PUBLIC VERSION
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`UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
`Washington, D.C.
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`In the Matter of
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`_
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`-­
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`CERTAIN CONSUMER ELECTRONICS AND DISPLAY
`DEVICES WITH GRAPHICS PROCESSING AND
`GRAPHICS PROCESSING UNITS THEREIN
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`V Inv. N0. 337-TA-932
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`. INITIAL DETERMINATION ON VIOLATION OF SECTION 337
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`.
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`Administrative Law Judge Thomas B. Pender
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`'
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`(October 09, 2015) 7
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`Pursuant to the Notice of Investigation and Rule 2lO.42(a) of the Rules of Practice and
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`Procedure of the United States International Trade Commission, this is my Initial Determination
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`in the matter of Certain Consumer Electronics Ana’Display Devices With Graphics Processing
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`And Graphics Processing Units Therein, Investigation N0. 337—TA-932.
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`Table of Contents
`\
`INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. ..
`A.
`The Parties .................................................................................. ..
`
`l Complainant ..................................................................... ..
`1.
`Respondents .................................................................... ..
`2.
`Products at Issue .;....................................................................... ..
`B.
`JURISDICTION ..................................................................................... ..
`
`A.
`B.
`C.
`
`Subject Matter Jurisdiction ......................................................... ..
`Personal Jurisdiction .......................................................... ..
`In Rem Jurisdiction ..................................................................... ..
`
`RELEVANT LAW ................................................................................. ..
`A.
`Infringement ................................................................................ ..
`l..
`Claim Construction ......................................................... ..
`
`2.
`
`Direct Infringement .........
`a.
`Literal Infringement ............................................ ..
`
`Doctrine of Equivalents ........_.............................. ..
`b.
`,
`Indirect Infringement ...................................................... ..
`3.
`Invalidity ..................................................................................... ..
`1.
`Anticipation.........
`..................... ..
`2.
`Obviousness .................................................................... ..
`
`B.
`
`Written Description and Enablement .............................. ..
`3.
`Domestic Industry —Technical Prong ......................................... ..
`C.
`U.S. PATENT NO. 7,209,140 ................................................................ ..
`A.
`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art ............................................... ..
`B.
`Claim Construction ........
`.......................................................... ..
`
`l.
`2.
`3.
`
`Order No. 20: Construing Terms of the Asserted Patents
`Agreed Construction - “programmable by the user” .......
`Disputed Constructions ............. .._.............
`...................... ..
`a.
`“graphics data”/“operations on the graphics data”
`b.
`“hardware graphics accelerator” ......................... ..
`c.
`r“recipr0cal
`instruction” ...... .........................................................
`
`.Q.................................... ..
`C. _ Infiingement ..........................................
`D. -
`Domestic Industry —Technical Prong.........
`E.
`Invalidity ..................................
`......................................................................... ..
`
`ii
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`.5
`.3
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`.'3
`.3
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`ll
`l3
`l4
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`15
`l7
`l7
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`29
`34
`37
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`38
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`1.
`2.
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`.. 38
`Anticipation—35 U.S.C. 102..................................................................
`'43
`Obviousness —35 U.S.C. 103 .............................................................
`a.
`Renderman on Horizon86O ......................................................... .. 43
`
`“C” Language, on TMS34082 ...................................................... .. 45
`b.
`Inventorship —35 U.S.C. 102(1)..............................................................
`.. 52
`3.
`U.S..PATENT NO. 6,690,372 .....................
`................................................................. .. 59
`
`A.
`B.
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`.. 60
`_ Level of Ordinary Skill in the A11.......................................................................
`Claim Construction ............................................................................................. .. 60
`
`60
`‘OrderNo. 20: Construing Tentrrsof the Patent - “shading calculation”
`1.
`Disputed Term - “texture look-up module coupled to the shading module”
`2.-
`(Claim 23) .......................
`................................................................................... .. 61
`C. _ ~ Infringement ......................
`................................................................................
`.. 71
`1.
`Claim 23 ....................................... .§..............................
`......71
`
`Sufficiency of NVIDIA’s infringement evidence ....................... .. 72
`a.
`Do the Accused Products have a “shading module” and a “texture
`b.
`look-up module” coupled to a “shading module”? ................................. .. 74
`c.
`Conclusion ............................................................ ...................... .. 81
`Claim 24......................... ......................................................................... .. 82
`
`2.
`
`D.
`E.
`
`.. 86
`Domestic Industry —Technical Prong .................................................................
`......87
`Anticipation ............................................................................................. .. 87
`a.
`“McCool” ......;.............................................................................
`.. 87
`
`1.
`
`.. 101
`U.S. Patent No. 6,236,413 .........................................................
`b.
`c. V “Acl<erman” .......................................................................
`.;....... 108
`
`...................................................... .. 114
`Obviousness...............
`2.
`U.S. PATENT NO. 7,038,685 ...................................................................................... .. 114
`
`A.
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art ..................................................................... .. 115
`Claim Construction ....
`.............................................................................
`....... 117
`
`117
`Agreed construction - “dynamically controlling...” ........................
`1.
`Disputed construction - “graphics processor” ....................................... .. 117
`2.
`Infringement ...................................................................................................... .. 123
`1.
`Claim 1......;...........................................................................................
`.. 123
`a.
`Mali GPUs ................................................................................
`.. 123­
`b. -
`Adreno GPUs ........................... ..
`132
`
`2.
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`Claim 15.......................
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`.......................................................................
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`.. 137
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`I
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`D.
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`E.
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`a.
`b.
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`Mali GPUs ............................................................ ..
`Adreno GPUs .........
`............................................. ..
`
`Domestic Industry - Technical Prong ........................................... ..
`
`........................................................ ..
`Invalidity .............................
`1.
`Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102) —The ATI Unified Shader
`a.
`Conception ....../.....................................
`.._............... ..
`' b.
`Reduction to Practice ............................................ ..
`
`_
`
`2.‘
`
`............................................. ..
`Conclusion .............
`c.
`‘ Obviousness —35 U.SlC. I03 ...........................................
`..
`a. .
`Selzer in view ofVan Hook .....
`b.
`Ainanatides in view of Van Hook ...........................
`VII. DOMESTIC INDUSTRY ......................................................................... ..
`VIII. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW .............;........................................................ ..
`IX.
`INITIAL DETERMINATION AND ORDER .......................................... ..
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`pTable of Abbreviations
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`Comp1ainant’s Demonstrative Exhibit
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`Complainanfs Initial Post-Hearing Brief
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`Complainanfs Reply Post-Hearing Brief
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`'
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`C0mplainant’s Exhibit
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`Deposition
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`Joint Exhibit
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`Respondent’s Demonstrative Exhibit
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`Respondent’s Initial Post-Hearing Brief
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`Respondenfs Reply Post-Hearing Brief
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`Respondent’s Exhibit
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`Transcript
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`Direct Witness Statement (Including Revised Direct Witness Statements)
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`Rebuttal Witness Statement
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`CDX
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`CIB
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`CRB
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`CX
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`Dep.
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`IX
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`RDX
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`RIB
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`RRB
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`RX
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`Tr.
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`DWS
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`RWS
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Complainant NVIDIA Corporation (“NVIDIA”) filed a complaint on September 4, 2014
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`alleging a violation of Section 337 based on infringement of seven patents: (i) U.S. Patent No.
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`6,198,488 (“the '488 patent”); (ii) U.S. Patent No. 6,992,667 (“the '66? patent”); (iii) us. Patent
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`No. 7,209,140 (“the '140 patent”); (iv) Us Patent No. 6,690,372 (“the 072 patent”); (v) us.
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`Patent N0. 7,038,685 (“the '685 patent”); (vi) U.S. Patent No. 7,015,913 (“the '913 patent”); and
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`(vii) U.S. Patent N0. 6,697,063 (“the ‘O63patent”).
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`(Compl. 115). On October 10, 2014, the
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`Commission instituted an investigation, by publication of a notice in the Federal Register, to
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`determine:
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`whether there is a violation of subsection (a)(1)(B) of section 337
`in the importation into the United States, the sale for importation,
`or the sale within the United States after importation of certain
`consumer electronicsand display devices with graphics processing
`and graphics processing units therein by reason of infringement of
`one or more of claims 1, 19, and 20 of the '488 patent; claims 1-29
`ofthe
`‘667 patent; claims 1-5, 7-19, 21-23, 25-30, 34-36, 38, 41-43
`of the ’685 patent; claims 5-8, 10, 12-20 and 24-27 of the '9l3
`patent; claims 7, 8, 11-13, 16-21, 23, 24, 28, and"29 of the '063
`patent; claims 1-10, 12, and 14 of the '140 patent; and claims 1-6,
`9-16, and 19-25 of the ‘372 patent, and whether an industry in the
`United States exists as required by subsection (a)(2) of section
`337....
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`79 Fed. Reg. 61338 (Oct. 10, 2014).
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`A Markman hearing was held on February 2 and 3, 2015, and an order construing the
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`disputed terms issued on April 2, 2015. (Order No. 20 (Apr. 2, 2015) (“Markman Order”)). In
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`addition, the Commission has determined that NVIDIA satisfies the economic prong of the
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`domestic industry requirement with respect to each of the asserted patents. (Notice of
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`Commission Determination not to Review an Initial Determination Granting Complainants’
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`Unopposed Motion for Summary Determination that the Economic Prong of the Domestic
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`Industry Requirement is Satisfied (Apr. 22, 2015).)
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`'
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`NVIDIA filed four motions for partial termination based on its withdrawal of certain
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`allegations set forth in its complaint. On December 31, 2014, NVIDIA filed a motion seeking
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`termination with respect to claim 19 ‘ofthe '488 patent.
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`(Mot. Docket Nos. 932-013). The
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`_
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`motion was granted, and the investigation was terminated with respect to that claim on_Februa1y
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`18, 2015. (See Order No. 10 (Jan. 15, 2015); Notice (Feb. 18, 2015)). On June 8, 2015, June 22
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`2015, and June 25,2015, NVIDIA ‘filedmotions seeking termination with respect to the '488
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`patent, the '667 patent, the '913 patent, the ‘O63patent, and claims 4, 16, 19, and 21 of the '685
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`patent. (Mot. Docket No. 932-047, 932-051, 932-060). These motions were granted and the
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`investigation was terminated with respect to these claims and patents. (See Order No. 35.)
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`The following patent assertions remain: claim 14 of the ‘I40 patent; claims 23 and 24 of
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`the '372 patent; and claims .1and 15 of the '685 patent (respectively, the “Asserted Claims” and
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`the “Asserted Patents”).
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`A.
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`The Parties
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`1.»
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`Complainant
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`Complainant NVIDIA Corporation (“NVIDIA”) is a Delaware corporation having a
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`principal place of business in Santa Clara, California.
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`(Complaint at 1]12). ­
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`2.
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`Respondents
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`'
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`I
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`'
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`Respondent Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. is a corporation organized under the laws of '
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`South Korea having a principal place of business at Samsung Main Building, 250 Taepyung-ro
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`2-ka, Chung-ku, Seoul 100-742, Korea. (Samsung Answer at 1125). Samsung Electronics _Co.,
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`Ltd. manufactures the accused mobile phones and tablet computers at issue in this investigation.
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`,_
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`Respondent Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC is a Delaware limited liability
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`'
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`company having a principal place of business at 1301 Lookout Drive, Richardson, Texas 75802.
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`(Id at 1128.) Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC is involved in the importation and
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`sale in the United States after importation of the accused mobile phones and tablet computers at
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`issue in this investigation. (Id) Respondent Samsung Semiconductor, Inc. is a California
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`corporation having a principal place of business at 3655 North First Street, San Jose, Califomia
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`95134. (Id at 1129.) Respondent Samsung Electronics America, Inc. is a New York corporation
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`having a principal place of business at 85 Challenger Road, Ridgefield Park, New Jersey 07660.
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`(Id. at 1127.) Samsung Electronics America, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Samsung
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`Electronics Co., Ltd. (Id. at 1127.) Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC and Samsung
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`Semiconductor, Inc. are subsidiaries of Samsung Electronics America, Inc. (Id at 111128-29.)
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`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC, Samsung
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`Semiconduct_or,Inc., and Samsung Electronics America, Inc. are referred to collectively herein
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`as “Samsung.”
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`Respondent Qualcomm, Inc. (“Qualcomm”) is a Delaware corporation having a principal
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`place of business at 5775 Morehouse Drive, San Diego, Califomia 92121. (Qualcomm Answer
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`at 1]23). Qualcomm designs, has-manufactured, and sells mobile processors with Adreno
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`graphics processing units (“GPU”) that are used in certain accused Samsung devices. (1d.)
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`B.
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`Products at Issue
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`g The parties still disagree about what products are actually at issue in this investigation.
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`(CRB at 3; RRB at 4-6.) It is black letter law that the scope of a Section 337 investigation is
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`determined by the Commission’s Notice of Investigation (“NOI”). Thus, in determining what
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`products are at issue in this investigation, I must turn to the NOI to see how the Commission
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`defined the scope of this investigation.
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`"
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`The scope of this investigation is defined in the NOI as “certain consumer electronics and
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`display devices with graphics processing and graphics processing units therein.” 79 Fed. Reg.
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`61338 (Oct. l0, 2014). NVIDIA argues that the NOI defmes the scope as: (1) certain consumer
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`electronics and display devices with graphics processing; and (2) graphics processingunits
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`therein. Respondents and the Staff maintains the scope of the investigation is certain consumer
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`electronics and display devices with graphics processing and graphics processing units therein
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`(i.e., “with graphics processing and graphics processing units therein” is a single prepositional
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`phrase that modifies “certain constuner electronics and display devices”).
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`The syntax of the NOI only supports the position of the Respondents and the Staff. If the
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`phrase “graphics processing tmits therein” was meant to be a separate clause from “certain
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`A
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`consumer electronics and display devices with graphics processing” there would be a comma
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`after “. ..with graphics processing.” Without such .a comma, the phrase “with graphics
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`processing and graphics processing units therein” reads as a single prepositional phrase.
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`Moreover, NVlDIA’s argument is belied by the following table from its own opening post­
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`hearing brief.
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`.
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`i
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`0 Patent
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`6’690’J72
`7,209,140
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`‘Claiml
`23
`24
`14
`
`l
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`1 A ~
`r
`Accused Products
`,
`A .
`l Samsung consumer products with Adreno, Mali, or PowerVR GPUs
`| Samsung consumer products with Mali GPUs
`Samsung consumer products with Adreno, Mali, or PowerVR GPUs
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`’
`’
`7 O38685
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`'
`
`' l5
`l
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`l Samsung consumer products with Adreno or Mali GPUs
`I Samsung consumer products with Adreno or Mali GPUs
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`'
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`(CIB at 2.) The above table makes clear the Accused Products are “Samsung consumer
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`products ...” NVIDIA does not identify any GPU, by itself, as an Accused Product and certainly
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`Qualcomm’s GPUs are not Samsung consumer products. Accordingly, for at least the reasons
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`above, I find the scope of this investigation is limited to consumer electronics and display
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`devices that include graphics processing capabilities and that have graphics processing units
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`therein.
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`'
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`Consistent with the NOI, the Accused Products in this investigation are Samsung mobile
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`devices, including phones and tablets, that employ one of the following five GPU architectures:
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`(i) Qualcomm Adreno A3X (302, 305, 306, 320, 330); (ii) Qualcomm Adreno A4X (420, 430);
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`(iii) ARM Mali T-6X (604, 624, 628); (iv) ARM Mali T-7X (720, 760); and (v) Imagination
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`PowerVR SGX 5X (540, 544). (CIB at 2.)
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`For purposes of the domestic industry requirement, NVIDIA relies upon its GPUs with
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`Kepler, Fermi, and Maxwell architectures (i.e., GeForce Titan Z, GeForce GTX750 TI, and
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`Tegra Kl processors) and products incorporating those GPUs. (CIB at 23, 63, 129.)
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`II.
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`JURISDICTION
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`‘
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`~ In order to have the power to decide a case, a court or agency must have both subject
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`matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over either the parties or thepro_perty involved. 19 U.S.C.
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`§ 1337; Certain Steel Rod Treating Apparatus and Components Thereo)’,Inv. No. 337-_TA-97,
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`Commission Memorandum Opinion, 215 U.S.P.Q. 229, 231‘(1981).
`
`A.
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`Subject Matter Jurisdiction
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`.
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`Section 337 confers subject matter jurisdiction on the International Trade Commission to
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`investigate, and if appropriate, to provide a remedy for, unfair acts and unfair methods of
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`competition in the importation, the sale for importation, or the sale after importation of articles
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`into the United States. (See 19 U.S.C. §§ l337(a)(l)(B) and (a)'(2).) NVIDIA alleges in the
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`Complaint a violation of Subsection 337(a)(l)(B) in the importation and sale of products that
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`infringe the Asserted Patents. (See Complaint.) NVIDIA has alleged sufficient facts that, if
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`proven, Would show Samsung and Qualcomrn imported articles that infringe NVIDIA’s patents.
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`See Certain Elec. Devices with Image Processing Sys., Components Thereof & Assoc. Software,
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`Inv. No. 337-TA-724, Comm’n Op. at 8-1O (Dec. 2, 2011) (citing Amgen, Inc. v. ITC, 902 F.2d
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`1532, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, I find the Commission has subject matter
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`jurisdiction overthis Investigation under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930
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`B.
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`Personal Jurisdiction
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`Respondents Samsung and Qualcomm have appeared and fully participated in this
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`g
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`investigation by, among other things, participating in discovery, participating in the evidentiary
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`hearing, and filing pre-hearing and post-hearing briefs. Accordingly, I find Respondents
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`Samsung and Qualcomm have submittedto the jurisdiction of the Commission. See Certain
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`Miniature Hacksaws, Inv. N0. 337-TA-237, Pub. No. 1948, Initial Determination at 4, 1986 WL
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`379287 (U.S.I.T.C., October 15, 1986) (unreviewed by Commission in relevant part).
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`C.
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`In Rem Jurisdiction
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`.
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`‘
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`Samsung has stipulated to importation of the Accused Products and further stipulated it
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`does not and will not dispute the importation requirement within the meaning of 19 USC
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`1
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`§ 1337(a)(1)(B) is satisfied in this Investigation. (See IX-020C.) See Certain Kinesiotherapy
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`Devices, Inv. N0. 337-TA-823, ID,'at 11-12 (Jan. 8, 2013) (unreviewed in relevant part) citing
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`Amgen, Inc. v. US. Int’! Trade Commfn, 902 F.2d 1532, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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`Qualcomm denies engaging in any importation-related activities with respect to the
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`Accused Products, but does not contest that the Accused Products (i.e., the Samsung mobile
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`devices at issue in this investigation) have been imported, as stipulated to by Samsung. Thus, I
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`find the Accused Products have been imported into the United States. Accordingly, the
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`Commission has in rem jurisdiction over the Accused Products. See Sealed Air Corp. v. United
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`States Int’! Trade Comm ’n, 645 F.2d 976, 985 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
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`III.
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`RELEVANT LAW
`
`A.
`
`Infringement
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`“An infringement analysis entails two steps. The first step is determining the meaning
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`and scope ofpthepatent claims asserted to be infringed. The second step is comparing the
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`properly construed claims to the device accused of infringing.” Markman v. Westview
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`Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane) (internal citations omitted), afld,
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`517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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`_
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`'
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`1.
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`Claim Construction
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`"
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`_
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`“Claim construction is generally a matter of law
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`but it may have underlying factual
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`determinations.” Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Electronics C0., Ltd., 2015 WL 5515331 (Fed. Cir.
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`2015) (citing TevaPharm. USA,Inc. v. Sandoz,’Inc.,—U.S. %_,
`
`i,
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`135 S.Ct. 831, 837, —
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`—L.Ed.2d i, —— (2015). “The construction of claims is simply a Wayof elaboratingthe
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`normally terse claim language in order to understand and explain, but not to change, the scope of
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`the claims.” Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Erzgg Corp, 216 F.3d "1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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`Claim construction focuses on the intrinsicevidence, which consists of the claims
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`themselves, thespecification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
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`.
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`Y
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`1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane); see also Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. As the Federal Circuit
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`in Phillips explained, courts must analyze each of these components to determine the “ordinary
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`and customary meaning of a claim term” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in art at the
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`time of the invention. 415 F.3d at 1313. “Such intrinsic evidence is the most significant source
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`of the legally operative meaning of disputed claim language.” Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v.
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`Covad C0mmc’ns Grp., Ina, 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001.). When the intrinsic evidence
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`does not establish the meaning of a claim, then extrinsic evidence (i.e., all evidence external to
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`the patent and the prosecution history, including dictionaries, inventor testimony, expert
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`testimony, and learned treatises) may be considered. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317.
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`2.
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`Direct Infringement
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`A complainant must prove either literal infringement or infringement under the doctrine
`
`of equivalents. Infringement must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. SmiihKline
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`Diagnostics, Inc. v.’Helena Labs. Corp, 859 F.2d 878, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1988). A preponderance
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`of the evidence standard “requires proving that infringement was more likely than not to have
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`occurred.” Warner-Lambert C0. v. Teva Pharm. USA,Ina, 418 F.3d 1326, 1341 n.15 (Fed. Cir.
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`2005).
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`I
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`a.
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`Literal Infringement
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`7
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`Literal infringement is a question of fact. Finisar Corp. v. Dz'recTVGroup, Inc., 523 F.3d
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`-A
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`1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Literal infringement requires the patentee to prove that the accused
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`device contains each and every limitation of the asserted claim(s). Frank ’s Casing Crew &
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`Rental Tools, Inc. v. Weatherford Int’l, Inc, 389 F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2004). If any claim
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`limitation is absent, there is no literal infringement of that claim as a matter of law. Bayer AG v.
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`Elan Pharm. Research Corp, 212 F.3d 1241, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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`' b.
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`Doctrine of Equivalents
`
`_
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`Where literal infringement is not found, infringement nevertheless can_befound under the
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`doctrine of equivalents. Determining infringement under the doctrine of equi'valents'“requires an
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`intensely factual inquiry.” Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel 1nt’l, Inc, 212 F.3d 1377,
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`1381 (Fed. Cir. 2000). According to the Federal Circuit:
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`e
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`Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents may be found when
`the accused device contains an “insubstantial” change from the
`claimed invention. Whether equivalency exists may be detennined
`based on the “insubstantial differences” test or based on the “triple
`identity” test, namely, Whether the element of the accused device
`“performs substantially the same function in substantially the same
`way to obtain the same result.” The essential inquiry is whether
`“the accused product or process contain elements identical or
`equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention[.]”
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`~
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`TIP Sys, LLC v. Phillips & Brooks/Gladwin, Inc, 529 F.3d 1364, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
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`(citations omitted). Thus, if an element is missing or not satisfied, infringement cannot be found
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`under the doctrine of equivalents as a matter of law. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & C0., 946
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`F.2d 1534, 1538-39 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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`-
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`3.
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`Indirect Infringement
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`_
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`.
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`Section 271(b) of the Patent Act prohibits inducement: “[w]hoever actively induces
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`infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). See DSU Med.
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`Corp. v. JMS C0., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed, Cir. 2006")(en bane) (“To establish liability under
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`section 271(b), a patent holder must prove that once the defendants knew of the patent, they
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`p
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`actively and knowingly aid[ed] and abett[ed] an0ther’s direct infringement”)
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`Section 271(c) of the Patent Act prohibits contributory infringement: “Under 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 271(c), a party who sells a component with knowledge that the component is especially
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`designed for use in a patented invention, and is not a staple article of commerce suitable for
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`substantial noninfringing use, is liable as-a contributory infringer.” Wordtech Sys., Inc. v.
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`Inregra1‘edNetw0rks Solutions, Ina, 609 F.3d 1308, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2010),
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`1
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`B.
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`Invalidity
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`/1
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`.
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`It is Respondents’ burden to prove invalidity, and the burden of proof never shifts to the
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`patentee to prove validity. Scanner Techs. Corp. v. ICOS Vision Sys. Corp. N. Ii/.,528 F.3d 1365,
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`1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “Under the patent statutes, a patent enjoys a presumption of validity, see
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`35 U.S.C. § 282, which canbe overcome only through facts supported by clear and convincing
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`evidence[.]” SRAM Corp. v. AD-HEng’g, Inc., 465 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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`The clear and convincing evidence standard placed on the party asserting the invalidity
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`defense requires a level of proof beyond the preponderance of the evidence. Although not»
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`susceptible to precise definition, “clear and convincing” evidence has been described as evidence
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`which produces in the mind of the trier of fact “an abiding conviction that the truth of a factual
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`contention is ‘highly probab1e.”’ Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing
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`Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus, Inc, 849 F.2d 1461, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1988).)
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`“\lVhenno prior art other than that which was considered by the PTO examiner is relied
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`on by the attacker, he has the added burden of overcoming the deference that is due to a qualified
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`government agency presumed to have properly done its job[.]” Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa
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`& Sons, Inc., 725 F-.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Therefore, the challenger’s “burden is
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`especially difficult when the prior art was before the PTO examiner during prosecution of the
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`application.” Hewlett-Packard C0. v. Bausch &.L0mb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1467 (Fed. Cir.
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`1990).
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`I
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`'
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`I
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`i
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`1.
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`Anticipation
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`Under 35 U.S_.C.§ l02(a), a patent is invalid for anticipation if it was “patented,
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`described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public
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`before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.”1 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). The Federal
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`Circuit has held that “[a] patent is invalid for anticipation if a single prior art reference discloses
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`each and every limitation of the claimed invention. Moreover, a prior art reference may
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`anticipate without disclosing a feature of the claimed invention if that missing characteristic is
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`necessarily present, or inherent, in the single anticipating reference.” Schering Corp. v. Geneva
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`Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). “Inherency, however,
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`may not be established“by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may
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`result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” Continental Can Company USA v.
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`Monsanto Company, 948 F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991). To be considered anticipatory, a
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`prior art reference must describe the applicant’s “claimed invention sufficiently to have placed it
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`in possession of a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention.” Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok,
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`Ltd, 208 F.3d 1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1479 (Fed. Cir.
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`1994)). Anticipation is a question of fact. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’! Trade Comm ’n,
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`988 F.2d 1-165, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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`2.
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`Obviousness
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`'
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`.
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`Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), a patent is valid unless “the differences between the subject
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`matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
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`i"Forpatent applications filed before March 16, 2013, the relevant priority date is “before the
`invention thereof by the‘applicant for a patent.” See MPEP § 2131..
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`have been obvious at the time the invention was made Ito a person having ordinary skill in the art
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`to "which said subject matter pertains” _35 U.S.C. § 103(a)l The ultimate question of
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`obviousness is a question of law, but “it is well understood that there are factual issues
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`underlying the ultimate obviousness decision.” Richards0n~ VicksInc. v. Upjohn C0., 122 F.3d
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`1476, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Wang Lab, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp, 993 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir.
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`1993). The underlying factual determinations include: (1) the scope and content of the prior art,
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`(2) the level of ordinary skill in the art, (3) the differences between the claimed invention and the
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`prior art, and (4) objective indicia of non-obviousness. Graham v. John Deere Ca, 383 U.S. 1,
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`17 (1966).
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`Although the Federal Circuit has historically required that, in order to prove obviousness,
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`the patent challenger must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is a
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`“teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine,” the Supreme Court has rejected this “rigid
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`approach.” KSR Int’! C0. v. Teleflex Ina, 550 U.S. 398, 417-418 (2007). In KSR, the Supreme
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`Court described a more flexible analysis:
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`.
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`it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated ‘teachings of
`Often,
`multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design community or
`present
`in the marketplace; and the background knowledge possessed by a
`person having ordinary skill in the art, all in order to determine whether there
`was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed
`by the patent at issue... As our precedents make clear, however, the analysis
`need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the
`challenged claim, for a court’ can take account of the inferences and creative
`steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.
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`Id Since KSR was decided, the Federal Circuit has announced that, where a patent challenger
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`contends that a patent is invalid for obviousness based on a combination of prior art references,
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`“the burden falls on the patent challenger to show by_clear and convincing evidence that a person
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`of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to attempt to makethe composition or
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`'
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`device, . . . and would have had areasonable expectation of success in doing so.” PharmaStem
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`Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc, 491 F.3d 1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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`7
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`3.
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`p Written Description and Enablement
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`35 U.S.C. § 112 is the basis for the written description and enablement requirements:
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`The specification shall contain a Written description of the invention, and the
`manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
`exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
`which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same
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`35 U.S.C.§112, 111.
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`The hallmark of the written description requirement is the disclosure of the invention.
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`Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and C0., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).. The test
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`for determining the sufficiency of the Writtendescription in a patent requires “an objective
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`inquiry