Case 9:22-cv-80388-DMM Document 70 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/30/2022 Page 1 of 27
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
`WEST PALM BEACH DIVISION
`
`OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Case No. 9:22-cv-80388-DMM
`
`v.
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION,
`
`Defendant.
`
`PLAINTIFF OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD.’S
`REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`Emerson Exhibit 1016
`Emerson Electric v. Ollnova
`IPR2023-00626
`Page 00001
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`Case 9:22-cv-80388-DMM Document 70 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/30/2022 Page 2 of 27
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 1
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`II. DISPUTED TERMS .............................................................................................................. 1
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`A.
`
`Terms for construction .................................................................................................. 1
`
`i.
`
`“to selectively operate the transceiver”, ’887 Patent, Claim 1 ............................... 1
`
`ii. “wherein transmission of the most recent reading of the indicator stored in the
`memory during the period of the transmission interval is suspended in response to
`detecting a change in the sensed condition within the predetermined range.”, ’887
`Patent Claim 1. ....................................................................................................... 3
`
`iii. “multi-sensor package”, ’282 Patent, Claims 1, 7, 13, 20 ...................................... 4
`
`iv. “sensor package”, ’282 Patent, Claims 1, 2, 7, 8, 13, 14 ......................................... 5
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`v. “sensor control information”, ’282 Patent, Claims 1, 5 .......................................... 6
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`vi. “change-of-value” terms, ’371 Patent, Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 15 .................. 7
`
`B.
`
`Indefiniteness Terms ..................................................................................................... 9
`
`i.
`
`“a most recent reading of the indicator…”, ’887 Patent, Claim 1 .......................... 9
`
`ii. “processor in communication with the wireless communications component and
`the sensor package”, ’282 Patent, Claims 1, 7, 13 ................................................ 10
`
`iii. “receive sensor control information related to sensor data in control at a second
`automation component”, ’282 Patent, Claims 1, 7, 13 ......................................... 11
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`C. Means-plus-function terms ......................................................................................... 12
`
`i.
`
`“wireless automation device” / “automation component”, ’887 Patent Claim 1;
`’282 Patent, Claims 1-11, 13, 17, 19, 20; ’371 Patent, Claims 1-6, 13-16 ........... 12
`
`ii. “transceiver”, ’887 Patent, Claim 1 ...................................................................... 14
`
`ii
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`iii. “controller”, ’887 Patent, Claim 1 ........................................................................ 15
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`iv. “wireless device”, ’371 Patent, Claims 2, 3, 14 .................................................... 15
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`D. “Wherein” clause terms .............................................................................................. 16
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`E. Certificate of correction terms .................................................................................... 20
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`III. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 20
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`
`
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`
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`
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`iii
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`Anderson v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co.,
`119 F. Supp. 3d 1328 (S.D. Fla. 2015) ..................................................................................... 20
`
`Apple Inc. v. Wi-LAN Inc.,
`25 F. 4th 960 (Fed. Cir. 2022) .................................................................................................... 8
`
`Aventis Pharm. Inc. v. Amino Chems. Ltd.,
`715 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013)................................................................................................... 1
`
`Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc.,
`512 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................. 10
`
`Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Texas Sys. v. BENQ Am. Corp.,
`533 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................... 5
`
`Clear Imaging Research, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`No. 2:19-cv-00326-JRG, 2020 WL 6384731 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2020) ................................. 18
`
`Collaborative Agreements, LLC v. Adobe Sys. Inc.,
`No. A-14-CV-356-LY, 2015 WL 2250391 (W.D. Tex. May 12, 2015) .................................. 17
`
`Dyfan, LLC v. Target Corp.,
`28 F.4th 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ................................................................... 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19
`
`El Hassan v. Liberty Home Equity Sols., Inc.,
`No. 17-22435-CIV, 2018 WL 3134418 (S.D. Fla. June 26, 2018) ........................................... 20
`
`Energizer Holdings, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`435 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006)................................................................................................. 11
`
`Fisher-Rosemount Sys., Inc. v. ABB Ltd.,
`No. 4:18-CV-00178, 2019 WL 6830806 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2019) ........................................ 18
`
`Grp. One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.,
`407 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................. 21
`
`Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp.,
`755 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014)............................................................................................... 1, 7
`
`HTC Corp. v. IPCom GmbH & Co., KG,
`667 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................... 14, 15, 19
`
`iv
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`Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. v. T-Mobile US, Inc.,
`No. 2:16-cv-57, 2017 WL 2691227 (E.D. Tex. June 22, 2017) ............................................... 14
`
`H-W Tech., L.C. v. Overstock.com, Inc.,
`758 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................. 20
`
`In re Teles AG Informationstechnologien,
`747 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................. 13
`
`Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.,
`21 F.4th 801 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ................................................................................................. 2, 5
`
`Intelligent Agency, LLC v. 7-Eleven, Inc.,
`No. 4:20-CV-0185-ALM, 2022 WL 760203 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2022) ................................. 17
`
`Kara Tech. Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc.,
`582 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................... 3
`
`Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp.,
`379 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................. 17
`
`Pavo Sols. LLC v. Kingston Tech. Co.,
`35 F. 4th 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ................................................................................................ 20
`
`Pelican Int’l Inc. v. Hobie Cat Comp.,
`No. 20-cv-2390-BAS-MSB, 2022 WL 298959 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2022) ................................. 14
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................... 7
`
`Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc.,
`724 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2013)................................................................................................... 9
`
`Proveris Sci. Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc.,
`739 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................................. 11
`
`RFCyber Corp. v. Google LLC, et al.,
`No. 2:20-cv-274-JRG, 2021 WL 5357465 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2021) .................................... 12
`
`Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. Prisua Eng’g Corp.,
`948 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2020)............................................................................... 13, 15, 16, 19
`
`Skky, Inc. v. MindGeek, s.a.r.l.,
`859 F.3d 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2017)................................................................................................. 15
`
`
`
`
`v
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`Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd.,
`844 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017)....................................................................................... 9, 10, 11
`
`Syncpoint Imaging, LLC v. Nintendo of Am. Inc.,
`No. 2:15-CV-00247-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 55118 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2016) .............................. 19
`
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent. Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)............................................................................................... 6, 7
`
`TomTom Inc. v. Adolph,
`790 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................. 12
`
`Toshiba Corp. v. Imation Corp.,
`681 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................... 4
`
`TQ Delta, LLC v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC,
`No. 1:15-CV-00611-RGA, 2016 WL 7013481 (D. Del. Nov. 30, 2016) ................................. 14
`
`VDPP LLC v. Vizio, Inc.,
`No. 2021-2040, 2022 WL 885771 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 25, 2022) ............................................. 17, 20
`
`WSOU Invs. LLC v. Oneplus Tech. (Shenzhen) Co.,
`No. W-20-CV-00952-ADA, 2022 WL 3500120 (W.D. Tex. May 24, 2022) .......................... 19
`
`XR Commc’ns, LLC v. D-Link Sys., Inc.,
`No. CV-17-00596-DOC-JDE, 2022 WL 2291747 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2022) ......................... 18
`
`Zeroclick, LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`891 F.3d 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2018)........................................................................................... 16, 18
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ............................................................................................... 12, 13, 15, 17, 19, 20
`
`
`
`
`
`vi
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
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`Plaintiff Ollnova Technologies Ltd. (“Ollnova”) submits this reply claim construction brief
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`in response to Defendant Carrier Global Corp.’s (“Carrier”) responsive claim construction and
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`indefiniteness brief (Dkt. No. 67, “Resp.”).
`
`II.
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`DISPUTED TERMS
`
`A. Terms for construction
`
`i. “to selectively operate the transceiver”, ’887 Patent, Claim 1
`
`It is Carrier’s burden to demonstrate why the Court should depart from the plain and
`
`ordinary meaning of the term “to selectively operate the transceiver” and define the term to include
`
`extraneous limitations not otherwise found in the claims. See Aventis Pharm. Inc. v. Amino Chems.
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`Ltd., 715 F.3d 1363, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“There is a heavy presumption that claim terms are to
`
`be given their ordinary and customary meaning.”).1 As the Federal Circuit has instructed, courts
`
`“depart from the plain and ordinary meaning of claim terms based on the specification in only two
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`instances: lexicography and disavowal.” Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367,
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`1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “The standards for finding lexicography and disavowal are exacting.” Id.
`
`“To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim
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`term other than its plain and ordinary meaning” and must “clearly express an intent to redefine the
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`term.” Id. “Disavowal requires that the specification [or prosecution history] make[] clear that
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`the invention does not include a particular feature, or is clearly limited to a particular form of the
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`invention.” Id. at 1372 (citations omitted). Here, Carrier cannot identify any lexicography or
`
`disavowal that would support limiting the plain and ordinary meaning of the term to mean “[t]o
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`communicate information during the transmission period in response to a triggering event.”
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`1 All emphasis added unless stated otherwise.
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`1
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`Carrier purports that its definition is somehow the “plain and ordinary meaning” of the
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`term. Resp. at 4. But Carrier is seeking a construction to limit and change the meaning of the
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`term.2 For example, Carrier’s proposed construction eliminates the use of the word “selectively”
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`and it is improper to render words of a claim superfluous. See Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21
`
`F.4th 801, 810 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“It is highly disfavored to construe terms in a way that renders
`
`them void, meaningless, or superfluous.”). Carrier’s construction also removes the word
`
`“transceiver,” which improperly suggests that the “controller” is communicating information
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`instead of the transceiver, which is an improper re-write of the claim and confusing to the jury.
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`See Dkt. No. 59-6 (“Madisetti Decl.”) ¶ 49.
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`Carrier’s proposed construction is also problematic because it seeks to limit the meaning
`
`of the term to an exemplary embodiment of the ’887 Patent, while simultaneously excluding other
`
`preferred embodiments. Madisetti Decl. ¶¶ 46-48. Specifically, Carrier’s proposed construction
`
`seeks to require that information be communicated in response “to a triggering event.” Resp. 4-5.
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`Carrier’s definition is cherry-picked from a single sentence in the ’887 Patent specification: “the
`
`transceiver may communicate the information during the transmission period in response to a
`
`triggering event....” ’887 Patent at 10:63-65. But the ’887 Patent expressly contemplates that the
`
`transceiver may communicate information in the absence of a triggering event—such as “in
`
`response to a number of successive transmission periods in which information was not
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`transmitted.” ’887 Patent at 11:11-13.
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`Carrier also fails to cite anything in the intrinsic record (i.e., the ’887 Patent or prosecution
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`history) that equates the ’887 Patent’s other examples about when the transceiver may selectively
`
`2 Carrier casts all of its proposed constructions as somehow advocating for the “plain and ordinary
`meaning” of the terms in an attempt to justify its request that the Court import limitations from the
`specification into the claims in contravention of Federal Circuit precedent.
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`2
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`communicate information (such as by means of an “external control signal” or “counter”) with the
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`recited “triggering event.” ’887 Patent at 11:41-50. Indeed, the ’887 Patent discusses that a
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`counter “may count a number of successive polling periods 336 for which a flag or triggering
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`event has not been set….” Id. at 11:47-53. To that end, Carrier is wrong that the ’887 Patent
`
`contemplates that a “counter” is a “triggering event”—to the contrary, the ’887 Patent
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`contemplates the use of a counter when a “triggering event has not been set.” Id. Ultimately,
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`because Carrier seeks to improperly limit Claim 1 of the ’887 Patent to require a “triggering event”
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`(i.e., one of the exemplary embodiments), while also excluding other embodiments (such as the
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`absence of an event, a “counter”, or “external control signal”), the Court should reject Carrier’s
`
`proposed construction.3 See Kara Tech. Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2009) (“The patentee is entitled to the full scope of his claims, and [the Court] will not limit him
`
`to his preferred embodiment or import a limitation from the specification into the claims.”).
`
`ii. “wherein transmission of the most recent reading of the indicator stored in
`the memory during the period of the transmission interval is suspended in
`response to detecting a change in the sensed condition within the
`predetermined range.”, ’887 Patent Claim 1
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`Carrier cannot overcome its burden to show why the plain and ordinary meaning of the
`
`
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`disputed phrase requires construction. Specifically, Carrier does not identify any lexicography or
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`disavowal that supports requiring that the most recent reading of the indicator be “identified as
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`pending but not transmitted” in response to detecting a change in the sensed condition. See
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`Toshiba Corp. v. Imation Corp., 681 F.3d 1358, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Absent disclaimer or
`
`
`3 Carrier is also wrong that Ollnova’s response to a hypothetical posed in connection with a
`challenge to the ’887 Patent based on patent eligibility is somehow contradictory and/or supports
`Carrier’s unduly narrow construction. Resp. at 5. Carrier cites to a brief where Ollnova did not
`opine on issues of claim construction. And there are no statements by Ollnova that some
`“triggering event” is needed for selective communication by the transceiver.
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`
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`3
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`lexicography, the plain meaning of the claim controls.”). Again, Carrier attempts to limit the plain
`
`and ordinary meaning of a term based on a single sentence in the ’887 Patent specification:
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`“[s]imilarly, the processor 214 may control the transceiver 216 to suspend the transmission of
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`information, notwithstanding a flag being set identifying a transmission may be pending.” ’887
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`Patent at 11:8-11. But the ’887 Patent contemplates a variety of ways that information may be
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`suspended from transmission without requiring that the information first be “pending
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`transmission”—for example, through the use of a “counter” or an “externally received control
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`signal.” Madisetti Decl. ¶¶ 52, 53. These other examples described in the ’887 Patent regarding
`
`the suspension of transmission of information are not tied to the concept that the information first
`
`be “identified as pending transmission,” as required by Carrier’s construction. Accordingly,
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`Carrier’s proposed construction should be rejected.
`
`iii. “multi-sensor package”, ’282 Patent, Claims 1, 7, 13, 20
`
`
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`Carrier is wrong that Ollnova’s construction somehow “reads out any requirement that the
`
`package be ‘multi’ sensor.” Resp. at 12. To the contrary, Ollnova’s already agreed-upon
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`construction requires “a single packaged sensor device, not a group of individual sensors”—which
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`necessarily means that there is more than one sensor in the “package.” Indeed, it is unclear what
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`a sensor “package” could be if it did not contain multiple sensors (i.e., a “multi-sensor”). Ex. 6
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`(Madisetti Depo.) at 308:15 – 315:14.
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`
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`Carrier’s insistence that its definition “is based word-for-word on the ’282 Patent
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`applicant’s own … description of why the multi-sensor package was distinguishable from the prior
`
`art” is unpersuasive. Resp. at 12. Notably, the concept that the multi-sensor package be
`
`“configured to detect values and variables related to multiple sensed properties” is already written
`
`into the claims:
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`4
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`1. An automation component configured for wireless communication within a
`building automation system, the automation component comprising:
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`a multi-sensor package configured to detect a plurality of variables and generate
`sensor data for each detected variable….
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`To that end, Carrier’s proposed construction improperly renders the ’282 Patent claim limitations
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`superfluous and redundant. See Intel Corp., 21 F.4th at 810. In order to promote consistency
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`across cases and because Carrier’s proposed construction renders certain claim limitations
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`superfluous, the Court should reject Carrier’s proposed construction.
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`iv. “sensor package”, ’282 Patent, Claims 1, 2, 7, 8, 13, 14
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`Carrier’s proposed construction for the term “sensor package” is based on the faulty
`
`assumption that “sensor package” refers to something different than the claimed “multi-sensor
`
`package.” But the ’282 Patent claims do not use the term “sensor package” differently from
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`“multi-sensor package.” Madisetti Decl. ¶ 89. Rather, after the ’282 Patent claims recite “a multi-
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`sensor package,” the claims then refer to the “multi-sensor package” as “the sensor package”—
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`meaning the earlier recited “multi-sensor package.” Dkt. No. 59 (“Br.”) at 11-12. As such, the
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`’282 Patent claims do not treat the “multi-sensor package” differently from the “sensor package”—
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`the terms mean the same thing.4 Madisetti Decl. ¶ 89.
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`Carrier’s reliance on the prosecution history only underscores that the term “sensor
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`package” refers to the “multi-sensor package.” Resp. at 14. Carrier notes that the Applicant argued
`
`the singular term “sensor” was different from the claimed “multi-sensor” term. See Resp. at 14.
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`Here, the claims do not recite a singular “sensor”—they first recite “a multi-sensor package” and
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`4 Carrier’s reliance on Bd. Of Regents is misplaced. Resp. 14. Unlike here, that case concerned
`two distinct claim elements (“each pre-programmed code” and “the matched one or more pre-
`programmed codes”) and how those claim elements interacted with one another. See Bd. of
`Regents of the Univ. of Texas Sys. v. BENQ Am. Corp., 533 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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`5
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`then refer to the “multi-sensor package” as “the sensor package.” To that end, Carrier seeks to
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`improperly use the applicant’s statements about a singular “sensor” to implicate a “sensor
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`package.” But a “sensor package” clearly refers to more than one sensor.
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`Additionally, Carrier’s reliance on the prosecution history is inherently contradictory.
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`Carrier argues that the Applicant’s statement regarding a singular “sensor” means that the claimed
`
`“multi-sensor package” must have a different meaning from the claims’ later use of the phrase
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`“sensor package.” Resp. at 14. But adopting Carrier’s construction would walk the claim directly
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`into the very prior art that the Applicant sought to distinguish. For example, the Applicant argued
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`that the ’282 Patent contemplates “a multi-sensor package is configured to detect values and
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`variables related to multiple sensed properties.” Ex. 7 (Dec. 12, 2011 Applicant Statements) at 9
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`(emphasis in original). The Applicant argued that the claimed “multi-sensor” package was
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`different from the prior art because “[f]rom the disclosure of Petite, it is clear that the sensor 310
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`is configured to provide a variety of output formats related to a single sensed property ….” Id.
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`(emphasis in original). As such, it would not make any sense to import a definition to the term
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`“sensor package” that imports the very concepts from the prior art that the Applicant expressly
`
`sought to distinguish. Carrier’s proposed construction should be rejected.
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`v. “sensor control information”, ’282 Patent, Claims 1, 5
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`Carrier cannot identify any lexicography or disavowal that justifies limiting the plain and
`
`ordinary meaning of the term “sensor control information” to Carrier’s narrow construction. See
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`Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365-67. Notably, Carrier does not dispute that it seeks to limit the term to
`
`the exemplary embodiment found in Figure 6 of the ’282 Patent by adding in the requirement that
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`the “sensor control information” be tied to a “scan cycle.” Resp. at 15. But in doing so, Carrier
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`commits the “cardinal sin” of importing limitations from the exemplary Figures into the claims.
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`6
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`See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (describing “reading a limitation
`
`from the written description into the claims” as “one of the cardinal sins of patent law”) (internal
`
`quotation marks omitted). While Carrier maintains that a POSITA would only understand the term
`
`“in relation to the scan cycle,” the Federal Circuit has “has expressly rejected the contention that
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`if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be construed as being
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`limited to that embodiment.” Hill-Rom Servs., 755 F.3d at 1371.
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`Carrier is also wrong that the term requires construction because “the term by itself does
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`not indicate what type of information is sensor control information or what is controlled by that
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`information.” Resp. at 15. For example, the ’282 Patent provides the following exemplary
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`discussion: “[t]he sensor usage or control information relates to or identifies the sensor values and
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`routines that are controlling and driving the receiving device.” ’282 Patent at 9:13-16. And,
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`contrary to Carrier’s proposed construction, nothing in the claims or specification requires the
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`“sensor control information” to be tied to a “scan cycle.” As such, the Court should reject Carrier’s
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`proposed construction.
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`vi. “change-of-value” terms, ’371 Patent, Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 15
`
`For the terms “change-of-value request,” “change-of-value messages,” and “change-of-
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`value acknowledgement,” Carrier does not dispute that it seeks to import limitations from a single
`
`sentence in the specification that is in the context of a single exemplary embodiment. Indeed,
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`Carrier does not even attempt to argue that the specification provides a definition or disavowal for
`
`these terms. As such, the terms must be given their ordinary meaning because there is no
`
`lexicography or disavowal. Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365-67. Moreover, the ordinary meaning of
`
`the terms and the relationship between the different terms is readily apparent in the context of the
`
`claim language itself. Madisetti Decl. ¶¶ 113-122. No further construction is necessary.
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`
`
`7
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`Carrier further fails to address the three points raised in Ollnova’s Opening Brief showing
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`why Carrier’s constructions contradict the specification. Br. at 16. For example, Carrier does not
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`(1) explain why it seeks to exclude the alternative of “direct[ing]” the described operation, or (2)
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`explain why its constructions require actual values as opposed to an indication of whether the
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`values have changed.
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`Because Carrier has no affirmative evidence that would support its unduly narrow
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`constructions, Carrier instead incorrectly argues that Dr. Madisetti proposed constructions for the
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`four terms. Resp. at 21. But Dr. Madisetti merely provided non-limiting examples of how the
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`terms are used in the context of the claims and specification. Ex. 6 (Madisetti Depo.) at 155:18-
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`25. Carrier’s criticisms only further confirm that Carrier improperly seeks to import limitations
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`from a single sentence in the specification. Resp. at 21. Carrier merely identifies limitations from
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`a single sentence in the specification without any evidence or suggestion that the patentee limited
`
`the ordinary meaning of the terms. See Apple Inc. v. Wi-LAN Inc., 25 F. 4th 960, 967 (Fed. Cir.
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`2022) (“Embodiments in the specification—even if there is only one embodiment—cannot limit
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`the scope of the claims absent the patentee’s words or expressions of manifest exclusion or
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`restriction.”). Carrier makes no effort to explain why the ordinary meaning of the terms requires
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`“local detected values” or “beyond a pre-defined reporting limit”—these are nothing more than
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`examples described in the context of one exemplary embodiment.5
`
`
`5 Carrier’s argument that claim 4 allegedly contradicts Dr. Madisetti’s statement that a “‘change-
`of-value update’ may be generated in response to the change-of-value request message” is
`illogical. Dkt. 67-6 at ¶ 83. Because claim 1 recites “generate a change-of-value update in
`response to the change-of-value request message,” there cannot be any dispute that the “change-
`of-value update” recited in claim 1 may be generated in response to the change-of-value request
`message.
`
`
`
`8
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`IPR2023-00626 Page 00014
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`

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`Case 9:22-cv-80388-DMM Document 70 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/30/2022 Page 15 of 27
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`Carrier’s response regarding its exclusion of the “Push” embodiment further misses the
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`mark. Resp. at 21-22. Ollnova’s point was that the specification describes multiple embodiments,
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`while Carrier seeks to import limitations from a single sentence in the context of only one of those
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`embodiments. There is no suggestion in the specification that Carrier’s limitations are required by
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`the “Push” embodiment. Carrier provides no basis to cherry-pick limitations described with
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`respect to one exemplary embodiment (e.g., the Polled embodiment) when such limitations are
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`plainly not required by other described embodiments (e.g., the Push embodiment). See
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`Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., 724 F.3d 1343, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (proposed construction
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`“would improperly limit the broadly drafted claims to one preferred embodiment (thereby
`
`excluding others) or would be the result of improperly importing a limitation from the specification
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`into the claims.”).
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`Finally, for the term “change-of-value update,” Carrier does not even bother to cite any
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`evidence or explain why the Court should import its proposed “queued” limitation from the
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`specification. Because there are no definitions, disclaimers, or disavowals that would support
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`Carrier’s proposed constructions, they are improper and should be rejected.
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`B.
`
`Indefiniteness Terms6
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`i. “a most recent reading of the indicator…”, ’887 Patent, Claim 1
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`Carrier cannot meet its burden to prove indefiniteness by clear and convincing evidence.
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`See Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Indefiniteness
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`must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”). The phrase is readily understood in the
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`context of the claim, as informed by the ’887 Patent specification. Ex. 8, Madisetti Suppl. Decl.
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`6 Carrier failed to identify these three terms in its preliminary claim constructions prior to Dr.
`Madisetti’s expert declaration or Ollnova’s opening claim construction brief.
`
`9
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`IPR2023-00626 Page 00015
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`Case 9:22-cv-80388-DMM Document 70 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/30/2022 Page 16 of 27
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`¶¶ 7-12. For instance, the specification explains that “[t]he current reading of the indicator also
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`may be compared to prior readings of the indicator to determine a change.” ’887 Patent at 3:11-
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`12; see also id. at 9:51 – 10:3 (“[T]he processor 214 may poll or sample the signal from the sensor
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`209 to read the most current indicator of the sensed condition.”), 10:12-56. To that end, a POSITA
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`would understand that the ’887 Patent uses the phrase under its plain and ordinary meaning to
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`mean “most recent reading” as opposed to a “prior reading[].” Madisetti Suppl. Decl. ¶ 10.
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`Carrier’s complaint that “there is no reasonable certainty to one of skill in the art if the
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`claim requires transmitting one reading, a plurality of readings, or either of the forgoing” is
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`meritless. It is axiomatic that “a” means “one or more” in patent claiming—meaning “a most
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`recent reading” can be one or more readings. See Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512
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`F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“That ‘a’ or ‘an’ can mean ‘one or more’ is best described as a
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`rule, rather than merely as a presumption or even a convention.”); Madisetti Suppl. Decl. ¶ 11.
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`Carrier’s insistence that the ’887 Patent does not teach just how “recent” the “most recent” reading
`
`must be is also misplaced—“a patentee need not define his invention with mathematical precision
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`in order to comply with the definiteness requirement.” Sonix Tech., 844 F.3d at 1377. Carrier’s
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`argument should be rejected.
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`the wireless communications
`in communication with
`ii. “processor
`component and the sensor package”, ’282 Patent, Claims 1, 7, 13
`
`Carrier cannot meet i