Case 8:22-cv-01874-JVS-JDE Document 82 Filed 08/02/23 Page 1 of 32 Page ID #:3705
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`Case No.
`
`Title
`
`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
`8:22-CV-01874-JVS (JDEx)
`RJ Technology, LLC v. Apple, Inc.
`
`Date August 2, 2023
`
`Present: The
`Honorable
`
`James V. Selna, U.S. District Court Judge
`
`Elsa Vargas
`Deputy Clerk
`Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:
`Not Present
`
`Not Present
`Court Reporter
`Attorneys Present for Defendants:
`Not Present
`
`Proceedings:
`
`[IN CHAMBERS] Order Regarding Claim Construction
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`Plaintiff RJ Technology LLC (“RJ”) filed this patent infringement action against
`Defendant Apple Inc. (“Apple”) alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,749,641 (the
`“’641 Patent” or “Asserted Patent”). (Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), Dkt. No.
`51.) The parties now seek construction of five claim terms in the Asserted Patent and
`have submitted a Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement with their proposed
`constructions. (Dkt. No. 67.) Both parties submitted opening briefs (Apple Op. Br., Dkt.
`No. 68; RJ Op. Br., Dkt. No. 70) and responsive briefs (Apple Resp. Br., Dkt. No. 73; RJ
`Resp. Br., Dkt. No. 74). The Court conducted a claim construction hearing on August 1,
`2023.
`
`The Court construes the disputed terms as stated herein.
`
`II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
`
`The ’641 Patent concerns rechargeable, or secondary, lithium-ion batteries. At a
`base level, lithium-ion batteries consist of an anode, a cathode, an electrolyte, and a
`separator:
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`Case 8:22-cv-01874-JVS-JDE Document 82 Filed 08/02/23 Page 2 of 32 Page ID #:3706
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`Case No.
`
`Title
`
`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
`8:22-CV-01874-JVS (JDEx)
`RJ Technology, LLC v. Apple, Inc.
`
`Date August 2, 2023
`
`(RJ Op. Br. at 4; Declaration of Dr. Yan Yao (“Yao Decl.”), Dkt. No. 70-1 ¶ 11–12;
`Declaration of Dr. Quinn Horn (“Horn Decl.”), Dkt. No. 68-1 ¶ 22.) The anode (negative
`electrode) and the cathode (positive electrode) are composed of materials referred to as
`the “active materials.” They are so named because the electrochemical reactions occur
`between these materials and ions in the electrolyte, which give rise to an electrical current
`(i.e., a flow of electrons). (Horn Decl. ¶ 22.) The anode is commonly composed of
`graphite, which is made of sheets of carbon. (Yao Decl. ¶ 11.) Cathodes are typically
`made of a compound of lithium, oxygen, and another element such as cobalt. (Id.) One
`common compound used for the positive electrode material at the time of the invention
`was lithium cobalt oxides. (’641 Patent at 1:64–66.)
`
`The electrolyte, an ionically conducting material usually consisting of a salt
`dissolved in a solvent, permits lithium ions to flow between the anode and cathode.
`(Horn Decl. ¶ 22.) The separator physically separates the two electrodes within the cell.
`(Id.; Yao Decl. ¶ 12.) Batteries often contain other components such as current collectors
`which collect electrical current from the reactions taking place in the electrodes, the
`exterior case, and a battery management system which regulates charge and discharge of
`the battery. (Yao Decl. ¶ 12; Horn Decl. ¶ 26; ’641 Patent at 1:10–11.)
`
`When a lithium-ion battery is in a discharged state, most lithium ions are stored in
`the cathode. (Horn Decl. ¶ 25; Yao Decl. ¶ 14.) During charging, electrons flow from
`the cathode to the anode while lithium ions are simultaneously extracted from the cathode
`and pulled into the anode by applying a voltage and an electrical current. (Id.) Each
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`Case 8:22-cv-01874-JVS-JDE Document 82 Filed 08/02/23 Page 3 of 32 Page ID #:3707
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`Case No.
`
`Title
`
`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
`8:22-CV-01874-JVS (JDEx)
`RJ Technology, LLC v. Apple, Inc.
`
`Date August 2, 2023
`
`electron that flows from the cathode to the anode corresponds to one lithium ion. (Id.)
`The electron then combines with a lithium ion in the electrolyte to form a lithium atom.
`(Id.) When the battery is discharged and is powering a device, the process reverses:
`electrons travel from the anode through the device, thereby powering it, and then arrive
`back at the cathode while lithium ions simultaneously leave the anode, travel across the
`separator, and settle back into the cathode. (Id.; Yao Decl. ¶ 15.)
`
`Lithium-ion batteries are widely-used in modern electronic devices in part because
`they have a high energy capacity. (See ’641 Patent at 1:21–27.) However, the batteries’
`volume limitations can restrict increased battery capacity, a goal for most manufacturers.
`(Id. at 1:27–30.) At the time of the Asserted Patent’s invention, it was accepted in the
`battery industry that the charge cut-off voltage of a lithium-ion battery was limited to a
`maximum of 4.2 V. (Id. at 1:46–48.) Battery manufacturers did not raise the charge cut-
`off voltage beyond this maximum because doing so would produce deleterious effects,
`including “structural change” in the positive and negative electrode materials,
`decomposition of the electrolyte, and adverse effects to the recycle property of the cell.
`(Id. at 1:58–63.) However, the positive and negative electrode materials used in lithium
`ion batteries have higher “theoretical capacities,” and therefore had the capability to store
`and release more lithium ions, than what was then used due mainly to the 4.2 V
`limitation. (Id. at 1:36–44.) Other industry members, largely unsuccessfully, attempted
`to increase battery capacity focused on changing the electrode materials, electrolyte, or
`battery shape. (Id. at 1:19–62; 2:63–74.) In contrast, the ’641 Patent claims an invention
`that increases battery capacity by “increasing the charge cut-off voltage” above 4.2 V
`while “adjusting the ratio of positive electrode material to negative electrode material . . .
`from 1:1.0 to 1:2.5.” (Id. at 3:7–12; 55–56.) In doing so, the Patentees discovered that
`the batteries could hold a higher charge without experiencing the poor recycle property or
`degradation of electrode materials that had come to be expected when the charge cut-off
`voltage was increased.
`
`The ’641 Patent has two independent claims sixteen dependent claims. (See id. at
`16:53–18:28.) The parties request construction of five disputed terms which appear
`throughout the ’641 Patent.
`
`Independent Claim 5 of the ’641 Patent recites:
`
`5. A secondary lithium ion cell or battery, characterized in that the
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`Case 8:22-cv-01874-JVS-JDE Document 82 Filed 08/02/23 Page 4 of 32 Page ID #:3708
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`Case No.
`
`Title
`
`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
`8:22-CV-01874-JVS (JDEx)
`RJ Technology, LLC v. Apple, Inc.
`
`Date August 2, 2023
`
`secondary lithium ion cell or battery has a charge cut-off voltage of greater
`than 4.2 V but less than 5.8 V, and a ratio of positive electrode material to
`negative electrode material of the secondary lithium ion cell or battery is
`from 1:1.0 to 1:2.5, as calculated by a theoretic capacity with a charge cut-
`off voltage set at 4.2 V.
`
`(Id. at 17:5–11.)
`
`Dependent Claims 9–15 recite:
`
`9. A secondary lithium ion cell or battery according to claim 5,
`characterized in that the secondary lithium ion cell or battery has a first
`overcharging protection voltage of grater than 4.35 V, and an overcharging
`protection release voltage of greater than 4.15 V.
`10. A secondary lithium ion cell or battery according to claim 9,
`characterized in that the secondary lithium ion cell or battery has a first
`overcharging protection voltage of greater than 4.45 V, and an overcharge
`protection release voltage of greater than 4.25 V.
`11. A secondary lithium ion cell or battery according to claim 5, wherein
`the secondary lithium ion cell or battery maintains at least 7500 of capacity
`after 400 cycles.
`12. A secondary lithium ion cell or battery according to claim 5, wherein
`the secondary lithium ion cell or battery maintains at least 75.83% of
`capacity over 400 cycles.
`13. A secondary lithium ion cell or battery according to claim 5, wherein
`the secondary lithium ion cell or battery maintains at least 80% of capacity
`over 400 cycles.
`14. A secondary lithium ion cell or battery according to claim 5, wherein
`the secondary lithium ion cell or battery maintains at least 80.72% of
`capacity over 400 cycles.
`
`(Id. at 17:24–18:16.)
`
`III. LEGAL STANDARD
`
`A.
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`Claim Construction
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`Case 8:22-cv-01874-JVS-JDE Document 82 Filed 08/02/23 Page 5 of 32 Page ID #:3709
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`Case No.
`
`Title
`
`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
`8:22-CV-01874-JVS (JDEx)
`RJ Technology, LLC v. Apple, Inc.
`
`Date August 2, 2023
`
`It is well settled that claim construction is “exclusively within the province of the
`court.” Markman v. Western Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). Such
`construction “must begin and remain centered on” the claim language itself, Interactive
`Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001), but
`extrinsic evidence may also be consulted “if needed to assist in determining the meaning
`or scope of technical terms in the claims,” Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d
`1211, 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
`
`In construing the claim language, the Court begins with the principle that “the
`words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.” Phillips v.
`AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal quotation marks
`omitted). Further, this ordinary and customary meaning “is the meaning that the [claim]
`term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the
`invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Id. at 1313.
`“[T]he person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the
`context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of
`the entire patent, including the specification.” Id.
`
`“In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person
`of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in
`such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of
`commonly understood words. In such circumstances general purpose dictionaries may be
`helpful.” Id. at 1314 (internal citation omitted). In other cases, “determining the ordinary
`and customary meaning of the claim requires examination of terms that have a particular
`meaning in a field of art.” Id. In those cases, “the court looks to those sources available
`to the public that show what a person of skill in the art would have understood disputed
`claim language to mean.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). These sources include
`“the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the prosecution
`history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning of
`technical terms, and the state of the art.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
`
`However, it is improper to read limitations from the specification into the claim.
`Callicrate v. Wadsworth Mfg., Inc., 427 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“‘[I]f we once
`begin to include elements not mentioned in the claim, in order to limit such claim . . . we
`should never know where to stop.’” (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312)). “We do not
`import limitations into claims from examples or embodiments appearing only in a
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`Case 8:22-cv-01874-JVS-JDE Document 82 Filed 08/02/23 Page 6 of 32 Page ID #:3710
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`Case No.
`
`Title
`
`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
`8:22-CV-01874-JVS (JDEx)
`RJ Technology, LLC v. Apple, Inc.
`
`Date August 2, 2023
`
`patent’s written description, even when a specification describes very specific
`embodiments of the invention or even describes only a single embodiment, unless the
`specification makes clear that ‘the patentee . . . intends for the claims and the
`embodiments in the specification to be strictly coextensive.’” JVW Enterprises, Inc. v.
`Interact Accessories, Inc., 424 F.3d 1324, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal citations
`omitted) (emphasis supplied).
`
`B.
`
`Indefiniteness
`
`A patent’s specification must conclude “with one or more claims particularly
`pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint
`inventor regards as the invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(b); see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2
`(2006). In order to meet this “definiteness” requirement, “a patent’s claims, viewed in
`light of the specification and prosecution history, [must] inform those skilled in the art
`about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
`Instruments, Inc. (“Nautilus I”), 572 U.S. 898, 910 (2014). The Supreme Court in
`Nautilus I emphasized that patents must be precise enough to afford clear notice of what
`is claimed, thereby “appris[ing] the public of what is still open to them,” while
`recognizing that absolute precision is unobtainable given “the inherent limitations of
`language.” Id. at 899, 910 (quoting Markman, 517 U.S. at 373).
`
`General claim construction principles apply to indefiniteness challenges, but the
`burdens are different. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1332
`(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“In the face of an allegation of indefiniteness, general principles of
`claim construction apply”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Although courts
`construing claim language sit in relative equipoise, a patent is “presumed valid under 35
`U.S.C. § 282.” Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc. (“Nautilus II”), 783 F.3d 1374,
`1377 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “[C]onsistent with that principle, a fact finder is instructed to
`evaluate . . . whether an invalidity defense has been proved by clear and convincing
`evidence.” Id. (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 111 (2011))
`(emphasis added and brackets removed); Young v. Lumenis, Inc., 492 F.3d 1336, 1345
`(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Because a patent is presumed to be valid, the evidentiary burden . . . is
`one of clear and convincing evidence.”).
`
`IV. DISCUSSION
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`Case 8:22-cv-01874-JVS-JDE Document 82 Filed 08/02/23 Page 7 of 32 Page ID #:3711
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`Case No.
`
`Title
`
`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
`8:22-CV-01874-JVS (JDEx)
`RJ Technology, LLC v. Apple, Inc.
`
`Date August 2, 2023
`
`A.
`
`Agreed Upon Claim Terms
`
`The parties agree that the following claim terms should be construed as listed
`below. The Court adopts the parties’ agreed-upon constructions as outlined below:
`
`Claim(s)
`Claims 6–7
`
`Claim Term(s)
`“within a range from”
`
`Agreed-Upon Construction
`The range is inclusive
`
`Claim 11
`
`“7500”
`
`75%
`
`B.
`
`Disputed Claim Terms
`
`The parties brief construction of five terms.
`
`1.
`
`Disputed Term 1: “charge cut-off voltage”
`
`Claim(s)
`5–7
`
`RJ’s Proposed Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning:
`
`“the maximum voltage to
`which the battery is
`configured to be charged”
`
`Apple’s Proposed Construction
`“the voltage at which the charging
`changes from constant current charging
`to constant voltage charging”
`
`a.
`
`The Positions of the Parties
`
`Apple contends its construction aligns with the ’641 Patent’s language, the
`prosecution history, and statements RJ made during invalidation proceedings for the ’641
`Patent’s Chinese counterpart patent (“CN Invalidation Proceedings”). (Apple Op. Br. at
`5.) Apple points to the ’641 Patent’s specification which describes the charge cut-off
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`Case 8:22-cv-01874-JVS-JDE Document 82 Filed 08/02/23 Page 8 of 32 Page ID #:3712
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`Case No.
`
`Title
`
`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
`8:22-CV-01874-JVS (JDEx)
`RJ Technology, LLC v. Apple, Inc.
`
`Date August 2, 2023
`
`voltage as “limited to no more than 4.2 V” which “is well accepted as a technical
`requirement in the industry of manufacture of secondary lithium ion battery.” (Id. at 4.)
`Apple further argues that the ’641 Patent’s inventors made several statements during the
`CN Invalidity Proceedings which adopt Apple’s construction. (Id. at 5.) For example,
`the Patentees stated that the charge cut-off voltage is a “[t]echnical term” that “is a
`standard general term in the field of battery related technology, and its meaning is
`determined, which refers to the voltage value of the battery when it transitions from
`charging at a constant current to charging at a constant voltage.” (Declaration of
`Yungmoon Chang (“Chang Decl.”), Ex. D at 7.) Similarly, in distinguishing prior art
`during the CN Invalidity Proceedings, the Patentees referenced the below figure and
`stated “[t]he limited charging voltage is the voltage value when the battery is charged
`from the constant current to constant voltage.” (Id., Ex. F. at 27.)
`
`Apple further contends that RJ initially adopted Apple’s construction in its
`previous disclosures. (See id., Ex. G at 5–6 (arguing that the plain and ordinary meaning
`of “charge cut-off voltage” is “the voltage at which the charging changes form constant
`current charging to constant voltage charging”).) Finally, Apple points to several pieces
`of extrinsic evidence supporting its construction. (See, e.g., id., Ex. F. at 5.3.6.2; Horn
`Decl. ¶¶ 30–40.)
`
`RJ Technology argues this term should be afforded its plain and ordinary meaning:
`the maximum voltage to which a battery is configured to be charged. (RJ Op. Br. at 8.)
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`Case 8:22-cv-01874-JVS-JDE Document 82 Filed 08/02/23 Page 9 of 32 Page ID #:3713
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`Case No.
`
`Title
`
`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
`8:22-CV-01874-JVS (JDEx)
`RJ Technology, LLC v. Apple, Inc.
`
`Date August 2, 2023
`
`RJ states there are several charging algorithms available in the context of lithium-ion
`batteries, including Constant Voltage (“CV”), Constant Current (“CC”), and Constant
`Current/Constant Voltage (“CC/CV”). (Id. at 6–7.) When a battery is charged using the
`CV algorithm, the battery is charged at a constant voltage until fully charged. (Id. at 6.)
`The CC algorithm describes a method in which the battery is charged at constant current
`until it reaches the charge cut-off voltage. (Id.) The CC/CV algorithm combines the CV
`and CC algorithms and charges a battery at a constant current, while permitting the
`voltage to increase, up to the charge cut-off voltage, then charged at constant voltage
`until the battery is fully charge. (Id.) RJ contends that Apple’s construction would
`improperly narrow the ’641 Patent to only allow for the CC/CV charging algorithm when
`that language is not present in any piece of intrinsic evidence. (Id. at 8.) RJ further
`contends that the ’641 Patent explains that the charge cutoff voltage is a maximum
`voltage for use in normal operation rather than a description of a specific charging
`algorithm. (Id. at 9.)
`
`In response, Apple asserts that RJ’s intrinsic evidence does not refute Apple’s
`construction, but merely restates the claim language, explaining that the “charge cut-off
`voltage” is between 4.2 V and 5.8 V, but providing no explanation for what the charge
`cut-off voltage is. (Apple Resp. Br. at 5.) Apple further notes that RJ’s “maximum” cut-
`off voltage construction “does not mean that during normal use of the battery, the
`charging voltage can never exceed the charge cut-off voltage” renders RJ’s proposed
`construction “indefinite and confusing.” (Id.)
`
`RJ argues in response that the ’641 Patent itself consistently refers to the “charge
`cut-off voltage” as the maximum voltage to which the battery is configured to be charged.
`(RJ Resp. Br. at 1.) Further, the statements the Patentees made during the CN
`Invalidation Proceedings upon which Apple relies should not be considered for four
`reasons. First, “litigation statements are not intrinsic evidence,” and these particular
`comments were made during invalidation proceedings over a decade after the patent was
`issued. (Id. at 1–2.) Second, post-grant comments on a term’s meaning could be
`considered non-contemporaneous extrinsic evidence, but such evidence does not hold the
`same weight as intrinsic evidence. (Id. at 3–4.) Third, even when a party takes a
`different view of claim meanings in parallel U.S. proceedings, such as inter partes review,
`courts do not consider them binding. (Id. at 4.) Finally, RJ contends that the differences
`between Chinese and U.S. law decreases the relevance of the Patentees’ statements,
`which RJ also asserts were taken out of context. (Id. at 4–5.)
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`Case 8:22-cv-01874-JVS-JDE Document 82 Filed 08/02/23 Page 10 of 32 Page ID #:3714
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`Case No.
`
`Title
`
`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
`8:22-CV-01874-JVS (JDEx)
`RJ Technology, LLC v. Apple, Inc.
`
`Date August 2, 2023
`
`b.
`
`Analysis
`
`Although the parties focus the bulk of their arguments on statements the Patentees
`made during a separate proceeding, the Court begins its analysis as it does with all issues
`of claim constructions: the Asserted Patent’s language. See Vederi, LLC, 744 F.3d at
`1382 (noting that the claim language itself is the best guide to the meaning of a claim
`term). Nowhere in the Asserted Patent’s claims or specification do the inventors define
`this claim term as within the bounds of a particular charging algorithm. Apple does not
`contest that there are several different charging algorithms available to lithium ion battery
`manufacturers, and that the CC/CV algorithm is merely one of several options from
`which to choose. Indeed, the terms “constant current charging” and “constant voltage
`charging” do not appear anywhere in the ’641 Patent, indicating that the Patentees did not
`intend to limit the invention to one particular algorithm. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at
`1313–14 (“[T]he claims of a patent define the invention,” as interpreted “in the context of
`the written description and the prosecution history.”). Absent a compelling reason to do
`otherwise, the Court will not read in claim limitations that are not present in the claim
`language. See Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed.
`Cir. 1998) (noting that claim construction “begins and ends” with the words of the claim).
`
`Furthermore, the Court concludes this claim term’s meaning is readily
`understandable from the claim language itself, particularly when interpreted in the
`context of the specification. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314 (“[T]he person of ordinary
`skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term . . . in the context of the entire patent,
`including the specification.”) While the ’641 Patent never expressly defines “charge cut-
`off voltage,” it uses the term consistently as an upper limit on the voltage to which a
`secondary lithium ion battery is charged. (See, e.g., ’641 Patent at 1:46–63; 7:24–36;
`8:19–24.) This construction encompasses Apple’s proposed construction, which its
`expert describes as a charging algorithm “commonly required,” without excluding other
`charging algorithms. (Horn Decl. ¶ 39.)
`
`Apple contends that the Patentees disavowed any other construction of this term
`than Apple’s proposed construction because of statements Patentees made during the CN
`Invalidation Proceedings. The heart of the parties’ dispute on this issue is whether the
`Patentees’ statements during the CN Invalidation Proceedings are intrinsic evidence and
`what weight, if any, they should be afforded. As to the first question, statements made
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`Case 8:22-cv-01874-JVS-JDE Document 82 Filed 08/02/23 Page 11 of 32 Page ID #:3715
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`Case No.
`
`Title
`
`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
`8:22-CV-01874-JVS (JDEx)
`RJ Technology, LLC v. Apple, Inc.
`
`Date August 2, 2023
`
`during invalidation proceedings in a foreign court that occurred over a decade after the
`Asserted Patent was issued are not intrinsic evidence. Apple cites to several cases in
`support of its position. (Apple Op. Br. at 4–5.) However, each of these cases concerns
`statements made during the prosecution of a patent before a foreign patent office, rather
`than post-grant litigation. See Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1312–13
`(Fed. Cir. 2014) (overruled on other grounds); Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc.,
`357 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings, Inc., 405 F.3d
`1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
`
`Apple further argues that RJ should be judicially estopped from advocating for a
`construction that diverges from the statements the Patentees made during the CN
`Invalidation Proceedings. (Apple Resp. Br. at 4.) The Federal Circuit has applied
`judicial estoppel when a party “change[d] its position and advocate[d] for a claim
`construction that is clearly inconsistent with its position” during inter partes review. See
`Intel Corp. v. XMTT, Inc., No. 21-2127, 2022 WL 1152312, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19,
`2022). The Court therefore agrees the Patentees should not be permitted to argue that the
`definition they advanced in the CN Invalidation Proceedings is not encompassed by the
`’641 Patent. However, the plain and ordinary meaning of “charge cut-off voltage” is not
`inconsistent with the position the Patentees took in the CN Invalidation Proceedings. As
`noted above, Apple’s proposed construction describes a particular charging algorithm,
`whereas RJ’s proposed construction would encompass that charging algorithm as well as
`any other algorithm the manufacturer chose to use. Finally, statements made years after
`the patents’ issuance cannot, by definition, amount to “an unmistakable disavowal of the
`unambiguous recitation” in the patent’s claim terms and specification. See Cadence
`Pharm. Inc. v. Exela PharmSci Inc., 780 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
`
`For the foregoing reason, the Court construes Disputed Claim Term 1 as follows:
`“the maximum voltage to which the battery is configured to be charged.”
`
`CV-90 (06/04)
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`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
`
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`Case 8:22-cv-01874-JVS-JDE Document 82 Filed 08/02/23 Page 12 of 32 Page ID #:3716
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`Case No.
`
`Title
`
`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
`8:22-CV-01874-JVS (JDEx)
`RJ Technology, LLC v. Apple, Inc.
`
`Date August 2, 2023
`
`2.
`
`Disputed Term 2: “ratio of positive electrode material to negative
`electrode material as calculated by a theoretic capacity with a charge
`cut-off voltage set at 4.2 V”
`
`Claim(s)
`5
`
`RJ’s Proposed Construction
`Plain and ordinary meaning:
`
`Apple’s Proposed Construction
`Indefinite
`
`“the ratio calculated as the product
`of the capacity of the cathode
`active material per mass unit and
`the amount of the cathode active
`material in the same mass unit
`divided by the product of the
`capacity of the anode active
`material per mass unit and the
`amount of the anode active
`material in the same mass unit,
`when the charge cutoff voltage is
`4.2 V.”
`
`or alternatively
`
`“the ratio calculated as the product of
`the theoretic capacity of the cathode
`active material per mass unit and the
`amount of the cathode active material
`in the same mass unit divided by the
`product of the capacity of the anode
`active material per mass unit and the
`amount of the anode active material
`in the same mass unit, when the cell
`charge cutoff voltage is set at 4.2 V,”
`
`wherein “theoretic capacity” means
`“theoretical, rather than actual,
`capacity that assumes all of the
`active substances participate in the
`reaction of the battery”
`
`a.
`
`The Positions of the Parties
`
`Apple proffers two arguments in support of its proposed construction. First, Apple
`contends that this claim term is indefinite because it “renders meaningless” the elements
`“theoretic capacity” and “as calculated by a . . . charge cut-off voltage set at 4.2 V.”
`(Apple Op. Br. at 8–9.) Apple points to statements Patentees made during the CN
`Invalidation Proceedings that “theoretic gram capacity” of a battery “refers to: The
`amount of electricity (electricity capacity) given by assuming that all active substances
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`Case 8:22-cv-01874-JVS-JDE Document 82 Filed 08/02/23 Page 13 of 32 Page ID #:3717
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`Case No.
`
`Title
`
`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
`8:22-CV-01874-JVS (JDEx)
`RJ Technology, LLC v. Apple, Inc.
`
`Date August 2, 2023
`
`participate in the reaction of the battery.” (Id. at 9; Chang Decl., Ex. D at 8 (emphasis
`supplied).) Conversely, specific, or actual, capacity refers to the amount of active
`substances actually participating in the reaction at a specific charge cut-off voltage.
`(Apple Op. Br. at 9; Horn Decl. ¶¶ 23, 43–44.) Thus, RJ’s construction, which refers
`only to “capacity” collapses the terms “theoretic capacity” and “specific capacity.” (Id.)
`Apple argues in the alternative that, if this claim term is not indefinite, “theoretic
`capacity” should be construed according to the meaning Patentees gave it during the CN
`Invalidation Proceedings. (Apple Op. Br. at 10–11.) Because the ’641 Patent refers to
`both “theoretic capacity” and “specific capacity” as distinct concepts, they should not be
`collapsed into one term: “capacity.” (Id. at 11.) Apple asserts that this distinction is
`further supported by the prosecution history. (Id. at 11–12.)
`
`RJ argues this claim term is not indefinite because the term “theoretic capacity” is
`modified by the clause “with a charge cut-off voltage at 4.2 V,” serving as a reference
`point from which a POSITA would be able to determine the theoretic capacity. (RJ Op.
`Br. at 14.) According to RJ, this was a common way in which skilled artisans referred to
`theoretic capacity at the time of the invention because when the charge cut-off voltage is
`limited, it necessarily follows that not all of the lithium in the battery can participate in
`the reaction. (Id. at 15.) Thus, because “theoretic capacity” is modified by a charge cut-
`off voltage, a POSITA would recognize the term referred to the theoretical capacity of a
`battery with a charge cut-off voltage of 4.2 V, rather than the maximum theoretical
`capacity. (Id.) RJ asserts this construction is supported by the ’641 Patent’s
`specification, which defines “theoretical capacities” as the “capacities of the positive
`electrode and the negative electrode calculated with a charge cut-off voltage set at 4.2 V.”
`(Id. (quoting ’641 Patent at 4:5–9).)
`
`Apple argues in response that RJ’s construction conflates two distinct measures of
`capacity: “specific capacity” and “theoretic capacity.” (Apple Resp. Br. at 8.) Apple
`asserts that the ’641 Patent uses these two terms in two different claims, and thus they
`should be afforded their own distinct meanings. (Id.) Additionally, Apple contends that
`RJ’s attempt to introduce a new term, “theoretical maximum capacity,” that is not present
`in the Asserted Patent merely serves to underscore the latent ambiguity in RJ’s
`construction and supports a finding of indefiniteness. (Id. at 10–13.)
`
`RJ responds again that the term “theoretic capacity” cannot be viewed in isolation,
`but rather in conjunction with its modifying phrase—the charge cut-off voltage used to
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`Case 8:22-cv-01874-JVS-JDE Document 82 Filed 08/02/23 Page 14 of 32 Page ID #:3718
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`Case No.
`
`Title
`
`CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
`8:22-CV-01874-JVS (JDEx)
`RJ Technology, LLC v. Apple, Inc.
`
`Date August 2, 2023
`
`calculate the appropriate ratio of positive to negative electrode material. (RJ Resp. Br. at
`6–7.) RJ additionally points to the prosecution history of the Chinese patent, which takes
`priority to the ’641 Patent, in which the Patentees provided the same definitions and
`explanations for this claim term as they proffer here. (Id. at 8–9.) RJ further notes that
`Apple’s reliance on statements the Patentees made in the CN Invalidation Proceedings
`suffer from the same evidentiary deficiencies as addressed in Disputed Claim Term 1, and
`are