Case 6:21-cv-01225-ADA Document 36 Filed 09/20/22 Page 1 of 38
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
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`OZMO LICENSING LLC,
`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`ACER INC. and ACER AMERICA
`CORP.,
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`Defendants.
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`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
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`6:21-CV-1225-ADA
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`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER AND MEMORANDUM
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`On September 2, 2022, the Court held a hearing to determine the proper construction of
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`the disputed claim terms. Ozmo Licensing LLC (“Plaintiff”) accuses Acer Inc. and Acer
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`America Corp. (collectively “Defendants”) of infringing five patents: U.S. Patent Nos.
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`8,599,814 (“the ’814 Patent”), 9,264,991 (“the ’991 Patent”), 10,873,906 (“the ’906 Patent”),
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`11,012,934 (“the ’934 Patent”), 11,122,504 (“the ’504 Patent”) (collectively “the patents-in-
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`suit”). Before the Court are the parties’ claim construction briefs. Defendants filed an opening
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`claim construction brief (Dkt. No. 26), to which Plaintiff filed a responsive claim construction
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`brief (Dkt. No. 29), to which Defendants filed a reply brief (Dkt. No. 31), to which Plaintiff filed
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`a sur-reply brief (Dkt. No. 32). The parties additionally submitted a Joint Claim Construction
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`Statement (Dkt. No. 33).1
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`The Court provided preliminary claim constructions in advance of the Markman hearing.
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`Having considered the parties’ arguments from the hearing and those presented in their claim
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`1 Citations to the parties’ claim construction briefs and Joint Claim Construction Statement are to
`the Case Management/Electronic Case Files (Dkt. Nos.) and pin cites are to the pagination
`assigned through ECF.
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`Case 6:21-cv-01225-ADA Document 36 Filed 09/20/22 Page 2 of 38
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`construction briefs, the Court adopts its preliminary constructions to be its final constructions
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`and enters those final constructions now.
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`I.
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`OVERVIEW OF THE PATENTS-IN-SUIT
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`The patents-in-suit are related, each claiming priority back to a provisional patent
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`application filed in 2005.2 The patents-in-suit are commonly titled “Apparatus And Method For
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`Integrating Short-Range Wireless Personal Area Networks For A Wireless Local Area Network
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`Infrastructure.” The patents-in-suit share a common specification, and as their titles suggest, the
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`patents relate to wireless network technology. As the parties did in their briefing, the Court
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`refers to the ’814 Patent when referencing the common specification.
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`At a high level, the patents-in-suit relate to wireless communication technology. ’814
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`Patent at 1:25-26. More particularly, the patents-in-suit relate to integrating short-range wireless
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`personal area networks (“WPANs”) into longer-range wireless local area networks (“WLANs”).
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`Id. at 1:26-29. As examples, the patents describe Wi-Fi as a standardized WLAN protocol and
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`Bluetooth as a standardized WPAN protocol. Id. at 1:49-53 and 2:25-30. The patents-in-suit
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`realized that problems arise when WLAN and WPAN protocols co-exist in the same wireless
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`medium. Id. at 2:37-44. The patents explain that “[b]ecause they use different methods of
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`accessing the wireless medium, and are not synchronized with one another, severe interference
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`may result when devices conforming to such standards are made to co-exist and are positioned in
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`the same physical vicinity.” Id.
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`In response to these issues, the patents-in-suit disclose an apparatus (e.g., “wireless hub”)
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`that is “adapted to facilitate seamless communication between the WLAN and the WPAN.” ’814
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`2 Each of the patents-in-suit claims priority back to Provisional Application No. 60/661,763. All
`five patents-in-suit issued from a chain of continuation patent applications. Dkt. No. 26 at 6.
`The ’814 Patent has the earliest filing date of the patents-in-suit.
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`Patent at 5:49-51; see also 4:30-33. As one example, FIG. 3 illustrates a WPAN 10 integrated
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`with WLAN 6 to form an integrated network 5. Id. at 4:63-65.
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`
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`The patents disclose that WLAN 6 is a conventional Wi-Fi network compliant with the 802.11x
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`specification. ’814 Patent at 4:66–5:3. WPAN 10 is described as a short-range wireless network
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`with a typical range of about 30 feet. Id. at 6:3-4, 9:36-39.
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`The patents describe wireless hub 12 as having a wireless 802.11x-compliant circuit that
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`can communicate with an access point (AP 7) disposed in WLAN 6 as well as with power
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`sensitive stations (PS-STAs 11) disposed in WPAN 10. ’814 Patent at 5:51-54. That is, the
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`wireless hub 12 is adapted to connect to both networks to facilitate seamless communication
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`between WLAN 6 and WPAN 10. Id. at 5:49-51, 7:3-5. In one implementation, the wireless
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`hub 12 connects to the WPAN without losing connectivity to the WLAN. Id. at 3:49-52, 7:5-9.
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`In another implementation, the wireless hub 12 connects to the WLAN and WPAN alternately.
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`Id. at 3:52-54, 7:9-11.
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`Representative independent claim 1 of the ’814 Patent is reproduced below with its
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`disputed terms emphasized in italics:
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`1. A network-enabled hub, usable for facilitating data
`communications between two or more wireless devices that are
`configured to communicate indirectly with each other via the
`network-enabled hub, comprising:
`an interface to a wireless radio circuit that can send and receive
`data wirelessly, providing the hub with bi-directional wireless
`data communication capability;
`logic for processing data received via the wireless radio circuit;
`logic for generating data to be transmitted by the wireless radio
`circuit;
`logic for initiating and maintaining wireless network connections
`with nodes of a wireless network external to the network-
`enabled hub, maintaining at least a first wireless network
`connection using a first wireless network protocol and a
`second wireless network connection using a second wireless
`network protocol,
`that can be maintained, at
`times,
`simultaneously with each other in a common wireless space,
`wherein the second wireless network protocol is an overlay
`protocol with respect to the first wireless network protocol in
`that communications using the second wireless network
`protocol are partially consistent with the first wireless network
`protocol and at least some of the communications using the
`second wireless network protocol impinge on at least some
`antennae used for the first wireless network; and
`data forwarding logic, implemented in the network-enabled hub
`using hardware and/or software, that forwards data between an
`originating node and a destination node, wherein
`the
`originating node is a node in one of the first and second
`wireless networks and the destination node is a node in the
`other of the first and second wireless networks.
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`’814 Patent at 14:45–15:10 (claim 1, emphasis added).
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`II.
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`LEGAL PRINCIPLES
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`A.
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`Claim Construction
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`“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention
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`to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
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`1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys.,
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`Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). To determine the meaning of the claims, courts start
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`by considering the intrinsic evidence. Id. at 1313; C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388
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`F.3d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Grp., Inc., 262
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`F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The intrinsic evidence includes the claims themselves, the
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`specification, and the prosecution history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d
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`at 861. The general rule—subject to certain specific exceptions discussed infra—is that each
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`claim term is construed according to its ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one
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`of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention in the context of the patent. Phillips, 415
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`F.3d at 1312-13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Azure
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`Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC, 771 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted)
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`(“There is a heavy presumption that claim terms carry their accustomed meaning in the relevant
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`community at the relevant time.”) cert. granted, judgment vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1846 (2015).
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`“The claim construction inquiry . . . begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of
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`the claim.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir.
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`1998). “[I]n all aspects of claim construction, ‘the name of the game is the claim.’” Apple Inc. v.
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`Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362,
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`1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) overruled on other grounds by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792
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`F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015). First, a term’s context in the asserted claim can be instructive.
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`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. Other asserted or unasserted claims can also aid in determining the
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`claim’s meaning, because claim terms are typically used consistently throughout the patent. Id.
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`Differences among the claim terms can also assist in understanding a term’s meaning. Id. For
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`example, when a dependent claim adds a limitation to an independent claim, it is presumed that
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`the independent claim does not include the limitation. Id. at 1314-15.
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`“[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’” Phillips,
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`415 F.3d at 1314-15 (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.
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`Cir. 1995) (en banc)). “[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction
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`analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’”
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`Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996));
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`Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This is true because
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`a patentee may define his own terms, give a claim term a different meaning than the term would
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`otherwise possess, or disclaim or disavow the claim scope. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. In these
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`situations, the inventor’s lexicography governs. Id.
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`The specification may also resolve ambiguous claim terms “where the ordinary and
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`accustomed meaning of the words used in the claims lack sufficient clarity to permit the scope of
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`the claim to be ascertained from the words alone.” Teleflex, Inc., 299 F.3d at 1325. But,
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`“‘[a]lthough the specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed claim
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`language, particular embodiments and examples appearing in the specification will not generally
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`be read into the claims.’” Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed.
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`Cir. 1998) (quoting Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir.
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`1988)); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. “[I]t is improper to read limitations from a preferred
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`embodiment described in the specification—even if it is the only embodiment—into the claims
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`absent a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claims to be so
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`limited.” Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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`The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim
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`construction because, like the specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of how the
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`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) and the inventor understood the patent. Phillips, 415
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`F.3d at 1317. However, “because the prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation
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`between the PTO and the applicant, rather than the final product of that negotiation, it often lacks
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`the clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for claim construction purposes.” Id. at
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`1318; see also Athletic Alts., Inc. v. Prince Mfg., 73 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
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`(ambiguous prosecution history may be “unhelpful as an interpretive resource”).
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`Although extrinsic evidence can also be useful, it is “‘less significant than the intrinsic
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`record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at
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`1317 (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 862). Technical dictionaries and treatises may help a
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`court understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one skilled in the art might
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`use claim terms, but technical dictionaries and treatises may provide definitions that are too
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`broad or may not be indicative of how the term is used in the patent. Id. at 1318. Similarly,
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`expert testimony may aid a court in understanding the underlying technology and determining
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`the particular meaning of a term in the pertinent field, but an expert’s conclusory, unsupported
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`assertions as to a term’s definition are not helpful to a court. Id. Extrinsic evidence is “less
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`reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms.” Id.
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`The Supreme Court has explained the role of extrinsic evidence in claim construction:
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`In some cases, however, the district court will need to look beyond
`the patent’s intrinsic evidence and to consult extrinsic evidence in
`order to understand, for example, the background science or the
`meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time
`period. See, e.g., Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, 546 (1871) (a
`patent may be “so interspersed with technical terms and terms of
`art that the testimony of scientific witnesses is indispensable to a
`correct understanding of its meaning”). In cases where those
`subsidiary facts are in dispute, courts will need to make subsidiary
`factual findings about that extrinsic evidence. These are the
`“evidentiary underpinnings” of claim construction
`that we
`discussed in Markman, and this subsidiary factfinding must be
`reviewed for clear error on appeal.
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`Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 331-32 (2015).
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`B.
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`Departing from the Ordinary Meaning of a Claim Term
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`There are “only two exceptions to [the] general rule” that claim terms are construed
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`according to their plain and ordinary meaning: “1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts
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`as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of the claim term
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`either in the specification or during prosecution.”3 Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 758
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`F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d
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`1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); see also GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304,
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`1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he specification and prosecution history only compel departure from
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`the plain meaning in two instances: lexicography and disavowal.”). The standards for finding
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`lexicography or disavowal are “exacting.” GE Lighting Sols., 750 F.3d at 1309.
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`To act as his own lexicographer, the patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of the
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`disputed claim term,” and “clearly express an intent to define the term.” Id. (quoting Thorner,
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`669 F.3d at 1365); see also Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249. The patentee’s lexicography must
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`appear “with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249.
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`To disavow or disclaim the full scope of a claim term, the patentee’s statements in the
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`specification or prosecution history must amount to a “clear and unmistakable” surrender.
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`Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Thorner, 669
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`F.3d at 1366 (“The patentee may demonstrate intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed
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`meaning of a claim term by including in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or
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`restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.”). “Where an applicant’s statements
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`are amenable to multiple reasonable interpretations, they cannot be deemed clear and
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`3 Some cases have characterized other principles of claim construction as “exceptions” to the
`general rule, such as the statutory requirement that a means-plus-function term is construed to
`cover the corresponding structure disclosed in the specification. See, e.g., CCS Fitness, Inc. v.
`Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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`unmistakable.” 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
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`2013).
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`III. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS
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`The parties dispute the meaning and scope of ten claim terms in the patents-in-suit.
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`A.
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`The “logic for” terms
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`The “logic for” terms include three disputed phrases. See Dkt. No. 33 at 1-3 (identifying
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`for construction “logic for processing . . .,” “logic for generating . . .,” and “logic for initiating
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`and maintaining . . .”). Because the threshold dispute between the parties is the same—whether
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`the terms are subject to means-plus-function interpretation in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶
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`64 —for this issue, the Court addresses the “logic for” terms together.
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`A patent claim may be expressed using functional language. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6;
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`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347-49 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in
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`relevant portion). Means-plus-function claiming occurs when a claim term invokes 35 U.S.C. §
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`112, ¶ 6, which provides:
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`An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a
`means or step for performing a specified function without the
`recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such
`claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure,
`material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
`thereof.
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`But § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply to all functional claim language. There is a rebuttal presumption
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`that § 112, ¶ 6 applies when the claim language recites “means” or “step for” terms and that it
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`does not apply in the absence of those terms. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348. “When a claim
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`term lacks the word ‘means,’ the presumption can be overcome and § 112, para. 6 will apply if
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`4 The Court notes that paragraph 6 of 35 U.S.C. § 112 was replaced with 35 U.S.C. § 112(f)
`when the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) took effect on September 6, 2012. Because
`the application that the resulted in the ’814 Patent was filed before that date, the Court refers to
`the pre-AIA version of § 112.
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`the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or
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`else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” Id.
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`(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). To rebut the presumption, “[a] challenger need
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`only show that the structure is not ‘sufficient.’” Egenera, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 972 F.3d 1367,
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`1373 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing TEK Glob., S.R.L. v. Sealant Sys. Int’l, Inc., 920 F.3d 777, 785
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`(Fed. Cir. 2019)). “The correct inquiry, when ‘means’ is absent from a limitation, is whether the
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`limitation, read in light of the remaining claim language, specification, prosecution history, and
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`relevant extrinsic evidence, has sufficiently definite structure to a person of ordinary skill in the
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`art.” Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Inventio AG v.
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`ThyssenKrupp Elevator Americas Corp., 649 F.3d 1350, (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“It is proper to consult
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`the intrinsic record, including the written description, when determining if a challenger has
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`rebutted the presumption that a claim lacking the term ‘means’ recites sufficiently definite
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`structure.”).
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`Therefore, the Court’s analysis proceeds in two steps. First, the Court must determine
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`whether the “logic for” terms are in means-plus-function form pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
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`See Robert Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On Inc., 769 F.3d 1094, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2014). If the Court
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`determines that the “logic for” terms invoke § 112, ¶ 6, then the Court proceeds to the next step
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`and attempts “to construe the disputed claim term by identifying the corresponding structure,
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`material, or acts described in the specification to which the term will be limited.” Id. (internal
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`quotation marks and citations omitted).
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`Both parties recognize that the “logic for” terms do no use the word “means,” thus giving
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`rise to a rebuttable presumption that the “logic for” terms do no invoke means-plus-function
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`interpretation. See Dkt. No. 26 at 9; Dkt. No. 29 at 6. Both parties also address the fact that in
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`Sonrai Memory Ltd. v. Oracle Corp., the Court did not apply § 112, ¶ 6 interpretation to claim
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`terms that used “logic for” language. No. 1:22-CV-94-LY, 2022 WL 800730 at *9 (W.D. Tex.
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`Mar. 16, 2022) (finding that “the context in which the term ‘logic’ is used in the claims and the
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`specification of the ’691 Patent provides sufficient structural meaning to a POSITA”). This case
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`is different from Sonrai.
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`Plaintiff argues that the “logic for” terms are not subject to means-plus-function
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`interpretation because 1) “means for” is not present; (2) “logic” as used in the claims is not a
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`nonce word; and (3) the claim language provides sufficient structure to avoid the application of §
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`112, ¶ 6. Dkt. No. 29 at 9. Defendants argue that in this case, the totality of the evidence, in
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`particular the lack of structure in the claim, the prosecution history, and the fact that the ’991
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`Patent claims are identical to the ’814 Patent claims except for the “logic for” language is
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`sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption against invoking § 112, ¶ 6 interpretation. Dkt. No.
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`31 at 4-5. The Court agrees with Defendants.
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`Although claim 1 of the ’814 Patent does not recite the word “means,” the “logic for”
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`terms follow conventional means-plus-function format. That is, the phrase “logic for” precedes a
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`function that the “logic” is required to perform. See e.g., ’814 Patent at 14:52-53 (“logic for
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`processing data received via the wireless radio circuit”). Indeed, the “logic for” terms recite
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`general functional language. Id. Unlike in Sonrai, the “logic for” terms here do not describe the
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`claim limitation’s operation, such as its input, output, or connections, in a manner that provides
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`sufficiently definite structure to a POSITA to avoid § 112, ¶ 6. Sonrai, 2022 WL 800730 at *9
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`(finding that “the context in which the term ‘logic’ is used in the claim and the specification of
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`the ’691 patent provides sufficient structural meaning to a POSITA”); see also Apple Inc. v.
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`Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining that “[s]tructure may also be
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`provided by describing the claim limitation’s operation, such as its input, output, or
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`connections”).
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`The prosecution history of the ’814 and ’991 Patents is also informative. Dyfan, LLC v.
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`Target Corp., 28 F.4th 1360, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“Intrinsic evidence, such as the claims
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`themselves and the prosecution history, can be informative in determining whether the disputed
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`claim language recites sufficiently definite structure or was intended to invoke § 112, ¶ 6.”).
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`During prosecution of the ’814 Patent, the Examiner specifically identified the “logic for” terms
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`as invoking § 112, ¶ 6 interpretation:
`
`In claim 1, claim limitations “interface providing”, “logic for
`processing”, “logic for generating”, “logic for initiating and
`maintaining” have been interpreted under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or
`U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA), sixth paragraph, because it uses a non-
`structural terms “interface” and “logic” coupled with functional
`language “providing, processing, generating,
`initiating and
`maintaining” without reciting sufficient structure to achieve the
`function. Furthermore, the non-structural term is not preceded by a
`structural modifier.
`
`See Dkt. No. 26-6 at 96 (’814 Patent prosecution history). The Examiner invited the patentee to
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`disagree with his conclusions by argument showing that the claim recites sufficient structure or
`
`to provide amendment to avoid § 112, ¶ 6:
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`If applicant does not wish to have the claim limitation treated
`under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA), sixth
`paragraph, applicant may amend the claim . . . or present a
`sufficient showing that the claim recites sufficient structure,
`material, or acts . . . .
`
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`See Dkt. No. 26-6 at 98. The patentee did not do so. In a subsequent Amendment to the
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`application that became the ’814 Patent, the patentee did not argue against application of § 112, ¶
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`6, nor did the patentee make any amendment to the claim language. See Dkt. No. 26-6 at 146-
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`157. In contrast, during prosecution of the related ’991 Patent, the application originally
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`included the same “logic for” language, and the Examiner again treated these terms as means-
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`Case 6:21-cv-01225-ADA Document 36 Filed 09/20/22 Page 13 of 38
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`plus-function limitations. See Dkt. No. 26-7 at 90 (’991 Patent prosecution history). Unlike the
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`’814 Patent, the patentee amended the claims to remove the “logic for” language from claim 1 of
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`the ’991 Patent. Id. at 112.
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`
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`The Court recognizes that it is not bound by the Examiner’s statements and/or the
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`patentee’s actions or inaction during prosecution. Skky, Inc. v. MindGeek s.a.r.l., 859 F.3d 1014,
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`1020 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that “we are not bound by the Examiner’s or the parties’
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`understanding of the law or the claims”). Even so, the Court finds that in this case the intrinsic
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`evidence persuasively demonstrates that the “logic for” terms are subject to means-plus-function
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`interpretation and that Defendants have established by a preponderance of the evidence that the
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`presumption against means-plus-function interpretation is rebutted.
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`1. Term No. 1: “logic for processing data received via the wireless radio
`circuit”
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`Plaintiff’s Proposal
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`Defendants’ Proposal
`
`Ordinary meaning (not means-plus-function)
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`Function: processing data received via the
`wireless radio circuit
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`Structure: Hub (in all claims). Also,
`processing unit 28 coupled to or integrated
`with wireless circuit 27, software platform 36,
`and operating system 37 and their equivalents
`
`Means-plus-function limitation
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`Function: processing data received from the
`wireless circuit
`
`Structure: Processing Unit 28 (Fig. 6) along
`with associated software platform 36
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`The “logic for processing . . .” term appears in claim 1 of the ’814 Patent and all asserted
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`claims depending therefrom. As explained above, the term invokes § 112, ¶ 6 construction.
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`
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`The parties appear to dispute whether the identified function for this means-plus-function
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`term should match the language recited in claim 1 of the ’814 Patent. Plaintiff’s alternative
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`means-plus-function proposal follows the claim language, whereas Defendants’ proposal
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`substitutes the word “from” for the term “via” in the claim language. Supra. The Court sees no
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`Case 6:21-cv-01225-ADA Document 36 Filed 09/20/22 Page 14 of 38
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`meaningful difference in the scope of the parties’ proposed functions. Because the use of “via”
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`in the “logic for processing . . .” term is readily understood, the Court adopts the actual claim
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`language contained in Plaintiff’s proposed function.5
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`After identifying the claimed function, the Court’s § 112, ¶ 6 analysis turns to identifying
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`the corresponding structure in the specification that performs that function. Omega Eng’g, Inc.
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`v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The parties dispute the structure
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`disclosed in the specification that corresponds to the claimed function. Dkt. No. 31 at 6; Dkt.
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`No. 32 at 4. Plaintiff’s proposed structure appears to have evolved throughout the claim
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`construction briefing. Compare Dkt. No. 26 at 14; Dkt. No. 29 at 11; Dkt. No. 32 at 4. In its
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`response brief, Plaintiff argues that its alternative § 112, ¶ 6 construction should be adopted
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`because the patents-in-suit disclose that “CPU 24 and memory module 25 are coupled to or
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`integrated with the wireless circuit, and are used to implement the portion of the communication
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`protocol that is not implemented in the dedicated control circuit and datapath logic, together with
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`any application-specific software (which may be written using an operating system 37) to form
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`and implement a software platform 36.” Dkt. No. 29 at 10. In its sur-reply, Plaintiff adds “Hub
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`(in all claims)” to its proposed structure and argues that the “hub” is sufficient structure to avoid
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`§ 112, ¶ 6 interpretation. Dkt. No. 32 at 6-7. Defendants argue that FIG. 6 and the
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`corresponding text in the specification show the corresponding structure for the claimed
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`function. Dkt. No. 26 at 13. Defendants argue that the corresponding structure disclosed in this
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`portion of the specification is processing unit 28 along with associated software platform 36. Id.
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`at 13. While the Court agrees with Defendants that the corresponding structure is shown and
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`5 The Court notes that both parties use the word “via” in their functional statements for the “logic
`for generating . . .” term, thus indicating no apparent dispute in scope. Dkt. No. 33 at 2.
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`disclosed in the context of FIG. 6 of the ’814 Patent, the Court finds that neither parties’ proposal
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`correctly identifies the corresponding structure for the claimed function.
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`FIG. 6 and the accompanying text from the specification disclose the structure for this
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`claim term. See e.g., ’814 Patent at 4:40-42 (“FIG. 6 is a simplified high-level block diagram of
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`a wireless hub configured for use as a bridge between a WPAN and a WLAN.”). The claimed
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`function requires “processing data received via the wireless radio circuit.” Id. at 14:52-53
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`(emphasis added). Box 27 shown in FIG. 6 (reproduced below) is described in the specification
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`as the “802.11x-compliant circuit 27.” ’814 Patent at 6:53-58 (emphasis added). According to
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`the claimed function, the processing is done by something that receives the data via the circuit,
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`thus the corresponding structure is not wireless circuit 27 and its constituent components.
`
`
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`The common specification of the patents-in-suit describes that “[i]nterface circuitry 34
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`provides an interface to the processing unit 28 and memory module 29.” ’814 Patent at 6:61-63.
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`The specification further discloses that “processing unit 28 and memory module 29 are used to
`
`implement that portion of the communication protocol that is not implemented in the dedicated
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`Case 6:21-cv-01225-ADA Document 36 Filed 09/20/22 Page 16 of 38
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`control and datapath logic . . . .” Id. at 7:17-19. In other words, processing unit 28 is the
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`corresponding structure that processes data received via wireless circuit 27. Additionally, the
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`Court notes that claim 1 of the ’991 Patent recites identical functional language as the “logic for”
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`terms, but precedes and associates such functional statements with the term “processor,” thus
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`providing further indication that the corresponding structure is processing unit 28 disclosed in
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`the specification. See e.g., ’991 Patent at 14:46-47 (claim 1 reciting “a processor configured to:
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`process data received via the wireless radio circuit”).
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`For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that the claimed function of this
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`means-plus-function term is “processing data received via the wirele