Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 36 Filed 08/02/22 Page 1 of 37
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`SPEIR TECHNOLOGIES LTD.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Case No. 6:22-cv-00077-ADA
`
`v.
`
`APPLE INC.
`
`Defendant.
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`DEFENDANT’S OPENING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`APPLE 1010
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 36 Filed 08/02/22 Page 2 of 37
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`V.
`
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
`U.S. PATENT NOS. 7,110,779AND 7,321,777 (THE RANGING PATENTS)............... 1
`A.
`Overview................................................................................................................. 1
`B.
`Disputed terms for construction.............................................................................. 3
`“known device latency” (’779 patent, claim 18; ’777 patent, claim 1, 12,
`1.
`20) ............................................................................................................... 3
`U.S. PATENT NO. 7,765,399 (THE ’399 PATENT) ........................................................ 6
`A.
`Overview................................................................................................................. 6
`B.
`Disputed term for construction ............................................................................... 6
`1.
`“human/machine interface” (claim 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9)..................................... 6
`2.
`“distinct” (claim 1, 7, 9)............................................................................ 10
`3.
`“classified” / “unclassified” (claim 1, 7, 9)............................................... 15
`4.
`“The mobile PDA computer system according to claim 1” (claim 7) ...... 20
`5.
`“physically secure enclosure” (claim 9) ................................................... 23
`U.S. PATENT NO. 8,345,780 (THE ’780 PATENT) ...................................................... 24
`A.
`Overview............................................................................................................... 24
`B.
`Disputed term for construction ............................................................................. 25
`1.
`“short term” / “long term” (claim 1, 9, 12)............................................... 25
`2.
`“self interference” (claim 1, 9, 12)............................................................ 28
`CONCLUSION................................................................................................................. 30
`
`i
`
`2
`
`

`

`Ex.
`A
`B
`C
`D
`
`E
`
`F
`G
`
`H
`I
`
`J
`
`K
`
`Description
`U.S. Patent No. 7,110,779
`U.S. Patent No. 7,321,777
`U.S. Patent No. 7,765,399
`September 1, 2009 Office Action (’399 Patent)
`(excerpt) (highlighting added)
`April 28, 2010 Office Action Response and Terminal Disclaimer
`(’399 Patent) (highlighting added)
`U.S. Patent No. 7,779,252
`November 10, 2009 Office Action Response (’399 Patent)
`(highlighting added)
`Declaration of Dr. John Black
`Webster’s II New College Dictionary definition of “classified”
`(highlighting added) (APL_SPEIR-EXTRINSIC_00000467-70)
`The Oxford American College Dictionary definition of “classified”
`(highlighting added) (APL_SPEIR-EXTRINSIC_00000230-34)
`Speir’s Preliminary Infringement Contentions for ’399 Patent
`(excerpt) (highlighting added)
`U.S. Patent No. 8,345,780
`L
`M Declaration of Dr. Robert Akl
`N
`July 25, 2012 Office Action Response (’780 patent)
`(highlighting added)
`O Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of “short term”
`(highlighting added) (SPEIR-APPLE-00006742-43)
`Dictionary.com definition of “short term”
`(highlighting added) (SPEIR-APPLE-00006750)
`TheFreeDictionary.com definition of “long term”
`(highlighting added) (SPEIR-APPLE-00006764-65)
`Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary definition of “long term”
`(highlighting added) (SPEIR-APPLE-00006767-68)
`January 11, 2012 Office Action Response (’780 patent)
`(highlighting added)
`
`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 36 Filed 08/02/22 Page 3 of 37
`
`TABLE OF EXHIBITS
`
`Abbreviation
`’779 patent
`’777 patent
`’399 patent
`
`’252 patent
`
`Black Decl.
`Webster’s
`
`Oxford
`
`’780 patent
`Akl Decl.
`
`P
`
`Q
`
`R
`
`S
`
`ii
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 36 Filed 08/02/22 Page 4 of 37
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc.,
`696 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................................5
`
`Aptalis Pharmatech, Inc. v. Apotex Inc.,
`718 F. App’x 965 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ..........................................................................................14
`
`AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc.,
`19 F.4th 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ................................................................................................30
`
`Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc.,
`512 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................22
`
`Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,
`881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................19
`
`Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)................................................................................................22
`
`Comput. Docking Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc.,
`519 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................29
`
`Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc.,
`417 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..........................................................................................17, 20
`
`DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, Inc.,
`239 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2001)................................................................................................14
`
`Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp,
`653 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011)..................................................................................................5
`
`GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. Lights of Am., Inc.,
`663 F. App’x 938 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ..........................................................................................20
`
`Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC,
`514 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..........................................................................................16, 20
`
`Homeland Housewares, LLC v. Whirlpool Corp.,
`865 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2602 (2018)......................................3
`
`Image Processing Techs., LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`No. 2:16-CV-505, 2017 WL 2672616 (E.D. Tex. June 21, 2017) ..........................................22
`
`iii
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 36 Filed 08/02/22 Page 5 of 37
`
`Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.,
`766 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014)........................................................................................ passim
`
`KEYnetik, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`837 F. App’x 786 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ..........................................................................................24
`
`KLA-Tencor Corp. v. Xitronix Corp.,
`No. A-08-CA-723, 2011 WL 318123 (W.D. Tex. 2011) ........................................................27
`
`Liberty Ammunition, Inc. v. United States,
`835 F.3d 1388 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................................28
`
`LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc.,
`424 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................23
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`572 U.S. 898 (2014)......................................................................................................... passim
`
`Nite Glow Indus. v. Cent. Garden & Pet Co.,
`No. 2020-1897, 2021 WL 2945556 (Fed. Cir. July 14, 2021).................................................29
`
`O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
`521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..............................................................................................3, 7
`
`Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`952 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2020)..........................................................................................15, 29
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..................................................................................................7
`
`In re Power Integrations, Inc.,
`884 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................23
`
`Rsch. Plastics, Inc. v. Fed. Packaging Corp.,
`421 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................................29
`
`Sol IP, LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
`No. 2:18-CV-00526-RWS(RSP), 2020 WL 60141 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2020)..........................22
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2........................................................................................................................15
`
`iv
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 36 Filed 08/02/22 Page 6 of 37
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Defendant Apple Inc. (“Apple”) respectfully submits this Opening Claim Construction
`
`brief supporting its proposed constructions for eight disputed terms. Apple’s constructions
`
`comport with the claim language, specification, and file history, and reflect how a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art would have understood the terms (if at all). In contrast, Speir contends
`
`that only one term requires construction, ignoring another that plainly lacks antecedent basis.
`
`Apple’s proposed constructions track the intrinsic evidence, whereas Speir’s proposals are
`
`divorced from that evidence. Accordingly, Apple asks the Court to adopt its constructions.
`
`II.
`
`U.S. PATENT NOS. 7,110,779AND 7,321,777 (THE RANGING PATENTS)
`
`A.
`
`Overview
`
`The ’779 patent (Ex. A) and ’777 patent (Ex. B) (collectively the “Ranging Patents”)1 are
`
`directed to a wireless device locator (“WDL”). According to the patents, the claimed WDL
`
`locates a target wireless device by (1) transmitting, to the target device, a plurality of location-
`
`finding signals and (2) receiving, from the target device, corresponding reply signals. ’779
`
`patent, Abstract. The distance between the WDL and target device is estimated using the total
`
`round trip time of the signals (for sending the finding signals and receiving the reply signals) and
`
`the known latency of the target device to reply. Id., 7:29-35. Figure 3 illustrates the “total round
`
`trip time” for one exchange of a “location finding signal 45” and a “reply signal 46” between the
`
`WDL and TARGET device:
`
`1 The ’777 patent is a continuation of the ’779 and shares the same specification. All citations
`are to the ’779 patent (Ex. A).
`
`1
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 36 Filed 08/02/22 Page 7 of 37
`
`Id., Fig. 3. The “total round trip time” is composed of several components including: 1) “the
`
`propagation delay or time tPD1 . . . from time t1 to t2” accounting for the location-finding signal’s
`
`time-of-flight between the WDL and target; 2) “the [actual] device latency tDL . . . time t2 to t3),”
`
`the time it takes “to process a received signal and generate an acknowledgement reply thereto”;
`
`and 3) the “propagation delay tPD2 . . . from time t3 to t4)” accounting for the return signal’s time-
`
`of-flight from the target to the WDL. Id., 6:49-7:3. “Dividing the total propagation delay [tPD1 +
`
`tPD2] by two … and multiplying this by the speed of light” gives the distance for a “stationary”
`
`target device. Id., 7:29-35.
`
`The Ranging Patents explain that, while the “controller 42” of the WDL “will not know []
`
`the propagation delays tPD1, tPD2 and the actual device latency tDL” it “will have access to the
`
`known device latency (i.e., a mean latency) for the given device type of the target device 34,
`
`which provides a close approximation of the actual device latency tDL.” Id., 7:9-15.
`
`“Accordingly, a close approximation of the total propagation delay (i.e., time tPD1+time tPD2) may
`
`[] be obtained by substituting the known device latency for the actual device latency tDL, and
`
`subtracting this value from the time between times t1 and t4.” Id., 7:25-29.
`
`2
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 36 Filed 08/02/22 Page 8 of 37
`
`B.
`
`Disputed terms for construction
`
`1.
`
`“known device latency” (’779 patent, claim 18; ’777 patent, claim 1,
`12, 20)
`
`Apple’s Proposed Construction
`“predetermined latency for the given device type of the
`target wireless communication device”
`
`Speir’s Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary.
`
`All asserted independent claims of the Ranging Patents recite “determining a propagation
`
`delay . . . based upon [a/the] known device latency of [the/said] target wireless communications
`
`device” and claims 1 and 20 of the ’777 patent further recite that “each device type having a
`
`known device latency.” Apple’s proposed construction— a “predetermined latency for the given
`
`device type of the target wireless communication device”—is consistent with how the term
`
`“known device latency” is used throughout the specification, and should be adopted. See
`
`Homeland Housewares, LLC v. Whirlpool Corp., 865 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
`
`(“[W]hen a patentee uses a claim term throughout the entire patent specification, in a manner
`
`consistent with only a single meaning, he has defined that term ‘by implication.’” (quoting Bell
`
`Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Grp., Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2001))),
`
`cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2602 (2018).
`
`In contrast, Speir contends that no construction is needed. But Speir’s opposition to
`
`Apple’s explanation of this term’s plain meaning, suggesting they believe the scope encompasses
`
`“actual device latency,” demonstrates that there is a dispute that must be resolved. See O2 Micro
`
`Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“When the
`
`parties raise an actual dispute regarding the scope of the[] claims, the court, not the jury, must
`
`resolve that dispute.”). The intrinsic record confirms Apple’s construction for three reasons.
`
`First, the Ranging Patents distinguish “known device latency” from “actual device
`
`latency.” Referring to Fig. 3, the specification defines the “actual device latency, tDL” of the
`
`3
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 36 Filed 08/02/22 Page 9 of 37
`
`target device as “time t2 to t3.” ’779 patent, 6:62-66 (“The third component of the round trip time
`
`is the device latency tDL, of the target device 34 (i.e., form time t2 to t3). The “actual device
`
`latency” is the time it takes the target device 34 to receive, process, and transmit a reply signal 46
`
`responsive to the location finding signal 45.”), see also Fig. 3 (reproduced above, showing that
`
`tDL is the difference in time between the target receiving the location finding signal at time t2 to
`
`sending the reply signal at time t3). The Ranging Patents expressly do not use the actual device
`
`latency to determine range because the “controller [of the WDL] will not know … the actual
`
`device latency tDL.” Id., 7:9-11. Rather, “the controller 42 will have access to the known device
`
`latency (i.e., a mean latency) for the given device type of the target device 34.” Id., 7:12-14.
`
`Second, unlike the actual device latency—which can only be determined by measuring
`
`times t2 and t3—the specification confirms the “known device latency” is predetermined. All of
`
`the specification’s examples of “known device latency” are predetermined values (i.e., known
`
`prior to the transmission and receipt of the ranging signals) as opposed to the actual latency of
`
`the target device. Specifically, the specification refers to the “known device latency” as “a mean
`
`latency” which provides a “close approximation of the actual device latency.” Id., 7:12-15. This
`
`known device latency could be “measured . . . based upon collected data,” “provided by
`
`manufacturers, or . . . based upon a value set in a communications standard.” Id., 7:15-19.
`
`Third, the specification ties “known device latency” to the latency generally associated
`
`with a “device type.” The specification explains that “[e]ach wireless communications
`
`device . . . has a device type associated therewith” which is “important in that different device
`
`types will have known device latencies associated therewith.” Id., 5:6-14, see also 2:39-45
`
`(“each device type may have a known device latency associated therewith.”). In order for the
`
`WDL to “determine the propagation delay” using the “known device latency,” the specification
`
`4
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 36 Filed 08/02/22 Page 10 of 37
`
`explains that the WDL’s controller must first know the device type. Id., 10:23-29 (“If the device
`
`type (and, thus, the known device latency) are known . . . then the propagation delay . . . is
`
`determined based upon the known device latency of the target wireless communications
`
`device.”), 10:34-36 (“[I]f the device type is unknown, the controller 42 may determine the device
`
`type from the reply signal (Block 119) . . . .”), Fig. 11 (showing WDL process for determining a
`
`propagation delay based on the target “device type”). Apple’s proposed construction is grounded
`
`in the specification’s explanations of what a “known device latency” is.
`
`Speir’s contention that no construction is necessary should be rejected because the scope
`
`of the term is disputed by the parties—namely, whether “known device latency” includes “actual
`
`device latency.” To the extent that Speir argues or implies that a “known device latency”
`
`includes the actual latency of the target device (as measured from the timings of the claimed
`
`“transmission of each location finding signal and the respective reply signal therefor”), as just
`
`discussed, such an interpretation improperly contradicts the specification. See id., 7:9-15, 7:20-
`
`29, 7:46-52; see also In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc., 696 F.3d 1142, 1149-50, 1342-43 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2012) (rejecting a construction where the specification “repeatedly, consistently, and
`
`exclusively depict[s] an electrochemical sensor without” certain characteristics proposed as
`
`being within the scope of construction (citation omitted)); Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653
`
`F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding “the disputed claim terms are limited to information
`
`that originates from a hard copy document” because “[t]he written description repeatedly and
`
`consistently defines the invention as a system that processes information derived from hard copy
`
`documents.”).
`
`Accordingly, Apple’s construction should be adopted.
`
`5
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 36 Filed 08/02/22 Page 11 of 37
`
`III.
`
`U.S. PATENT NO. 7,765,399 (THE ’399 PATENT)
`
`A.
`
`Overview
`
`The ’399 patent (Ex. C) is directed to a computer architecture having a cryptographic
`
`engine that forms a bridge between a secure user processor and a non-secure user processor.
`
`’399 patent, Title, Abstract. The patent explains that conventional devices suffer from security
`
`vulnerabilities that generally prohibits “transport, processing or communication of classified
`
`data.” Id., 1:41-67. The patent also explains that secure devices have been developed to address
`
`these problems but generally do not include “data processing or wireless communication”
`
`capabilities. Id., 2:1-10. The ’399 patent purports to address these deficiencies by combining
`
`secure and non-secure devices (including their respective processors, human/machine interfaces,
`
`and file systems) into one device and employing a cryptographic engine between the secure and
`
`non-secure components, offering the benefits of conventional secure and non-secure devices in
`
`one. Id., Fig. 3, 4:37-39, 5:25-38, cl. 1.
`
`B.
`
`Disputed term for construction
`
`1.
`
`“human/machine interface” (claim 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9)
`
`Apple’s Proposed Construction
`“an interface by which a user inputs information to,
`and receives information from, a device”
`
`Speir’s Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary.
`
`The ’399 patent’s independent claims 1 and 9 recite secure and non-secure
`
`“human/machine interface[s]” (“HMIs”) that enable “bi-directional communication of
`
`information between a user and secure user processor” or “non-secure user processor,”
`
`respectively. ’399 patent, cls. 1, 9. The consistent usage of the term “human/machine interface”
`
`in the intrinsic record confirms that its plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITA is an “interface
`
`by which a user inputs information to, and receives information from, a device”—not merely one
`
`6
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 36 Filed 08/02/22 Page 12 of 37
`
`(inputting information) or the other (outputting information). Speir, however, refuses to
`
`acknowledge this plain and ordinary meaning.
`
`Specifically, Speir’s infringement allegations for the claimed “human/machine interface”
`
`contravene that plain meaning by pointing to, at best, one half of a human/machine interface’s
`
`claimed functionality—the “‘biometric sensor[s]’ that communicate data from the user directly
`
`and securely to the Secure Enclave.” Dkt. No. 27 at 8. But the alleged HMI is not an “interface
`
`by which a user inputs information to, and receives information from, a device.” See id. at 9
`
`(Speir’s allegations lacking any indication that a user receives information from the purported
`
`human/machine interfaces); 10-11 (alleging the “result” of a match “will be communicated …
`
`back to the user” but failing to recognize that the user does not receive this information by way
`
`of the alleged human/machine interface). In lights of Speir’s erroneous contentions, a dispute
`
`exists between the parties regarding the term’s scope which the Court must resolve. See O2
`
`Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362 (“When the parties present a fundamental dispute regarding the scope of
`
`a claim term, it is the court’s duty to resolve it.”).
`
`Apple’s construction should be adopted because it is supported by the claim language and
`
`specification. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Quite apart
`
`from the written description and the prosecution history, the claims themselves provide
`
`substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms. … To begin with, the context in
`
`which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly instructive.” (citation omitted)). In
`
`relevant part, the independent claims (including claims 1, 9, and 12) all require the secure and
`
`non-secure human/machine interfaces to enable “bi-directional” communication of information.
`
`’399 patent., cls. 1, 9, 12. Dependent claims 2 and 4 further require the human/machine
`
`interfaces to include an “input device to allow said user to control the [non-]secure processor,”
`
`7
`
`12
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 36 Filed 08/02/22 Page 13 of 37
`
`and dependent claims 3 and 5 additionally require an “output device” to “inform said user.” Id.,
`
`cls. 3, 5. The claims show that a human/machine interface must have bidirectional
`
`functionality—allowing the user to input information to, and receive information from, a device.
`
`This understanding of an HMI— enabling both input and output of information—is also
`
`consistent with the specification, which makes clear that the term “human/machine interface” is
`
`an interface between the user and the device that allows the user to both input information to the
`
`device and receive information output from the device. For example, the ’399 patent illustrates
`
`that typical PDAs have human/machine interfaces comprising “built in LCD displays, touch
`
`sensitive screens, and keypads” whether the HMI is non-secure (e.g., Fig. 1) or is secure (e.g.,
`
`Fig. 2). Id., 1:20-22. Indeed, Figures 1 and 2 both expressly use two-way arrows between the
`
`human/machine interfaces and their respective processors to indicate both inputting and
`
`receiving information. Id., Figs. 1-2.
`
`In contrast to a typical PDA, the claimed invention has two human/machine interfaces: a
`
`secure HMI to “communiate[] classified data to and from the secure processor” and a “non
`
`secure” HMI, so that the “non-secure processor can be controlled” and “unclassified information
`
`can be provided to the user.” Id., 3:4-15, cls. 1, 2. In either scenario, the specification
`
`consistently describes the human/machine interface as an interface for both input and output of
`
`information. For example, the ’399 patent explains that the claimed human/machine interfaces
`
`provide for the input and output of data, where “[s]ecure processor 302 receives user inputs and
`
`provides information to users through a secure HMI 308.”). Id., 4:44-45, see also 4:61-62
`
`(“Non-secure processor 306 receives user inputs and provides information to users through a
`
`non-secure HMI 310.”). Figure 4 further illustrates the non-secure processor portion having a
`
`“non-secure human/machine interface 310” with both an input device (i.e., keypad/pointing
`
`8
`
`13
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 36 Filed 08/02/22 Page 14 of 37
`
`device 412) and an output device (i.e., color display 416) for enabling bidirectional
`
`communication between the user and the non-secure processor:
`
`Id., Fig. 4. Figure 5 similarly illustrates the secure processor portion having a “secure
`
`human/machine interface 308” with its own set of a keypad/pointing device and display for
`
`enabling bidirectional communication between the user and the secure processor. Id., Fig. 5,
`
`7:62-8:13. Notably, both figures also show that the audio “interface[s]” also each have a
`
`microphone as an input and a headphone as an output, again illustrating the bi-directional nature
`
`of a human/machine interface. Id., Figs. 4-5; see also, 3:23-28, (describing an “audio
`
`interface . . . communicating audio information to and from the non-secure processor”), 6:22-37
`
`(describing input and output of audio and audio data), 7:20-25 (same).
`
`Speir’s position that no construction is necessary, particularly given their allegations in
`
`their responsive brief to the motion to dismiss, ignores that the intrinsic evidence mandates the
`
`HMIs to provide communication of information from a user to the device and from the device to
`
`the user.
`
`Apple’s proposed construction should be adopted because it reflects the term’s plain and
`
`ordinary meaning.
`
`9
`
`14
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 36 Filed 08/02/22 Page 15 of 37
`
`2.
`
`“distinct” (claim 1, 7, 9)
`
`Apple’s Proposed Construction
`“physically separate”
`
`Speir’s Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary.
`
`Speir’s current contention that the term “distinct” requires no construction is
`
`irreconcilable with its prior briefing in this case. Only a few months ago, Speir told this Court
`
`that with respect to the recited HMIs, the “issue of ‘distinctness’ is one of claim construction.”
`
`Dkt. No. 27 at 9. Now that the time for claim construction has come, Speir refuses to propose
`
`any construction at all. Apple’s construction should be adopted because it is mandated by the
`
`intrinsic record, including the claims, all of the embodiments in the ’399 patent, and the
`
`prosecution history, where applicant’s unequivocal statements to secure allowance of the claim
`
`cement that “distinct” HMIs are those which are “physically separate.”
`
`First, the claims themselves explicitly distinguish the “distinct” secure and non-secure
`
`HMIs. See, ’399 patent, cl. 1 (“a non-secure [HMI] distinct from said secure [HMI]”), cl. 9
`
`(“said non-secure [HMI] distinct from said secure [HMI].”). Claim 7 further describes that when
`
`one component is “distinct” from another, “physical separation” is required. Id., cl. 7 (“said
`
`second file system distinct from said first file system so as to provide physical separation”).
`
`Second, the “physically separate” nature of the “distinct” HMIs is confirmed by the ’399
`
`specification, where all described embodiments demonstrate that the claimed “non-secure
`
`[HMI]” that is “distinct from said secure [HMI]” requires the claimed HMIs to be physically
`
`separate. The ’399 patent describes two types of prior art devices, a “secure” device and “non-
`
`secure” device. See ’399 patent, 3:49-4:36. The ’399 patent illustrates both devices in Figures 1
`
`and 2, depicting a “secure human/machine interface (HMI) 106” in the “secure” device, and
`
`“non-secure HMI 206” in the “non-secure” device:
`
`10
`
`15
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 36 Filed 08/02/22 Page 16 of 37
`
`Id., Figs. 1 and 2 (annotated), 4:6-7, 4:24-26.
`
`The purported invention of the ’399 patent is then described with reference to Figure 3,
`
`which “offers the combined advantages of secure PDA 100 [of Figure 1] and commercial PDA
`
`200 [of Figure 2],” where “[s]ecure processor 302 receives used inputs and provide information
`
`to users through a secure HMI 308,” and “[n]on-secure processor 306 receives user inputs and
`
`provides information to users through a non-secure HMI 310”:
`
`Id., Figure 3 (annotated), 4:37-39, 4:44-45, 4:61-61.
`
`11
`
`16
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 36 Filed 08/02/22 Page 17 of 37
`
`The specification emphasizes that because the “architecture” shown and described in
`
`Figure 3 “provides for physical separation of classified data from data which is unclassified” a
`
`user of the device is “capable of storing, processing and communicating classified as well as
`
`unclassified data.” Id., 8:57-9:8. The ’399 patent describes that in such an architecture the
`
`separation of classified and unclassified data is accomplished because “[n]on-secure processor
`
`306 can interface with a user through non-secure HMI 310” whereas communication with the
`
`secure processor 302 is accomplished via the “secure HMI 308” which “ensure[s] trusted
`
`communications between the user and the secure processor 302.” Id., 6:43-44, 7:40-44.
`
`Moreover, the ’399 patent describes another example, illustrated in Figure 3 (above), where a
`
`user “plug[s] in a headset 316” to exchange classified audio communications using “secure
`
`processor 302,” whereas “unclassified voice communications can be conducted using headset
`
`318 and non-secure processor 306.” Id., 9:33-37, 9:42-44. Like the HMIs, these audio interface
`
`devices are also physically separate.
`
`Thus, in addition to the claims’ use of the word “distinct” in describing one HMI being
`
`“distinct” from the other, the specification’s explicit description of the patent’s architecture
`
`providing “physical separation” of classified and unclassified data via distinct processors and
`
`HMIs confirms that confirms that the claimed “distinct” HMI’s are physically separate.
`
`Third, the prosecution history unequivocally confirms that the claimed secure and non-
`
`secure HMIs are “physically separate.” Specifically, in order to secure allowance of the ’399
`
`patent’s claims, applicant filed a terminal disclaimer to overcome a double patenting rejection
`
`over another application by the same patentee (and inventor). Ex. D (Sep. 1, 2009 Office
`
`Action) at 1-4; Ex. E (April 28, 2010 Response and Terminal Disclaimer) at 12. That patent
`
`application, filed less than one month after the ’399 patent application, issued as U.S. Patent No.
`
`12
`
`17
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 36 Filed 08/02/22 Page 18 of 37
`
`7,779,252 (Ex. F) and is substantively identical to the ’399 patent, directed to the same
`
`architecture, with one important difference: a “shared HMI”:
`
`Ex. F (’252 patent), abstract, Figure 3 (annotated), c.f. Ex. C (’399 patent), abstract, Figure 3.
`
`Indeed, both patents show the same “prior art” conventional devices as Figures 1 and 2,
`
`but unlike the ’399 patent’s “distinct” HMIs, the ’252 patent discloses and claims a “shared”
`
`HMI. See Exs. C and F, Figs. 1 and 2. In other words, the same applicant filed a separate patent
`
`at almost the same time, directed to the same “architecture for a mobile PDA computer system
`
`300 that offers the combined advantages of PDA 100 and commercial PDA 200,” but this time,
`
`the “secure processor 302 and non-secure user processor 306 can each receive user inputs and
`
`provide information to users through the shared HMI 308.” Ex. F (’252 patent), 4:63-65, 5:51-
`
`53. That the same applicant filed a separate patent application (within a month of filing the ’399
`
`patent application) for substantively the same invention but with a “shared” HMI (as opposed to
`
`two that are “distinct”) confirms that the ’399 patent’s “distinct” HMIs must be “physically
`
`13
`
`18
`
`

`

`Case 6: