/01/23 Page 16 of 23
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`wherein the biometric data and the scan data of
`Plain and ordinary meaning. No
`construction necessary.
`claim 1 consists of a single fingerprint
`Google makes the same argument that this Court rejected in Proxense v. Samsung. See
`
`Proxense v. Samsung, ECF 149 at 22. Dependent claim 5 is not invalid; it properly reduces the
`
`number of possible fingerprints from those intrinsic to the “palm print” or “hand geometry” of
`
`independent claim 1.
`
`Claim 1 of the 730 Patent describes multiple categories of “biometric data” as “selected
`
`from a group consisting of a palm print, a retinal scan, an iris scan, a hand geometry, a facial
`
`recognition, a signature recognition and a voice recognition.” In its briefing, Google raises the
`
`same arguments the Court already considered and rejected, asserting that “dependent claim 5 fails
`
`to ‘specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed’ in independent claim 1[.]”. Op. Br.
`
`at 16. But as the Court held in Proxense v. Samsung, Claim 5 of the 730 Patent:
`
`properly narrows the scope of “biometric data” to a single “fingerprint.” The plain
`and ordinary meaning of “palm print” would be understood to include some
`combination of prints from the heel and/or flat of the hand, with multiple
`fingerprints and/or a thumb print (see, e.g., 730 Patent 3:4-11, expanding exemplary
`biometric data from “fingerprint” to additional metrics like an entire “palm print”;
`id. at 3:29-33, indicating that biometric data capture could include thumb or other
`fingerprints). Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
`
`There is no need for the Court to hold any differently in this case or to re-construe this
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`term. Google has