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`IPR2024-00567
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`––––––––––––––
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`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`––––––––––––––
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`NJOY, LLC,
`NJOY HOLDINGS, INC.,
`Petitioners
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`v.
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`JUUL LABS, INC.,
`Patent Owner
`––––––––––––––
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`Case No. IPR2024-00567
`U.S. Patent No. RE49,114
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`––––––––––––––
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`PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
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`08755-00011A/14950653.6
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1
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`II.
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`LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART ....................... 2
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`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ...................................................... 2
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`A.
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`Claim 1’s Preamble is Limiting....................................... 3
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`IV. Ground 1: Petitioner Fails to Establish that Cho anticipates the
`Challenged Claims .................................................................... 6
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`A.
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`B.
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`Legal Principles of Anticipation...................................... 6
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`Cho does not anticipate or enable a “liquid reservoir at
`least partially defined by an interior of the cartridge
`housing and an exterior of the atomizing chamber”
`(claims 43 and 44)........................................................... 8
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`1.
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`2.
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`The “integrated embodiment” does not disclose a
`liquid reservoir partially defined by the exterior of
`the atomization chamber ..................................... 10
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`The “integrated embodiment” is a distinct,
`mutually incompatible embodiment .................... 13
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`3.
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`Cho’s “integrated embodiment” is not enabled ... 16
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`C.
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`Cho does not disclose an “electronic cigarette” (claims 1
`and 44) .......................................................................... 21
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`V. Ground 2 Also Fails ................................................................ 23
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`VI. CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 23
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`EXHIBIT LIST
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`No.
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`Exhibit
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`2001 Declaration of John Collins, Ph.D.
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`2002
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`Curriculum vitae of John Collins, Ph.D.
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Petitioner challenges the independent claims of U.S. Pat. No. RE49,114
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`(the “’114 patent”) as anticipated by Cho. The Petition presents only a single
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`anticipatory grounds against the independent claims. In order to meet its
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`burden, Petitioner must show that Cho discloses every element within the four
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`corners of the reference as arranged in the challenged claims, i.e., without
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`combining distinct embodiments. There are several reasons Cho does not.
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`First, Cho does not disclose an “electronic cigarette.” As the ’114
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`patent explains, the invention is an “electronic cigarette” intended to emulate
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`tobacco cigarettes by providing nicotine through atomizing a liquid instead of
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`burning tobacco. Cho, by contrast, discloses a “vaporisation unit” for health
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`supplements “beneficial to the human body”—not nicotine.
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`Second, Cho does not disclose a liquid reservoir defined by “an interior
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`of the cartridge housing and an exterior of the atomizing chamber.” Cho
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`describes that its liquid reservoir is entirely defined by the housing interior.
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`Petitioner relies on a single half-sentence in Cho as disclosing this limitation.
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`But this statement says nothing about the liquid reservoir, is a distinct,
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`mutually incompatible embodiment, and is not enabled. Cho therefore cannot
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`anticipate.
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`II. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
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`Petitioners propose that the level of a POSITA at the time of the ’114
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`patent “would have at least a B.S. degree in Mechanical Engineering,
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`Electrical Engineering, Industrial Design, Product Design, or similar field,
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`with at least two years of industry experience in one of these fields, and such
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`POSA would have been familiar with electrically powered vaporizing articles,
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`their components or the underlying technologies.” Pet. 7.
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`Patent Owner proposes that a POSITA at the time of the ’114 patent
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`would have had a B.S. in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or
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`an equivalent degree, and either at least two years of experience designing
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`electro-mechanical consumer products or an advanced degree in mechanical
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`engineering, electrical engineering, or an equivalent field. Ex. 2001, ¶19.
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`While Patent Owner submits that its level of skill is correct, the
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`arguments in this Response apply regardless of which standard is adopted. Id.,
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`¶¶20-21. Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. John Collins, was a POSITA at the time
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`of the ’114 patent under either definition. Id., ¶22.
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`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`In an inter partes review, claim terms receive their plain and ordinary
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`meaning in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear, the
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`same standard as used in district court. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see Phillips v.
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`AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005). While there are several terms in
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`dispute in the parallel ITC litigation (Pet. 8), none of them need to be resolved
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`by the Board. Ex. 2001, ¶¶36-37. With the exception of the preamble of claim
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`1, in this preliminary stage, it is not necessary for the Board to resolve the
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`construction of any terms. Id.
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`A. Claim 1’s Preamble is Limiting
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`A preamble is limiting if it “recites essential structure or steps, or if it
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`is necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality to the claim.” Catalina Mktg.
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`Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002). If the
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`preamble only “state[s] a purpose or intended use for the invention,” it is not
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`limiting. Id. The determination is based on “the overall form of the claim,
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`and the invention as described in the specification and illuminated in the
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`prosecution history.” Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC, 703 F.3d 1349, 1357
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`(Fed. Cir. 2012).
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`Claim 1 of the ’114 patent’s preamble recites “[a]n electronic cigarette
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`cartridge apparatus.” Claim 44’s preamble also recites “[a]n electronic
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`cigarette.” The Board should construe this term “electronic cigarette” as
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`limiting because it is essential structure and necessary to give meaning to the
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`claims. Ex. 2001, ¶¶38-44.
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`The specification of the ’114 patent frequently and consistently treats
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`“electronic cigarette” as essential structure of the invention. The title of the
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`patent is “Electronic cigarette with liquid reservoir” and the abstract states that
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`the invention is “[a]n electronic cigarette.” Ex. 1001, Title, Abstract. In the
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`description of related art, the specification notes that “[e]lectronic cigarettes
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`have become increasingly popular in recent times” and that they “emulate a
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`tobacco cigarettes, but without the combustion of tobacco during use.” Id.,
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`1:19-21. The specification further notes that with electronic cigarettes,
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`“[r]ather than burning tobacco, a liquid is atomized within the electronic
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`cigarette.” Id., 1:22-24. The background also describes “certain prior art
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`electronic cigarettes.” Id., 1:28-39.
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`The specification also describes the “invention” as “advanc[ing] the art
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`of electronic cigarettes by teaching an electronic cigarette that provides a
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`liquid reservoir, which effectively delivers liquid … from the reservoir to an
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`atomizer.” Id., 4:1-5. Figures 1 through 6 of the patent, which are illustrative
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`embodiments of the invention, are described as depicting “an electronic
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`cigarette.” Id., 2:46-3:25.
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`The below figures show that an “electronic cigarette” is essential to the
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`invention because it describes the purpose of the apparatus, which is the
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`delivery of nicotine by atomizing liquid instead of burning tobacco. Ex. 2001,
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`¶43.
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`Thus, the term “electronic cigarette” is limiting because it provides
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`essential meaning to the invention as a nicotine delivery system replacement
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`for a tobacco cigarette. Such functionality is important to the invention
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`because one of the primary purposes of electronic cigarettes is to replace
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`tobacco cigarettes with a safer, non-combustible alternative to nicotine
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`consumption. Ex. 2001, ¶44. The invention of the ’114 Patent is not a
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`vaporizer for health supplements. Id.; Ex. 1005 at ¶1 (“The present invention
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`relates to a device . . . that vaporizes a substance beneficial to the human body
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`. . . .”).
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`For these reasons, the term “electronic cigarette” found in the preamble
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`of claims 1 and 44 should be construed as limiting.
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`IV. GROUND 1: PETITIONER FAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT
`CHO ANTICIPATES THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS
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`The Petition challenges three independent claims: 1, 43, and 44. The
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`Petition fails to establish that Cho anticipates the challenged claims for at least
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`the following reasons: First, for claims 43 and 44, for the limitation “liquid
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`reservoir at least partially defined by an interior of the cartridge housing and
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`an exterior of the atomizing chamber,” Cho does not disclose this limitation,
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`nor does the half-sentence Petitioner relies upon—which, in any case, is a
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`distinct, mutually incompatible embodiment that cannot be combined with
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`Cho’s other disclosures, and is also not an enabling disclosure. Second, for
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`claims 1 and 44, Cho does not disclose an “electronic cigarette.” Ex. 2001,
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`¶45.
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`A. Legal Principles of Anticipation
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`For a claim to be anticipated, “each and every element as set forth in
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`the claim [must be] found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single
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`prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d
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`628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Anticipation requires that the prior art is “shown
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`in as complete detail as is contained in the claim.” Richardson v. Suzuki Motor
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`Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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`In addition to disclosure, the prior art must teach the limitations
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`“arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim.” Net
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`MoneyIN, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Thus,
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`a reference does not anticipate if the disclosures are found in different
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`embodiments. Microsoft Corp. v. Biscotti, Inc., 878 F.3d 1052, 1069 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2017) (“[A]nticipation is not proven by multiple, distinct teachings that
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`the artisan might somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention.”).
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`For a reference to be anticipatory, it must also “enable one of ordinary
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`skill in the art to make the invention without undue experimentation.” Finisar
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`Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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`Specifically, it must “enable[] the subject matter that falls within the scope of
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`the claims at issue.” In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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`Enablement requires that a POSITA “would know how to make and use the
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`invention based on the reference’s disclosure.” Id., 523 F.3d at 1335. This
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`means the POSITA must know how “to practice or to carry out” the
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`disclosures in the prior art. Id.
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`B. Cho does not anticipate or enable a “liquid reservoir at least
`partially defined by an interior of the cartridge housing and
`an exterior of the atomizing chamber” (claims 43 and 44)
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`Claims 43 and 44 require that the liquid reservoir is “defined by an
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`interior of the cartridge housing and an exterior of the atomizing chamber.”
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`Cho does not disclose this limitation. Ex. 2001, ¶46. Instead, Cho’s alleged
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`liquid reservoir is defined entirely by the interior of its storage container 1201.
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`Id.
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`Petitioner relies on “loading portion 1503” as the liquid reservoir. Pet.
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`49. However, Cho makes clear that this “loading portion 1503” is completely
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`defined by the interior of “storage container 1202” and nothing else. Ex. 1005,
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`Figs. 8, 10, ¶89 (“the storage container 1201 has a loading portion 1503 as the
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`remaining space …”). Nothing about Cho’s disclosure here indicates that the
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`liquid reservoir is partially defined by the exterior of an atomizing chamber.
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`Ex. 2001, ¶47.
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`Recognizing this deficiency, Petitioner instead relies on a single half-
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`sentence description of an alternative embodiment in which “the storage
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`container 1201 and atomization container 1203 are integrated into a single
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`structure.” Pet. 49 (citing Ex. 1005, ¶74); Ex. 2001, ¶48.
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`There are several problems with Petitioner’s theory and Cho’s half-
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`sentence disclosure. Ex. 2001, ¶49. First, Cho does not disclose that in the
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`“integrated embodiment,” the loading portion is partially defined by the
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`exterior of the atomizing chamber. Second, this “integrated embodiment” is
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`an embodiment that is distinct from the other embodiments that the Petition
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`relies on and, as such, Petitioner is mixing and matching embodiments.
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`Again, Petitioner has presented this ground as anticipatory, and thus presented
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`no evidence or argument that it would have been obvious to modify Cho’s
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`other embodiments according to the separate “integrated embodiment.”
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`Microsoft Corp. v. Biscotti, Inc., 878 F.3d 1052, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 2017). It is
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`therefore improper for Petitioner to rely on it for anticipation. Third, the
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`“integrated embodiment” imagined by Petitioner is not enabled.
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`1.
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`The “integrated embodiment” does not disclose a
`liquid reservoir partially defined by the exterior of
`the atomization chamber
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`Cho provides no explanation at all about how “the atomization
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`container and the storage container are molded into a mutually integrated
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`structure.” Ex. 1005, ¶74. Cho provides no figures that depict such an
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`integrated structure. Thus, there is no disclosure whatsoever that in this
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`embodiment, Cho’s “loading portion” is in any way defined by the exterior of
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`the atomization chamber. Ex. 2001, ¶¶50-51. The anticipation inquiry should
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`end there.
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`Yet Petitioner persists and instead relies on its own imagined and
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`hindsight-driven version of Figure 11. To be clear, this Figure appears
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`nowhere in Cho, and was fabricated specifically for purposes of the Petition:
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`Moreover, even in Petitioner’s contrived figure, there is no disclosure
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`that the loading portion (in blue) is partially defined by the exterior of the
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`atomizing chamber. Ex. 2001, ¶52. Within Petitioner’s integrated structure,
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`the exterior is one seamless piece that is no longer defined by separate
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`portions. Id. Thus, the exterior of the atomizing chamber can only be those
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`portions of the exterior co-located with the atomizing chamber, as shown in
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`the annotations below:
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`As is clearly seen, the loading portion (in blue) is not defined by the
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`actual exterior of the atomizing chamber. Ex. 2001, ¶53. Petitioner’s theory
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`relies on the exterior of the atomizing chamber component in the “separated”
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`embodiment, but being a completely different, mutually incompatible
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`embodiment, that component’s exterior has no bearing on what is the exterior
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`of the atomizing chamber in Petitioner’s “integrated” embodiment. Id.
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`Thus, neither Cho nor Petitioner’s contrived figure discloses a liquid
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`reservoir partially defined by the exterior of the atomizing chamber.
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`2.
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`The “integrated embodiment” is a distinct, mutually
`incompatible embodiment
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` Anticipation cannot be proven “by multiple, distinct teachings that the
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`artisan might somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention.” Microsoft
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`Corp. v. Biscotti, Inc., 878 F.3d at 1069. That is precisely what the Petition
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`has done.
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`The “integrated embodiment”
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`is clearly a different, distinct
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`embodiment from the other embodiments that the Petition relies on. Ex. 2001,
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`¶¶54-55. Cho does not provide any description for this “integrated
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`embodiment” (an issue discussed in more detail in the next subsection). All
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`that is disclosed by Cho is that, unlike the embodiment where “the atomization
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`container and the storage container as a structure [are] separated from each
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`other as an embodiment,” the “integrated” embodiment’s “atomization
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`container and the storage container are molded into a mutually integrated
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`structure,” and thus “the shape of the atomization container itself becomes
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`unnecessary.” Ex. 1005, ¶74. Clearly, these are two distinct, mutually
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`incompatible embodiments—a “separated” embodiment and an “integrated”
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`embodiment. Ex. 2001, ¶55.
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`Yet the Petition clearly relies on the “separated” embodiment for other
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`limitations. See, e.g., Pet. 46-47 (relying on Figure 11, which depicts a
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`“separated” embodiment). Indeed, most of the Petition’s Claim 43 analysis
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`relies on its Claim 1 analysis that expressly relies on the structures being
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`separate. Ex. 2001, ¶56. For example, for limitation [43.F], the Petition solely
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`relies on “limitation [1.F].” Pet. 48. However, for limitation [1.F], the
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`Petition argues that in Cho, “inductor 1315 (wick) pass[es] through the first
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`and second holes in fixing plate 1327 and also through the insertion holes
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`1311 in storage container 1201” (Pet. 22-23), which is only possible in the
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`“separated” embodiment. This is clearly seen in Petitioner’s modified and
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`annotated versions of Figures 8 and 11, wherein the fixing plate 1327 and
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`inductor 1315 is clearly depicted as being inserted into the bottom of a storage
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`container that must be separated from the atomizing chamber. Ex. 2001, ¶56.
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`Although combining embodiments might be proper for anticipation if a
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`POSITA “would at once envisage the claimed arrangement or combination,”
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`there is no evidence that a POSITA would or could do so here. Kennametal,
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`Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In
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`fact, it would not be possible for a POSITA to envisage the claimed
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`arrangement, because the two embodiments are mutually incompatible. Ex.
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`2001, ¶57. Again, for example, whereas for limitation [43.F] Petitioner relies
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`on the fixing plate being inserted into the bottom of a storage container
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`separated from the atomizing chamber, for this limitation here [43.G],
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`Petitioner relies on the storage container being integrated with the atomizing
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`chamber. Id.
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`Thus, Petitioner has
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`improperly mixed mutually
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`incompatible
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`embodiments, which cannot sustain a theory of anticipation.
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`3.
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`Cho’s “integrated embodiment” is not enabled
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`Another issue with the Petition’s reliance on Cho’s “integrated
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`embodiment” is that the embodiment is not enabled—Cho does not inform a
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`POSITA “how to make and use the invention.” In re Gleave, 523 F.3d at
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`1335; Ex. 2001, ¶58.
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`Cho does not provide any explanation as to how “the atomization
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`container and the storage container are molded into a mutually integrated
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`structure.” Ex. 1005, ¶74. Cho does not explain to a POSITA how the
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`integrated structure would be constructed or formed, what it would look like,
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`or what surfaces would be defined in the device. Ex. 2001, ¶59. On this basis
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`alone, there is no enablement of this integrated embodiment.
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`Moreover, the issues with “mak[ing] and us[ing]” the “integrated”
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`embodiment come to light with Petitioner’s contrived modification of Figure
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`11. For example, in Petitioner’s modification, it is not possible to install the
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`heating module, fixing plate, and inductors as described by Cho. Specifically,
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`Cho describes that in the separated embodiment, the heating module, fixing
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`plate and inductors are assembled together as shown in Figure 10. Ex. 1005,
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`¶88; Ex. 2001, ¶¶60-61.
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`This combined structure is then inserted and screwed into atomization
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`container 1203 via the threaded portion 1321. Ex. 2001, ¶62.
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`This combined structure is then attached to the storage container, as
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`shown in Figure 11. Ex. 2001, ¶63.
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`The above process of assembly is impossible with Cho’s integrated
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`embodiment, especially in the contrived example from Petitioner’s modified
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`Figure 11, reproduced below. Ex. 2001, ¶64.
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`With the storage container and atomization container being “molded
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`into a mutually integrated structure” (Ex. 1005, ¶74), it is not possible to insert
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`the combined heating module, fixing plate, and inductors into the integrated
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`structure. Ex. 2001, ¶65. Indeed, in Petitioner’s contrived figure, there is no
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`fixing plate to which the inductors are fastened (the blue strip in the middle is
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`instead the bottom of the loading portion containing the inductor insertion
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`holes). Id. Because the body is integrated and not separate components, there
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`is no mechanism to insert the necessary elements into the integrated body,
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`because the internal area where they must be placed is closed off. Id.
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`Similarly, it is not possible to screw the heating module/inductor module
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`structure into the inside of the atomization container (which again is closed
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`off) as instructed by Cho. See Fig. 10 (annotated by Patent Owner); Ex. 2001,
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`¶65.
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`Even assuming the fixing plate is manufactured as part of the integrated
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`structure (which Cho does not disclose and which Petitioner does not
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`propose), there is no mechanism to insert the inductors into it, or wind the
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`heating module around the inductors, or fasten those elements to the
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`atomizing chamber by screwing them in. Ex. 2001, ¶66.
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`Thus, Cho’s single, non-descript half-sentence of an “integrated
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`structure” does not enable a POSITA to make or use the claimed invention.
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`C. Cho does not disclose an “electronic cigarette” (claims 1 and
`44)
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`Cho does not disclose an “electronic cigarette,” whose purpose is to
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`atomize a nicotine-based liquid as a replacement for a tobacco cigarette. Ex.
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`2001, ¶67. Instead, Cho describes what it calls a “vaporisation unit” or a
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`“vaporisation and inhalation device” that is specifically and solely directed to
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`vaporizing “a substance beneficial to the human body.” Ex. 1005, ¶¶1, 33
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`(referring to “the present invention”). There is no dispute that nicotine is not
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`such a substance and, indeed, where Cho identifies exemplary substances for
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`its vaporizer, it refers to mint, lavender, grapefruit, ginseng, and other similar
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`health supplements—nowhere even hinting at nicotine. Id., Abstract, ¶¶12,
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`15.
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`Indeed, the entire focus of Cho is on therapeutic substances, not
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`nicotine. Id., ¶¶57-61, 66 (listing therapeutic substances for various
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`“therap[ies]”—none of which relate to or even suggest the use of nicotine).
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`Cho states that the “object of the present invention is to provide a device for
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`vaporisation and inhalation [of] highly viscous target substances … such as
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`amino acids, vitamins, and minerals.” Id., ¶8; see also ¶11 (“minerals,
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`08755-00011A/14950653.6
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`IPR2024-00567
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`vitamins, and amino acids as target substances”). Table 1 of Cho lists various
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`“substances to be vaporized belonging to a part of the present invention,” and
`
`includes their effects, all of which are therapeutic, such as “concentration
`
`enhancement,” “memory enhancement, senile dementia,” “insomnia,”
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`“bronchitis,
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`asthma,”
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`“indigestion,”
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`“arthritis,”
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`“acne,”
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`“cystitis,”
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`“constipation,” “enhancing sexual function,” “bad breath removal,” “oral
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`ulcers,” “osteoporosis,” “cancer prevention,” and “nutrition.” Id., ¶¶57-58.
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`The provision of such therapeutic substances and benefits by Cho’s apparatus
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`is the direct opposite of the ’114 patent’s claimed electronic cigarette—which
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`is to “emulate a tobacco cigarette[]” by providing nicotine when “a liquid is
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`atomized” “[r]ather than burning tobacco.” Ex. 1001, ¶¶1:19-24; Ex. 2001,
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`¶68.
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`Cho consistently and exclusively refers to the use of health supplements
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`and a POSITA would, thus, understand it does not disclose an electronic
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`cigarette but instead discloses something entirely different. Ex. 2001, ¶69.
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`Petitioner has fashioned Ground 1 as an anticipatory ground. It has thus
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`failed to present any arguments or evidence that Cho’s “vaporisation unit” for
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`delivery of “therapeutic substances” would have rendered obvious a the
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`claimed “electronic cigarette.” For these reasons, Cho does not disclose
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`IPR2024-00567
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`claim 1 and claim 44’s “electronic cigarette.”
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`V. GROUND 2 ALSO FAILS
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`Petitioner’s Ground 2, which challenges claim 80 which depends on
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`claim 43, likewise fails because it relies on Ground 1 and does not assert that
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`any of the limitations in claim 43 are obvious. Ex. 2001, ¶¶70-71.
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`VI. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons the Board should deny institution of this
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`petition.
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`Date: May 28, 2024
`
`
`
`
`
` By: /s/ James Glass
`James M. Glass (Reg. No. 46,729)
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
`SULLIVAN LLP
`51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor
`New York, NY 10010
`Email: jimglass@quinnemanuel.com
`Phone: 212-849-7142
`Fax: 212-849-7100
`
`Counsel for Patent Owner
`JUUL Labs, Inc.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`08755-00011A/14950653.6
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`CERTIFICATE OF LENGTH (37 C.F.R. §§ 42.24)
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that, according to the word-processing
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`system used to prepare the foregoing document, this document has 3,328
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`words and thus complies with the applicable word limit.
`
`Date: May 28, 2024
`
`
`
`
`
` By: /s/ James Glass
`James M. Glass (Reg. No. 46,729)
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
`SULLIVAN LLP
`51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor
`New York, NY 10010
`Email: jimglass@quinnemanuel.com
`Phone: 212-849-7142
`Fax: 212-849-7100
`
`Counsel for Patent Owner
`JUUL Labs, Inc.
`
`
`
`
`08755-00011A/14950653.6
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`24
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`IPR2024-00567
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (37 C.F.R. §§ 42.6(E), 42.105(A))
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing document was
`
`served in its entirety on May 28, 2024 upon the following parties via
`
`Electronic Mail:
`
`elizabeth.weiswasser@weil.com
`anish.desai@weil.com
`adrian.percer@weil.com
`anne.cappella@weil.com
`sutton.ansley@weil.com
`christopher.pepe@weil.com
`matthew.sieger@weil.com
`taylor.lawrence@weil.com
`
`
`
`Date: May 28, 2024
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` By: /s/ James Glass
`James M. Glass (Reg. No. 46,729)
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
`SULLIVAN LLP
`51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor
`New York, NY 10010
`Email: jimglass@quinnemanuel.com
`Phone: 212-849-7142
`Fax: 212-849-7100
`
`Counsel for Patent Owner
`JUUL Labs, Inc.
`
`
`08755-00011A/14950653.6
`
`25
`
`
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