Case 7:23-cv-00077-DC Document 75 Filed 03/21/24 Page 1 of 50
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION
`
`RESONANT SYSTEMS, INC. d/b/a
`RevelHMI,
`
`Case No. 7:23-cv-00077-DC
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
` v.
`
`APPLE INC.,
`
`Defendant.
`
`DEFENDANT APPLE INC.’S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`APPLE 1046
`
`1
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`

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`Case 7:23-cv-00077-DC Document 75 Filed 03/21/24 Page 2 of 50
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
`
`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
`
`TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................... 2
`
`LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ................................................................ 4
`
`AGREED CONSTRUCTIONS ...................................................................................................... 5
`
`ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 5
`
`“Control Component …” is a Means-Plus-Function Term in All (Not Just Some)
`of the Asserted Patents and Should Be Construed as Having the Function and
`Corresponding Structure Apple Proposes ........................................................................... 5
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Legal Principles of Means-Plus-Function Claiming under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 112(f).................................................................................................................... 6
`
`“Control Component” Should Be Construed as a Means-Plus-Function
`Term Under § 112(f) ............................................................................................... 7
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`Legal Principles Regarding When § 112(f) Applies. .................................. 7
`
`“Control Component …” Is a Means-Plus-Function Term Under
`§ 112(f) Because It Does Not Provide Sufficient Structure. ....................... 8
`
`C.
`
`The Construction of “Control Component …” Under § 112(f) ............................ 11
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Legal Principles of Construing § 112(f) Limitations. ............................... 11
`
`There Is No Dispute Over the Function of the “Control Component
`…” Terms Under § 112(f)......................................................................... 12
`
`The Corresponding Structure of the “Control Component …” Is
`the Structure Disclosed in Each Respective Specification, as
`Required Under § 112(f). .......................................................................... 12
`
`The Preamble of Each Asserted Claim Is Limiting .......................................................... 22
`
`Indefiniteness .................................................................................................................... 24
`
`A.
`
`This Court Should Find Indefinite the Asserted Claims that Lack
`Antecedent Basis ................................................................................................... 25
`
`1.
`
`Claim 4 of the ’830 Patent and Claims 17, 19, and 20 of the ’882
`Patent Are Indefinite Because They Lack Any Antecedent Basis. ........... 26
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`
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`2.
`
`3.
`
`Claims 1, 3–7, and 10 of the ’882 Patent Are Indefinite Because
`They Fail to Limit the Claim to One of Two Possible Antecedent
`Bases. ........................................................................................................ 26
`
`Claim 1 of the ’767 Patent and Claim 20 of the ’882 Patent Are
`Indefinite Because the Antecedent Basis Conflicts with a Recited
`Term. ......................................................................................................... 27
`
`B.
`
`Claim 1 of the ’767 Patent and Claim 4 of the ’830 Patent Are Indefinite
`Because They Lack Objective Boundaries. .......................................................... 28
`
`
`
`The Court Should Not Rewrite Two of Resonant’s Claims ............................................. 28
`
`ii
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`Case 7:23-cv-00077-DC Document 75 Filed 03/21/24 Page 4 of 50
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. V. Openet Telecom, Inc.,
`2018 WL 1699429 (E.D. Va. Apr. 6, 2018) ..............................................................................8
`
`Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc.,
`345 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003)................................................................................................29
`
`B. Braun Med. Inc. v. Abbott Labs.,
`124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997)................................................................................................12
`
`Biomedino, LLC v. Waters Techs. Corp.,
`490 F.3d 946 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..................................................................................................21
`
`Bushnell Hawthorne v. Cisco,
`813 F. App’x 522 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ..........................................................................................25
`
`Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc.,
`296 F.3d 1106 (Fed. Cir. 2002)................................................................................................11
`
`Cellular Commc'ns Equip. v. AT&T, Inc.,
` 2016 WL 7364266 (E.D. Tex. 2016) ......................................................................................30
`
`Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................25
`
`Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc.,
`868 F.2d 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1989)................................................................................................23
`
`Cypress Lake Software, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc.,
`382 F. Supp. 3d 586 (E.D. Tex. 2019) .......................................................................................8
`
`Default Proof Credit Card Sys. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,
`412 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................14
`
`Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. v. In’l Trade Com’n,
`899 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................11
`
`Display Techs., LLC v. Mechtronics Corp.,
`335 F. Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ......................................................................................22
`
`E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Unifrax I LLC,
`921 F.3d 1060 (Fed. Cir. 2019)..................................................................................................4
`
`
`
`i
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 7:23-cv-00077-DC Document 75 Filed 03/21/24 Page 5 of 50
`
`
`
`Egenera, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`972 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020)..................................................................................................9
`
`Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
`9 F. Supp. 3d 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2014) .........................................................................................6
`
`Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC,
`514 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................25
`
`Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker,
`329 U.S. 1 (1946) .......................................................................................................................6
`
`Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure Inc.,
`600 F.3d 1357, 94 USPQ2d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .................................................................23
`
`Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co.,
`277 U.S. 245 (1928) ...................................................................................................................6
`
`Image Processing Technologies, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.,
`2017 WL 2672616 (E.D. Tex. 2017) .......................................................................................27
`
`Intell. Ventures I LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
`902 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................28
`
`Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.,
`766 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..........................................................................................25, 28
`
`Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Systems/Loral, Inc.,
`324 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2003)..................................................................................................7
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`517 U.S. 370 (1996) ...................................................................................................................4
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995)......................................................................................................4
`
`Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Abacus Software,
`462 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006)................................................................................................10
`
`MEMS Tech. Berhad v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`447 F. App’x 142 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ..........................................................................................24
`
`Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., Inc.,
`194 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1999)................................................................................................11
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
` 572 U.S. 898 (2014) ..........................................................................................................24, 25
`
`ii
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`Case 7:23-cv-00077-DC Document 75 Filed 03/21/24 Page 6 of 50
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`
`
`Ocean Semiconductor LLC v. Huawei Device USA, Inc.,
`2022 WL 389916 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2022) .............................................................................29
`
`Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp.,
`334, F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2003).....................................................................................12
`
`Peloton Interactive, Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc.,
`2021 WL 4133702 (D. Del. Sept. 10, 2021) ......................................................................19, 20
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..............................................................................................4, 5
`
`Poly-Am., L.P. v. GSE Lining Tech., Inc.,
`383 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................23
`
`Rembrandt Data Technologies, LP v. AOL, LLC,
`2011 WL 1458662 (Fed. Cir. 2011).........................................................................................28
`
`Sensor Electronic Technology, Inc. v. Bolb, Inc.,
`2019 WL 4645338 (N.D. Cal. 2019) .................................................................................26, 27
`
`Signtech USA, Ltd. v. Vutek, Inc.,
`174 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999)................................................................................................22
`
`Synchronoss Technologies, Inc. v. Dropbox Inc.,
`2019 WL 2503642 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 987 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ..........................27
`
`Ultravision Techs. v. Holophane Eur. Ltd.,
`2020 WL 6271231 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2020) .........................................................................28
`
`Umbanet Inc. v. Epsilon Data Management, LLC,
`2017 WL 3508771 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2017) ..........................................................................8
`
`Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Roku, Inc.,
` 2023 WL 5316526 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 18, 2023) .........................................................................20
`
`UUSI, LLC v. United States,
`131 Fed. Cl. 244 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 17, 2017) ...............................................................................20
`
`Wavetronix LLC v. EIS Elec. Integrated Sys.,
`573 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..................................................................................................4
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) .................................................................7, 8, 11, 12
`
`WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech.,
`184 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1999)....................................................................................10, 15, 19
`
`iii
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`Case 7:23-cv-00077-DC Document 75 Filed 03/21/24 Page 7 of 50
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`WSOU Invs. LLC v. Google LLC,
`2023 WL 6210607 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2023) .........................................................................10
`
`WSOU Invs. v. Google,
`2023 WL 6531525 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 6, 2023) .............................................................................10
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112(f) .................................................................................................................. passim
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 .......................................................................................................................24
`
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`Case 7:23-cv-00077-DC Document 75 Filed 03/21/24 Page 8 of 50
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Apple and Resonant have agreed on the construction of several claim terms in Resonant’s
`
`asserted patents, narrowing the number of disputed issues for the Court. Specifically, the parties
`
`have agreed that: (1) the preambles are limiting in claim 1 of the ’767 patent; claims 1 and 20 of
`
`the ’830 patent; and claims 1 and 10 of the ’882 patent; (2) the “control component …” limitations
`
`in three of the four asserted patents should be construed as means-plus-function terms and given
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`their agreed-upon function, and (3) the “driving component …” limitations should be construed as
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`means-plus-function limitations and given their agreed-upon function and corresponding structure.
`
`Agreed constructions are listed in Section I of Appendix A.
`
`Four disputes regarding claim construction remain: (1) whether the term “control
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`component …” in the ’767 patent is also a means-plus-function term for one claim (it is, as
`
`Resonant has agreed it is for all other claims) and the appropriate corresponding structure for the
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`term across all the asserted patents (i.e., to cover the structure shown in the specification); (2)
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`whether the preambles of two claims are limiting (they are); (3) whether fourteen claims are
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`indefinite (they are); and (4) whether the Court should rewrite two claims (it should not).
`
`First, the Court should construe the term “control component …” in claim 1 of the ’767
`
`patent as a means-plus-function term, just as the parties have agreed for the same term in all the
`
`other asserted claims and patents. The Federal Circuit has explained that, where, as here, claim
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`terms do not recite sufficient structure for performing the claimed function, they must be construed
`
`as means-plus-function limitations. Courts have routinely found (and as Resonant has agreed in
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`this and in other cases), the term “component” is a generic term that provides no details about
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`structure, and thus the limiting structure must come from the specification. Next, in construing
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`the term as means-plus-function, the Court should adopt both the function and corresponding
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`structure proposed by Apple. Resonant agrees with Apple’s proposed function, but Resonant has
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`1
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`proposed a corresponding structure that fails to comport with Federal Circuit precedent because it
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`expands the scope of the claim far beyond the structure disclosed in the specification.
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`Second, the Court should find that the preambles of all asserted independent claims limit
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`their scope. Resonant agrees for all claims except two: “A linear vibration module” in claim 2 of
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`the ’337 patent and “A vibration module” in claim 20 of the ’830 patent. Resonant used these
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`terms in the preamble to distinguish the claims from the prior art, so they must limit the scope of
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`the claims. Indeed, Resonant has agreed that these exact same preambles are limiting in other
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`claims. These two claims should be treated the same as the others.
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`Third, the Court should find that certain claims are indefinite because the claims fail to
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`inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art and the public about the scope of the
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`invention. Some claims lack reasonable certainty in that they recite multiple different masses or
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`outputs, for example, and then later add more detail about a mass or an output without specifying
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`which of the masses or outputs is meant. Other claims recite the subjective term “desired output,”
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`but fail to provide any objective standard to determine what is “desirable.” Because these claims
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`do not have objective boundaries as to their scope, they are indefinite.
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`Fourth, the Court should reject Resonant’s invitation to rewrite claim 4 of the ’830 patent
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`and claim 17 of the ’882 patent. The Federal Circuit precedent is clear that courts may not redraft
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`claims to fix an alleged error in draftsmanship where the alleged error is subject to reasonable
`
`debate. Here it is not clear that the claims even contain an error, and if they do, there are multiple
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`corrections that are equally as plausible as the ones Resonant proposes.
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`TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW
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`Apple’s products utilize some of the most innovative methods and structures ever
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`conceived to communicate information to and from its users. Apple’s introduction of a graphical
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`user interface in computers, and touch screens in mobile phones and tablets, revolutionized entire
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`industries. The asserted patents stand far afield from Apple’s products and technology and instead
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`are directed to “adult sex toy” devices. The claim construction disputes in this case arise from the
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`gulf separating Apple’s products from Resonant’s “adult sex toy” patents.
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`The asserted patents trace their lineage to a provisional application titled “Linear Vibrating
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`Motor for Sex Toy.” Ex. 1 (Pro. App. No. 61/179,109 (the “’109 provisional”)). The provisional
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`explains that the purported invention is directed to “variations of a linear resonating vibration
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`motor primarily for use in adult sex toys,” further explaining that, in the state of the art at that time,
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`“most vibrating motors used for adult sex toys use rotary motors that push an off-center weight
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`around to create vibrations,” whereas the purported “invention moves a weight back and forth
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`(linearly) to create vibrations.” Id.
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`The ’109 provisional discloses two examples of a “linear vibrator” to create vibrations—
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`(1) a “Thumper” that moves a magnet “back and forth” and (2) a “Pattycake” that moves a plunger
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`“up and down.” Id. at 8–12. In operation, vibration is caused through the movement of the weight
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`back and forth as a result of current applied to an electromagnet, creating a magnetic force that
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`accelerates the weight (a magnet) in a first direction, and the current is then reversed, resulting in
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`acceleration of the weight in the opposite direction. Id. at 7–9; see also Visell Dec. ¶¶ 55–641. As
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`confirmed by Dr. Visell, this general structure was well-known in the art. Visell Dec. ¶¶ 39–54.
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`The asserted patents all relate to controlling vibrators. Visell Dec. ¶¶ 55–64. The three
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`asserted patents that stem from the ’109 provisional (the ’767, ’337, and ’830 patents) are directed
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`to controlling the vibrator based on the strength of the vibration. Id. The ’882 patent (filed several
`
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`1 With this brief, Apple submits a declaration from Dr. Yon J. Visell (Exhibit 5 to Yang
`Declaration)—an expert in the field of haptic engineering and robotics. Dr. Visell holds a Ph.D.
`in Electrical and Computer Engineering and has more than a decade of experience in the field of
`haptics, which is the study of technology that provides tactile information to a user. Dr. Visell has
`provided additional background concerning the state of the art in Sections V–VII of his declaration.
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`years later) is directed to controlling vibrators based on the position of the moving mass. ’882
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`patent at cover, Figs. 45, 31:19–32:13.
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`LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`Claim construction is a pivotal procedure where the Court determines the meaning of the
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`words used in the asserted patent claims as a matter of law, and those definitions are then used to
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`determine infringement and validity. See Wavetronix LLC v. EIS Elec. Integrated Sys., 573 F.3d
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`1343, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Infringement analysis involves a two-step process: the court first
`
`determines the meaning of disputed claim terms and then compares the accused device to the
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`claims as construed.”); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 996 n.7 (Fed. Cir.
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`1995) (“A claim must be construed before determining its validity just as it is first construed before
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`deciding infringement.”). By resolving disputes as to the meaning and scope of the asserted claims,
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`the Court will allow the parties to enter discovery with increased certainty as to what is needed for
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`each party to prove their case. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,
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`372 (1996).
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`Claim construction requires examining the words of the claims to determine the scope of a
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`patented invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The words of
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`the claims are generally given the “ordinary and customary meaning” that they “would have to a
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`person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention” “in the context of the
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`entire patent, including the specification.” Id. The specification—the part of the patent preceding
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`the claims describing the invention—provides the “single best guide to the meaning of a disputed
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`term” and is usually dispositive of a term’s meaning. Id. at 1315. The entire intrinsic record,
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`including the specification, prosecution history, and prior art cited, must be examined when
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`determining the meaning of a claim term. Id. at 1315–16; see also E.I. du Pont De Nemours &
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`Co. v. Unifrax I LLC, 921 F.3d 1060, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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`The Federal Circuit has endorsed the use of extrinsic evidence (i.e., evidence outside of the
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`patent and its prosecution history) in the form of expert testimony, dictionaries, and treatises to
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`“help educate the court regarding the field of the invention and can help the court determine what
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`a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand claim terms to mean.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at
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`1318–19.
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`AGREED CONSTRUCTIONS
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`The parties have agreed to the following constructions (Appx A, Section I):
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`• The preambles of the following claims are limiting: claim 1 of the ’767 patent; claims
`1 and 20 of the ’830 patent; and claims 1 and 10 of the ’882 patent; and
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`• “a driving component that drives the moveable component in each of two opposite
`directions [within the housing]” (’767 patent, claim 1; ’337 patent, claim 2) and “a
`driving component that drives the moveable component to oscillate within the housing”
`(’830 patent, claims 1, 19, 20) should be construed as means-plus-function terms
`pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), with the agreed-upon function and corresponding
`structure set forth in Appendix A at Section I to this brief.
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`Further, Resonant is withdrawing its allegation that Apple infringes claim 7 of the ’882 patent and
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`claims 1 and 4 of the ’337 patent, mooting claim construction disputes on those claims. Apple
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`respectfully asks that this Court memorialize these agreements in its order.
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`ARGUMENT
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`
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`“Control Component …” is a Means-Plus-Function Term in All (Not Just Some) of
`the Asserted Patents and Should Be Construed as Having the Function and
`Corresponding Structure Apple Proposes
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`The term “control component …” appears in asserted claims in all four patents (claim 1 of
`
`the ’767 patent, claim 2 of the ’337 patent, claims 1, 19, and 20 of the ’830 patent, and claims 1
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`and 10 of the ’882 patent). There are two steps to construing this term. See Appx A, Section II.B.
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`First is the issue of whether the term should be construed as a means-plus-function term
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`pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (explained further below). It should, and for three of the four
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`patents, Resonant agrees. But in the ’767 patent alone, Resonant contends that “control
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`component” is not a means-plus-function limitation and should be treated differently. As
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`discussed in Section I.B, infra, the Court should construe “control component” as a means-plus-
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`function term consistently across all four patents.
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`Second, after determining that “control component …” is a means-plus-function term for
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`all claims, the Court must then construe the term by identifying its function and corresponding
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`structure. The parties agree on the claimed function but disagree on the corresponding structure.2
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`For the reasons set out in Section I.C, infra, the Court should adopt Apple’s proposed
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`corresponding structure.
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`But first, we start with an overview of means-plus-function claiming under § 112(f).
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`A. Legal Principles of Means-Plus-Function Claiming under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f)
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`A patent claim must be directed to a particular mechanism of achieving a result or function
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`rather than claiming just the result of the function itself—lest a patentee’s claims be so broad as to
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`cover any mechanism of performing that function, whether described in the patent or not. See
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`Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245, 257 (1928). In other words, claims
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`cannot broadly cover only the function of a particular structure but must be limited to the structure
`
`as well, and that structure must be specifically described in the patent. Halliburton Oil Well
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`Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 12 (1946) (rejecting the practice of functional claiming
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`because of “the broadness, ambiguity, and overhanging threat of the functional claim” deters the
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`development of other devices to accomplish the same purpose); see also Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft
`
`Corp., 9 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1128 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (summarizing 35 U.S.C. § 112(f)).
`
`Section 112(f)3 of the Patent Act allows an applicant to write a claim limitation “by reciting
`
`
`2 See Section II.B of Appendix A.
`3 § 112(f) was previously codified at § 112 ¶ 6, so some earlier decisions refer to this section in
`this manner.
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`a function to be performed, rather than a structure for performing that function.” Such claim
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`limitations are referred to as means-plus-function limitations, and they are properly construed to
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`cover “only the structure, materials, or acts described in the specification as corresponding to the
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`function and equivalents thereof.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2015) (en banc); see also 35 U.S.C. § 112(f); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Systems/Loral,
`
`Inc., 324 F.3d 1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003). For example, a patentee may describe several different
`
`kinds of chairs in the specification of her patent and then claim a “means for sitting” that covers
`
`only the chairs described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
`
`B. “Control Component” Should Be Construed as a Means-Plus-Function Term Under
`§ 112(f)
`
`1. Legal Principles Regarding When § 112(f) Applies.
`
`The use of the word “means” in a claim limitation creates a rebuttable presumption that
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`§ 112(f) applies. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348. Similarly, the lack of the word “means” creates
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`a rebuttable presumption that § 112(f) does not apply. Id. That presumption is rebutted, and
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`§ 112(f) applies when the claim “fails to ‘recite sufficiently definite structure’ or else recites
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`‘function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.’” Id. (overruling prior
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`precedent that, in the absence of the word “means,” presumption against the application of § 112(f)
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`was “strong”).
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`For example, in Williamson, the Federal Circuit found the presumption rebutted—and
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`construed the phrase “distributed learning control module” pursuant to § 112(f)—because it did
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`not recite a sufficiently definite structure. Id. at 1349–54. The Federal Circuit explained that, like
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`the word “means,” “modules” is just another “nonce” term—i.e., a term that has no specific
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`meaning. See, e.g., Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350 (explaining that “[g]eneric terms such as
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`‘mechanism,’ ‘element,’ ‘device,’ and other nonce words that reflect nothing more than verbal
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`Case 7:23-cv-00077-DC Document 75 Filed 03/21/24 Page 15 of 50
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`constructs may be used in a claim in a manner that is tantamount to using the word ‘means’ …”).
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`2. “Control Component …” Is a Means-Plus-Function Term Under § 112(f) Because
`It Does Not Provide Sufficient Structure.
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`Like the terms means, mechanism, element, or device, the claimed “control component” is
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`another classic example of a generic nonce word that fails to provide sufficient structure and is
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`thus subject to § 112(f). As confirmed by Dr. Visell, the term “component” connotes no structure
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`and rather refers to a generic part (hardware and/or software) of a larger assembly. See Visell Dec.
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`¶¶ 69–81. Adding “control” to the term “component” offers no help as it only explains the
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`supposed function performed by the component—not its structure. See Visell Dec. ¶¶ 69–81; see
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`also, e.g., Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. V. Openet Telecom, Inc., 2018 WL 1699429, at *19 (E.D. Va. Apr.
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`6, 2018) (construing “enhancement component” pursuant to § 112(f) because “‘component’ does
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`not refer to any specifically known structure in the art”); see also Umbanet Inc. v. Epsilon Data
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`Management, LLC, 2017 WL 3508771, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2017) (applying § 112(f) for
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`“document-encoding component”); Cypress Lake Software, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 382
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`F. Supp. 3d 586, 622 (E.D. Tex. 2019) (applying § 112(f) for “navigation element handler
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`component” and “navigation director component”); cf. USPTO’s Manual of Patent Examination
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`Procedure (“MPEP”) at § 2181 (identifying “component for” as a potential “non-structure generic
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`placeholder” that is subject to § 112(f)). Put differently, a “control component” is not any different
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`than simply reciting a “means for control” and is subject to § 112(f). See, e.g., Williamson, 792
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`F.3d at 1350.
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`Resonant agrees that “control component” should be construed pursuant to § 112(f) for the
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`’337 patent (claim 2), ’830 patent (claims 1, 10, 19, 20) and ’882 patent (claims 1, 10). But
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`Resonant argues that the same term in claim 1 of the ’767 patent § 112(f) does not apply because
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`the “control component” includes a “microprocessor,” “control program,” and “switch.” Resonant
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`Case 7:23-cv-00077-DC Document 75 Filed 03/21/24 Page 16 of 50
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`is wrong because “[t]he question is not whether a claim term recites any structure but whether it
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`recites sufficient structure”—that is structure “sufficient … for performing [the] function[s]”
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`recited. Egenera, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 972 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2020). In this case, Claim
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`1 of the ’767 patent does not recite sufficient structure, because the “microprocessor,” “program,”
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`and “switch”—either alone or in combination—are not sufficient structures for performing the
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`claimed functions. See Visell Dec. ¶¶ 74–87.
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`The relevant portion of claim 1 of the ’767 patent is reproduced below, with the “control
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`component” limitation in bold emphasis and the language that Resonant claims provides the
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`allegedly sufficient structure called out in red:
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`a control component that includes a microprocessor and
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`that controls supply of power from the power supply to the driving
`component to cause the moveable component to linearly oscillate,
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`the control component including, in addition to the microprocessor,
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`a control program, stored in one of a separated electronic memory
`or within the processor, that is executed by the microprocessor to
`control operation of the linear resonant vibration module, and
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`a switch that receives a directional signal d from the processor and
`that selects a corresponding direction of the two opposite directions
`in which the driving component drives the moveable component,
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`the co