throbber
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
`Washington, D.C.
`
`The Honorable Doris Johnson Hines
`Administrative Law Judge
`
`
`In the Matter of
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`Certain Video Capable Electronic Devices,
`Including Computers, Streaming Devices,
`Televisions, Cameras, and Components and
`Modules Thereof
`
`
`Investigation No. 337-TA-1379
`
`COMMISSION INVESTIGATIVE STAFF’S RESPONSIVE CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Margaret Macdonald, Director
`Jeffrey T. Hsu, Supervisory Attorney
`Marissa R. Ducca, Investigative Attorney
`Office of Unfair Import Investigations
`U.S. International Trade Commission
`500 E Street SW, Suite 401
`Washington D.C. 20436
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`AMAZON-1021
`7,532,808
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`

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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`A.  THE INTRINSIC RECORD DOES NOT REQUIRE THE ADDITION OF “WHEREIN NO
`RESIDUAL INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR THE FIRST SEGMENT IN THE ENCODED
`BITSTREAM” TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF BIT CODING MODE .......................... 1 
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`B.  THE INDEPENDENT CLAIMS ARE SILENT ON “RESIDUAL INFORMATION” AND
`THEREFORE, DO NOT PRECLUDE THE USE OF “RESIDUAL INFORMATION” EVEN
`IN CONJUNCTION WITH SKIP CODING MODE” ........................................... 3 
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`i
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`

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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Cases
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`Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l Inc., 246 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
`.............................................................................................................................. 1, 2, 4
`
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`Dippin’ Dots v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ......................................................... 2
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`Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ........ 1
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`ii
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`INTRODUCTION
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`The only issue for the ALJ to decide is whether the construction of “skip coding
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`mode” should explicitly include the language “wherein no residual information is provided
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`for the first segment in the encoded bitstream.” All parties agree that the construction
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`should include “A coding mode in which a zero (non-active) motion vector or a non-zero
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`(active) motion vector is associated with each skip mode macroblock, depending on the
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`characteristics of the motion in image segments surrounding the macroblock in question.”
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`As explained below and in Staff’s Opening Claim Construction Brief, the language should
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`not be included.
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`
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`ARGUMENT
`A.
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`THE INTRINSIC RECORD DOES NOT REQUIRE THE ADDITION OF “WHEREIN
`NO RESIDUAL INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR THE FIRST SEGMENT IN THE
`ENCODED BITSTREAM” TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF BIT CODING MODE
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`Respondents are correct that claim construction always begins with the claim
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`language. Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1370 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2002). RRB at 1-2. But what Respondents fail to explain, is why residual information
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`has to be explicitly mentioned in the independent claims to be permissible. And this is
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`because residual information does not have to be mentioned. It is not a claimed element and
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`therefore, not a requirement. Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l Inc.,
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`246 F.3d 1336, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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`Respondents mis-apply the case law regarding the transitional term “comprising” in
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`their reply. RRB at 11. Indeed, unlike Respondents’ arguement, this is not a case of trying
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`to modify limitations already in the claim. As Respondents’ observe, “the term ‘comprising’
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`in a preamble raises a presumption that the list of claim limitations is nonexclusive.” Id.
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`1
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`

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`That is precisely the case here. The independent claims identify a number of limitations, but
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`do not identify “residual information.” The Staff is therefore not trying to eliminate any
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`limitations, but rather permitting the use (or non-use) of “residual information.”
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`As Respondents observe in footnote 1 of their reply brief, the “patentee knew how to
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`specify that information would not be sent in independent claims. For example, in claim 1,
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`the patentee expressly stated that ‘no further motion vector information . . . is coded in the .
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`. . bitstream.’ No such limitation exists as to ‘skip coding mode.’” RRB at 2. The fact that
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`the patentee chose to claim how motion vector information should be used, but was silent as
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`to residual information, is further evidence that “residual information is an unclaimed
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`element that may or may not be used in conjunction with the other limitations in the claim.
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`Crystal Semiconductor Corp., 246 F.3d at 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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`The Dippin’ Dots case does not support Respondents’ argument in this case. In
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`Dippin’ Dots, the Federal Circuit reviewed the construction of the term “beads,” which the
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`District Court construed as “small frozen droplets . . . which have a smooth, spherical
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`(round or ball shaped) appearance.” Dippin’ Dots v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir.
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`2007). In that case, the term “beads” was narrowed by the patentee to exclude “popcorn”
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`style beads. Id. Therefore, the plaintiff was effectively trying to use the “comprising” term
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`to argue that the specification is broader than it really is. Id. But in that case, the patentee
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`had claimed the term “beads” that it was trying to broaden. Here, the patentee did not
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`claim “residual information.” The Staff is not arguing for broadening a construction –
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`2
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`

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`residual information is not claimed at all in the independent claims. It is an additional
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`nonexclusive limitation that may or may not be used.1
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`B.
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`THE INDEPENDENT CLAIMS ARE SILENT ON “RESIDUAL INFORMATION” AND
`THEREFORE, DO NOT PRECLUDE THE USE OF “RESIDUAL INFORMATION”
`EVEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH SKIP CODING MODE”
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`The arguments present an interesting dynamic. Respondents argue that the
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`additional language is necessary to breath life into the dependent claims, while
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`simultaneously arguing that the patent discloses multiple embodiments that allow for the
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`use of residual information. Respondents’ Responsive Claim Construction Brief (“RRB”) at
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`1. The Complainants, on the other hand, argue the language is not necessary while
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`simultaneously arguing that skip mode cannot use residual information at all.
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`Complainants’ Reply Claim Construction Brief (“CRB”) at 2. In their Reply Brief,
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`Respondents specifically address this dynamic and in footnote 2 request that the ALJ
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`address this dispute: “If the ALJ adopts Complainants’ position, it should modify
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`Complainants’ construction to make clear that “skip coding mode” “cannot include residual
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`information” because there is a claim construction dispute that requires resolution and
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`Complainants’ construction, as written, does not resolve that dispute.”
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`The Staff agrees with Complainants that the embodiments described in the
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`specification do not explicitly demonstrate the use of residual information in conjunction
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`with skip coding mode. CRB at 17-20. But the Staff disagrees with Complainants that this
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`automatically means that residual information cannot be used in conjunction with the
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`elements of the independent claims. As Respondents observe, the specification includes a
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`1 If Respondents’ argument is correct, then every claim construction offered would
`necessarily exclude any unclaimed elements unless explicitly identified as offered by
`Respondents.
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`3
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`

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`number of embodiments where residual information is permitted for use with other coding
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`modes. RRB at 8-9. As Staff has offered, the claims use the open language, “comprising,”
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`which means unclaimed limitations are not requirements of the claims. Crystal
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`Semiconductor Corp. 246 F.3d at 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The Staff also disagrees with
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`Respondents that the language needs to be modified to say that residual information cannot
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`be used. That is axiomatic in the fact that the patentee did not claim residual information in
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`the independent claims. Id.
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` CONCLUSION
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`Thus, for the reasons set out above, the ALJ should adopt the Staff’s and
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`Complainants’ proposed construction for the term “skip coding mode.”
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`4
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`February 28, 2024
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`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/s/ Marissa R. Ducca
`Margaret D. Macdonald, Director
`Jeffrey Hsu, Supervisory Attorney
`Marissa R. Ducca, Investigative Attorney
`Office of Unfair Import Investigations
`U.S. International Trade Commission
`500 E Street, S.W., Suite 401
`Washington, D.C. 20436
`(202) 205-2044 (office)
`
`5
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`

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`Certain Video Capable Electronic Devices, Including Computers, Streaming
`Devices, Televisions, Cameras, and Components and Modules Thereof
`
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned certifies that on February 28, 2024, she caused the foregoing
`
`337-TA-1379
`
`COMMISSION INVESTIGATIVE STAFF’S RESPONSIVE CLAIM
`CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`to be served upon the Administrative Law Judge at JohnsonHines1379@usitc.gov with courtesy
`copies uploaded to Box in accordance with Ground Rule 1.10.2.1, and serving the same upon the
`private parties in the manner indicated below:
`
`
`For Complainants Nokia Technologies Oy
`and Nokia Corporation
`
`Adam Swain
`Alston & Bird LLP
`950 F Street, NW
`Washington DC 20004
`
`John D. Haynes
`Nicholas T. Tsui
`Lindsay C. Church
`Shawn P. Gannon
`Paul Michael Haley
`Alston & Bird LLP
`1201 West Peachtree Street, Suite 4900
`Atlanta, GA 30309
`
`Theodore Stevenson
`Alston & Bird LLP
`Chase Tower
`2200 Ross Avenue
`Suite 2300
`Dallas, TX 75201
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`Caleb J. Bean
`Alston & Bird LLP
`333 South Hope Street
`16th Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`
`August R. Meny
`Alston & Bird LLP
`90 Park Avenue
`New York, NY 10016-1387
`
`Warren Lipschitz
`Alexandra F. Easley
`McKool Smith P.C.
`300 Crescent Court Suite 1200
`
`By Email:
`
`NKAmazonITC@alston.com
`Nokia_HP_Amazon@mckoolsmith.com
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`337-TA-1379
`
`
`
`1
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`Certificate of Service
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`

`

`Certain Video Capable Electronic Devices, Including Computers, Streaming
`Devices, Televisions, Cameras, and Components and Modules Thereof
`
`
`
`
`337-TA-1379
`
`Dallas, TX 75201
`
`R. Mitch Verboncoeur
`McKool Smith P.C.
`303 Colorado Street Suite 2100
`Austin, TX 78701
`
`Joshua J. Newcomer
`McKool Smith, P.C.
`600 Travis Street, Suite 7000
`Houston, TX 77002
`
`Kevin Burgess
`McKool Smith P.C.
`104 East Houston St., Suite 300
`Marshall, TX 75670
`
`For Respondent HP Inc.:
`
`Eric S. Namrow
`Stephanie L. Roberts
`Kandis C. Gibson
`Manu Bansal, Ph.D.
`Kevin J. Spinella
`Eunjean Je
`Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
`1111 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
`Washington D.C. 20004-2541
`
`David J. Levy
`Rick L. Rambo
`Thomas R. Davis
`Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius LLP
`1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 4000
`Houston, TX 77002-5005
`
`Jason E. Gettleman
`Corey R. Houmand
`Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
`1400 Page Mill Road
`Palo Alto, CA 94304
`For Respondents Amazon.com, Inc. and
`Amazon.com Services LLC
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`Veronica S. Ascarrunz
`Perkins Coie LLP
`700 13th Street, NW, Suite 800
`Washington DC 20005-3960
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`Stefani E. Shanberg
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`By Email:
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`HP-Nokia-ITC@morganlewis.com
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`By Email:
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`Nokia_Amazon_ITC_Perkins@perkinscoie.com
`LegalTm-Amazon-Nokia@sheppardmullin.com
`vascarrunz@perkinscoie.com
`
`337-TA-1379
`
`
`
`2
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`Certificate of Service
`
`

`

`Certain Video Capable Electronic Devices, Including Computers, Streaming
`Devices, Televisions, Cameras, and Components and Modules Thereof
`
`
`
`
`337-TA-1379
`
`Robin L. Brewer
`Perkins Coie LLP
`505 Howard Street, Suite 1000
`San Francisco, CA 94105-3204
`
`Thomas N. Millikan
`Perkins Coie LLP
`11452 El Camino Real, Suite 300
`San Diego, CA 92130-2080
`
`Stephen S. Korniczky
`Martin R. Bader
`Ericka J. Schulz
`Ryan P. Cunningham
`Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton
`LLP
`12275 El Camino Real, Suite 100
`San Diego, CA 92130-4092
`
`J. David Hadden
`Vigen Salmastlian
`Allen Wang
`Fenwick & West LLP
`801 California Street
`Mountain View, CA 94041
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/ Marissa R. Ducca
`Marissa R. Ducca
`Investigative Attorney
`Office of Unfair Import Investigations
`U.S. International Trade Commission
`500 E Street, SW
`Washington, DC 20436
`(202) 205-2044 (office)
`
`
`
`
`
`337-TA-1379
`
`3
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`Certificate of Service
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`

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