UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
`WASHINGTON, D.C.
`
`Before The Honorable Doris Johnson Hines
`Administrative Law Judge
`
`
`In the Matter of
`
`CERTAIN VIDEO CAPABLE
`ELECTRONIC DEVICES, INCLUDING
`COMPUTERS, STREAMING DEVICES,
`TELEVISIONS, CAMERAS, AND
`COMPONENTS AND MODULES
`THEREOF
`
`
`Investigation No. 337-TA-1379
`
`RESPONDENTS’ RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`AMAZON-1019
`7,532,808
`
`

`

`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`2. 
`
`2. 
`
`(b) 
`
`Page
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 
`ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 1 
`The Intrinsic Record Shows “Skip Coding Mode” Must Be Capable of
`A. 
`Providing Residual Information. ............................................................................ 1 
`The Claims Show “Skip Coding Mode” Includes the Capability to
`1. 
`Provide Residual Information. ................................................................... 1 
`The Specification’s Description of the Invention and Embodiments
`Reinforces the Scope of “Skip Coding Mode.” ......................................... 4 
`Complainants Failed to Show a Clear Intent to Exclude Residual
`Information. ........................................................................................................... 5 
`Complainants’ Alleged Lexicography Is Silent on Residual
`1. 
`Information. ............................................................................................... 5 
`Complainants Cannot Fill the Patentee’s Silence With Expert
`Testimony Contradicting the Intrinsic Record. .......................................... 6 
`Complainants’ Alleged Lexicography Distorts the
`(a) 
`Independent Claims and Invalidates Dependent Claims. .............. 7 
`Contrary to Complainants’ Arguments, the Specification
`Describes the “Present Invention” As Including Residual
`Information. ................................................................................... 8 
`Complainants’ And Staff’s Claim Differentiation Arguments Are Flawed. ......... 9 
`If the ALJ Agrees with Complainants’ Claim Differentiation Argument,
`the ALJ Should Find the “First Segment” Can Have Residual Information
`Somewhere. .......................................................................................................... 12 
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 13 
`
`I. 
`II. 
`
`III. 
`
`B. 
`
`C. 
`D. 
`
`
`
`-i-
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`

`

`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Page
`
`CASES
`
`AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine,
`344 F.3d 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2003)..................................................................................................1
`
`Baxalta Inc. et al. v. Genentech, Inc.,
`972 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2020)..................................................................................................5
`
`Clearstream Wastewater Sys., Inc. v. Hydro-Action, Inc.,
`206 F.3d 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2000)..................................................................................................3
`
`Cont’l Cirs. LLC v. Intel Corp.,
`915 F.3d 788 (Fed. Cir. 2019)....................................................................................................9
`
`Curtiss Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc.,
`438 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006)................................................................................................11
`
`Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey,
`476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..........................................................................................11, 12
`
`Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp.,
`112 F.3d 495 (Fed. Cir. 1997)..................................................................................................11
`
`Littelfuse, Inc. v. Mersen USA EP Corp.,
`29 F.4th 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ..................................................................................................6
`
`Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc.,
`520 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..................................................................................................8
`
`Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Lab’ys Ltd.,
`457 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2006)..........................................................................................2, 4, 7
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..............................................................................................6, 7
`
`Ruckus Wireless, Inc. v. Innovative Wireless Sols.,
`LLC, 824 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ..........................................................................................8
`
`SciMed Life Sys. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys.,
`242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001)..................................................................................................4
`
`Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc.,
`279 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002)..................................................................................................1
`
`
`
`-ii-
`
`
`
`

`

`
`STATUTES
`
`35 U.S.C. 112 ...................................................................................................................................8
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ..................................................................................................................2, 4, 7, 11
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`MPEP § 608.01(n) .......................................................................................................................2, 7
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,532,808...................................................................................................... passim
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
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`

`

`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`
`
`Respondents’ opening brief demonstrates that “skip coding mode” must be capable of
`
`providing residual information. Dependent claims recite not providing residual information in a
`
`bitstream. Under the doctrine of claim differentiation, “skip coding mode” in the independent
`
`claims cannot exclude residual information. The specification consistently describes the invention
`
`and several embodiments as including residual information.
`
`Complainants base their proposed construction of “skip coding mode” that excludes
`
`residual information on an alleged lexicography and extrinsic expert testimony. Complainants fail
`
`to meet the “exacting” standard for lexicography because the intrinsic record never excludes
`
`residual information from the invention. For the same reason, Complainants cannot rebut the
`
`presumption of claim differentiation.
`
`Accordingly, the ALJ should construe “skip coding mode” to include the capability of
`
`providing residual information.
`
`II.
`
`ARGUMENT
`A.
`
`The Intrinsic Record Shows “Skip Coding Mode” Must Be Capable of
`Providing Residual Information.
`
`The two most important guides for claim construction—the claims and specification—
`
`support Respondents’ position that “skip coding mode” must be capable of providing residual
`
`information.
`
`1.
`
`The Claims Show “Skip Coding Mode” Includes the Capability to
`Provide Residual Information.
`
`Claim construction always begins with the claim language. Tate Access Floors, Inc. v.
`
`Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2002). “Under the doctrine of
`
`claim differentiation, dependent claims are presumed to be of narrower scope than the independent
`
`claims from which they depend.” AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1242 (Fed.
`
`1
`
`

`

`
`Cir. 2003). Moreover, a dependent claim that fails to specify a further limitation of the subject
`
`
`
`matter is invalid for failing to comply with 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 4. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Lab’ys
`
`Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2006); MPEP § 608.01(n) at § III (“[N]on-compliance with
`
`35 U.S.C. 112(d) renders the claim unpatentable just as non-compliance with other paragraphs of
`
`35 U.S.C. 112 would.”). Here, claim differentiation between the independent claims (claims 1, 7,
`
`10, and 16) and their respective dependent claims (claims 30, 41, 49, and 60) shows that “skip
`
`coding mode” must allow residual information because the only difference in the dependent claims
`
`is that they specifically recite not providing that information.
`
`Independent claim 1 (below), for example, recites a method for encoding a video sequence.
`
`Notably, the claim is silent about the presence or absence of residual information.1
`
`
`’808 patent at cl. 1 (highlighting added). The Staff agrees with Respondents that the independent
`
`
`
`claims allow for residual information. Staff Op. Br. at p. 9 (noting that claim “uses permissible
`
`
`1 The patentee knew how to specify that information would not be sent in independent claims. For
`example, in claim 1, the patentee expressly stated that “no further motion vector information… is
`coded in the… bitstream.” No such limitation exists as to “skip coding mode.”
`
`2
`
`

`

`
`language for the use of prediction error [(i.e., residual)] information” and the intrinsic record
`
`
`
`“nowhere” explicitly disclaims use of residual information.). The Staff disagrees with
`
`Complainants’ position that residual information can never be provided for any skip coding mode.
`
`See Declaration of Dr. Michael Orchard in Support of Nokia and ITC Staff’s Proposed
`
`Construction for “Skip Coding Mode” in U.S. Patent No. 7,532,808 at ¶ 25 (hereinafter “Orchard
`
`Decl.”) (stating that “residual information can never be provided for any skip mode macroblock”),
`
`¶ 20 (“residual information can never be provided for any skip mode macroblock associated with
`
`a ‘non-active’ motion vector”), ¶ 21 (“[N]o residual information is involved in the reconstruction
`
`of skip mode macroblocks associated with ‘active’ motion vectors.”); Staff Op. Br. at p. 9.2
`
`Respondents and the Staff agree on the scope of the independent claims.
`
`Dependent claim 30 specifies an embodiment in which “no residual information is
`
`provided for the first segment”:
`
`
`’808 patent at cl. 30 (highlighting added). Because dependent claim 30 specifies that no
`
`
`
`residual information is provided, independent claim 1 must be capable of providing residual
`
`information. Clearstream Wastewater Sys., Inc. v. Hydro-Action, Inc., 206 F.3d 1440, 1446 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2000) (“Under the doctrine of claim differentiation, it is presumed that different words used
`
`in different claims result in a difference in meaning and scope for each of the claims.”). A POSITA3
`
`
`2 If the ALJ adopts Complainants’ position, it should modify Complainants’ construction to make
`clear that “skip coding mode” “cannot include residual information” because there is a claim
`construction dispute that requires resolution and Complainants’ construction, as written, does not
`resolve that dispute.
`3 Complainants and the Staff propose a different level of ordinary skill in the art than Respondents.
`But, for purposes of this claim construction dispute, Respondents do not believe there is a material
`difference between the parties’ POSITA definitions.
`
`3
`
`

`

`
`would understand the dependent claims to mean “the ‘first segment’ that has been assigned a ‘skip
`
`
`
`coding mode’ in the independent claims can have residual information.” Ex. 1, Declaration of Dr.
`
`Joseph Havlicek (“Havlicek Decl.”) at ¶ 34.
`
`If claim 1 cannot include residual information, then claim 30 does not add a narrowing
`
`limitation, and it is invalid. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 (a “claim in dependent form shall contain a
`
`reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation”); see, e.g., Pfizer,
`
`457 F.3d at 1292 (invalidating dependent claim that failed to specify a further limitation).
`
`2.
`
`The Specification’s Description of the Invention and Embodiments
`Reinforces the Scope of “Skip Coding Mode.”
`
`Additionally, the specification supports Respondents’ construction. The specification
`
`describes coding modes with residual information, as Respondents explained in their opening
`
`brief. Resp. Op. Brief at pp. 12-15. For example, the invention uses INTER coding modes, which
`
`indisputably include residual information,4 when defining “the present invention”5 for the encoder
`
`in Figure 6:
`
`As the present invention relates to the encoding of video frames in INTER-coded
`format and more particularly to details of the motion-compensated prediction
`performed as part of the INTER coding process, description of encoder 600 in
`INTRA-coding mode will be omitted and the following sections will concentrate
`on the operations performed by the encoder in INTER-coding mode. In INTER-
`coding mode… combiner 116 forms corresponding blocks of prediction error [(i.e.
`residual information)].
`
`’808 patent at 16:15-31 (emphasis added). Similarly, the invention uses INTER coding
`
`modes when defining “the present invention” for the decoder in Figure 7:
`
`Furthermore, as the present invention affects the decoding of video frames in
`INTER-coded format, description of the operations performed by decoder 700 in
`
`4 Nokia’s expert admits INTER modes include residual information. See Orchard Decl. at ¶ 18; see
`also Havlicek Decl. at ¶ 34.
`5 See, e.g., SciMed Life Sys. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 242 F.3d 1337, 1340-45 (Fed. Cir.
`2001) (noting that language in the specification of “the present invention,” “defines [the
`patentee’s] invention”).
`
`4
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`connection with the decoding of INTRA-coded frames will be omitted.… [A]n
`INTER-coded macroblock may compromise … prediction error information.
`Id. at 20:39-49 (emphasis added).
`
`These statements show the patentee not only explicitly included INTER-coded modes with
`
`residual information in the scope of its invention, see Havlicek Decl. at ¶ 34, but that it also knew
`
`how to omit modes, e.g., INTRA-coded modes, that are unrelated to the invention.
`
`Given the above evidence from the claims and specification, the ALJ should adopt
`
`Respondents’ construction.
`
`B.
`
`Complainants Failed to Show a Clear Intent to Exclude Residual Information.
`
`Unable to overcome the intrinsic record in support of Respondents’ construction,
`
`Complainants argue “skip coding mode” excludes residual information because the patentee
`
`redefined the term to exclude it in a couple of select specification excerpts. But lexicography
`
`requires a “clear intent” to exclude claim scope. Baxalta Inc. et al. v. Genentech, Inc. et al., 972
`
`F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“[T]he standard for lexicography is exacting, requiring the
`
`patentee to clearly express an intent to redefine a term.”) (internal quotation marks and citations
`
`omitted). Complainants gloss over that exacting legal standard and cherry-pick excerpts from the
`
`specification that are silent about residual information while ignoring contrary examples. Here,
`
`lexicography must be so clear that it also overcomes the presumption of claim differentiation.
`
`None of Complainants’ arguments or citations justify this extraordinary result. Indeed, the intrinsic
`
`record as a whole shows there is no lexicography to exclude residual information.
`
`1.
`
`Complainants’ Alleged Lexicography Is Silent on Residual
`Information.
`
`Complainants’ lexicography argument hinges on two excerpts in the specification that
`
`allegedly constitute a “redefinition” of skip coding mode. The two excerpts are silent about
`
`5
`
`

`

`
`residual information, vitiating Complainants’ ability to show “clear intent” to exclude claim scope
`
`
`
`from the start.
`
`As shown below, these excerpts focus on motion information, not residual information,
`
`which is used in a separate step after accounting for motion. Compl. Op. Brief at p. 16. As Dr.
`
`Joseph Havlicek explains in his declaration, those specific excerpts do not mention whether
`
`residual information is sent or not and certainly do not say the invention can never send residual
`
`information. Havlicek Decl. at ¶¶ 40-41.
`
`
`(’808 patent at 17:43-53)6
`
`
`(’808 patent at 14:14-29)
`That silence is fatal to Complainants’ lexicography argument. Littelfuse, Inc. v. Mersen
`
`USA EP Corp., 29 F.4th 1376, 1379-82 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (finding no lexicography where “[n]othing
`
`in the specification state[d] that a fastening stem [could not] be present in a single-piece
`
`apparatus.”).
`
`2.
`
`Complainants Cannot Fill the Patentee’s Silence With Expert
`Testimony Contradicting the Intrinsic Record.
`
`Using expert testimony to speak for the patentee is itself suspect. Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`
`415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (expert testimony is “generated at the time of and for the
`
`
`6 If the ALJ allows Complainants to tie their construction to the JM1 “redefinition” based on this
`part of the specification, the Construction should also include the other mentioned JM1 coding
`modes in Table 3, not just the redefinition part Complainants find favorable.
`
`6
`
`

`

`
`purpose of litigation and thus can suffer from bias that is not present in intrinsic evidence”). Here,
`
`
`
`it is especially problematic when it conflicts with the claims and specification. See Phillips, 415
`
`F.3d at 1319 (expert testimony “is unlikely to result in a reliable interpretation of patent claim
`
`scope unless considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence”).
`
`Complainants try to fill the patentee’s silence with expert testimony that the patentee
`
`actually meant to limit “skip coding mode” to JM1 Skip Mode, which excludes residual
`
`information. Compl. Op. Br. at pp. 17-18 (“As Dr. Orchard explains in his declaration … a
`
`POSITA would not understand the inventor to be replacing JM1’s SKIP Mode with a skip coding
`
`mode that does not itself skip ‘the coding transmission and decoding of residual information’ for
`
`skip mode macroblock.”). But Complainants’ expert relies on cherry picking certain excerpts and
`
`stretching simple phrases like “generate the pixels” to mean “generated directly … and thus no
`
`‘residual information’” when the specification teaches adding residual information to “generated”
`
`pixels. Havlicek Decl. at ¶¶ 46-47; see also Havlicek Decl. at ¶¶ 39, 41, 43 45, 50, and 52.
`
`Complainants’ expert does not discuss the claims, their use of the term “residual information,” or
`
`that Figures 6 and 7, and their descriptions, teach the use of residual information as part of “the
`
`present invention.” See generally Orchard Decl.
`
`(a)
`
`Complainants’ Alleged Lexicography Distorts the Independent
`Claims and Invalidates Dependent Claims.
`
`As explained above in Section A.1, the claims demonstrate that the patentee did not define
`
`“skip coding mode” to exclude residual information. Complainants’ construction renders
`
`dependent claims 30, 41, 49, and 60 invalid because they do not add a narrowing limitation as
`
`required under 35 U.S.C § 112 ¶ 4. See, e.g., Pfizer, 457 F.3d at 1292 (invalidating dependent
`
`claim that failed to specify a further limitation); MPEP § 608.01(n) at § III (“[N]on-compliance
`
`with 35 U.S.C. 112(d) renders the claim unpatentable just as non-compliance with other
`
`7
`
`

`

`
`paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 112 would.”); see also Ruckus Wireless, Inc. v. Innovative Wireless Sols.,
`
`
`
`LLC, 824 F.3d 999, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (stating principle that claims “should be construed to
`
`preserve [their] validity.); see also Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358,
`
`1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (construing claims to avoid the “nonsensical result” of “rendering several
`
`other dependent claims meaningless”).
`
`Consequently, Complainants’ and Staff’s construction cannot be correct because it renders
`
`dependent claims meaningless.
`
`(b)
`
`Contrary to Complainants’ Arguments, the Specification
`Describes the “Present Invention” As Including Residual
`Information.
`
`Complainants also failed to show the patentee limited the invention to JMI Skip mode and
`
`disclaimed residual information in the specification. To the contrary, the patentee expressly said
`
`the invention was not limited to a modification of JM1 Skip Mode.
`
`
`
`The patentee expressly stated that their invention was not limited to a supposed
`
`“redefinition” of JM1 Skip Mode, as Complainants contend, but could be used in other modes.
`
`’808 patent at 25:4-8 (“The invention can also be used to generate motion compensated prediction
`
`for other Macroblock modes in addition to or instead of the SKIP mode. It is also not limited by
`
`the macroblock structure but can be used in any segmentation based video coding system.”)
`
`(emphasis added). Also, the patentee stated that, in an embodiment, there is no skip mode
`
`whatsoever—“the macroblock mode table is completely regenerated depending on the output of
`
`the surrounding motion analysis block, for example, by removing the skip.” ’808 patent at 24:57-
`
`60 (emphasis added). Complainants’ expert again ignores these portions of the specification.
`
`Additionally, the patentee was specific when it wanted to exclude residual information. For
`
`example, the patentee expressly excluded residual information from being sent in an embodiment
`
`disclosed in connection with Figure 7. ’808 patent at 20:26-55 (“Operation of a video decoder 700
`
`8
`
`

`

`
`according to an embodiment of the invention will now be described with reference to FIG. 7 … If
`
`
`
`a macroblock is encoded in skip mode, no prediction error or motion vector information relating
`
`to the macroblock is included in the bit-stream.”). If “skip coding mode,” by definition, did not
`
`include residual information, the patentee would not have needed to specify not providing residual
`
`information in connection with this embodiment.
`
`Moreover, the patentee clearly stated when an embodiment was implemented according to
`
`JM1, so it follows that not all embodiments are so limited. ’808 patent at 23:13-17 (“In the example
`
`illustrated in FIG. 10, the video codec is implemented according to JM1 of the JVT codec, with
`
`appropriate modifications to implement the modified SKIP mode concept according to the
`
`invention in both the encoder and the decoder of the video codec.”).
`
`In all, these examples show the patentee did not intend their invention to be limited to JM1
`
`or for “skip coding mode” to exclude residual information.7 See Cont’l Cirs. LLC v. Intel Corp.,
`
`915 F.3d 788, 798 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (finding no lexicography where intrinsic record was
`
`inconsistent).
`
`C.
`
`Complainants’ And Staff’s Claim Differentiation Arguments Are Flawed.
`
`Complainants argue claim differentiation does not apply because the dependent claims
`
`recite no residual information “in the encoded bitstream,” and somehow “in the encoded
`
`bitstream” is a separate limitation. Compl. Op. Brief at p. 22 (emphasis added). This is incorrect
`
`for several reasons.
`
`First, “in the encoded bitstream” is not a separate limitation. It simply clarifies that there is
`
`
`7 Complainants’ alleged lexicography also lacks support in the provisional application to which
`the ’808 patent claims priority. Specifically, none of the excerpts on which Complainants rely for
`lexicography is found in the provisional application. Compare ’808 patent at 17:43-53 and 14:14-
`29 with Ex. 3 (’808 patent provisional application). Those excerpts and the embodiments
`underlying Complainants’ construction, including JM1, were not added until later.
`
`9
`
`

`

`
`no residual information anywhere. Indeed, the phrase follows the same style and language found
`
`
`
`in other claims. See, e.g., ’808 patent at cl. 1 (“wherein no further motion vector information for
`
`the first segment is coded in the encoded bitstream.”). So “no residual information … in the
`
`encoded bitstream” just means “no residual information” for purposes of the claims. For the
`
`independent claims, this also means there can be residual information somewhere in order for the
`
`dependent claim to be narrowing.
`
`Second, the specification is clear that the coding mode defines whether a macroblock can
`
`or cannot have residual information. Havlicek Decl. at ¶¶ 35-36. In other words, the “skip coding
`
`mode” defines whether there can be residual information in the bitstream or not, which, as Dr.
`
`Havlicek explains “is necessary so the decoder knows whether to look for residual information in
`
`the bitstream for that macroblock or not to look.” Id. For example, “[d]epending on the coding
`
`mode, the compressed video data included in the bit-stream for an INTER-coded macroblock may
`
`comprise … prediction error information for each block….” ’808 patent at 20:46-49 (emphasis
`
`added). Complainants’ expert also agrees with Respondents that the coding mode signals whether
`
`the macroblock can have residual information. Orchard Decl. at ¶¶ 17-19 (comparing macroblock
`
`modes and acknowledging that “reconstruction in INTER modes” can have “residual information”
`
`and a prior art skip mode cannot).
`
`Lastly, Complainants ignore an essential part of the claim language: the fact that the
`
`dependent claims specify “no residual information is provided for the first segment [i.e., the skip
`
`coded segment] in the encoded bitstream.” Id. (emphasis added). Contrary to Complainants’
`
`argument, the dependent claims do not broadly claim that residual information is not provided for
`
`some other segment in the encoded bitstream, but rather add a specific limitation that residual
`
`10
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`

`

`
`information is not provided for the first segment [i.e., the skip coded segment] in the encoded
`
`
`
`bitstream.8
`
`Staff argues that “comprising” in the preambles of the independent claims means the term
`
`“skip coding mode” does not need to allow or not allow residual information. Staffs Brief. at pp.
`
`10-11. Staff misapplies the law on “comprising.” The term “comprising” in a preamble raises a
`
`presumption that the list of claim limitations is nonexclusive. But “‘comprising’ is not a weasel
`
`word with which to abrogate claim limitations.” Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1343
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
`
`In Dippin’ Dots, the Federal Circuit rejected a similar argument. There, the patentee argued
`
`the term “beads” could include irregularly shaped beads because the preamble used “comprising,”
`
`even though the intrinsic record disclosed spherical beads. Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1342-43. The
`
`Federal Circuit rejected the argument because while the transitional term “comprising” rendered
`
`the enumerated steps open-ended and thus allowed for additional steps, the “presumption raised
`
`by the term ‘comprising’ does not reach into each of the six steps to render every word and phrase
`
`therein open-ended.” Id. at 1343.
`
`
`8 Complainants cite Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc. et al., 582 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir 2009).
`Edwards is distinguishable. Here, the parties have not “agreed at trial” to a construction (i.e.,
`waiver). Further, “every embodiment described in the specification and shown in the drawings” of
`the ’808 does not exclude residual information, the ’808 patent does not use “the present invention”
`language to exclude residual information, every claim does not have “a requirement that” having
`no residual information “perform[s] [a certain] function,” and here the dependent claims do not
`“add further limitations.” Id. at 1331-32. Curtiss Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438
`F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006) does not support Complainant’s claim construction either. In
`Curtiss Wright, the Federal Circuit applied a different standard because the comparison was
`between independent claims, not dependent claims. Curtiss Wright noted that if it was a dependent
`claim, “reading an additional limitation from a dependent claim into an independent claim …
`might render the dependent claim invalid” under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4. Id. at 1380.
`
`11
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`

`
`
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`
`Here, as in Dippin’ Dots, “comprising” is a transitional term in the preamble, indicating
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`that the claim limitations are nonexclusive, and leaving the claim open to additional limitations
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`that are consistent with the stated limitations. But “comprising” does not reach into each of the
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`recited limitations, like “skip coding mode,” and render them open-ended.
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`Staff’s position is also incorrect from a technical perspective: the “skip coding mode” in
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`the independent claims cannot be defined as both a skip coding mode with residual and a skip
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`coding mode without residual. The parties agree that coding modes are designed to be either
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`capable or incapable of providing residual information. See Orchard Decl. at ¶¶ 17-19 (comparing
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`coding modes and acknowledging that “reconstruction in INTER modes” can have “residual
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`information” and a prior art skip mode cannot); Havlicek Decl. at ¶ 37 (“a macroblock coding
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`mode defines whether the macroblock can have residual information or cannot”). Coding modes
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`that are capable of providing residual information tell the decoder to look for residual information.
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`See Havlicek Decl. at ¶ 37 (“This is necessary so the decoder knows whether to look for residual
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`information in the bitstream for that macroblock or not to look.”). This does not mean a macroblock
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`coded under this mode must provide residual information, but the coding mode must provide that
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`capability. See Havlicek Decl. at ¶ 37 (“a macroblock coding mode can allow a macroblock to
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`have residual information and still decide not to send residual information.”). By contrast, coding
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`modes that are incapable of providing residual information do not have such a code because they
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`do not need one. Id. at ¶ 35.
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`D.
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`If the ALJ Agrees with Complainants’ Claim Differentiation Argument, the
`ALJ Should Find the “First Segment” Can Have Residual Information
`Somewhere.
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`If the ALJ agrees with Complainants’ claim differentiation argument that “the entire coded
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`bitstream does not contain residual information for the first segment,” the ALJ should still find
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`that the independent claims 1, 7, 10 and 16 require that the “first segment can have residual
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`information somewhere in the encoded bitstream.” In other words, under Complainants’ theory,
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`
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`the dependent claims necessitate that whatever the coding mode of the first segment is, the first
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`segment must be capable of having residual information somewhere in the bitstream and
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`infringement of the independent claims requires a showing of this capability.
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`For the reasons stated herein, the ALJ should adopt Respondents’ position and construe
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`skip coding mode as: “a coding mode in which a zero (nonactive) motion vector or a nonzero
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`(active) motion vector is associated with each skip mode macroblock, depending on the
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`characteristics of the motion in image segments surrounding the macroblock in question, and
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`residual information can be provided for each skip mode macroblock.”
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`GROUND RULE 1.7 CERTIFICATION
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`Pursuant to Ground Rule 1.7, on behalf of Respondents Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon.com
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`Services LLC, and HP, Inc., the undersigned hereby certifies that Respondents’ Opening Claim
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`Construction Brief complies with the word count limitations and contains 3,247 words according
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`to the word-processing program used to prepare the brief (Microsoft Word). The word count
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`includes footnotes. The word count does not include captions, the signature block, or the certificate
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`of service.
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`
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`DATED: February 23, 2024
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`
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`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/s/ Thomas N. Millikan
`Veronica S. Ascarrunz
`Perkins Coie LLP
`700 13th Street, NW, Suite 800
`Washington, DC 20005-3960
`(202) 654-6200
`
`Stefani E. Shanberg
`Robin L. Brewer
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`Perkins Coie LLP
`505 Howard Street, Suite 1000
`San Francisco, California 94105-3204
`(415) 344-7000
`
`Thomas N. Millikan
`Perkins Coie LLP
`11452 El Camino Real, Suite 300
`San Diego, CA 92130-2080
`(858) 720-5700
`
`Stephen S. Korniczky
`Martin R. Bader
`Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP
`12275 El Camino Real, Suite 100
`San Diego, CA 92130-4092
`(858) 720-8900
`
`Counsel for Respondents Amazon.com, Inc. and
`Amazon.com Services LLC
`
`
`/s/ Stephanie L. Roberts
`Eric S. Namrow
`Stephanie L. Roberts
`Kandis C. Gibson
`Manu Bansal
`Kevin J. Spinella
`Emily K. Burge
`Eunjean Je
`Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
`1111 Pennsylvania Ave, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20004-2541
`Telephone: (202) 739-3000
`Facsimile: (202) 739-3001
`
`Jason E. Gettleman
`Ehsun Forghany
`Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
`1400 Page Mill Road
`Palo Alto, CA 94304
`Telephone: (650) 843-4000
`Facsimile: (650) 843-4001
`
`Rick L. Rambo
`Thomas R. Davis
`Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
`
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`1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 4000
`Houston, TX 77002-5005
`Telep