throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`
`Paper No. 17
`Entered: January 19, 2024
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`YECHEZKAL EVAN SPERO,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2023-01034
`Patent 11,208,029 B2
`
`Before JON M. JURGOVAN, JASON W. MELVIN, and
`AARON W. MOORE, Administrative Patent Judges.
`MELVIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Granting Institution of Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2023-01034
`Patent 11,208,029 B2
`
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 2, “Pet.”)
`requesting inter partes review of claims 1–33 (“the challenged claims”) of U.S.
`Patent No. 11,208,029 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’029 patent”). Yechezkal Evan Spero
`(“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response. (Paper 10, “Prelim. Resp.”). As
`authorized, Petitioner filed a Preliminary Reply (Paper 14, “Prelim. Reply”), and
`Patent Owner filed a Preliminary Sur-Reply (Paper 15, “Prelim. Sur-Reply”).
`Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a), we have authority to
`determine whether to institute review.
`An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information
`presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable
`likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims
`challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we
`conclude that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood it will prevail in
`establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim.
`
`A. REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
`As real parties in interest, Petitioner identifies: Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC;
`Mercedes-Benz Group AG; Mercedes-Benz AG; and Mercedes-Benz Intellectual
`Property GmbH & Co. KG. Pet. 3. Patent Owner identifies Yechezkal Evan Spero
`and Torchlight Technologies LLC as the real parties in interest, noting that
`Torchlight is the exclusive licensee of the ’029 patent. Paper 3, 1 (Patent Owner’s
`Mandatory Notices).
`
`B. RELATED MATTERS
`The parties identify the following related federal district court litigations of
`the ’029 patent: Torchlight Techs. LLC v. Daimler AG et al., No. 1:22-cv-00751
`
`2
`
`

`

`IPR2023-01034
`Patent 11,208,029 B2
`(D. Del.); Torchlight Technologies LLC v. General Motors LLC et al., No. 1:22-
`cv-00752 (D. Del). Pet. 3; Paper 3, 1.
`The parties identify the following PTAB inter partes reviews of the
`’029 patent: IPR2022-01500; IPR2023-01586; IPR2023-01122; IPR2023-01226.
`Pet. 3; Paper 3, 1–2.1
`
`C. THE ’029 PATENT
`The ’029 patent is titled “Adaptive Headlight System” and relates to motor
`vehicle headlamps with LED light sources and a processor to control the headlamp
`light pattern. Ex. 1001, codes (54), (57). The specification more generally
`describes a lighting device that “incorporates one or more discrete light sources
`and their ancillary optical and electrical control equipment in an integrated
`illuminating element.” Id. at 13:34–36. The combined unit is referred to as a
`Digital Lighting Fixture (DLF). Id. at 18:29–33.
`The specification further describes transportation-vehicle applications. Id.
`at 50:49–57:35. One such application involves a DLF headlamp device that
`includes a cluster of LEDs to illuminate around a curve. Id. at 51:54–63, 54:8–15.
`With LEDs having a variety of aims, the headlamp’s light distribution pattern may
`be controlled based on a number of factors, including location data from a GPS
`system, providing information about upcoming curves in the road. See id. at 51:54–
`67, 54:15–22.
`
`
`1 Patent Owner further lists reissue applications, reexaminations, and IPRs
`involving patents related to the ’029 patent. Paper 3, 2–3.
`
`3
`
`

`

`IPR2023-01034
`Patent 11,208,029 B2
`
`D. CHALLENGED CLAIMS
`Petitioner challenges all thirty-three claims of the ’029 patent. Pet. 4.
`Claim 1 is independent and is reproduced below:
`1. A system, for a motor vehicle, comprising:
`a plurality of headlamps, each comprising a plurality of LED light
`sources;
`one or more processors; and
`a memory storing instructions that, when executed by one or more
`of the one or more processors, enable the one or more
`processors to:
`receive first data, including at least map data, indicating a road
`curvature upcoming along a road on which the motor
`vehicle is traveling;
`determine a light change, the change adapting a light pattern of
`the headlamps in at least one of color, intensity or spatial
`distribution to increase light in a direction of the road
`curvature ahead of the motor vehicle and shaping light
`based at least in part on the road curvature; and
`control at least a first plurality of the LED light sources to
`provide light based at least in part on the determined light
`change and prior to the motor vehicle reaching the road
`curvature.
`Ex. 1001, 95:56–96:8. Claims 2–11 depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1. Id.
`at 96:9–97:44. Claim 12 is independent and recites limitations similar to claim 1’s.
`Id. at 97:45–62. Claims 13–22 depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 12. Id. at
`97:63–99:27. Claim 23 is independent and recites limitations similar to claim 1’s.
`
`[2]
`
`[3]
`
`
`2 Patent Owner refers to these as the “predictive curve illumination limitations.”
`Prelim. Resp. 8.
`3 Patent Owner refers to these as the “control limitations.” Prelim. Resp. 8.
`
`4
`
`

`

`IPR2023-01034
`Patent 11,208,029 B2
`Id. at 99:28–43. Claims 24–33 depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 23. Id.
`at 99:44–100:66.
`
`E. PRIOR ART AND ASSERTED GROUNDS
`This proceeding includes the following unpatentability grounds:
`Claims Challenged
`35 U.S.C. §4 References/Basis
`1–8, 10–19, 21–30, 32, 33
`103
`Alden5, Kobayashi6
`9, 20, 31
`103
`Alden, Beam7, Kobayashi
`
`Pet. 5. Petitioner also relies on the Declaration of Dr. Nikolaos Papanikolopoulos.
`Ex. 1003.
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`A. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL
`Patent Owner argues that we should exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 314(a) to deny institution under the factors considering serial petitions set forth
`in General Plastic Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha,
`IPR2016-01357, Paper 19, 15–16 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (precedential). Prelim.
`Resp. 43–59.
`The ’029 patent was challenged by Unified Patents, LLC, in
`IPR2022-01500; we instituted review and later terminated by the parties’
`agreement. IPR2022-01500, Paper 15 (institution), Paper 26 (termination). The
`
`
`4 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29,
`125 Stat. 284 (2011), effective March 16, 2013, amended the applicable statutes.
`Because the application from which the ’029 patent issued was filed before this
`date, the pre-AIA version of § 103 applies.
`5 US 2003/0137849 A1, filed Jan. 22, 2002 (Ex. 1005).
`6 US 6,049,749, issued Apr. 11, 2000 (Ex. 1006).
`7 US 6,144,158, issued Nov. 7, 2000 (Ex. 1007).
`
`5
`
`

`

`IPR2023-01034
`Patent 11,208,029 B2
`’029 patent was challenged also by Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., in
`IPR2023-01586; we instituted review, which remains pending. IPR2023-01586,
`Paper 7. Patent Owner challenges institution here based on both prior proceedings.
`Prelim. Resp. 47–51. We do not agree that this case warrants discretionary denial.
`The first General Plastic factor considers whether the same petitioner
`previously challenged the same claims of the same patent. General Plastic,
`Paper 19, 16. Here, Patent Owner asserts that although Petitioner did not do so, we
`should consider Petitioner as having a substantial relationship with both Unified, to
`which Patent Owner asserts Petitioner is a real party in interest (Prelim. Resp. 47–
`49), and Volkswagen, which is a co-defendant with Petitioner in Patent Owner’s
`infringement suit (id. at 50–51).
`As to Unified, Petitioner points out that Patent Owner makes no argument
`regarding a statutory bar or estoppel, arguing that we should therefore not assess
`the potential relationship. Prelim. Reply 1; see SharkNinja Operating LLC v.
`iRobot Corp., IPR2020-00734, Paper 11 at 18–20 (PTAB Oct. 6, 2020)
`(precedential). Regardless of whether an RPI relationship may, in some case,
`influence factor 1, we determine that it would not support discretionary denial
`here. In particular, in IPR2022-01500, we instituted review and did not find the
`petition deficient. IPR2022-01500, Paper 15. Thus, Petitioner’s assertion of a
`different reference does not appear to have resulted from that prior IPR. And that
`proceeding settled without a final written decision, further supporting that
`Petitioner received no benefit from Unified’s IPR.
`To argue that we should consider Petitioner related to VW, Patent Owner
`relies on Valve Corp. v. Electronic Scripting Products, Inc., IPR2019-00062,
`Paper 11, 2 (PTAB April 12, 2019) (precedential). We do not agree, because Valve
`involved parties that were accused of infringement based on the same product.
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR2023-01034
`Patent 11,208,029 B2
`Valve, Paper 11, 9–10. Here, Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner is accused of
`infringing “based on the same type of headlight technology” (Prelim. Resp. 50–
`51), but that is insufficient. Patent Owner asserts that both parties’ accused
`headlights were “developed jointly with Hella KGaA Hueck & Co.” (id. at 51), but
`that also is an insufficient connection for us to consider two parties substantially
`related for purposes of discretionary denial. As Petitioner points out, it and VW are
`direct competitors, accused of infringing based on two different products, not as a
`supplier and customer of a single product, as was at issue in Valve. Prelim.
`Reply 1.
`Additionally, although Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner and VW “have a
`history of coordinating serial IPR petitions” (Prelim. Resp. 51–53), the facts of
`each case are unique and we will not infer a motive from prior proceedings.
`Having considered Patent Owner’s arguments,8 we conclude that the first General
`Plastic factor weighs strongly against discretionary denial.
`Factors 2 through 5 relate to Petitioner’s knowledge of its asserted art,
`knowledge of Patent Owner’s or the Board’s position on previously asserted art,
`and any explanation for the time between two petitions. General Plastic, Paper 19,
`16. Because we determine that Petitioner did not previously challenge the
`challenged claims, those factors are substantially diminished. Even considering
`
`
`8 Patent Owner asserts further that we should follow Shenzhen Silver Star
`Intelligent Tech. v. iRobot Corp., IPR2018-00761, Paper 15 at 16-17 (PTAB
`September 5, 2018), to apply a presumption that a petition should be denied when
`it is filed after a preliminary response or institution decision arising from an
`earlier-filed petition. Prelim. Resp. 50. Patent Owner does not acknowledge that
`the discussion it seeks to rely on comes from a concurrence, which is not the
`opinion of the Board. That opinion is not binding and we decline to adopt its
`approach.
`
`7
`
`

`

`IPR2023-01034
`Patent 11,208,029 B2
`that Petitioner saw Patent Owner’s preliminary responses to Unified’s and
`Volkswagen’s petitions and the Board’s institution decisions, any roadmapping
`concern is substantially reduced in light of our decision to institute review for the
`two prior petitions. See IPR2022-01500, Paper 15 (institution); IPR2023-01586,
`Paper 7. Patent Owner’s roadmapping contention relates to our evaluation of VW’s
`ground using Beam as a primary reference in IPR2023-01586. Prelim. Resp. 56–
`57. Because we noted “that Beam’s disclosures cast doubt on [VW’s]
`combination” of Beam and Kobayashi (IPR2023-01586, Paper 7, 20), Patent
`Owner submits that Petitioner here “dropped Beam as a primary reference for the
`independent claims” (Prelim. Resp. 57). Petitioner disputes that contention,
`submitting that it “developed its own challenges based on Alden.” Prelim.
`Reply 3–4, 4 n.3.
`We are not persuaded that the Petition shows unfair roadmapping. As
`discussed below, Patent Owner argues that Alden suffers from the same deficiency
`that it asserted against Beam in IPR2023-01586. See infra at 14 (discussing Patent
`Owner’s argument that Alden teaches projecting a high beam everywhere other
`than towards a detected oncoming vehicle); IPR2023-01586, Paper 7, 19–20
`(discussing same argument as to Beam). Although we read Alden as not suffering
`from Beam’s possible deficiency, had Petitioner wanted to address Patent Owner’s
`IPR2023-01586 argument (and our institution decision), Petitioner would have
`adjusted its challenge here more directly and fully. Stated otherwise, if Petitioner
`had roadmapped in light of IPR2023-01586, we would expect such an adjustment
`to be more evident. Instead, we view the Petition’s challenges as resulting from
`Petitioner’s independent evaluation of the prior art. Given our determination that
`Petitioner is not substantially related to VW, Petitioner should have the opportunity
`
`8
`
`

`

`IPR2023-01034
`Patent 11,208,029 B2
`to proceed with its own challenge against a patent for which Petitioner has been
`accused of infringing.
`We have considered Patent Owner’s arguments based on General Plastic
`and conclude that this case does not warrant discretionary denial.
`
`B. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`Petitioner asserts that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have had an
`undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering,
`automotive engineering, optical engineering, applied physics, computer science, or
`similar disciplines, along with two years of experience working with intelligent
`vehicle systems, automotive control systems, or lighting control systems.” Pet. 8–9
`(citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 33). Patent Owner does not dispute that level of ordinary skill in
`the art. Prelim. Resp. 9. We adopt the undisputed level of ordinary skill in the art
`for purposes of this decision.
`
`C. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`The parties agree that no express claim construction is required at this stage.
`Pet. 8; Prelim. Resp. 9. We agree with the parties and therefore do not further
`construe the claims for this decision. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368,
`1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that
`. . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the
`controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795,
`803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
`Below, we discuss Patent Owner’s argument relating to the “shaping” claim
`term, which appears to imply a claim construction that Patent Owner has not yet
`explained. See infra at 15. Should Patent Owner wish to pursue such an argument
`
`9
`
`

`

`IPR2023-01034
`Patent 11,208,029 B2
`in the instituted trial, Patent Owner should offer and support a construction for the
`term.
`
`D. OBVIOUSNESS OVER ALDEN AND KOBAYASHI
`Petitioner asserts that claims 1–8, 10–19, 21–30, 32, and 33 are unpatentable
`as obvious over Alden and Kobayashi. Pet. 12–68. For most of claim 1’s
`limitations, Petitioner relies on Alden alone. Id. at 12–30.
`Alden discloses a vehicle headlight system using a segmented-beam
`headlight and a sensor to detect other vehicles, such that the headlight’s beam can
`be dimmed in the area of a detected vehicle, maximizing illumination for the
`equipped vehicle while minimizing glare to other vehicles. Ex. 1005, codes (54),
`(57). Alden describes a sensor such as a photodiode array for detecting oncoming
`vehicles’ headlights as pairs of bright dots, and a controller that interprets those
`dots as an oncoming vehicle and designates for dimming a portion of the
`illumination field corresponding to the possible driver of the oncoming vehicle,
`then reduced the brightness of the segmented-beam headlight in the designated
`area. Id. ¶¶ 25–28. As one embodiment for the headlight, Alden discloses an array
`of individual LEDs, controlled to implement the desired lighting pattern in the
`projected beam. Id. ¶ 29. As an additional application of its system, Alden
`discloses that it may be “used to concentrate light to look around corners in
`response to road conditions.” Id. ¶ 36. When a vehicle detects road turns, the
`system “direct[s] light into the corner to maximize the driver’s ability to see there.”
`Id.
`
`For receiving map data indicating an upcoming road curvature, Petitioner
`relies on Kobayashi, submitting that it would have been obvious to “use map data
`to identify road curvature when adapting the LEDs of Alden to ‘direct light into the
`
`10
`
`

`

`IPR2023-01034
`Patent 11,208,029 B2
`corner.’” Pet. 23–24 (quoting Ex. 1005 ¶ 36). Petitioner reasons that Alden
`discloses detecting road curvature through roadside reflectors and steering-wheel
`sensors, and Kobayashi discloses an additional way to detect road curvature. Id.
`at 24. Petitioner continues that, because Kobayashi discloses using map data to
`control vehicle headlights, skilled artisans would have had reason to adopt its
`teachings in Alden’s system “to maximize successful detection in different
`environments.” Id. at 24–25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 70). Petitioner relies on Kobayashi
`also for determining a light change to increase light in the direction of road
`curvature and shaping light based on the road curvature. Id. at 27. Finally,
`Petitioner relies on Kobayashi for the requirement to control the light sources both
`based on the determined light change and also prior to the vehicle reaching the
`road curvature. Id. at 30.
`Patent Owner disputes several aspects of Petitioner’s contentions relating to
`the independent claims. Prelim. Resp. 22–41. The disputes relate to limitations that
`Patent Owner identifies as the “Predictive Illumination Determination Limitation”
`and the “Control Limitation.” Id. at 8; see supra at 4 n.2, n.3 (§ I.D). As noted
`above, Petitioner relies on a combination of Alden and Kobayashi for those
`limitations. Petitioner asserts that Alden discloses determining illumination based
`on road curvature as shown in Figure 11, reproduced below:
`
`11
`
`

`

`IPR2023-01034
`Patent 11,208,029 B2
`
`
`
`Figure 11 illustrates an application of Alden’s invention “being used to concentrate
`light to look around corners in response to road conditions” in which vehicle 153
`senses that the road turns and “direct[s] light into the corner to maximize the
`driver’s ability to see there.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 36.
`Petitioner asserts that Alden’s system determines a light change that both
`increases light in the direction of road curvature and shapes the light based on the
`road curvature. Pet. 25–27. Petitioner relies on Alden’s disclosures that it can
`“concentrate light to look around corners” and “direct light into the corner.” Id.
`Petitioner asserts further that Kobayashi discloses shaping light because it
`discloses controlling its lights “in accordance with the course concerned.” Pet. 23
`(quoting Ex. 1006, 17:59–61), 27 (referencing Pet. 23). Petitioner reasons that it
`would have been obvious to use Kobayashi’s teachings to adapt lighting to the road
`shape informed by map data. Id. at 27.
`Patent Owner argues first that Petitioner relies on multiple embodiments in
`Alden but provides no reason that a skilled artisan would have combined those
`
`12
`
`

`

`IPR2023-01034
`Patent 11,208,029 B2
`embodiments. Id. at 24–27. We do not agree. Alden discusses “elements of a
`segmented distribution illumination process” in connection with Figure 2. Ex. 1005
`¶ 26. The described process uses “Segmented Beam Headlight” 61 to differentially
`illuminate sectors of the illumination. Id. Alden’s description is generic to the
`specific headlight embodiment, and states that “[s]ome methods employed within
`61 to segment light into independently controlled sectors are discussed later.” Id.
`Similarly, Figure 3 and its associated discussion provides “a more detailed
`illustration of the information flow, processes and architecture of the elements
`described in FIG. 2.” Id. ¶ 27, Fig. 3. Figure 3 depicts Segmented Headlights 83
`and 85 generically, and the description refers to them without limiting the
`particular form of those headlights. Id. Thus, when Alden describes that Figure 5
`“illustrates the segmented headlight means and controlling switch array in a first
`embodiment,” that does not describe an aspect disconnected from the components
`and operation depicted in Figures 2 or 3, but rather provides details regarding one
`embodiment of the segmented headlights included in Figures 2 and 3. See id. ¶ 29.
`The same is true for Figure 11, in which Alden illustrates an application where its
`controllable headlights are used “to concentrate light to look around corners in
`response to road conditions.” Ex. 1005, ¶ 36, Fig. 11. As Alden states, the
`application directing light around road bends “can be achieved with the segmented
`sensing elements and segmented light distribution elements described herein.” Id.
`¶ 36. That disclosure supports that any of its embodiments for controllable
`headlights could be operated in a manner to light in the direction of road curvature.
`Patent Owner argues also that Alden does not disclose controlling its lights
`to increase light in the direction of road curvature. Prelim. Resp. 28–31. Patent
`Owner identifies Petitioner’s annotated Figure 5 from Alden, which Petitioner uses
`
`13
`
`

`

`IPR2023-01034
`Patent 11,208,029 B2
`to show how Alden would operate its segmented light to achieve Figure 11’s
`application. Petitioner’s annotated Figure 5 is reproduced below:
`
`
`
`Pet. 29. Figure 5 illustrates Alden’s segmented-beam headlight using a number of
`individual lighting element 119 to project light through headlight lens 121.
`Ex. 1005 ¶ 29. Petitioner’s annotations show a plurality of lighting elements being
`used to illuminate only one side of the possible lighting distribution area. Pet. 28–
`29.
`
`In Patent Owner’s view, Alden never discloses deactivating LED elements
`as depicted in Petitioner’s annotated Figure 5, because Alden discloses projecting a
`high beam everywhere other than where an oncoming vehicle is detected. Prelim.
`Resp. 29–31. Because all lights are activated in Alden’s base state, argues Patent
`Owner, Alden does not disclose increasing light in the direction of a curve. Id.
`
`14
`
`

`

`IPR2023-01034
`Patent 11,208,029 B2
`Patent Owner’s argument, however, does not consider Alden’s Figure 11
`application discussed above, in which light is directed towards the road curvature
`and not provided to the opposite side. We view Petitioner’s annotated Figure 5 as
`accurately depicting how Figure 5’s embodiment would operate when
`implementing the Figure 11 application.
`Next, Patent Owner argues that neither Alden nor Kobayashi discloses
`“shaping light” as claimed. Prelim. Resp. 31–33. In that regard, Patent Owner
`asserts Alden’s Figure 11 application “merely changes the direction of light
`emitted by the headlight . . . but does not shape the light emitted.” Id. at 32
`(emphasis omitted). Patent Owner further supports its position by pointing out that
`Alden never discusses “shaping” the projected light. Id. As discussed above,
`Petitioner relies on Alden’s disclosures that the Figure 11 application can
`“concentrate light to look around corners in response to road conditions” and that
`the headlights “direct light into the corner.” Pet. 25–26 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 36, 54,
`Fig. 11). Petitioner relies additionally on Kobayashi’s teaching of controlling light
`according to “the road profile.” Pet. 23 (quoting Ex. 1006, 5:5–8).
`Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner’s contentions conflate “directing” light
`with “shaping” light, but Patent Owner does not explain further. Patent Owner
`appears to be relying on particular view of what “shaping” requires but has not
`offered a claim construction at this stage. It seems that light projected out at
`different angles through Alden’s or Kobayashi’s optical system would have
`different shapes, as a result of each system’s characteristics. Moreover, Alden’s
`teaching to “concentrate” light appears to address the claims’ requirement for
`shaping light. We determine that Petitioner’s contentions support institution.
`Finally, Patent Owner argues that neither Alden nor Kobayashi discloses
`controlling lights based on road curvature “prior to” the vehicle reaching the
`
`15
`
`

`

`IPR2023-01034
`Patent 11,208,029 B2
`curvature. Prelim. Resp. 33–37. For that aspect of the claims, Petitioner asserts that
`Alden discloses detecting an upcoming turn using roadside reflectors, such that
`“sensing would occur before the road curves.” Pet. 29–30 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 36–
`40, Figs. 1, 4). Petitioner asserts that Alden teaches concentrating the light around
`the turn as soon as the turn is detected, thus “prior to” the vehicle reaching the turn.
`Id. Petitioner further relies on Kobayashi, which discloses using map data to
`indicate road curves to a controller that directs light into the curve. Id. at 23, 30.
`We agree with Petitioner that at least Kobayashi discloses controlling lights
`prior to the vehicle reaching a road curvature. Kobayashi’s Figure 10 is reproduced
`below:
`
`
`
`Figure 10 depicts vehicle K approaching a road curvature and shows that the
`“direction of irradiation point” has been altered in the direction of road curvature
`before the vehicle reaches the curvature. Ex. 1006, Fig. 10 (position A); see id.
`at 15:20–23. Controlling lights using Kobayashi’s method based on map data
`would therefore result in a vehicle that turns its lights toward a road curvature prior
`
`16
`
`

`

`IPR2023-01034
`Patent 11,208,029 B2
`to the vehicle reaching the curvature. Patent Owner points to Kobayashi’s
`statement that, “[w]hen the vehicle turns to the left, the left shoulder is
`illuminated” to argue that Kobayashi does not support adjusting lights prior to a
`curve. Prelim. Resp. 35 (quoting Ex. 1006, 15:21–23) (emphasis omitted). But that
`statement (1) does not preclude adjusting the lights before the vehicle turns left and
`(2) may be read as describing the general relationship without restricting the exact
`timing. Because Kobayashi’s Figure 10 discloses the claimed timing, we determine
`that Petitioner’s contentions support institution.
`Patent Owner does not otherwise contest Petitioner’s obviousness challenge
`to the independent claims. We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions and evidence
`regarding obviousness of the independent claims and determine that they support
`institution. Additionally, at this stage, Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s
`contentions regarding the dependent claims. We will evaluate the merits of those
`contentions during the instituted trial.
`
`E. OBVIOUSNESS OVER ALDEN, BEAM, AND KOBAYASHI
`Petitioner asserts that dependent claims 9, 20, and 31 would have been
`obvious over Alden, Beam, and Kobayashi. Pet. 68–79. Those claims indirectly
`depend from claims 1, 12, and 23, respectively, and further recite, inter alia, that
`controlling a second plurality of LEDs “includes termination of light from at least
`one LED providing light directed to the area prior to the termination.” E.g.,
`Ex. 1001, 97:33–36. Petitioner asserts first that skilled artisans would have
`understood that Alden’s approach of dimming an LED “could include operating at
`zero” and that “turning off LEDs that emit light directly at the drive of the other
`vehicle would accomplish Alden’s purpose of reducing glare to other drivers.”
`
`17
`
`

`

`IPR2023-01034
`Patent 11,208,029 B2
`Pet. 75 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 147). Those contentions appear to address obviousness
`without reliance on Beam.
`Petitioner asserts additionally that Beam discloses a headlight system using
`individually controlled microbeams to eliminate glare for other vehicles,
`“controlled to darken light directed to the areas of the sensed oncoming and
`preceding vehicles.” Id. at 76 (emphasis omitted) (citing Ex. 1007, 4:9–25, 4:45–
`59. 5:61–6:8, 6:61–7:8). Petitioner points also to Beam’s disclosure that its lighting
`elements can be “blanked” (id. at 77 (quoting Ex. 1007, 4:26–52, 5:33–54)), which
`skilled artisans would understand as terminating light output (id. (citing Ex. 1003
`¶¶ 149–150)). Petitioner reasons that skilled artisans would have had reason to
`modify Alden’s system to place at least one LED of the claimed second plurality in
`the terminated output state “to further dim headlight beam output directed to areas
`of the oncoming vehicles as taught by Beam.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 151).
`Patent Owner argues that including Beam does not remedy the deficiencies
`with Petitioner’s independent-claim challenge. Prelim. Resp. 42. To the extent
`Patent Owner addresses Beam’s disclosures, it does so in relation to the limitations
`of the independent claims, for which Petitioner does not rely on Beam. Id. For the
`reasons discussed above and considering Petitioner’s unchallenged contentions, we
`determine that Petitioner’s contentions for the independent claims support
`institution. And Petitioner’s contentions directed to Beam support obviousness of
`dependent claims 9, 20, and 21, further supporting institution.
`
`III. CONCLUSION
`For the reasons discussed above, we conclude Petitioner has shown a
`reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim. We have
`
`18
`
`

`

`IPR2023-01034
`Patent 11,208,029 B2
`evaluated all of the parties’ submissions and determine that the record supports
`institution.
`
`IV. ORDER
`
`Accordingly, it is
`ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter partes review of
`claims 1–33 of the ’029 patent is instituted on the grounds set forth in the Petition;
`and
`
`FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(c) and 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial commencing on the entry
`date of this decision.
`
`
`
`
`19
`
`

`

`IPR2023-01034
`Patent 11,208,029 B2
`For PETITIONER:
`Celine Crowson
`Joe Raffetto
`Scott Hughes
`Ryan Stephenson
`HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
`celine.crowson@hoganlovells.com
`joseph.raffetto@hoganlovells.com
`scott.hughes@hoganlovells.com
`ryan.stephenson@hoganlovells.com
`
`For PATENT OWNER:
`Sangeeta G. Shah
`David Bir
`Andrew Turner
`BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C.
`sshah@brookskushman.com
`aturner@brookskushman.com
`btomsa@brookskushman.com
`
`
`
`
`
`20
`
`

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket