Case 4:23-cv-00753-SDJ Document 28 Filed 03/18/24 Page 1 of 23 PageID #: 798
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`SHERMAN DIVISION
`
`CHIEN-MIN SUNG
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`TEXAS INSTRUMENTS
`INCORPORATED,
`
`Defendant.
`
`Civil Action No.4:23-cv-00753-SDJ
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`DEFENDANT TEXAS INSTRUMENTS’
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF INVALIDITY
`
`IPR2024-00534
`Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. et al v. Chien-Min Sung
`Samsung's Exhibit 1030
`Ex. 1030, Page 1
`
`

`

`Case 4:23-cv-00753-SDJ Document 28 Filed 03/18/24 Page 2 of 23 PageID #: 799
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`I.
`II.
`III.
`
`INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 1
`STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED BY THE COURT ..................................... 1
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND .............................................................................................. 2
`A. Dr. Sung’s Complaint accuses TI of infringing the Asserted Patents using,
`inter alia, 3M Diamond pad conditioners, like the A160 conditioner. ......................... 2
`B. Dr. Sung continued to accuse all 3M Diamond pad conditioners, even after
`TI identified specific models like the A160 3M Diamond pad conditioner. ................ 3
`C. TI’s purchase and use of the A160 3M Diamond pad conditioners long predates
`Dr. Sung’s Asserted Patents. ......................................................................................... 4
`D. Despite knowing that he is accusing prior art, Dr. Sung continues to stay the
`course and drive-up discovery costs. ............................................................................ 5
`IV. LEGAL BACKGROUND .................................................................................................... 5
`A. Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of
`material fact. ................................................................................................................. 5
`B. The on-sale bar under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) applies for invalidity. . ................ 6
`C. When the on-sale bar involves an Accused Product, invalidity is self-proving. ......... 7
`V. ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 10
`A. Dr. Sung consistently accuses all 3M Diamond pad conditioners—including
`the A160—of infringement, even after being told this product was prior art. ............ 10
`B. The Asserted Claims are invalid because the A160 3M Diamond pad conditioner
`was on sale (and purchased by TI) by September 20, 2000—well before the
`Asserted Patents’ critical dates. .................................................................................. 11
`C. Resolution of this issue is ripe now. ........................................................................... 13
`VI. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 16
`
`
`
`
`
`
`i
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`EX1030, Page 2
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`

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`Case 4:23-cv-00753-SDJ Document 28 Filed 03/18/24 Page 3 of 23 PageID #: 800
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`CASES
`
`Alacritech Inc. v. CenturyLink, Inc.
` No. 2:16-CV-00693-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 3007464 (E.D. Tex. July 14, 2017) ..................... 15
`
`Allied Machine & Engineering Corp. v. Competitive Carbide, Inc.
` No. 1:10-cv-773, 2011 WL 13193425 (N.D. Ohio July 5, 2011) ....................................... 9, 14
`
`Alpek Polyester, S.A. de C.V. v. Polymetrix AG
` No. 2021-1706, 2021 WL 5974163 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 16, 2021) ................................................. 5
`
`Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
`
`477 U.S. 242 (1986) .................................................................................................................. 6
`
`Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd.
`
`731 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1984)................................................................................................... 5
`
`Bennett Regul. Guards, Inc. v. Canadian Meter Co., Inc.
`
`184 Fed. App’x. 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006)....................................................................................... 8
`
`Big Baboon, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc.
` No. 4:17-cv-02082-HSG, 2019 WL 1791421 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2019)
`
`aff’d, 819 F. App’x 928 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ............................................................................ 9, 14
`
`Bright Ideas Co., Inc. v. Target Corp.
` No. MJG-05-30l5, 2006 WL 6903811 (D. Md. Aug. 25, 2006) ............................................. 10
`
`Chien-Min Sung v. 3M Corp
` No. 2:02-cv-191, Dkt. No. 1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2002) ........................................................ 15
`
`Cummings v. Adidas USA
`
`716 F. Supp. 2d 323 (S.D.N.Y 2010)...................................................................................... 10
`
`D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp.
`
`714 F.2d 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1983)........................................................................................... 7, 13
`
`Davis v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.
`
`823 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1987) .................................................................................................. 14
`
`Dean v. PowerTech Marine, Inc.
` No. 5:19-cv-1567, 2023 WL 199682 (W.D. La. Jan. 17, 2023) ............................................... 9
`
`Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey
`
`476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007)........................................................................................... 7, 13
`
`ii
`
`EX1030, Page 3
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`

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`Case 4:23-cv-00753-SDJ Document 28 Filed 03/18/24 Page 4 of 23 PageID #: 801
`
`Electromotive Div. of Gen. Motors Corp. v. Transp. Sys. Div. of Gen. Elec.
`
`417 F.3d 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2005)............................................................................................... 12
`
`Empire Tech. Grp. Ltd. v. Light & Wonder, Inc.
` No. 2:22-CV-00923-MMD-BNW, 2023 WL 8529084 (D. Nev. Dec. 7, 2023) ................ 9, 14
`
`Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc.
`
`424 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2005)........................................................................................... 6, 13
`
`Evans Cooling Sys., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp.
`
`125 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1997)........................................................................................ passim
`
`FMC Techs., Inc. v. OneSubsea IP UK Ltd.
`
`412 F. Supp. 3d 706 (S.D. Tex. 2019) .................................................................................... 10
`
`Gammino v. Southwestern Bell Tel., L.P.
`
`512 F. Supp. 2d 626 (N.D. Tex. 2007) ................................................................................... 10
`
`In re King
`
`801 F.2d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1986)........................................................................................... 6, 13
`
`Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.
`
`475 U.S. 574 (1986) .................................................................................................................. 5
`
`Minton v. National Ass’n. of Securities Dealers, Inc.
`
`336 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003)................................................................................................. 6
`
`Perfect Surgical Techs., Inc. v. Olympus Am., Inc.
` No. 4:12-cv-05967, 2013 WL 12214189 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2013) ..................................... 10
`
`Peters v. Active Mfg. Co.
`
`129 U.S. 530 (1889) .................................................................................................................. 1
`
`Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng’g, Inc.
`
`249 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2001)................................................................................................. 6
`
`SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am.
`
`775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985)................................................................................................. 5
`
`Upsher-Smith Lab., Inc. v. Pamlab, LLC
`
`412 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................. 7
`
`Vanmoor v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
`
`201 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2000)......................................................................................... 6, 7, 8
`
`
`
`
`iii
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`EX1030, Page 4
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`

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`Case 4:23-cv-00753-SDJ Document 28 Filed 03/18/24 Page 5 of 23 PageID #: 802
`
`WPEM, LLC v. SOTI Inc.
`
`837 F. App’x 773 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ......................................................................................... 15
`
`ZT IP, LLC v. VMware, Inc.
` No. 3:22-CV-0970, 2023 WL 1785769 (N.D. Tex. 2023) ..................................................... 15
`
`STATUTES
`35 U.S.C. § 102(b) ................................................................................................................. passim
`35 U.S.C. § 271(g) ........................................................................................................................ 13
`
`RULES
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ............................................................................................................................ 5
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) ..................................................................................................................... 14
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ....................................................................................................................... 5
`P.R. 3-1 ........................................................................................................................................... 3
`P.R. 3-1(b) ................................................................................................................................. 3, 10
`
`
`
`
`iv
`
`EX1030, Page 5
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`

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`Case 4:23-cv-00753-SDJ Document 28 Filed 03/18/24 Page 6 of 23 PageID #: 803
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`This is a uniquely frivolous case warranting early summary judgment and dismissal. Dr.
`
`Sung accused the prior art of infringement. Neither of the two facts needed to grant this motion
`
`can be genuinely disputed:
`
`(1) Dr. Sung accused TI of infringing the asserted patents by using third party 3M’s
`“Diamond pad conditioner” products, and
`
`(2) certain of these accused 3M Diamond pad conditioners were “on sale”—and in fact
`sold to TI and in use—up to a decade before the Asserted Patents alleged critical dates (that
`is, for § 102(b), one year before the earliest effective filing dates).
`
`These facts doom Dr. Sung’s patents under 35 U.S.C. §102(b) even at this early stage. It
`
`is axiomatic “that which infringes, if later, would anticipate if earlier.” Peters v. Active Mfg. Co.,
`
`129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889). Indeed, the Federal Circuit has explained that in this atypical scenario
`
`where a prior art product is accused of infringement, defendant’s “burden [to show invalidity] is
`
`met by [plaintiff’s] allegation, forming the sole basis for the complaint, that the [prior art]
`
`infringes.” Evans Cooling Sys., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 125 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
`
`Thus, the Court can determine—even at this early stage—that the asserted claims are invalid based
`
`on Dr. Sung’s own allegations of infringement without the need for claim construction or expert
`
`testimony. Id.
`
`TI respectfully requests that the Court grant summary judgment that the asserted claims of
`
`Dr. Sung’s ’862, ’802, and ’270 patents are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), dismiss this case
`
`with prejudice, and issue a judgment in TI’s favor on its counterclaims 1–3 of invalidity.
`
`II.
`
`STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED BY THE COURT
`
`Where Dr. Sung alleges that certain prior art CMP conditioner products infringe the
`
`Asserted Claims, should the Court grant summary judgment that the Asserted Claims are invalid
`
`under 35 U.S.C. §102(b) pursuant to, e.g., Evans Cooling, 125 F.3d at 1451?
`
`1
`
`EX1030, Page 6
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`

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`Case 4:23-cv-00753-SDJ Document 28 Filed 03/18/24 Page 7 of 23 PageID #: 804
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`III.
`
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
`
`A.
`
`Dr. Sung’s Complaint accuses TI of infringing the Asserted Patents using, inter
`alia, 3M Diamond pad conditioners, like the A160 conditioner.
`
`In his Complaint, Dr. Sung asserts three patents against TI: U.S. Patent Nos. 9,138,862
`
`(“the ’862 patent”), 9,724,802 (“the ’802 patent”) and 8,974,270 (“the ’270 patent”) (collectively,
`
`the “Asserted Patents”). Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”) at ¶ 25.1 The Asserted Patents “relate to
`
`chemical mechanical polishing/planarization (“CMP”) pad dressers and dressing and conditioning
`
`methods.” Id. As the Complaint acknowledges, the CMP process is a standard semiconductor
`
`manufacturing process used to polish or planarize the surface of the semiconductor wafers2 by
`
`removing excess material through both chemical and mechanical reactions. See id. at ¶ 26. With
`
`CMP, a wafer is pressed into and rotated against a polishing pad in conjunction with a slurry to
`
`remove protrusions and planarize the surface. See id. To extend the life of the CMP pads, a CMP
`
`pad “conditioner” is rotated against the CMP pad in conjunction to condition or regenerate the
`
`surface of the CMP pad. See id. at ¶ 27.3
`
`For each of the Asserted Patents, Dr. Sung’s infringement allegations are premised on TI’s
`
`use of CMP pad conditioner products purchased from third parties such as 3M. See, e.g.,
`
`Complaint at ¶¶ 31, 35, 36, 59, 81. One relevant group of accused products is 3M’s Diamond pad
`
`
`1 Dr. Sung previously worked for a Taiwanese company named Kinik. But Dr. Sung’s relationship
`with Kinik ended in litigation and criminal charges in Taiwan and the US for breach of their
`agreements, including allegedly improperly taking intellectual property that belonged to Kinik
`(including the Asserted Patents). See Ex. 6, Chien-Min Sung v. Kinik Company, No. 1:14-cv-
`01027, Dkt. No 37 at ¶ 10 (Nov. 5, 2015, D. Del). Dr. Sung also pled guilty to a felony relating to
`his misappropriation of GE trade secrets. See Ex. 1, Sung Dep., IPR2014-01523, Paper 1014 (June
`4, 2015); Ex. 2, In the matter of Certain Abrasive Products, 337-TA-449, Hr’g Tr. (Oct. 17, 2001).
` In semiconductor manufacturing, multiple integrated circuits are manufactured on a large circular
`slice of semiconductor material called a wafer. Wafers must then be sliced and packaged into
`individual chips.
` An illustration of a typical CMP process can be seen in Figure 1 of TI’s U.S. Patent No. 5,522,965
`from 1996. See Ex. 3 at 2 (annotations to Figure 1 added).
`
` 2
`
` 3
`
`2
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`EX1030, Page 7
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`

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`Case 4:23-cv-00753-SDJ Document 28 Filed 03/18/24 Page 8 of 23 PageID #: 805
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`conditioners. Id. Exhibits 4, 9, and 14 to the Complaint purport to chart how the 3M Accused
`
`Instrumentalities infringe the Asserted Patents and generally identify 3M Diamond pad
`
`conditioners as accused products. See Complaint Ex. 4 at 1–3; Ex. 19 at 1–3, Ex. 14 at 1–2; see
`
`also id. at ¶¶ 37, 60, 82. Each of these Exhibits refer to the same page of 3M’s website related to
`
`3M Diamond pad conditioners: “https://www.3m.com/3M/en_US/p/d/b5005035338.” See, e.g.,
`
`Complaint Ex. 4 at 3. This 3M webpage identifies several “Product Series” within the “3M
`
`Diamond Pad Conditioner” group, including the A160 model conditioner. The website has an
`
`A160 datasheet as its top link on “Frequently viewed resources,” and it lists the A160 datasheet
`
`first in the “Resources” section of the page.
`
`B.
`
`Dr. Sung continued to accuse all 3M Diamond pad conditioners, even after TI
`identified specific models like the A160 3M Diamond pad conditioner.
`
`Before Dr. Sung served his infringement contentions, he served discovery on TI requesting
`
`that TI identify the specific models of accused third party pad conditioners that it was using. TI
`
`responded and identified, among others, the 3M Diamond pad conditioner model A160. Ex. 4 at
`
`6, TI Response to Sung 1st Set of Interrogatories (Nos. 1-11), Appendix A.
`
`Dr. Sung subsequently served his infringement contentions—asserting ’862 patent claims
`
`1–13, 15, 17–20; ’802 patent claims 1–21; and ’270 patent claims 1–8 (“Asserted Claims”). Ex.
`
`5 at 2–4, (Sung Infringement Contentions Cover Pleading). Rather than identifying each (or any)
`
`accused instrumentality “by name or model number” as required by P.R. 3-1, Dr. Sung’s
`
`contentions parroted the Complaint’s general accusations against all 3M Diamond pad
`
`conditioners, failing to identify or chart any specific model despite obtaining discovery from TI
`
`on specific 3M Diamond pad conditioner models it was using.
`
`TI emailed Dr. Sung’s counsel noting how Dr. Sung’s contentions failed to comply with
`
`the Local Patent Rule 3-1(b) and requesting Dr. Sung confirm if any of the specific conditioners
`
`3
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`EX1030, Page 8
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`

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`Case 4:23-cv-00753-SDJ Document 28 Filed 03/18/24 Page 9 of 23 PageID #: 806
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`that TI uses—like the A160—were accused of infringement. Ex. 7 at 13, 9, 5 and 2 (Email re
`
`Deficiencies with Sung’s Infringement Contentions). After refusing to answer for weeks, Dr.
`
`Sung’s counsel ultimately confirmed that Dr. Sung was indeed accusing all 3M Diamond pad
`
`conditioners. Id. at 1 and 3
`
`C.
`
`TI’s purchase and use of the A160 3M Diamond pad conditioners long
`predates Dr. Sung’s Asserted Patents.
`
`Even assuming Dr. Sung’s alleged priority dates, TI’s purchase and use of the A160
`
`predates the Asserted Patents by years.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Id. Yet, TI’s business records and witness testimony show that
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Moreover, 3M documents produced in response to Dr. Sung’s subpoena corroborate that
`
`the A160 Diamond Pad Conditioner was on sale and in use at TI before the alleged critical dates.
`
`See, e.g.,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`4 Notably, in a prior case, Dr. Sung declared under penalty of perjury that he invented the ’802
`patent after Oct. 28, 2013. Ex. 13 at 5. And Dr. Sung’s counsel in this case stated, “its contention
`is and will remain that the priority date [for the ’802 patent] is Oct. 3, 2014.” Ex. 20 at 1. Based
`on this, the Court found Dr. Sung “only claims priority to October 3, 2014.” Ex. 14 at 2. But for
`purposes of this motion, TI does not need to dispute the claimed priority.
`
`4
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`EX1030, Page 9
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`

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`Case 4:23-cv-00753-SDJ Document 28 Filed 03/18/24 Page 10 of 23 PageID #: 807
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`D.
`
`Despite knowing that he is accusing prior art, Dr. Sung continues to stay the
`course and drive-up discovery costs.
`
`After confirming Dr. Sung was in fact intentionally accusing TI’s use of the A160 3M
`
`Diamond pad conditioners, TI conferred with Dr. Sung’s counsel multiple times. TI explained
`
`that the accused A160 was prior art and that TI had been using these A160 conditioners since the
`
`early 2000s (as documented in its invalidity contentions and corroborated by both TI and third-
`
`party 3M documentation). Nevertheless, Dr. Sung reaffirmed his contentions, continuing to accuse
`
`TI’s use of all 3M Diamond pad conditioners, including use of the A160 conditioner.
`
`IV.
`
`LEGAL BACKGROUND
`
`A.
`
`Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of
`material fact.
`
`“[S]ummary judgment is a procedural device for promptly disposing of actions in which
`
`there is no genuine issue of any material fact even though such issue might have been raised by
`
`formal pleadings.” Alpek Polyester, S.A. de C.V. v. Polymetrix AG, No. 2021-1706, 2021 WL
`
`5974163, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 16, 2021). “[C]ourt[s] should utilize the salutary procedure of Fed.
`
`R. Civ. P. 56 to avoid unnecessary expense to the parties and wasteful utilization of the jury process
`
`and judicial resources.” Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d
`
`831, 835 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine dispute of
`
`material fact initially rests with the movant. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d
`
`1107, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). If met, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to “set
`
`forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita
`
`Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “[T]he mere existence of some
`
`5
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`EX1030, Page 10
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`

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`Case 4:23-cv-00753-SDJ Document 28 Filed 03/18/24 Page 11 of 23 PageID #: 808
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`alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion
`
`for summary judgment . . . .” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986).
`
`B.
`
`The on-sale bar under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) applies for invalidity.
`
`Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b),5 a “person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . (b) the
`
`invention was . . . on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application
`
`for patent in the United States.” To show a patent claim is invalid under § 102(b), a challenger
`
`must prove by clear and convincing evidence that a product embodying the invention in the claim
`
`was “on sale” more than one year prior to the earliest application date to which the patent claims
`
`priority (the “critical date”). Vanmoor v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 201 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2000). Invalidity under the on-sale bar is a question of law with underlying questions of fact.
`
`Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng’g, Inc., 249 F.3d 1307, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
`
`The on-sale bar equally applies to method claims. Minton v. National Ass’n. of Securities
`
`Dealers, Inc., 336 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (ruling lease of patentee’s trading system to a
`
`local brokerage firm raised an on-sale bar against patentee’s method claims because the system
`
`substantially “embod[ied] the claimed method”). For example, a prior art product “can be used to
`
`support an anticipation rejection of method claims that, in essence, simply define what happens
`
`when that [product] is placed in the environment in which the [product] will be used.” In re King,
`
`801 F.2d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1986); accord Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 424 F.3d
`
`1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he offer to sell the compositions invalidates [method of use
`
`claims] based on those same [products].”). Likewise, the sale of a product produced by a patented
`
`process creates an on-sale bar that invalidates method claims covering that process. Dippin’ Dots,
`
`5 As previously discussed, all alleged priority dates pre-date the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
`of 2012. Therefore, TI bases this motion on pre-AIA law, but the result would be the same under
`the AIA.
`
`6
`
`EX1030, Page 11
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`

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`Case 4:23-cv-00753-SDJ Document 28 Filed 03/18/24 Page 12 of 23 PageID #: 809
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`Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The public sale of goods produced by a
`
`process more than one year before a patent is filed places that process in the § 102(b) prior art.”);
`
`see also D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 714 F.2d 1144, 1147–48 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
`
`(affirming summary judgment that patentee’s pre-critical date sales of a product made by the
`
`patented process created an on-sale bar that invalidated method claims).
`
`C. When the on-sale bar involves an Accused Product, invalidity is self-proving.
`
`In a typical case applying § 102(b)’s on-sale bar, the accused infringer must demonstrate
`
`that the prior art contains each and every limitation of the asserted claims. However, “[a] century-
`
`old axiom of patent law holds that a product ‘which would literally infringe if later in time
`
`anticipates if earlier.’” Upsher-Smith Lab., Inc. v. Pamlab, LLC, 412 F.3d 1319, 1322 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2005) (citation omitted). Thus, where an accused product itself was on sale before the critical
`
`dates of the asserted patents (like is the case here), the accused infringer need not show that the
`
`product meets the elements of the claims—instead, that showing is completely satisfied by the
`
`plaintiff’s own infringement allegations. Evans Cooling, 125 F.3d at 1451; Vanmoor, 201 F.3d at
`
`1366. In this atypical situation—where the patentee has accused a prior art product of
`
`infringement—no claim construction or comparison of the product to the claims is needed. The
`
`only showing required for summary judgment of invalidity is that the accused product was on sale
`
`prior to the critical date.
`
`The prime example of this principle is Evans Cooling. There, the plaintiff alleged that
`
`GM’s LT1 engine contained a cooling system that infringed plaintiff’s patent. 125 F.3d at 1450.
`
`The district court granted GM’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity on GM’s showing that
`
`its dealers put the accused LT1 engine on sale to retail customers more than one year prior to the
`
`priority date of the patent. Id. In affirming the district court’s holding, the Federal Circuit rejected
`
`7
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`EX1030, Page 12
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`Case 4:23-cv-00753-SDJ Document 28 Filed 03/18/24 Page 13 of 23 PageID #: 810
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`plaintiff’s contention that GM had not demonstrated that the accused LT1 engine actually met (i.e.,
`
`anticipated) each and every limitation of the asserted claims:
`
`Evans . . . argue[s] that summary judgment was inappropriate because GM did not
`meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the [LT1] engine
`of the 1992 Corvette anticipated the claims of the ’636 patent. . . .We do not agree.
`This is not the typical case where the patentee has placed some device on sale prior
`to the critical date and the accused infringer must demonstrate that this device
`actually embodied or rendered obvious the patented invention. Here, the entire
`basis of the lawsuit is Evans’—the patentee’s—contention that the LT1 engine—
`the device that was put on sale—contains a cooling system that infringes. . . .
`Although GM bore the burden of proving that the LT1 engine embodied the
`patented engine or rendered it obvious for purposes of the summary judgment
`motion, this burden is met by Evans’ allegation, forming the sole basis for the
`complaint, that the LT1 engine infringes.
`
`Id. at 1451.
`
`Similarly, in Vanmoor, the plaintiff accused defendants of infringing his patent by selling
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`a cartridge used to dispense caulking compound. 201 F.3d at 1364–65. In affirming summary
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`judgment, the Federal Circuit held that, while the defendants “bore the burden of proving” the
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`accused cartridges anticipated plaintiff’s patent, “that burden was satisfied by plaintiff’s allegation
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`that the accused cartridges infringe the [] patent.” Id.6 Because there was no genuine dispute that
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`some of the accused cartridges were on sale and used before the critical date, plaintiff’s patent was
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`invalid, and defendants were entitled to summary judgment. Id. at 1367.
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`District courts around the country have followed Evans Cooling and Vanmoor, granting
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`summary judgment of invalidity when the accused product was shown to be on-sale prior art. For
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`example, in Allied Machine & Engineering Corp. v. Competitive Carbide, Inc., the plaintiff’s
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`complaint accused two products of infringement. No. 1:10-cv-773, 2011 WL 13193425, at *1
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`6 See also Bennett Regul. Guards, Inc. v. Canadian Meter Co., Inc., 184 Fed. App’x. 977, 978 n.1
`(Fed. Cir. 2006) (“When the anticipatory reference is the accused product, the Defendant’s burden
`[of showing that the anticipatory reference contains each and every claim element] is satisfied by
`the Plaintiff’s infringement allegations in the Complaint that the accused product embodies the
`claimed invention.”).
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`8
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`EX1030, Page 13
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`

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`Case 4:23-cv-00753-SDJ Document 28 Filed 03/18/24 Page 14 of 23 PageID #: 811
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`(N.D. Ohio July 5, 2011). After the case management conference, the defendant moved for
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`summary judgment of invalidity because one of the products identified in the complaint had been
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`on sale before the critical date. Id. Although the plaintiff tried to recant its claim against the prior
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`art product, the court granted summary judgment of invalidity based on the complaint’s
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`accusations. Id. at *3.
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`Likewise, in Big Baboon, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc., the plaintiff identified several products
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`in its complaint as allegedly infringing, including an “R/3 3.1” product. No. 4:17-cv-02082-HSG,
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`2019 WL 1791421, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2019), aff’d, 819 F. App’x 928 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
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`Thereafter, defendants moved for summary judgment of invalidity, showing that the R/3 3.1
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`product had been sold before the critical date. Id. The Court granted the early summary
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`judgment—finding that “Plaintiff’s accusations serve as a ‘binding admission’ that satisfies
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`Defendants’ burden to prove for purposes of its invalidity argument that the accused product
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`contains all of the elements of the asserted claims.” Id. Although the plaintiff tried to “reverse
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`course” and suggest only certain versions of the R/3 3.1 product were accused, the Court rejected
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`plaintiff’s suggestion that it was “entitled to conduct discovery on the technical modification
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`timeline of the R/3 3.1 system” based on speculated differences—finding that “Plaintiff’s own
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`allegation that R/3 3.1 is the infringing product obviates the need for an element-by-element
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`analysis that might make additional discovery potentially necessary.” Id. at *3–4.
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`Many other courts have reached similar conclusions in § 102(b) cases.7 In these cases, no
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`claim construction or technical analysis was necessary to resolve the summary judgment motion.
`
`
`7 Empire Tech. Grp. Ltd. v. Light & Wonder, Inc., No. 2:22-CV-00923-MMD-BNW, 2023 WL
`8529084, at *3 (D. Nev. Dec. 7, 2023) (granting summary judgment after limited discovery
`“because [plaintiff’s] display and demonstration of the accused [product] … was an invalidating
`prior public use”); Dean v. PowerTech Marine, Inc., No. 5:19-cv-1567, 2023 WL 199682, at *4
`(W.D. La. Jan. 17, 2023) (granting summary judgment—even after plaintiff dismissed its claims—
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`9
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`EX1030, Page 14
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`Case 4:23-cv-00753-SDJ Document 28 Filed 03/18/24 Page 15 of 23 PageID #: 812
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`Because the patentee accused the product of infringement, coverage of the product by the claims
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`was necessarily conceded by the patentee, and the only remaining question was whether the
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`accused product was on sale before the critical date. That is precisely the scenario at issue here.
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`V.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`A.
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`Dr. Sung consistently accuses all 3M Diamond pad conditioners—including
`the A160—of infringement, even after being told this product was prior art.
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`From his Complaint to his infringement contentions, Dr. Sung has consistently taken the
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`position that all 3M Diamond pad conditioners are accused of infringement. Dr. Sung’s
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`accusations against 3M Diamond pad conditioners were not accidental—they are central to his
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`broad theory of infringement. Instead of actually identifying specific products and charting each
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`of them against the asserted claims, Dr. Sung chose to file a Complaint and serve contentions that
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`rely on general allegations against the entire category of 3M Diamond pad conditioners.
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`After TI noted that Dr. Sung’s contentions failed to comply with Local Patent Rule 3-1(b),
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`Dr. Sung’s counsel persisted with its claim that Dr. Sung’s Complaint and contentions were not
`
`
`because “[plaintiff’s] infringement allegations invalidate his own patent” when an “materially
`identical” version of the accused product was on sale before priority date of asserted patent); FMC
`Techs., Inc. v. OneSubsea IP UK Ltd., 412 F. Supp. 3d 706, 716 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (granting
`summary judgment of invalidity where accused infringer presented “evidence that [a version of
`the accused product], which is materially identical to the [accused product] was the subject of a
`commercial sale to Shell before the effective filing date for the [asserted] Patent.); Cummings v.
`Adidas USA, 716 F. Supp. 2d 323, 328-29, 334 (S.D.N.Y 2010) (granting summary judgment of
`invalidity because sales records showed that Nike had sold eighteen samples of the accused shoe
`to sales representatives and showrooms before the critical date); Bright Ideas Co., Inc. v. Target
`Corp., No. MJG-05-30l5, 2006 WL 6903811, at *2-4 (D. Md. Aug. 25, 2006) (finding business
`records, including order forms sent to prospective customers and reports reflecting the existence
`of unshipped orders for the accused product prior to the critical date justified summary judgment
`of invalidity); Gammino v. Southwestern Bell Tel., L.P., 512 F. Supp. 2d 626, 637 (N.D. Tex. 2007)
`(grating summary judgment of invalidity, noting that “Gammino cannot have i