IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`THETA IP LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
`and SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS
`AMERICA, INC.
`
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
`NO. 2:16-CV-527-JRG-RSP
`
`MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`On May 23, 2017, the Court held a hearing to determine the proper construction of
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`disputed claim terms in United States Patents No. 7,010,330 and 9,331,728. Having re-
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`viewed the arguments made by the parties at the hearing and in their claim construction
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`briefing [Dkt. # 63, 69 & 71],1 having considered the intrinsic evidence, and having made
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`subsidiary factual findings about the extrinsic evidence, the Court issues this Claim Con-
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`struction Memorandum and Order. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2005); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015).
`
`1 Citations to documents (such as the parties’ briefs and exhibits) in this Claim Construction Mem-
`orandum and Order refer to the page numbers of the original documents rather than the page num-
`bers assigned by the Court’s electronic docket unless otherwise indicated.
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`Petitioners Lenovo (United
`States) Inc. and Motorola
`Mobility LLC - Ex. 1010
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`I. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................ 3
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`II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES ................................................................................................. 4
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`III. THE PARTIES’ STIPULATED TERMS .................................................................. 7
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`IV. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS ............................................................ 7
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`A. “dynamically adjust[ed]” ............................................................................................ 7
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`B. “impedance” .............................................................................................................. 15
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`C. “a component in the receiver signal path” ................................................................ 16
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`D. “scaling . . . impedance” ........................................................................................... 18
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`E. “interfering signals” .................................................................................................. 24
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`F. “interferer signal” ....................................................................................................... 25
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`G. “substantially the desired signal with the interferer signal reduced by filtering
`from the input signal” ............................................................................................... 25
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`H. “variably changing . . . impedance” .......................................................................... 32
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`I. “at least a component in the receiver path” ................................................................ 36
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`V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 40
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`I. BACKGROUND
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`Plaintiff Theta IP LLC (“Plaintiff” or “Theta”) has alleged infringement of United
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`States Patents No. 7,010,330 (“the ’330 Patent”) and 9,331,728 (“the ’728 Patent”) (col-
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`lectively, the “patents-in-suit”) by Defendants Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. and Samsung
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`Electronics America, LLC (“Defendants” or “Samsung”). Plaintiff submits that “[t]he ’330
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`and ’728 patents describe and claim systems and methods to achieve reduced power dissi-
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`pation in wireless transceivers.” [Dkt. # 63] at 2. Plaintiff has asserted Claims 29 and 30 of
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`the ’330 Patent and Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 of the ’728 Patent. Id.
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`The ’330 Patent, titled “Power Dissipation Reduction in Wireless Transceivers,” is-
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`sued on March 7, 2006, and bears an earliest priority date of March 1, 2003. The ’728
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`Patent issued on May 3, 2016, and is a continuation of the ’330 Patent. The named inventor
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`of both of the patents-in-suit is Yannis Tsividis. The Abstract of the ’330 Patent states:
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`Methods and circuits for reducing power dissipation in wireless transceivers
`and other electronic circuits and systems. Embodiments of the present inven-
`tion use bias current reduction, impedance scaling, and gain changes either
`separately or in combination to reduce power dissipation. For example, bias
`currents are reduced in response to a need for reduced signal handling capa-
`bility, impedances are scaled thus reducing required drive and other bias cur-
`rents in response to a strong received signal, or gain is increased and imped-
`ances are scaled in response to a low received signal in the presence of no or
`weak interfering signals.
`
`Shortly before the start of the May 23, 2017 hearing, the Court provided the parties
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`with preliminary constructions with the aim of focusing the parties’ arguments and facili-
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`tating discussion. Those preliminary constructions are set forth below within the discussion
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`for each term.
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`II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
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`“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the in-
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`vention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312
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`(quoting Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115
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`(Fed. Cir. 2004)). Claim construction is clearly an issue of law for the court to decide.
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`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970–71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),
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`aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). “In some cases, however, the district court will need to look
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`beyond the patent’s intrinsic evidence and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to under-
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`stand, for example, the background science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art
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`during the relevant time period.” Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841 (citation omitted). “In cases where
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`those subsidiary facts are in dispute, courts will need to make subsidiary factual findings
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`about that extrinsic evidence. These are the ‘evidentiary underpinnings’ of claim construc-
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`tion that we discussed in Markman, and this subsidiary factfinding must be reviewed for
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`clear error on appeal.” Id. (citing 517 U.S. 370).
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`To determine the meaning of the claims, courts start by considering the intrinsic
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`evidence. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313; see also C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
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`388 F.3d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns
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`Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The intrinsic evidence includes the
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`claims themselves, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at
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`1314; C.R. Bard, 388 F.3d at 861. Courts give claim terms their ordinary and accustomed
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`meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention in the
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`context of the entire patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13; accord Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade
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`Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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`The claims themselves provide substantial guidance in determining the meaning of
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`particular claim terms. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. First, a term’s context in the asserted
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`claim can be very instructive. Id. Other asserted or unasserted claims can aid in determining
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`the claim’s meaning because claim terms are typically used consistently throughout the
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`patent. Id. Differences among the claim terms can also assist in understanding a term’s
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`meaning. Id. For example, when a dependent claim adds a limitation to an independent
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`claim, it is presumed that the independent claim does not include the limitation. Id. at 1314–
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`15.
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`“[C]laims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’” Id.
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`at 1315 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 979 (en banc)). “[T]he specification ‘is always
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`highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single
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`best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Vitronics
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`Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); accord Teleflex, Inc. v.
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`Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This is true because a patentee
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`may define his own terms, give a claim term a different meaning than the term would oth-
`
`erwise possess, or disclaim or disavow the claim scope. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. In these
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`situations, the inventor’s lexicography governs. Id. The specification may also resolve the
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`meaning of ambiguous claim terms “where the ordinary and accustomed meaning of the
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`words used in the claims lack sufficient clarity to permit the scope of the claim to be ascer-
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`tained from the words alone.” Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325. But, “[a]lthough the specification
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`may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed claim language, particular em-
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`bodiments and examples appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the
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`claims.” Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
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`(quoting Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988));
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`accord Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
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`The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for claim con-
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`struction because a patent applicant may also define a term in prosecuting the patent. Home
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`Diagnostics, Inc., v. Lifescan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“As in the case
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`of the specification, a patent applicant may define a term in prosecuting a patent.”). “[T]he
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`prosecution history (or file wrapper) limits the interpretation of claims so as to exclude any
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`interpretation that may have been disclaimed or disavowed during prosecution in order to
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`obtain claim allowance.” Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed.
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`Cir. 1985).
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`Although extrinsic evidence can be useful, it is “less significant than the intrinsic
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`record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.” Phillips, 415 F.3d
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`at 1317 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Technical dictionaries and trea-
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`tises may help a court understand the underlying technology and the manner in which one
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`skilled in the art might use claim terms, but technical dictionaries and treatises may provide
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`definitions that are too broad or may not be indicative of how the term is used in the patent.
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`Id. at 1318. Similarly, expert testimony may aid a court in understanding the underlying
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`technology and determining the particular meaning of a term in the pertinent field, but an
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`expert’s conclusory, unsupported assertions as to a term’s definition are entirely unhelpful
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`to a court. Id. Generally, extrinsic evidence is “less reliable than the patent and its prosecu-
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`tion history in determining how to read claim terms.” Id.
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`III. THE PARTIES’ STIPULATED TERMS
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`The parties did not reached agreement on any constructions in their February 28,
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`2017 Joint Claim Construction and Pre-Hearing Statement. [Dkt. # 50] at 1. Plaintiff’s
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`opening brief, however, states that the parties have agreed that “the terms ‘a first signal
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`strength indicator circuit’ and ‘an output-level-sensing circuit’ from the ’330 patent should
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`be given their plain and ordinary meanings.” [Dkt. # 63] at 2. This agreement is also set
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`forth in the parties’ May 9, 2017 Joint Claim Construction Chart. [Dkt. # 73] at A1–A2.
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`IV. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS
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`A. “dynamically adjust[ed]”
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`Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction
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`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
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`Plain and ordinary meaning. Alternatively,
`“changing during operation”
`
`“adjust[ed] in a continuous manner, as op-
`posed to discrete steps”
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`[Dkt. # 50-1] at 1, 17; [Dkt. # 63] at 5; [Dkt. # 69] at 1; [Dkt. # 71] at 1; [Dkt. # 73] at A-
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`1. The parties submit that this term appears in Claims 23, 26, 29, and 30 of the ’330 Patent.
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`Id.
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`Shortly before the start of the May 23, 2017 hearing, the Court provided the parties
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`with the following preliminary construction: “adjust[ed] during operation without being
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`limited to whether a threshold has been crossed.”
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`(1) The Parties’ Positions
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`Plaintiff argues: “A person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that a first
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`parameter, such as signal strength, is identified during operation of the system and would
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`thus further understand that an adjustment/change of a second parameter based on or in
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`response to the identification of the first parameter, such as a change in impedance based
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`on or in response to the identified signal strength, likewise occurs during operation of the
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`system.” [Dkt. # 63] at 6. Plaintiff further argues that Defendants’ proposal of “continuous
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`manner, as opposed to discrete steps” is unsupported and is contrary to examples disclosed
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`in the specification, such as in Figure 13. Id. at 6–7.
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`Defendants respond that during prosecution, “[i]n the process of making [a] dis-
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`claimer, the patentee clearly defined the term ‘dynamically’ to mean continuous as opposed
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`to discrete.” [Dkt. # 69] at 1. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff is misinterpreting the
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`description of Figure 13 because “Figure 13 merely shows a resulting power dissipation
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`rather than any type of adjustment of a parameter (impedance or gain) to a discrete set of
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`levels.” Id. at 5.
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`Plaintiff replies that “dynamically” as used in the prosecution history “refers to mak-
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`ing adjustments without reliance on a threshold. Theta’s comments note that ‘continuous
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`behavior’ is commonly characterized as dynamic; but this does not necessitate an under-
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`standing that ‘dynamic’ must mean ‘continuous.’” [Dkt. # 71] at 1. Plaintiff also argues
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`that the patentee “pointed out that the distinction between the claim and [the] Clark [refer-
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`ence] is not based on ‘dynamically’ changing—but simply on making any change (i.e.,
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`based on the claimed term ‘changing’ rather than the combined claimed terms ‘dynamically
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`changing’[).]” Id. at 2.
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`At the May 23, 2017 hearing, Defendants argued that the prosecution history repeat-
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`edly described “dynamically” in terms of levels rather than in terms of time. Defendants
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`reiterated that the patentee referred to “dynamically” as being “continuous,” which De-
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`fendants argue means being able to select any value within an operable range of values.
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`Defendants concluded that the ultimate question of whether the adjustability is “continu-
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`ous” is a factual question for expert witnesses to opine upon. Plaintiff responded that the
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`patentee used “dynamically” to refer to making changes in response to changing condi-
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`tions. Plaintiff had no objection to the Court’s preliminary construction.
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`(2) Analysis
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`Claim 29 of the ’330 Patent, for example, recites (emphasis added):
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`29. A wireless transceiver integrated circuit comprising:
`a receiver comprising a signal path, the signal path comprising:
`a first circuit; and
`a second circuit having an input coupled to an output of the
`first circuit; and
`a first signal strength indicator circuit coupled to the signal path, and
`configured to determine a first signal strength;
`wherein a gain of the first circuit is configured to be dynamically ad-
`justed in response to the first signal strength, and
`wherein an impedance in the second circuit is configured to be dy-
`namically adjusted in response to the first signal strength.
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`Surrounding claim language thus provides context suggesting that “dynamically”
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`refers to adjustment being responsive to the “first signal strength” that is determined by an
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`indicator circuit coupled to the signal path. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314 (“the context in
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`which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly instructive”).
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`Also, the specification contrasts “dynamic” with “fix[ed]” when describing Figure
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`13:
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`FIG. 13 is an example shown [sic] how power may be saved as a function of
`time by employing one or more of these methods consistent with embodi-
`ments of the present invention. Power is plotted along a Y-axis 1304 as a
`function of time along X-axis 1302. Conventional worst case design would
`fix power dissipation at line 1310. As can be seen, dynamic power dissipation
`1320 under the control of variable gains, impedances, biasing, or combina-
`tion thereof, allows for a lower average power 1330 as compared to the power
`dissipated 1310 by the conventional design.
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`’330 Patent at 11:30–39 (emphasis added).
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`Defendants have relied extensively upon the prosecution history of the ’728 Patent,
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`asserting that the patentee defined “dynamically” or otherwise disclaimed claim scope.
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`As a threshold matter, Defendants have not shown that any purported disclaimer in
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`the prosecution history of the ’728 Patent can be applied to the recitals of “dynamically”
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`in the parent ’330 Patent, which issued several years prior to the ’728 Patent prosecution
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`history cited by Defendants. The authorities cited by Defendants involved disclaimers ap-
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`plied from a parent patent to a child patent, or between sibling patents, not from a child
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`patent to a parent patent. See Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1334 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2003) (finding disclaimer applicable to child patent because “we presume, unless oth-
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`erwise compelled, that the same claim term in the same patent or related patents carries the
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`same construed meaning”); see also Alloc, 342 F.3d at 1372 (similar); Elkay Mfg. Co. v.
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`Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“When multiple patents derive from
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`the same initial application, the prosecution history regarding a claim limitation in any
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`patent that has issued applies with equal force to subsequently issued patents that contain
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`the same claim limitation.”) (emphasis added).
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`Defendants rely primarily upon Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d
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`1340, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 2004), but although Microsoft applied a disclaimer to a related
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`patent that issued prior to the prosecution history that included the disclaimer, that related
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`patent was a sibling (or, arguably, a cousin), not a parent. Defendants presumably are as-
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`serting that this is a distinction without a difference, but it is noteworthy that whereas prec-
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`edent supports applying a disclaimer to a child patent, such as cited above, Defendants
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`have cited no binding or persuasive precedent that applied a disclaimer to a parent patent,
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`and the Court finds none.
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`One of the authorities cited by Defendants nonetheless states that later prosecution
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`history can be “relevant” to earlier claims. Absolute Software, Inc. v. World Computer Sec.
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`Corp., No. A-09-CV-142-LY, 2014 WL 496879, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2014). Also, Mi-
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`crosoft noted:
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`We rejected the argument that the patentee was bound, or estopped, by a
`statement made in connection with a later application on which the examiner
`of the first application could not have relied. We did not suggest, however,
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`that such a statement of the patentee as to the scope of the disclosed invention
`would be irrelevant. Any statement of the patentee in the prosecution of a
`related application as to the scope of the invention would be relevant to claim
`construction, and the relevance of the statement made in this instance is en-
`hanced by the fact that it was made in an official proceeding in which the
`patentee had every incentive to exercise care in characterizing the scope of
`its invention.
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`Microsoft, 357 F.3d at 1350 (discussing Georgia–Pacific Corp. v. United States Gypsum
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`Co., 195 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
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`Even when the prosecution history of the ’728 Patent is considered, however, the
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`patentee distinguished the “Clark” reference on the basis that “dynamic” adjustment “uses
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`no threshold” and occurs “as SNR [(signal-to-noise ratio)] varies”:
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`Clark in US patent 5,001,776 (hereinafter “Clark”) is teaching a system with
`a “High current mode” and a “Low current mode”. This is shown in his Fig.
`2. Also, Column 2, line 7 discusses a “threshold” which is always necessary
`in any so called “two-level” system. This is also discussed in the Abstract,
`stating that when the quality of the desired signal is low and the strength of
`all received signals is also low, or when the quality of the desired signal is
`above a threshold, the receiver operates in a lower current mode to conserve
`power and maximize battery lifetime. By contrast, Tsividis uses no threshold;
`rather, the control adjusts dynamically the power dissipation as the received
`external signal’s SNR varies as set forth in all independent claims in the case
`as now amended.
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`Aug. 27, 2014 Amendment [Dkt. # 69-10] at 8 (emphasis modified). The patentee thus used
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`“dynamically” with reference to a varying signal-to-noise ratio as contrasted with merely
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`evaluating whether the quality of the desired signal exceeded a threshold. A review of Clark
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`itself further reinforces that the patentee was distinguishing Clark as disclosing a signal
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`quality threshold rather than dynamic adjustments based on signal strength ratios. See, e.g.,
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`U.S. Patent 5,001,776 [Dkt. # 7] at 2:6–8. Likewise, the patentee further stated:
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`For that purpose, consider for example the 1st row of Clark’s Table 1 that
`teaches that when the desired signal is low and the received signal is low, the
`Clark system operates in a low bias. By contrast, as Tsividis teaches, the re-
`lation between the desired signal and the interference is checked and when
`the desired signal is larger than the interference signal (even if both are low)
`then the power dissipation decreases, however, if the desired signal is smaller
`than the interference signal (even if both are low) then the power dissipation
`increases. The same is possible in the case described in the 4th row of Clark
`when both the desired signal and the interference are high, it is still possible
`that the desired signal is higher than the interference or vice versa, leading to
`different operation of the circuit, and therefore not teaching the same case.
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`Aug. 27, 2014 Amendment [Dkt. # 69-10] at 9 (emphasis added).
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`Defendants have emphasized statements by the patentee referring to “continuous
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`behavior” as the basis for Defendants’ proposed construction:
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`Applicant disagrees with Examiner’s assertion that Clark teaches dynami-
`cally adjust [sic, adjusting] impedance in the signal path as Clark teaches
`away therefrom. In fact Clark teaches an on/off solution that is based on a
`threshold and therefore Clark does not dynamically respond but rather re-
`sponds when a threshold is crossed. In other words, Clark does not teach a
`continuous behavior, commonly characterized as dynamic, and rather teaches
`away therefrom by teaching a[] two-state solution, or discrete at best.
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`Id. at 11 (emphasis modified).
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`This disclosure that “continuous” can be “characterized” as dynamic does not
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`amount to a definition and does not necessarily mean that all that is “dynamic” is neces-
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`sarily “continuous,” particularly in light of the other prosecution statements discussed
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`above and herein. See CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2002) (“the claim term will not receive its ordinary meaning if the patentee acted as
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`his own lexicographer and clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term in either
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`the specification or prosecution history”) (emphasis added); see also Golight, Inc. v. Wal-
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`Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Because the statements in the
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`prosecution history are subject to multiple reasonable interpretations, they do not constitute
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`a clear and unmistakable departure from the ordinary meaning of the term . . . .”).
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`Also, whereas the patentee in another portion of the prosecution history distin-
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`guished Clark as “seem[ing] to teach adaptation between a lower current mode and a
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`higher current mode (see Col. 3 lines 26–57), which therefore reaches [sic, teaches] away
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`from dynamically varying an impedance,” the patentee further asserted that “nothing taught
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`in Clark teaches any kind of change in impedance.” Feb. 24, 2014 Amendment [Dkt. # 69-
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`8] at 9, 12; see Aug. 27, 2014 Amendment [Dkt. # 69-10] at 9 (“Furthermore, Clark teaches
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`shutting down certain stages, which is a simple ‘on/off’ control. Tsividis does not shut off
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`any circuits.”).
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`Instead, the patentee appears to have used “dynamically” to refer to during opera-
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`tion. Such a reading is also consistent with other portions of the prosecution history. See
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`Feb. 10, 2012 Amendment [Dkt. # 69-5] at 27 (“Yamamoto [(U.S. Patent 6,370,210)] seems
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`to teach discrete gain adjustment during the preamble portion of a transmission . . .”; “after
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`the time T4 . . ., while still in the preamble period, there cannot be any dynamic changing
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`of the AGC [(automatic gain control)]”) (emphasis added).
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`Still, the patentee distinguished using a signal strength threshold rather than variable
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`ratios between signals, as discussed above, and Plaintiff appears to acknowledge this dis-
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`tinction in its reply brief, noting that the patentee referred to “making adjustments without
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`reliance on a threshold.” [Dkt. # 71] at 1 (discussing Aug. 27, 2014 Amendment [Dkt. #
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`69-10] at 8, 11 (quoted above)).
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`The Court therefore construes “dynamically adjust[ed]” to mean “adjust[ed] dur-
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`ing operation without reliance upon a signal strength threshold.”
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`B. “impedance”
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`Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction
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`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
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`Plain and ordinary meaning. Alternatively,
`“a value of electrical resistance, electrical
`reactance, or both”
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`“the total opposition (i.e., resistance and
`reactance) a circuit offers to the flow of al-
`ternating current at a given frequency”
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`[Dkt. # 50-1] 2, 18; [Dkt. # 63] at 7; [Dkt. # 69] at 10; [Dkt. # 71] at 2; [Dkt. # 73] at A-1.
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`The parties submit that this term appears in Claims 1, 2, 4, 17, 20, 23, 24, 25, and 29 of the
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`’330 Patent. Id.
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`Shortly before the start of the May 23, 2017 hearing, the Court provided the parties
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`with the following preliminary construction: “opposition to the flow of current.” During
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`the hearing, the parties agreed that “impedance” should be construed to mean “opposition
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`to the flow of alternating current.”
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`Based on this agreement between the parties, the Court construes “impedance” to
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`mean “opposition to the flow of alternating current.”
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`C. “a component in the receiver signal path”
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`Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction
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`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
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`Plain and ordinary meaning. Alternatively,
`“an active or passive electronic device or
`circuit element in the receiver signal path”
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`“a component through which the input
`signal passes”
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`[Dkt. # 50] Ex. A at 4 & 20; [Dkt. # 63] at 10; [Dkt. # 69] at 19; [Dkt. # 71] at 3; [Dkt. #
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`73] at B-1. The parties submit that this term appears in Claim 1 of the ’728 Patent. Id.
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`Shortly before the start of the May 23, 2017 hearing, the Court provided the parties
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`with the following preliminary construction: “plain meaning.”
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`(1) The Parties’ Positions
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`Plaintiff argues that the non-limiting examples set forth in the specification include
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`passive as well as active devices. [Dkt. # 63] at 11. Plaintiff also argues that Defendants’
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`proposal should be rejected because “it remains unclear at what position along the receiver
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`signal path would an ‘input signal’ be sufficiently altered to become an ‘output signal’ (or
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`at least sufficiently altered to no longer be deemed an ‘input signal’).” Id. at 12.
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`Defendants respond that their proposed construction “comports with the plain mean-
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`ing of the claim phrase, since a component that is ‘in’ the path of the received signal would
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`have the signal pass through it.” [Dkt. # 69] at 20. Defendants also argue that the specifi-
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`cation is consistent with their proposal. Id. at 20–21.
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`Plaintiff replies that “[t]o be clear, the language in this instance does not recite ‘in
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`the path of the received signal,’ and Defendants’ arguments relying on such alternative
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`language should be disregarded.” [Dkt. # 71] at 3. Plaintiff also argues that “there is no
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`indication that the input signal received at the upstream component is the same signal re-
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`ceived at the downstream component, or any further downstream component.” Id. at 4.
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`(2) Analysis
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`The specification discloses various inputs and outputs, for example as follows:
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`When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the sig-
`nal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly in-
`terfering signals. The desired signal is the useful, information-carrying por-
`tion of a received signal.
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`* * *
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`FIG. 14 is a block diagram of a portion of a receiver consistent with an em-
`bodiment of the present invention. Included are low-noise amplifier 1410,
`mixer 1420, gain stage 1430, filter 1440, AGC amplifier 1450, and VCO
`1460. Signal strength detection is done at the output of the low-noise ampli-
`fier by signal strength indicator 1470, at the output of the mixer by signal
`strength indicator 1472, and at the output of the filter by signal strength indi-
`cator 1474. The outputs of the signal strength indicator circuits are received
`by the computational circuit 1470, which in turn controls gain and power
`control circuits 1480 and 1485. Power and gain control circuits 1480 and
`1485 control the gain, biasing, and impedance levels of the circuits in the
`receiver signal path.
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`’330 Patent at 5:17–21, 11:40–53 (emphasis added).
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`Defendants’ proposal of referring to “the input signal” is unclear as to whether a
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`received signal remains the “input signal” after having been altered. Defendants’ proposal
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`would therefore tend to confuse rather than clarify the scope of the disputed term. See, e.g.,
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`id. at 2:19–23 (“a signal path having a low-noise amplifier configured to receive the signal,
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`a mixer having an input coupled to an output of the low-noise amplifier, and a low-pass
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`filter having an input coupled to an output of the mixer”) (emphasis added).
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`The Court therefore expressly rejects Defendants’ proposed construction. No further
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`construction is necessary. See U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568
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`(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Claim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and
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`technical scope, to clarify and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the
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`claims, for use in the determination of infringement. It is not an obligatory exercise in
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`redundancy.”); see also O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351,
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`1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[D]istrict courts are not (and should not be) required to construe
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`every limitation present in a patent’s asserted claims.”); Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing
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`Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Unlike O2 Micro, where the court failed to
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`resolve the parties’ quarrel, the district court rejected Defendants’ construction.”); ActiveVi-
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`deo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commcn’s, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Sum-
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`mit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 802 F.3d 1283, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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`At the May 23, 2017 hearing, neither party had any objection to the Court’s prelim-
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`inary construction of this term as having its plain meaning.
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`The Court accordingly construes “a component in the receiver signal path” to
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`have its plain meaning.
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`D. “scaling . . . impedance”
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`Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning, Alternatively,
`“varying a value of electrical resistance,
`electrical reactance, or both”
`
`“adjusting a load R and a capacitance C
`using the same factor”
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`[Dkt. # 50-1] at 5, 20; [Dkt. # 63] at 12; [Dkt. # 69] at 14; [Dkt. # 71] at 4; [Dkt. # 73] at
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