`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`
`
`
`PROXENSE, LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`Defendant.
`
`Civil Action No. 6:23-cv-320
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`JURY TRIAL REQUESTED
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`DEFENDANT GOOGLE LLC’S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Patent Owner Exhibit 2005, Page 1 of 27
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`Case 6:23-cv-00320-ADA Document 40 Filed 11/06/23 Page 2 of 27
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`I.
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`II.
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`Introduction ..........................................................................................................................1
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`Background ..........................................................................................................................2
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`III.
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`Level of Skill in the Art .......................................................................................................3
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`IV.
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`Undisputed Terms ................................................................................................................3
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`V.
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`Disputed Terms ....................................................................................................................4
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`A.
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`B.
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`3.
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`Device ID Patents ....................................................................................................4
`1.
`“integrated device” (’730 claims 1, 15) .......................................................4
`2.
`“persistently storing … a plurality of codes and other data values
`comprising a device ID code … and a secret decryption value”
`(’730 claim 1, 15; ’954 claim 1, 22) ............................................................9
`“access message” terms (’730 claims 1, 15; ’954 claim 1, 22; ’905
`claim 1, 13) ................................................................................................11
`“The method of claim 1, wherein the biometric data and the scan
`data are both based on a fingerprint scan by the user.” (’730 claim
`5) ................................................................................................................13
`Hybrid Device Patents ...........................................................................................18
`1.
`“receiver-decoder circuit” (’042 claim 10; ’289 claim 14) ........................18
`2.
`“personal digital key” (’042 claim 10; ’289 claim 14) ..............................19
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`4.
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`VI.
`
`CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................21
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`Patent Owner Exhibit 2005, Page 2 of 27
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`Case 6:23-cv-00320-ADA Document 40 Filed 11/06/23 Page 3 of 27
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page
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`
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`Cases
`
`In re Anderson,
`471 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A.1973) ........................................................................................................7
`Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)......................................................................................................18
`Dart Indus., Inc. v. Banner,
`636 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1980) .....................................................................................................7, 8
`Goldenberg v. Cytogen, Inc.,
`373 F.3d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2004)........................................................................................................8
`Ingevity Corp. v. BASF Corp.,
`No. 18-CV-1391-RGA, 2019 WL 2356978 (D. Del. June 4, 2019) ................................................6
`IQASR LLC v. Wendt Corp.,
`825 F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ..............................................................................................4, 6
`Iridescent Networks, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC,
`933 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2019)....................................................................................................4, 5
`Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp.,
`728 F.2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984)........................................................................................................8
`Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp.,
`831 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................13, 16
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`572 U.S. 898 (2014) ...................................................................................................................9, 10
`In re Oda,
`443 F.2d 1200 (C.C.P.A.1971) ........................................................................................................7
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)......................................................................................................19
`Proxense, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd.,
`No. 6:21-cv-210-ADA (W.D. Tex.) .................................................................................................2
`Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
`789 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................10, 11
`TMI Prod., Inc. v. Rosen Ent. Sys., L.P.,
`610 F. App'x 968 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .................................................................................................20
`Trustees of Columbia Univ. in City of New York v. Symantec Corp.,
`811 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016)......................................................................................................15
`
`
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`Patent Owner Exhibit 2005, Page 3 of 27
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`Case 6:23-cv-00320-ADA Document 40 Filed 11/06/23 Page 4 of 27
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`
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`TurboCare Div. of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
`264 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2001)........................................................................................................8
`WSOU Investments LLC v. Google LLC,
`Nos. 2022-1066 & 2022-1067, 2023 WL 6210607 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2023) .............................15
`WSOU Invs., LLC v. Google LLC,
`No. 6:20-CV-00571-ADA, 2021 WL 11745550 (W.D. Tex. June 2, 2021)
`(Albright, J.), aff'd, No. 2022-1066, 2023 WL 6210607 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2023) .....................17
`
`Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 4 .......................................................................................................................13, 16
`
`Other Authorities
`U.S. Patent No. 8,352,730..........................................1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18
`U.S. Patent No. 8,646,042..........................................................................................1, 3, 18, 19, 20, 21
`U.S. Patent No. 8,886,954..........................................................................................1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12
`U.S. Patent No. 9,679,289................................................................................................1, 3, 19, 20, 21
`U.S. Patent No. 9,928,905....................................................................................................1, 2, 3, 8, 12
`U.S. Patent No. 10,073,960................................................................................................................1, 3
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`Patent Owner Exhibit 2005, Page 4 of 27
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`Case 6:23-cv-00320-ADA Document 40 Filed 11/06/23 Page 5 of 27
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`Defendant Google LLC (“Google) respectfully submits this Opening Claim Construction
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`Brief for U.S. Patent No. 8,352,730 (“’730 patent”), U.S. Patent No. 8,886,954 (“’954 patent”),
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`U.S. Patent No. 9,928,905 (“’905 patent”), U.S. Patent No. 8,646,042 (“’042 patent”), U.S. Patent
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`No. 9,679,289 (“’289 patent”), and U.S. Patent No. 10,073,960 (“’960 patent”) asserted by
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`Plaintiff Proxense, LLC (“Proxense”) in the above-captioned action.
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`In all, there are six disputed terms that fall into two categories. First, there are three terms
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`(i.e., “integrated device,” “plurality of codes and other data values,” and the “fingerprint”
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`limitation in a dependent claim of the ’730 patent) that are indefinite because they fail to inform
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`those of ordinary skill of the scope of the alleged inventions. The term “integrated device” is a
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`coined term with no plain meaning, and the specification of the ’730 patent provides no guidance
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`regarding the meaning of that term. This is confirmed by the fact that Proxense added an express
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`definition for “integrated device” to the specifications of subsequent applications purporting to
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`claim the benefit of the ’730 patent. But this definition is absent from the ’730 patent, rendering
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`“integrated device” indefinite in the claims of that patent, where the term is not defined. Next, the
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`phrase “plurality of codes and other data values” is susceptible to at least four different
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`interpretations, each requiring different sets of data to be stored. Accordingly, this phrase too is
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`indefinite because it fails to inform those of ordinary skill of the scope of the alleged invention and
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`fails to put the public on notice of what would constitute infringement. Finally, dependent claim
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`5 of the ’730 patent purports to narrow the “biometric data” from claim 1, but instead introduces
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`language that conflicts with the plain meaning of claim 1. Because the claim is internally
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`inconsistent and irreconcilable, it is indefinite.
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`Second, there are three terms (i.e., the “access message” terms, “receiver-decoder circuit,”
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`and “personal digital key”) that were previously construed by the Court, at least in part, and Google
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`
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`1
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`Patent Owner Exhibit 2005, Page 5 of 27
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`Case 6:23-cv-00320-ADA Document 40 Filed 11/06/23 Page 6 of 27
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`herein proposes only minor revisions or additions to ensure the Court’s constructions align with
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`the plain meaning of the language of the claims asserted here.
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`II.
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`BACKGROUND
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`The asserted patents belong to two different, purported patent families.1 The ’954 and ’905
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`patents claim priority to the non-provisional application for the ’730 patent filed December 20,
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`2005, as well as to two provisional applications, Nos. 60/637,538 (“’765 Prov. Appl.”) filed
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`December 20, 2004, and 60/652,765 (“’765 Prov. Appl.”) filed February 14, 2005. The ’730, ’954,
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`and ’905 patents are collectively referred to herein as the “Device ID patents.”
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`The ’042, ’289, and ’960 patents all claim priority to a non-provisional application filed
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`December 5, 2008, and provisional application No. 60/992,953 filed December 6, 2007. The ’042,
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`’289, and ’960 patents are collectively referred to herein as the “Hybrid Device patents.”
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`Members of both the Device ID and Hybrid Device patent families, including the ’730 and
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`’905 patents, were previously construed by the Court in Proxense, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
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`Ltd., No. 6:21-cv-210-ADA (W.D. Tex.) (“the Samsung case”) in Dkt. 43 (“Order”) and Dkt. 149
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`(“Memorandum in Support of Claim Construction Order”).2
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`In this litigation, Proxense is asserting a limited set of claims from different members of
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`the same previously-asserted patent families:
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`Patent Family
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`Patent
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`Claims (independent claims emphasized)
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`Device ID Patents
`
`’730 Patent
`
`1, 2-3, 5, 15, 16-17
`
`
`1 As addressed below, while the ’954 and ’905 patents purport to be continuations of the ’730
`patent, and thus are part of the same purported patent family, the applications for the ’954 and
`’905 patents add new matter not present in the ’730 patent, and thus the ’954 and ’905 patents’
`cannot be continuations of the ’730 patent.
`2 In the Samsung case, the asserted Device ID patents were the ’730 patent, the ’905 patent, and
`U.S. Pat. No. 10,698,989, and the asserted Hybrid Device patents were U.S. Pat. Nos. 9,049,188
`and 9,235,700.
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`
`
`2
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`Patent Owner Exhibit 2005, Page 6 of 27
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`Case 6:23-cv-00320-ADA Document 40 Filed 11/06/23 Page 7 of 27
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`
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`’954 Patent
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`’905 Patent
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`Hybrid Device Patents
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`’042 Patent
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`1, 2-3, 5-7, 22, 23-27
`1, 2, 4-5, 7, 133
`104
`
`’289 Patent
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`’960 Patent
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`14, 16
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`14, 16
`
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`III. LEVEL OF SKILL IN THE ART
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`Google submits that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a B.S. in
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`computer or electrical engineering, or equivalent, and at least three years of experience in the field
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`of encryption and security or equivalent experience. More education could substitute for less
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`experience, and vice-versa. Black Decl. ¶ 17.
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`IV. UNDISPUTED TERMS
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`The parties have agreed to the following constructions entered in the Samsung case:
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`Term
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`“device ID code” / “ID code” (’730 claims 1, 15; ’954
`claims 1, 22; ’905 claim 1, 13)
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`Agreed Construction
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`“a unique code identifying a device”
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`“access message” (’730 claims 1, 15; ’954 claims 1,
`22; ’905 claim 1, 13)
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`“a signal or notification enabling or
`announcing access”
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`“persistently storing . . . a tamper proof format written
`to a storage element on the integrated device that is
`unable to be subsequently altered” (’730 claims 1, 15)
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`“hybrid device” (’042 claim 10; ’289 claim 14)
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`“enablement signal” (’042 claim 10; ’289 claim 14;
`’960 claim 14)
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`No construction necessary
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`“A device comprising an integrated
`personal digital key (PDK) and an
`integrated receiver-decoder circuit”
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`No construction necessary
`
`
`3 Proxense’s cover pleadings to its infringement contentions identify dependent claim 15, but the
`accompanying claim chart is based on the language of independent claim 13. Google therefore
`understands claim 13 of the ’905 patent is asserted, not claim 15.
`4 Proxense’s complaint identifies claim 1 of the ’042 patent, but Proxense’s opposition to
`Google’s motion to dismiss stated that this was “a typographical error” and that, consistent with
`its infringement contentions, Proxense intended to assert claim 10. Dkt. 27 at 4 fn. 4.
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`
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`3
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`Patent Owner Exhibit 2005, Page 7 of 27
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`Case 6:23-cv-00320-ADA Document 40 Filed 11/06/23 Page 8 of 27
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`V.
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`DISPUTED TERMS
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`A.
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`Device ID Patents
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`1.
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`“integrated device” (’730 claims 1, 15)
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`Term
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`Google’s Construction
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`Proxense’s Construction
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`“integrated device”
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`Indefinite
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`No construction necessary
`
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`“[I]ntegrated device” is “a coined term, meaning it has no ordinary and customary
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`meaning,” and thus “the question is whether the intrinsic evidence provides objective boundaries
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`to the scope of the term.” See Iridescent Networks, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 933 F.3d 1345,
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`1353 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Here, neither the claim language nor other intrinsic evidence defines the
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`scope of the claimed “integrated device,” leaving undefined what types of devices are
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`authenticated by the method and system of claims 1 and 15 of the ’730 patent and thereby rendering
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`those claims indefinite. See, e.g., IQASR LLC v. Wendt Corp., 825 F. App’x 900, 908 (Fed. Cir.
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`2020) (finding a “magnetic fuzz” claim term was indefinite because “‘patent fails to offer any
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`meaningful and functional explanation’ of the definitional characteristics of ‘magnetic fuzz’”).
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`The two asserted independent claims of the ’730 patent are directed to methods and systems
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`for authenticating an “integrated device.” ’730 patent, claims 1 and 15. Asserted method claim 1
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`requires storing a “device ID code uniquely identifying the integrated device” and “a third-party
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`trusted authority possessing a list of device ID codes uniquely identifying legitimate integrated
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`devices.” Asserted system claim 15 refers to “a device ID code uniquely identifying [a] biometric
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`key” but then requires a “third-party trusted authority possessing a list of device ID codes uniquely
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`identifying legitimate integrated devices.”
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`As explained by Google’s expert, Dr. John Black, the term “integrated device” is not a
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`known term used in connection with computer technology and lacks any ordinary or customary
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`meaning. Black Decl. ¶ 20. Dr. Black’s survey of nine computer dictionaries did not identify a
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`4
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`Patent Owner Exhibit 2005, Page 8 of 27
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`Case 6:23-cv-00320-ADA Document 40 Filed 11/06/23 Page 9 of 27
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`single definition for “integrated device.” Id. ¶¶ 21-22.
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`The constituent words of “integrated device” also fail to inform one of ordinary skill
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`regarding the scope of this claim term. For example, in asserted method claim 1, the term dictates
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`that the claimed “device” being “authenticated” via the claimed method must be “integrated,” but
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`other than indicating that the “integrated device” includes “a storage element,” the language of
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`method claim 1 fails to define what it means for a device to be “integrated,” including whether it
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`is the device itself that is “integrated” into a system or it is individual components that are
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`“integrated” into the device, or anything about the nature or number of components that must be
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`included in a device for it to qualify as an “integrated device.” Black Decl. ¶¶ 23-24. Asserted
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`system claim 15 fares even worse, since it refers to “a biometric key,” yet does not identify whether
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`that alone is an example of the claimed “legitimate integrated devices,” or what else would be
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`required for such key to qualify as an “integrated device” (e.g., whether there is a particular
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`arrangement of components within the key that must be “integrated” and/or whether there must be
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`other system components in addition to that “biometric key” for it to qualify as an “integrated
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`device”). Id. ¶ 25.
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`Nor does “the intrinsic evidence provide[] objective boundaries to the scope of the term.”
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`See Iridescent, 933 F.3d at 1353. Indeed, the specification of the ’730 patent provides no guidance
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`whatsoever on the scope of the claimed “integrated device.” The term is found only in the abstract,
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`which merely parrots the claim language. ’730 patent at Abstract. None of the figures in the
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`specification, including Figures 1 and 2 showing a “Biometric Key,” are ever described as
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`including an “integrated device.” The specification incorporates by reference the provisional
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`applications, but those provisional applications also never use the term “integrated device,” instead
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`at most referring to “integrated biometric readers/scanners” found in a “Bio Key.” Ex. 1 at 6; Ex.
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`5
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`Patent Owner Exhibit 2005, Page 9 of 27
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`Case 6:23-cv-00320-ADA Document 40 Filed 11/06/23 Page 10 of 27
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`2 at 5. In sum, neither the ’730 patent nor any of its predecessor applications describes, or provides
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`any guidance regarding the scope of, the claimed “integrated device.” Black Decl. ¶¶ 26-27.
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`Accordingly, a POSITA reading the claim language and other intrinsic evidence is left
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`without reasonable certainty as to whether the claimed “integrated device” refers to just a
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`“Biometric Key” (due to its inclusion of “integrated biometric readers/scanners”), a device with a
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`“Biometric Key,” or a device with a “Biometric Key” and other components. Nor can Proxense
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`argue that the claim is broad enough to support all of the foregoing possibilities, because any such
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`assertion leaves unanswered the fundamental question: what does it mean for the device to be an
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`“integrated device” and what must be “integrated” for a device to become an integrated device?
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`Because the intrinsic evidence fails to define the scope of the coined “integrated device” term, the
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`asserted claims of the ’730 patent reciting the same are indefinite. See IQASR, 825 F. App’x at
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`908; see also Ingevity Corp. v. BASF Corp., No. 18-CV-1391-RGA, 2019 WL 2356978, at *4 (D.
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`Del. June 4, 2019) (finding “incremental adsorption capacity” indefinite as “it is neither a term of
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`art nor defined by the patentee,” and a POSITA would need to select between multiple methods of
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`measuring “adsorption capacity”).
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`Subsequent developments in the purported Device ID patent family confirm the
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`indefiniteness of the “integrated device” term in the ’730 patent claims. When Proxense filed the
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`first purported continuation application from the ’730 patent application, which matured into
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`the ’954 patent, it added an express definition for “integrated device” and a list of exemplary
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`devices that qualify as an “integrated device”—none of which appears in the ‘730 patent:
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`In one embodiment, the biometric key 100 is integrated into another
`object or device. A device having an integrated biometric key 100 is
`occasionally referred to herein as an “integrated device.” For
`example, in one embodiment, the biometric key 100 is integrated
`into a mobile phone (e.g. a cellular phone or smartphone), tablet,
`laptop, mp3 player, mobile gaming device, watch, key fob or other
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`6
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`Patent Owner Exhibit 2005, Page 10 of 27
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`Case 6:23-cv-00320-ADA Document 40 Filed 11/06/23 Page 11 of 27
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`mobile device, thereby making the biometric key 100 unobtrusive
`to carry.
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`’954 patent at 4:6-14. Thus, in later patent applications, Proxense deemed it necessary to define
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`“integrated device” as a device (e.g., a cellular phone) “having an integrated biometric key.” Yet
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`none of that discussion is found anywhere in the ’730 patent or either of its provisional
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`applications.
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`By adding a written description of what constitutes an “integrated device” to the ‘954
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`patent application and its progeny, Proxense introduced new matter that is not part of the ‘730
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`patent. See, e.g., Dart Indus., Inc. v. Banner, 636 F.2d 684, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“An addition to
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`a patent specification constitutes ‘new matter’ when it changes the invention disclosed or
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`introduces a concept not previously present in that specification.”) (citing In re Anderson, 471 F.2d
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`1237, 1244 (C.C.P.A.1973); In re Oda, 443 F.2d 1200, 1203-05 & n.2 (C.C.P.A.1971)).
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`Proxense’s addition of new matter only confirms that the “integrated device” recited in the ’730
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`patent claims was inadequately defined in the ’730 patent specification, such that a POSITA would
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`be unable to ascertain its scope. Proxense tacitly recognized this deficiency and surreptitiously
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`sought to correct it in its subsequent application by adding a new definition, without alerting the
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`USPTO to the addition of new matter. Ex. 3 at 48 (application data sheet for ’954 patent
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`application, claiming it is a “continuation” ’730 patent application); Ex. 3 at 13-14 (paragraph
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`[0025] of originally filed application for ’954 patent containing new matter relative to ’730 patent
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`application without any indication that it is new).
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`This addition of new matter in subsequent patents, however, cannot cure the indefiniteness
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`of the earlier-filed ’730 patent claims, which issued without the benefit of Proxense’s belated
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`attempt at lexicography. Not only did the subsequent ’954 and ’905 patents add a new definition
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`of “integrated device,” these later patents disclosed and claimed an “integrated device” that
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`
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`7
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`Patent Owner Exhibit 2005, Page 11 of 27
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`Case 6:23-cv-00320-ADA Document 40 Filed 11/06/23 Page 12 of 27
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`“comprises one or more of a mobile phone, tablet, laptop, mp3 player, mobile gaming device,
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`watch and a key fob” (’954 patent at 4:10-14; ’954 patent claims 6, 25; ’905 patent claims 5, 12,
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`15), whereas the ’730 patent only disclosed that “biometric key 100 comprises a modified key fob”
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`(’730 patent at 3:53-54). See Ex. 4 at 5 (redline comparison of ’954 patent to originally-filed non-
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`provisional application for the ’730 patent); see also Dart Indus., 636 F.2d at 688.5
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`The fact that these later patents disclosed and claimed embodiments (“a mobile phone,
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`tablet, laptop, mp3 player, mobile gaming device, watch”) not found in the ’730 patent only
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`confirms that they added new matter. See TurboCare Div. of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery
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`Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 264 F.3d 1111, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding claims improperly added
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`new matter where the original disclosure was “completely lacking in any description” of the
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`embodiment described in the claims). That fact has two consequences. First, because the ’954
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`and ’905 patents added new matter, they cannot be “continuations” of the ’730 patent, which is the
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`only relationship Proxense ever identified between the ’730, ’954, and ’905 patent. See Litton
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`Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1437–38 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Second, even if Proxense
`
`were to argue that the ’954 and ’905 patents are continuations-in-part of the ’730 patent, the newly
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`added definition of “integrated device” cannot be used to interpret the undefined “integrated
`
`device” term found in the earlier-filed ’730 patent claims. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has made
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`clear that “new matter added by the [] continuation-in-part application” is “not part of the intrinsic
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`evidence” of a patent at issue and, therefore, such new matter “is not available to construe the
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`claims” of the patent at issue. Goldenberg v. Cytogen, Inc., 373 F.3d 1158, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
`
`
`5 The ’954 and ’905 patent also added new matter in the form of disclosure and claims
`specifying that the application to which access is controlled can be “a financial account (e.g. a
`savings account, checking account, brokerage account, credit card account, credit line, etc.)” or
`“medical information such as a medical record, insurance information or other healthcare
`information.” ’954 patent at 6:22-26; ’905 patent at 6:24-28; see also Ex. 4 at 8.
`
`
`
`8
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`Patent Owner Exhibit 2005, Page 12 of 27
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`Case 6:23-cv-00320-ADA Document 40 Filed 11/06/23 Page 13 of 27
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`Thus, the asserted ’730 patent claims are invalid as indefinite.
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`2.
`
`“persistently storing … a plurality of codes and other data values
`comprising a device ID code … and a secret decryption value” (’730
`claim 1, 15; ’954 claim 1, 22)
`
`Term
`
`Google’s
`Construction
`
`Proxense’s
`Construction
`
`“persistently storing … a plurality of codes and
`other data values comprising a device ID
`code … and a secret decryption value”
`
`Indefinite
`
`No construction
`necessary
`
`
`The asserted claims of the ’730 and ’954 patents require “persistently storing … a plurality
`
`of codes and other data values comprising a device ID code … and a secret decryption value.”
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`This claim language does not clearly delineate the scope of the claimed subject matter, leaving the
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`scope of the claims unclear. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 909 (2014)
`
`(“[A] patent must be precise enough to afford clear notice of what is claimed, thereby ‘appris[ing]
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`the public of what is still open to them.’”). Indeed, the language is susceptible to at least four
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`different interpretations—as shown through the use of parentheses to group different terms
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`together and thereby change the interpretation—each resulting in different claim scope:
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`1. “(plurality of (codes and other data values)) comprising (a device ID code and a secret
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`decryption value)”: Under this interpretation, the claims require a plurality of elements,
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`and each of those elements can be either a “code” or an “other data value.” Just storing one
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`“device ID code” and one “secret decryption value” would meet this limitation.
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`2. “((plurality of codes) and (other data values)) comprising (a device ID code and a secret
`
`decryption value)”: Under this interpretation, the claims require a plurality of code, and
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`also require “other data values.” Because each of those terms is plurality, storing a single
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`“device ID code” and a single “secret decryption value” would be required to meet the
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`limitation, but not sufficient. Instead, you would need to store at least two codes and at
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`9
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`Patent Owner Exhibit 2005, Page 13 of 27
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`Case 6:23-cv-00320-ADA Document 40 Filed 11/06/23 Page 14 of 27
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`least two values to meet the claim language.
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`3. “(plurality of codes) and (other data values comprising a device ID code) and (a secret
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`decryption value)”: Since the specification teaches that a single “code” can be one or more
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`“values” (’730 Patent at 7:24-31), the limitation can also be interpreted to require storing
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`three different types of codes/values: (1) a plurality of codes; (2) other data values
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`comprising a device ID code; and (3) a secret decryption value. Under this interpretation,
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`you would need to store at least three codes (two due to “plurality of codes” requirement;
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`and one more due to the separate “device ID code requirement”) and at least one value to
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`meet the claim language.
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`4. “((plurality of (codes and other data values)) comprising a device ID code) and (a secret
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`decryption value)”: Under this interpretation, the “plurality of codes and other data values”
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`include the claimed “device ID code,” while the “secret decryption value” is a separate
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`requirement. To meet the limitation would thus require storing at least two codes and at
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`least one value.
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`Because the asserted ’730 and ’954 patent claims and their specifications fail to specify
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`with reasonable certainty the scope of the “persistently storing” limitation—including the number
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`and nature of codes and values that must be stored—these claims are indefinite. The Federal Circuit
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`has found a claim indefinite where a POSITA would have multiple interpretations of the same
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`term. For example, in Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., the court determined that the term
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`“molecular weight” could be understood to cover three different measurements – Mp, Mn, or Mw
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`– and the claims “[did] not indicate which measure to use.” 789 F.3d 1335, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir.
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`2015). As a result, the Federal Circuit determined that the patentee “failed to inform with
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`reasonable certainty those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” The same logic
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`10
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`Patent Owner Exhibit 2005, Page 14 of 27
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`Case 6:23-cv-00320-ADA Document 40 Filed 11/06/23 Page 15 of 27
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`applies here, where the term “persistently storing … a plurality of codes and other data values
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`comprising a device ID code … and a secret decryption value” is susceptible to multiple
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`interpretations and leaves a POSITA guessing as to the scope of the claim.
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`3.
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`“access message” terms (’730 claims 1, 15; ’954 claim 1, 22; ’905 claim
`1, 13)
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`Term
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`Google’s Construction
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`Proxense’s Construction
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`“an access message …
`[allowing / allows] the user
`[access to / to access] an
`application” (’730 claims 1,
`15; ’954 claim 1, 22)
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`“an access message …
`[allowing / allows] the user to
`complete a financial
`transaction (’905 claim 1, 13)
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`“a signal or notification
`allowing the user to access an
`application”
`
`No construction necessary
`beyond adopting the Court’s
`previous construction of
`“access message”
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`“a signal or notification
`allowing the user to complete
`a financial transaction”
`
`No construction necessary
`beyond adopting the Court’s
`previous construction of
`“access message”
`
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`This Court previously construed the term “access message” as “a signal or notification
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`enabling or announcing access.” Google is not challenging the Court’s holding that an “access
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`message,” in the abstract, is not limited to just “enabling” access and can include “announcing”
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`access. However, this construction leaves the impression that the “access message,” as specifically
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`used in the asserted claims, may be used merely as notification that a user (previously) accessed
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`an application or completed a financial transaction. Such an interpretation of the claims would be
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`incorrect and conflict with the plain meaning of the remaining claim language and, as such,
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`Google’s clarifications are necessary to avoid an improper application to the claims.
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`Specifically, the remaining claim language is clear that any “signal or notification” must
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`do more to meet the claims than just “announc[e]” prior access; it must “allow” the user “to access
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`an application” or “to complete a financial transaction”:
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`
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`’730 patent claim 1: “receiving an access message from the agent allowing the user access
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`to an application;”
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`11
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`Patent Owner Exhibit 2005, Page 15 of 27
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`Case 6:23-cv-00320-ADA Document 40 Filed 11/06/23 Page 16 of 27
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`’730 patent claim 15: “receiving an access message from the agent allowing the user to
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`access an application;”
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`’954 patent claim 1: “receiving, at an application, an access message from the trusted
`
`authority … allowing the user access to the application;”
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`’954 patent claim 22: “receives an access message from the trusted authority … and allows
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`the user to access an application;”
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`’905 patent claim 1: “responsive to receiving an access message from the third-party trusted
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`authority …, allowing the user to complete a financial transaction;” and
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`’905 patent claim 13: “receives an access messa