`571-272-7822
`
`
` Paper 9
`
`Date: May 21, 2024
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`LG ELECTRONICS, INC. and LG ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`MULTIMEDIA TECHNOLOGIES PTE. LTD.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`IPR2024-00351
`Patent 9,510,040 B2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, MICHAEL R. ZECHER, and
`SHARON FENICK, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`ZECHER, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`____________
`
`
`DECISION
`Granting Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314
`
`
`
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`IPR2024-00351
`Patent 9,510,040 B2
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`I. INTRODUCTION
`Petitioner, LG Electronics, Inc. and LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc.
`(collectively, “LG”), filed a Petition requesting an inter partes review
`(“IPR”) of claims 1–6, 11–16, 21, and 22 of U.S. Patent No. 9,510,040 B2
`(Ex. 1001, “the ’040 patent”). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). Patent Owner, Multimedia
`Technologies Pte. Ltd. (“Multimedia”), filed a Preliminary Response.
`Paper 5 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Based on the authority delegated to us by the
`Director under 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023), we may not institute an IPR
`unless the information presented in the Petition and any response thereto
`shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with
`respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C.
`§ 314(a) (2023). Taking into account Multimedia’s Preliminary Response,
`we conclude that the information presented in the Petition establishes that
`there is a reasonable likelihood that LG would prevail in demonstrating at
`least one of claims 1–6, 11–16, 21, and 22 of the ’040 patent as
`unpatentable. Pursuant to § 314, we hereby institute an inter partes review
`as to these claims of the ’040 patent.
`A. Real Parties in Interest (“RPIs”)
`The Petition identifies LG Electronics, Inc. and LG Electronics
`U.S.A., Inc. as RPIs. Pet. 95. Multimedia identifies itself as the only RPI.
`Paper 4 (Multimedia’s Mandatory Notices), 2.
`B. Related Matters
`The parties indicate that the ’040 patent is the subject of the following
`
`two district court cases: (1) Multimedia Technologies Pte. Ltd. v. LG
`Electronics Inc., No. 2:22-cv-00494 (E.D. Tex. filed Dec. 23, 2022); and
`(2) Multimedia Technologies Pte. Ltd. v. Vizio, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-00124
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`(E.D. Tex. Filed Mar. 24, 2023). Pet. 95; Paper 4, 2. In addition to this
`Petition, LG filed the following three other petitions challenging related
`patents owned by Multimedia: (1) LG Electronics, Inc. v. Multimedia
`Technologies Pte. Ltd., IPR2024-00352, Paper 1 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2023)
`(challenging claims 1–14 of U.S. Patent No. 9,247,174 B2); (2) LG
`Electronics, Inc. v. Multimedia Technologies Pte. Ltd., IPR2024-00353,
`Paper 1 (PTAB Dec. 22, 2023) (challenging claims 1–4, 6, 8–10, 12–17, and
`19 of U.S. Patent No. 9,055,254 B2); and (3) LG Electronics, Inc. v.
`Multimedia Technologies Pte. Ltd., IPR2024-00354, Paper 1 (PTAB
`Dec. 22, 2023) (challenging claims 1–18 of U.S. Patent No. 10,419,805
`B2)). Paper 4, 2.
`
`C. The ’040 Patent
`The ’040 patent, titled “Global Panel,” issued from U.S. Patent
`Application No. 14/834,316, filed on August 24, 2015. Ex. 1001, codes
`(54), (21), (22). The ’040 patent has an extensive priority chain of
`continuation and provisional applications that ultimately results in a claim of
`priority to U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 61/684,672 (“the ’672
`application”), which was filed on August 17, 2012. Id. at codes (60), (63).
`The ’040 patent generally relates to “methods and systems of
`displaying content on a television” that includes “receiving an indication
`associated with a selection by a user,” determining “a global panel to display
`via the television” based on the received indication,” retrieving “a first
`content information for display in the global panel” from memory, and then
`displaying “the retrieved content information in the specified global panel”
`on the television. Ex. 1001, code (57). According to the ’040 patent,
`“[a] Smart TV [television] is generally conceived as a device that integrates
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`access to the Internet and Web 2.0 features into television sets.” Id. at 2:15–
`17. The ’040 patent, however, states that “most Smart TV’s have yet to
`provide seamless and intuitive user interfaces for navigating and/or
`executing the various features of the Smart TV” and, as a result, “there are
`still issues with the consolidation of features and the presentation of these
`features in Smart TVs.” Id. at 2:21–26.
`The ’040 patent ostensibly addresses these issues with smart TVs by
`providing “intuitive user interfaces . . . with seamless user interaction
`capability.” Ex. 1001, 2:30–31. Figure 15B of the ’040 patent, reproduced
`below, illustrates a global panel configuration consistent with one
`embodiment. Id. at 11:31–32, 29:60–62.
`
`
`Figure 15B illustrates intelligent TV 100 that includes global panel 1404 on
`the left and active content area 1408 on the right. See id. at 29:60–30:5.
`Global panel 1404 includes, among other things, one or more sources
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`1504A–E represented by icons or texts. Id. at 30:26–27. Global panel 1404
`also “indicate[s] a source that is selected or highlight[ed] using indicator
`1512.” Id. at 30:41–43. As shown above, indicator 1512 is represented as
`“a box positioned around Live TV––801 CNXN,” which, in turn, results in
`displaying Live TV in active content area 1408. Id. at 30:43–44, 30:65–67.
`
`Figure 15C of the ’040 patent, reproduced below, illustrates that same
`global panel configuration as Figure 15B, except indicator 1512 was moved
`to a different source. Ex. 1001, 11:31–32, 32:9–12.
`
`
`Figure 15C illustrates positioning indicator 1512 within global panel 1404
`around “On Demand – Skyfalls,” which, in turn, results in displaying an
`image or video associated with Skyfalls in active content area 1408. Id. at
`32:12–14.
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`
`D. Challenged Claims
`Of the challenged claims, claims 1, 11 and 21 are independent.
`Independent claim 1 is directed to “[a] method of displaying content on a
`television,” independent claim 11 is directed to “[a] non-transitory computer
`readable information storage medium having stored thereon instructions that
`cause a computing system to execute a method of displaying content on a
`television,” and independent claim 21 is directed to “[a] system for
`displaying content on a television.” Ex. 1001, 39:58–59, 41:1–4, 42:29–30.
`Claims 2–6 directly depend from independent claim 1, claims 12–16 directly
`depend from independent claim 11, and claim 22 directly depends from
`independent claim 21. Id. at 40:8–49, 41:20–42:5, 42:49–61. Independent
`claim 1 is illustrative of the challenged claims and is reproduced below.
`1.
`A method of displaying content on a television,
`comprising:
`receiving, by a processor, an indication associated with a
`selection by a user;
`determining, by the processor, based on the received
`indication, a global panel to display via the television;
`retrieving, by the processor, from memory, a first content
`information for display in the global panel; and
`displaying, via the television, the retrieved content
`information in the global panel, wherein the global panel
`includes a list of sources of content for the intelligent television,
`wherein at least one of the sources is highlighted as being
`associated with the first content information, and wherein the
`sources include a live television source, a video on demand
`source, a media center source, an applications source, and an
`electrical input associated with the television.
`Id. at 39:58–40:7.
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`E. Asserted Prior Art References
`LG relies on the prior art references set forth in the table below.
`Name1
`Reference
`Dates
`Exhibit
`Nos.
`1005
`
`Kim
`
`US 2012/0054791 A1 published Mar. 1, 2012;
`filed Mar. 9, 2011
`issued Apr. 14, 2015;
`filed Jan. 4, 2010
`US 2013/0057764 A1 published Mar. 7, 2013;
`filed June 28, 2012
`issued July 19, 2016;
`filed Dec. 16, 2010
`
`US 9,008,190 B2
`
`US 9,398,339 B2
`
`1006
`
`1007
`
`1010
`
`Lee
`(“Lee-1”)
`Choi
`
`Lee
`(“Lee-2”)
`
`
`
`
`F. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`LG challenges claims 1–6, 11–16, 21, and 22 of the ’040 patent based
`on the asserted grounds of unpatentability set forth in the table below.
`Pet. 10–92.
`Claim(s) Challenged
`1–5, 11–15, 21
`2, 3, 6, 12, 13, 16, 22
`
`35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis
`103(a)2
`Kim, Lee-1, Choi
`103(a)
`Kim, Lee-1, Choi, Lee-2
`
`
`1 For clarity and ease of reference, we only list the first named inventor.
`2 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125
`Stat. 284, 287–88 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103, effective March 16,
`2013. Because the ’040 patent claims the benefit of the ’672 application,
`which was filed before this date, the pre-AIA version of § 103 applies.
`Ex. 1001, code (60).
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`II. ANALYSIS
`A. Discretionary Denial Arguments Under § 314(a)
`1. Parties Arguments
`LG contends that we should not exercise our discretion to deny the
`Petition under § 314(a), primarily because LG stipulates “that if instituted,
`[LG] will not pursue in District Court the specific grounds asserted here, or
`on any other ground that was raised or could have been reasonably raised in
`this IPR.” Pet. 93 (citing Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in
`AIA Post-grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation at 3,
`available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_
`proc_discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20
`220621_.pdf. (“Director Memo”)). In its Preliminary Response, Multimedia
`contends that we should exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under
`§ 314(a) because, among other reasons, LG failed to file a stipulation
`consistent with the holding set forth in Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo
`Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to
`§ II.A) (“Sotera”). Prelim. Resp. 2–20. After Multimedia filed its
`Preliminary Response, we granted LG authorization to file a “Notice of
`Sotera Stipulation,” asserting that a stipulation according to Sotera was
`entered in the district court case where LG is a party. Ex. 1014.
`2. Fintiv Analysis
`It is well-settled that institution of an IPR is discretionary. Harmonic
`Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he [U.S.
`Patent and Trademark Office] is permitted, but never compelled, to institute
`an IPR proceeding.”); 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (“The Director may not authorize
`an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the
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`information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any
`response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood
`that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims
`challenged in the petition.” (emphasis added)). In Fintiv, the Board
`discussed potential applications of NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc.,
`IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential), as well as a
`number of other cases dealing with discretionary denial under § 314(a).
`Fintiv identifies a non-exclusive list of six factors parties may consider
`addressing, particularly where there is a related district court case involving
`the same patent and whether such a case provides any basis for discretionary
`denial. Fintiv at 5–16. Those factors include the following:
`1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one
`may be granted if a proceeding is instituted;
`
`2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected
`statutory deadline for a final written decision;
`
`3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the
`parties;
`
`4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel
`proceeding;
`
`5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel
`proceeding are the same party; and
`
`6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of
`discretion, including the merits.
`
`Id. at 5–6.
`On June 21, 2022, the Director issued interim guidance in the form of
`a memo that further clarifies how we should approach analyzing the Fintiv
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`factors. See Director Memo. Notably, the Director stated that “the PTAB
`[Patent Trial and Appeal Board] will not discretionarily deny institution in
`view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a
`stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any
`ground that could have been reasonably raised before the PTAB.” Director
`Memo at 3. With this interim guidance in mind, we decline to exercise our
`discretion to deny institution of this proceeding under Fintiv because LG
`filed a Sotera stipulation in both this proceeding and the district court case
`where LG is a party. Pet. 93; Ex. 1014.
`In its Preliminary Response, Multimedia contends that LG fails to
`provide a proper Sotera stipulation for the following two reasons: (1) LG
`did not file its stipulation in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
`Texas, which is handling the two parallel district court cases; and (2) LG’s
`stipulation would have little, if any, impact on the district court case where
`Vizio, Inc. (“Vizio”) is a party. Prelim. Resp. 11–17. We do not agree with
`Multimedia’s arguments.
`As an initial matter, we do not share Multimedia’s view that a Sotera
`stipulation must be filed in the two parallel district court cases. See Prelim.
`Resp. 13–16. This same argument was raised previously in another
`proceeding before the Board. See Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co. Ltd. v.
`Alidouble, Inc., IPR2023-00369, Paper 7 at 10 (PTAB July 12, 2023)
`(Institution Decision) (declining to discount petitioner’s stipulation because
`petitioner did not file it in the district court). In Taiwan Semiconductor,
`patent owner urged the Board to exercise discretion to deny institution under
`§ 314(a) in light of a parallel district court litigation because, in part,
`petitioner had not filed the stipulation in the district court. Id. at 9. The
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`Board disagreed and found that the Director Memo does not require that
`such a stipulation be filed in the district court, only that the petitioner
`“stipulate[]” or “present[] a stipulation.” Id. (citing Director Memo at 3, 7).
`We agree with the Board’s reasoning in Taiwan Semiconductor case.
`That is, the Director Memo only requires that LG “stipulate[]” or “present[]
`a stipulation,” and it does not lay out a requirement for a petitioner to file the
`stipulation in the district court case where it is a party. Director Memo at 3,
`7.
`
`In any event, even if we were to agree with Multimedia’s argument,
`LG filed a Notice of Sotera Stipulation in the district court case where LG is
`a party. Ex. 1014. This Notice states the following:
`[LG] hereby stipulates, consistent with the stipulation made by
`the [p]etitioner in Sotera that, if the PTAB institutes an IPR in
`response to [LG’s] petition against [Multimedia’s] U.S. Patent
`No. 9,510,040 (IPR2024-00351), [LG] will not pursue in this
`litigation the grounds raised or any other grounds that could have
`reasonably been raised before the PTAB in that instituted
`proceeding.
`Id. at 2. Consequently, the purpose of LG’s Sotera stipulation has been
`achieved here because it “mitigates any concerns of duplicative efforts
`between the district court and the Board, as well as concerns of potentially
`conflicting decisions.” Sotera, Paper 12 at 19 (citing Sand Revolution II,
`LLC v. Cont’l Intermodal Group – Trucking LLC, IPR2019-01393, Paper 24
`at 12 (PTAB June 16, 2020) (Decision Granting Request for Rehearing)
`(informative)).
`Although Multimedia is correct that LG’s Sotera stipulation would
`have little, if any, impact on the district court case where Vizio is a party
`(see Prelim. Resp. 16–17), the Director’s interim guidance does not
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`condition or otherwise qualify the effect of a Sotera stipulation on our
`exercise of discretion to deny the Petition based on any remaining
`defendants in the parallel district court cases that are not subject to the
`stipulation (see Director Memo at 7, 9). Put simply, LG has filed a Sotera
`stipulation in this proceeding and, as a result, we will not exercise our
`discretion to deny the Petition.
`B. Claim Construction
`In this IPR, claim terms are construed using the same claim
`construction standard as in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). See
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2023). That is, claim terms generally are construed
`in accordance with their ordinary and customary meaning, as would have
`been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, in view of the
`specification and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent at issue.
`See id. The ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term “is its meaning
`to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent,” and “as of the
`effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415
`F.3d 1303, 1313, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
`In its Petition, LG contends that, “for purposes of this proceeding and
`the grounds presented herein, no claim term requires express construction.”
`Pet. 9. Despite this contention, LG proposes that we construe the claim term
`“at least one,” as recited in each of claims 1, 6, 11, 21, and 22. Id.
`According to LG, “the phrasing of ‘at least one of A, B, C’ and ‘at least one
`of A, B, or C’ includes ‘A alone, B alone, C alone, A and B together, B and
`C together, or A, B, and C together.’” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 3:49–56;
`Ex. 1003 (Declaration of Andrew Lippman, Ph.D.) ¶¶ 34–39). In its
`Preliminary Response, “[Multimedia] does not dispute [LG’s] statement[s]
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`on claim construction for purposes of [its] Preliminary Response.” Prelim.
`Resp. 30 (citing Pet. 9).
`Based on the preliminary record, there is no readily discernible
`controversy between the parties that requires us to construe any claim terms
`at this time. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co.,
`868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe
`terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the
`controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d
`795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
`C. Obviousness Over the Combined Teachings of Kim, Lee-1, and Choi
`LG contends that claims 1–5, 11–15, and 21 of the ’040 patent are
`unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combined
`teachings of Kim, Lee-1, and Choi. Pet. 10–76. LG contends that the
`combined teachings of Kim, Lee-1, and Choi account for the subject matter
`of each challenged claim, and provides reasoning as to why a person of
`ordinary skill in the art would have been prompted to modify the teachings
`of these references. Id. LG also relies on the testimony of Dr. Lippman to
`support its positions. See Ex. 1003.
`Based on the preliminary record, we determine that LG has shown
`that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in challenging at
`least one of claims 1–5, 11–15, and 21 of the ’040 patent as unpatentable.
`We begin our analysis with the principles of law that generally apply to an
`asserted ground based on obviousness, followed by an assessment of the
`level of skill in the art, next we provide overviews of Kim, Lee-1, and Choi,
`and then we address the parties’ contentions with respect to the independent
`claims 1, 11, and 21.
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`1. Principles of Law
`A claim is unpatentable under § 103(a) if the differences between the
`claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a
`whole, “would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
`person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of
`obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations,
`including (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences
`between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of skill in
`the art; and (4) when in evidence, objective indicia of obviousness or non-
`obviousness (i.e., secondary considerations, such as commercial success,
`long-felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.).3 Graham v. John Deere
`Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). We analyze the asserted
`grounds based on obviousness with the principles we identify above in mind.
`2. Level of Skill in the Art
`In determining whether an invention would have been obvious at the
`time it was made, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art
`at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. “The importance of
`resolving the level of ordinary skill in the art lies in the necessity of
`maintaining objectivity in the obviousness inquiry.” Ryko Mfg. Co. v.
`Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The “person having
`ordinary skill in the art” is a hypothetical construct, from whose vantage
`
`
`3 At this stage in the proceeding, Multimedia does not present arguments or
`evidence of secondary considerations. See Prelim. Resp.
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`point obviousness is assessed. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
`1998).
`Factors pertinent to a determination of the level of ordinary skill in the
`art include “(1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems
`encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity
`with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and
`(6) educational level of active workers in the field.” Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v.
`Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Orthopedic
`Equip. Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376, 1381–82 (Fed.
`Cir. 1983)). “Not all such factors may be present in every case, and one or
`more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular case.” Id. at
`696–97.
`For purposes of institution, there is sufficient evidence in the record
`that enables us to determine the knowledge level of a person of ordinary skill
`in the art. Relying on the testimony of Dr. Lippman, LG argues the
`following:
`[a] Person of Ordinary Skill in The Art . . . in August of 2012
`would have been someone knowledgeable and familiar with the
`interactive media guide arts that are pertinent to the ’040 patent.
`A [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have had a
`bachelor’s degree
`in Electrical Engineering, Software
`Engineering, or Computer Engineering, or equivalent training,
`and approximately two years of experience working in the field
`of
`television systems and networking, human-computer
`interaction, or related technologies. Lack of professional
`experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice
`versa.
`
`Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 18–20). For the limited purposes of its
`Preliminary Response, “[Multimedia] does not dispute [LG’s] definition of a
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`person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 30 (citing Pet. 8–9).
`To the extent necessary, we adopt LG’s assessment of the level of skill in the
`art because it is consistent with the ’040 patent and the asserted prior art.
`3. Overview of Kim
`Kim generally relates to “[a] multifunctional display device” that
`displays multiple card objects in different portions of the display. Ex. 1005,
`code (57). Kim discloses image display apparatus 100 (e.g. a smart TV) that
`includes, among other things, display 180. Id. ¶¶ 38, 65, Figs. 2, 6. Figure
`19 of Kim, reproduced below, illustrates an exemplary home screen display
`according to one embodiment. Id. ¶¶ 21, 192.
`
`Figure 19 illustrates display 180 that includes home screen 1300 displaying
`three card objects: (1) card object 1310 named BROADCAST, (2) card
`object 1320 named NETCAST, and (3) card object 1330 named APP
`STORE. Id. ¶¶ 192, 193, 195. Hidden area 1301 includes additional card
`objects 1340, 1350, 1360, 1370, 1380, and 1390, which a user may shift or
`
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`scroll to on display 180 to replace card objects 1310, 1320, or 1330. Id.
`¶ 196. The number of card objects included in display 180 may vary “from
`three to either four or two card objects.” Id. ¶ 198. As one example, “upon
`receipt of an incoming call,” if display 180 already includes card object
`1390, “it may be highlighted or otherwise distinguished from the other card
`objects.” Id. ¶ 211.
`
`4. Overview of Lee-1
`Lee-1 generally relates to “an apparatus for processing images and an
`operating method thereof.” Ex. 1006, 1:15–19. Lee-1 discloses an
`apparatus for displaying images 100 that includes, among other things,
`display 180. Id. at 1:66–2:6, Fig. 1. Display 180 is capable of displaying
`thumbnail image screen 500. Id. at 12:38–43, Fig. 10. Thumbnail image
`screen 500 displays thumbnail images that may include “a currently inputted
`image, or a previously stored image.” Id. at 12:65–67.
`5. Overview of Choi
`Choi generally relates to “an image display device” and, in particular,
`“to a method for providing a list of external devices.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 2. Figure
`11 of Choi, reproduced below, illustrates “a screen that provides an external
`device list” according to one embodiment. Id. ¶¶ 19, 250.
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`Figure 11 illustrates display unit 180 that includes full screen 810 displaying
`a plurality of external device icons 820. Id. ¶ 250. The external devices
`actually connected to the image display device are identified using specific
`symbols 830a, 830b, and 830c. Id.
`6. Claims 1, 11, and 21
`For purposes of consistency and added clarity, we address each
`limitation of independent claims 1, 11, and 21 in turn by relying on the
`bracketed annotations provided by LG in the Petition. See Pet. 15–56, 72–
`73, 75–76, 97–103 (Claims Appendix). The preamble of independent claim
`1 recites [1.0]—“[a] method of displaying content on a television,
`comprising[].” Ex. 1001, 39:58–59. To the extent the preamble should be
`treated as limiting, LG contends that Kim teaches the features recited therein
`because it discloses smart TV 100 displaying exemplary content, including,
`among other things, BROADCAST image 1315, NETCAST content 1320
`and APP STORE content 1330. Pet. 15–17 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 193–202,
`282–289, Figs. 9, 19–21; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–65).
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`The first step of independent claim 1 recites limitation [1.1]—
`“receiving, by a processor, an indication associated with a selection by a
`user.” Ex. 1001, 39:60–61. LG contends that Kim teaches this limitation
`because it discloses controller 170, which includes a video processor, audio
`processor, data processor, and application processor, that executes software
`to operate smart TV 100 by receiving a user selection from input interface
`150 via remote controller 200. Pet. 17–23 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 85–87, 90, 94,
`109, 110, 112, 113, 133, 145, 166–175, 187, 192, Figs. 6, 11, 12; Ex. 1003
`¶¶ 66–79; Ex. 1001, 17:5–9).
`The second method step of independent claim 1 recites limitation
`[1.2]—“determining, by the processor, based on the received indication, a
`global panel to display via the television.” Ex. 1001, 39:62–63. LG
`contends that Kim teaches this limitation because it discloses, “upon receipt
`of a go-to-home screen input,” controller 170 displays the home screen on
`display 180 that includes “a plurality of card objects classified according to
`content sources.” Pet. 23 (quoting Ex. 1005 ¶ 94 (emphasis omitted)) (citing
`Ex. 1005 ¶ 192; Ex. 1003 ¶ 81), 24–27 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 89, 94, 96, 193,
`196, Figs. 6, 19–23; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 82–86; Ex. 1001, 29:58–59, 32:60–65).
`LG argues that Kim’s home screen may include card objects representing “a
`thumbnail list of broadcast channels,” “a broadcast program guide,” “a
`program reservation list or a program recording list,” “a media list of a
`device connected to [smart TV] 100,” “a list of connected external devices,”
`“an application menu,” etc. Id. at 23–24 (quoting Ex. 1005 ¶ 94) (citing
`Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 81, 82).
`The third method step of independent claim 1 recites limitation
`[1.3]—“retrieving, by the processor, from memory, a first content
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`information for display in the global panel.” Ex. 1001, 39:64–65. Relying
`on its argument and evidence for limitations [1.1] and [1.2], LG contends
`that Kim in combination with Lee-1 teaches this limitation because Kim’s
`controller 170 determines the home screen to display on smart TV 100,
`including whether the home screen displays descriptive text (e.g.,
`application names, video genre, video title, and audio/visual indicator) and
`thumbnails. Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 87, 88). More specifically, LG
`argues that Kim’s card objects 1330, 1360, and 1370 include descriptive text
`informing the user of available content. Id. at 27–28 (citing Ex. 1005
`¶¶ 137, 208, Fig. 21). As one example, LG argues that Kim’s card object
`1330 includes “Angry Birds” and “Bejeweled 2,” both of which are
`descriptive text because they correspond to a “title” or “name” of an
`application available to the user. Id. at 28 (citing Ex. 1005, Fig. 21;
`Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 89–91; Ex. 1001, 25:41–49, 27:23–30, Fig. 15C). LG also
`argues that Kim’s card objects 1330, 1360, and 1370 include thumbnails
`informing the user of available content. Id. at 29–30 (citing Ex. 1005
`¶¶ 137, 184–186, 208, 209, Figs. 19–21). As one example, Kim’s card
`object 1330 displays a thumbnail image informing the user that the
`application “Angry Birds” is available. Id. at 30 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 84, 208;
`Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 95–97; Ex. 1001, Fig. 15C).
`LG further contends that Kim’s smart TV 100 “reproduce[s] content
`stored in memory 140” and that “controller 170 may control display of the
`home screen on the display 180.” Pet. 31 (quoting Ex. 1005 ¶ 85, then
`quoting id. ¶ 94 (emphasis omitted)) (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 84–86, 92–94;
`Ex. 1003 ¶ 102); see also id. at 32–33 (arguing the same) (quoting Ex. 1005
`¶ 92) (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 94, 117, 206; Ex. 1003 ¶ 105). Based on these and
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`other cited disclosures in Kim, LG asserts that it would have been obvious to
`a person of ordinary skill in the art for Kim’s controller 170 to retrieve
`content stored in memory 140, such as descriptive text and thumbnails, so it
`may reproduce the retrieved content on the home screen of display 180. Id.
`at 31–34 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 65, 84, 85, 89, 92, 117, 192, 213, 293, claim 1,
`Fig. 6; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 103, 104, 106, 107).
`In addition, LG contends that Kim incorporates by reference Lee-1.
`Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 106). LG argues that Lee-1 discloses that the
`“displayed thumbnail images may be a . . . previously stored image.” Id. at
`34–35 (quoting Ex. 1006, 12:65–67 (emphasis omitted)). Based on this
`cited disclosure in Lee-1, LG asserts that it would have been obvious to a
`person of ordinary skill in the art for Kim’s smart TV 100 to store Lee-1’s
`thumbnails in memory 140 and display those images to the user. Id. at 35
`(citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 65, 192, 239; Ex. 1006, 12:65–67; Ex. 1003 ¶ 108).
`Turning to rationale to combine, LG contends that a person of ordinary skill
`in the art would have “considered and applied Lee-1’s incorporated by
`reference thumbnail teachings to successfully implement Kim’s system and
`method thereof, which [also] uses thumbnails.” Id. at 12–13 (citing
`Ex. 1005 ¶ 106). Stated differently, LG asserts that it would have been
`obvious to combine the teachings of Kim and Lee-1 because “[Lee-1]
`provide[s] implementation details directly applicable to successfully
`implementing Kim’s system and method.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 53, 54).
`The fourth method step of independent claim 1 recites limitation
`[1.4]—“displaying, via the television, the retrie