Case 2:21-cv-00310-JRG Document 169 Filed 06/08/22 Page 1 of 116 PageID #: 6143
`
`THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`TQ DELTA, LLC,
` Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`COMMSCOPE HOLDING COMPANY,
`INC., COMMSCOPE INC., ARRIS
`INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, ARRIS
`GLOBAL LTD., ARRIS US HOLDINGS
`INC., ARRIS SOLUTIONS, INC., ARRIS
`TECHNOLOGY, INC., and ARRIS
`ENTERPRISES, LLC,
` Defendants.
`_______________________________________________________________________
`
`TQ DELTA, LLC,
` Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`NOKIA CORP., NOKIA SOLUTIONS
`AND NETWORKS OY, and NOKIA OF
`AMERICA CORP.,
` Defendants.
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
` CASE NO. 2:21-CV-310-JRG
` (Lead Case)
`
` CASE NO. 2:21-CV-309-JRG
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
`
`Before the Court is the Opening Claim Construction Brief (Dkt. No. 107) filed by
`
`Plaintiff TQ Delta, LLC (“Plaintiff” or “TQ Delta”). Also before the Court are the Responsive
`
`Claim Construction Brief (Dkt. No. 135) filed by Defendants CommScope Holding Company,
`
`Inc., CommScope Inc., ARRIS US Holdings, Inc., ARRIS Solutions, Inc., ARRIS Technology
`
`(collectively, “CommScope Defendants”), Nokia of America Corp., Nokia Corp., and Nokia
`
`Solutions and Networks Oy (collectively, “Nokia Defendants”) (all, collectively, “Defendants”),
`
`Plaintiff’s reply (Dkt. No. 140), and Defendants’ supplemental brief (Dkt. No. 157).
`
`The Court held a hearing on June 1, 2022.
`
`- 1 -
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`TQ Delta Exhibit 2031
`COMMSCOPE, INC. v. TQ DELTA LLC
`IPR2023-00066
`
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`Case 2:21-cv-00310-JRG Document 169 Filed 06/08/22 Page 2 of 116 PageID #: 6144
`
`Table of Contents
`
`I. BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 4
`
`II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES ........................................................................................................... 6
`
`III. AGREED TERMS............................................................................................................... 11
`
`IV. DISPUTED TERMS IN MULTIPLE PATENT FAMILIES .......................................... 11
`
`1. “transceiver” ........................................................................................................................ 12
`
`2. “configurable to,” “operable,” and “operable to” ................................................................ 16
`
`V. DISPUTED TERMS IN THE “FAMILY 1” PATENTS ................................................... 23
`
`3. “each bit in the diagnostic message is mapped to at least one DMT symbol,” “DMT
`symbols that are mapped to one bit of the diagnostic message,” and “at least one bit in
`the diagnostic message is mapped to at least one DMT symbol” ....................................... 24
`
`4. “array representing frequency domain received idle channel noise information” ............... 28
`
`VI. DISPUTED TERMS IN THE “FAMILY 2” PATENTS ................................................. 32
`
`5. “plurality of bonded transceivers” ....................................................................................... 33
`
`6. “reduce a difference in latency between the bonded transceivers”...................................... 38
`
`7. “each bonded transceiver [utilizing/selecting] at least one transmission parameter value
`to reduce a difference in latency between the bonded transceivers” and “[utilize/select]
`at least one transmission parameter value, for each transceiver in a plurality of bonded
`transceivers, to reduce a difference in latency between the bonded transceivers” ............. 45
`
`VII. DISPUTED TERMS IN THE “FAMILY 3” PATENTS................................................ 46
`
`8. “shared memory,” “sharing the memory,” and “operable to be shared / sharing” .............. 47
`
`9. “wherein the generated message indicates how the memory has been allocated between
`the interleaving function and the deinterleaving function” ................................................ 52
`
`10. “a message indicating how the shared memory is to be used by the interleaver or
`deinterleaver” ...................................................................................................................... 52
`
`11. “specifying a maximum number of bytes of memory that are available to be allocated
`to [a/an interleaver/deinterleaver]” ..................................................................................... 57
`
`VIII. DISPUTED TERMS IN THE “FAMILY 4” PATENTS .............................................. 59
`
`12. “phase characteristic(s)” .................................................................................................... 60
`
`13. “substantially scramble the phase characteristics of the plurality of carrier signals” ........ 63
`
`14. “same bit value” ................................................................................................................. 68
`
`15. “multiple carrier signals corresponding to the scrambled carrier signals are used by the
`first multicarrier transceiver to modulate the same bit value” ............................................ 68
`
`16. “computing a phase shift for each carrier signal” .............................................................. 74
`
`17. “combining the phase shift computed for each respective carrier signal with the phase
`characteristic of that carrier signal” .................................................................................... 77
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`IX. DISPUTED TERMS IN THE “FAMILY 6” PATENTS ................................................. 79
`
`18. “steady-state communication” ........................................................................................... 79
`
`19. “FIP setting” ...................................................................................................................... 83
`
`20. “FIP value” ........................................................................................................................ 83
`
`21. “flag signal” ....................................................................................................................... 87
`
`22. “interleaver parameter value” ............................................................................................ 91
`
`X. DISPUTED TERMS IN THE “FAMILY 9” PATENTS ................................................... 94
`
`23. “higher immunity to noise” ................................................................................................ 95
`
`24. “PTM-TC [(Packet Transfer Mode Transmission Convergence)] codewords” ................ 97
`
`25. “receive at least one packet using deinterleaving” ............................................................ 98
`
`26. “[transmit/retransmit] at least one packet using interleaving” ........................................... 98
`
`27. “[transmit/receive] a [packet/plurality of messages] using a forward error correction
`[encoder/decoder] and [without using] [an/a interleaver/deinterleaver]” ........................... 98
`
`28. “transmitting, by the transceiver, a packet using a forward error correction encoder
`and an interleaver” .............................................................................................................. 98
`
`29. “receiving, by the transceiver, at least one message using a forward error correction
`decoder and without using a deinterleaver” ........................................................................ 98
`
`30. “[transmitting/transmit/receiving/receive] a [packet/message] using forward error
`correction [encoding/decoding] and [without using] [interleaving/deinterleaving]” ......... 98
`
` “[retransmit/retransmitting] the packet using [the] forward error correction
`31.
`[encoder/encoding] and [the interleaver/interleaving]” ...................................................... 98
`
`32. “[receive/receiving] a retransmitted packet using [the] forward error correction
`[decoder/decoding] and [the deinterleaver/deinterleaving]” .............................................. 98
`
`XI. DISPUTED TERMS IN THE “FAMILY 10” PATENTS ............................................. 102
`
`33. “a multicarrier communications transceiver operable to: receive a multicarrier symbol
`comprising a first plurality of carriers” ............................................................................. 103
`
`34. “receive a first plurality of bits on the first plurality of carriers using a first SNR
`margin; receive a second plurality of bits on the second plurality of carriers using a
`second SNR margin” ........................................................................................................ 106
`
`35. “wherein the first SNR margin provides more robust reception than the second SNR
`margin” ............................................................................................................................. 110
`
`36. “signal to noise ratio (SNR) margin” and “SNR margin” ............................................... 113
`
`XII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 116
`
`
`
`
`
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`I. BACKGROUND
`
`
`
`Plaintiff submits that “[t]his case generally relates to communications technology for
`
`DSL-based systems.” (Dkt. No. 124, at 1.)
`
`
`
`Plaintiff alleges infringement of United States Patents No. 7,453,881 (“the ’881 Patent”),
`
`7,570,686 (“the ’686 Patent”), 7,844,882 (“the ’882 Patent”), 8,090,008 (“the ’008 Patent”),
`
`8,276,048 (“the ’048 Patent”), 8,462,835 (“the ’835 Patent”), 8,468,411 (“the ’411 Patent”),
`
`8,495,473 (“the ’5473 Patent”), 8,594,162 (“the ’162 Patent”), 8,595,577 (“the ’577 Patent”),
`
`8,937,988 (“the ’988 Patent”), 9,014,193 (“the ’193 Patent”), 9,094,348 (“the ’348 Patent”),
`
`9,154,354 (“the ’354 Patent”), 9,300,601 (“the ’601 Patent”), 9,485,055 (“the ’055 Patent”),
`
`9,547,608 (“the ’608 Patent”), 9,894,014 (“the ’014 Patent”), 10,044,473 (“the ’4473 Patent”),
`
`10,409,510 (“the ’510 Patent”), 10,567,112 (“the ’112 Patent”), and 10,833,809 (“the ’809
`
`Patent”) (collectively, “the patents-in-suit”).
`
`
`
`As for the patents that are at issue in these claim construction proceedings, Defendants
`
`submit that “the parties refer to the [patent] families by the nomenclature used in the co-pending
`
`Delaware Cases that TQ Delta has filed against other defendants: Families 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9,
`
`and 10,” and the parties submit that the disputed terms in these patents have been construed by
`
`the District of Delaware, such as in the rulings cited in the following chart:
`
`Name of Group of Patents
`
`“Family 1 Patents”
`
`Patents
`
`Prior Claim Construction
`
`’686 Patent
`
`
`TQ Delta, LLC v. 2Wire, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-
`01835, Dkt. No. 477 (D. Del. Jan. 30, 2018)
`(Pl. Ex. 20) (Defs. Ex. 35)
`(“Delaware Family 1 CC Opinion”)
`
`
`
`
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`Case 2:21-cv-00310-JRG Document 169 Filed 06/08/22 Page 5 of 116 PageID #: 6147
`
`“Family 2 Patents”
`
`“Family 3 Patents”
`
`“Family 4 Patents”
`
`“Family 6 Patents”
`
`“Family 9 Patents”
`
`TQ Delta, LLC, v. 2Wire, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-
`01835, Dkt. No. 486 (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2018)
`(Pl. Ex. 21) (Defs. Ex. 30)
`(“Delaware Family 2 CC Opinion”)
`
`TQ Delta, LLC v. 2Wire, Inc., 373 F. Supp.
`3d 509, 523–24 (D. Del. 2019)
`(“Delaware Family 2 SJ Opinion”)
`
`TQ Delta, LLC v. 2Wire, Inc., 1:13-CV-
`01835-RGA, et al., Dkt. No. 445 (D. Del.
`Dec. 18, 2017) (Pl. Ex. 23)
`(“Delaware Family 3 CC Opinion”)
`
`
`TQ Delta, LLC v. 2Wire, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-
`01835, Dkt. No. 473 (D. Del. Jan. 29, 2018)
`(Pl. Ex. 25) (Defs. Ex. 32)
`(“Delaware Family 4 CC Opinion”)
`
`TQ Delta, LLC, v. 2Wire, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-
`01835, Dkt. No. 447 (D. Del. July 3, 2018)
`(Defs. Ex. 29)
`(“Delaware Family 6 CC Opinion”)
`
`TQ Delta, LLC v. 2Wire, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-
`01835, Dkt. No. 540 (D. Del. July 24, 2018)
`(Defs. Ex. 36)
`(“Delaware Family 6 CC Order”)
`
`TQ Delta, LLC v. ADTRAN, Inc., No. 1:14-
`CV-00954-RGA, Dkt. No. 1377 (D. Del.
`Mar. 1, 2022).
`
`TQ Delta, LLC v. 2Wire, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-
`01835, Dkt. No. 1567 (D. Del. June 28, 2021)
`(“Delaware Family 6 SJ Opinion”)
`
`TQ Delta, LLC v. Zyxel Commc’ns, Inc., No.
`1:13-CV-02013, et al., Dkt. No. 521 (D. Del.
`May 8, 2018) (Pl. Ex. 24)
`(“Delaware Family 9 CC Opinion”)
`
`’881 Patent
`’193 Patent
`’601 Patent
`’014 Patent
`
`
`’5473 Patent
`’882 Patent
`’608 Patent
`’510 Patent
`’048 Patent
`
`’008 Patent
`
`
`’835 Patent
`’112 Patent
`’162 Patent
`
`
`’055 Patent
`’348 Patent
`’809 Patent
`’577 Patent
`’411 Patent
`’4473 Patent
`
`
`
`
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`Case 2:21-cv-00310-JRG Document 169 Filed 06/08/22 Page 6 of 116 PageID #: 6148
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`“Family 10 Patents”
`
`’354 Patent
`’988 Patent
`
`
`TQ Delta, LLC v. ADTRAN, Inc., No. 1:14-
`CV-00954-RGA, Dkt. No. 375 (D. Del.
`Apr. 27, 2018) (as to related patent)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
`
`It is understood that “[a] claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right
`
`which the patent confers on the patentee to exclude others from making, using or selling the
`
`protected invention.” Burke, Inc. v. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc., 183 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 1999). Claim construction is clearly an issue of law for the court to decide. Markman v.
`
`Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970–71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370
`
`(1996).
`
`
`
`“In some cases, however, the district court will need to look beyond the patent’s intrinsic
`
`evidence and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the background
`
`science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time period.” Teva
`
`Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015) (citation omitted). “In cases where
`
`those subsidiary facts are in dispute, courts will need to make subsidiary factual findings about
`
`that extrinsic evidence. These are the ‘evidentiary underpinnings’ of claim construction that we
`
`discussed in Markman, and this subsidiary factfinding must be reviewed for clear error on
`
`appeal.” Id. (citing 517 U.S. 370).
`
`
`
`To ascertain the meaning of claims, courts look to three primary sources: the claims, the
`
`specification, and the prosecution history. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. The specification must
`
`contain a written description of the invention that enables one of ordinary skill in the art to make
`
`and use the invention. Id. A patent’s claims must be read in view of the specification, of which
`
`they are a part. Id. For claim construction purposes, the description may act as a sort of
`
`dictionary, which explains the invention and may define terms used in the claims. Id. “One
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`
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`purpose for examining the specification is to determine if the patentee has limited the scope of
`
`the claims.” Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 882 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
`
`
`
`Nonetheless, it is the function of the claims, not the specification, to set forth the limits of
`
`the patentee’s invention. Otherwise, there would be no need for claims. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita
`
`Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). The patentee is free to be his own
`
`lexicographer, but any special definition given to a word must be clearly set forth in the
`
`specification. Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
`
`Although the specification may indicate that certain embodiments are preferred, particular
`
`embodiments appearing in the specification will not be read into the claims when the claim
`
`language is broader than the embodiments. Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc.,
`
`34 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`
`
`
`This Court’s claim construction analysis is substantially guided by the Federal Circuit’s
`
`decision in Phillips v. AWH Corporation, 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). In Phillips,
`
`the court set forth several guideposts that courts should follow when construing claims. In
`
`particular, the court reiterated that “the claims of a patent define the invention to which the
`
`patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Id. at 1312 (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari
`
`Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). To that end, the words used
`
`in a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning. Id. The ordinary and
`
`customary meaning of a claim term “is the meaning that the term would have to a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date
`
`of the patent application.” Id. at 1313. This principle of patent law flows naturally from the
`
`recognition that inventors are usually persons who are skilled in the field of the invention and
`
`that patents are addressed to, and intended to be read by, others skilled in the particular art. Id.
`
`
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`
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`Despite the importance of claim terms, Phillips made clear that “the person of ordinary
`
`skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in
`
`which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the
`
`specification.” Id. Although the claims themselves may provide guidance as to the meaning of
`
`particular terms, those terms are part of “a fully integrated written instrument.” Id. at 1315
`
`(quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 978). Thus, the Phillips court emphasized the specification as
`
`being the primary basis for construing the claims. Id. at 1314–17. As the Supreme Court stated
`
`long ago, “in case of doubt or ambiguity it is proper in all cases to refer back to the descriptive
`
`portions of the specification to aid in solving the doubt or in ascertaining the true intent and
`
`meaning of the language employed in the claims.” Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 38 (1878). In
`
`addressing the role of the specification, the Phillips court quoted with approval its earlier
`
`observations from Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1998):
`
`Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can only be determined and
`confirmed with a full understanding of what the inventors actually invented and
`intended to envelop with the claim. The construction that stays true to the claim
`language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention
`will be, in the end, the correct construction.
`
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. Consequently, Phillips emphasized the important role the
`
`specification plays in the claim construction process.
`
`
`
`The prosecution history also continues to play an important role in claim interpretation.
`
`Like the specification, the prosecution history helps to demonstrate how the inventor and the
`
`United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) understood the patent. Id. at 1317. Because
`
`the file history, however, “represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the
`
`applicant,” it may lack the clarity of the specification and thus be less useful in claim
`
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`construction proceedings. Id. Nevertheless, the prosecution history is intrinsic evidence that is
`
`relevant to the determination of how the inventor understood the invention and whether the
`
`inventor limited the invention during prosecution by narrowing the scope of the claims. Id.; see
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that
`
`“a patentee’s statements during prosecution, whether relied on by the examiner or not, are
`
`relevant to claim interpretation”).
`
`
`
`Phillips rejected any claim construction approach that sacrificed the intrinsic record in
`
`favor of extrinsic evidence, such as dictionary definitions or expert testimony. The en banc court
`
`condemned the suggestion made by Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2002), that a court should discern the ordinary meaning of the claim terms (through
`
`dictionaries or otherwise) before resorting to the specification for certain limited purposes.
`
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319–24. According to Phillips, reliance on dictionary definitions at the
`
`expense of the specification had the effect of “focus[ing] the inquiry on the abstract meaning of
`
`words rather than on the meaning of claim terms within the context of the patent.” Id. at 1321.
`
`Phillips emphasized that the patent system is based on the proposition that the claims cover only
`
`the invented subject matter. Id.
`
`
`
`Phillips does not preclude all uses of dictionaries in claim construction proceedings.
`
`Instead, the court assigned dictionaries a role subordinate to the intrinsic record. In doing so, the
`
`court emphasized that claim construction issues are not resolved by any magic formula. The
`
`court did not impose any particular sequence of steps for a court to follow when it considers
`
`disputed claim language. Id. at 1323–25. Rather, Phillips held that a court must attach the
`
`appropriate weight to the intrinsic sources offered in support of a proposed claim construction,
`
`bearing in mind the general rule that the claims measure the scope of the patent grant.
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`
`
`The Supreme Court of the United States has “read [35 U.S.C.] § 112, ¶ 2 to require that a
`
`patent’s claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled
`
`in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
`
`Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 910, 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014). “A determination of claim
`
`indefiniteness is a legal conclusion that is drawn from the court’s performance of its duty as the
`
`construer of patent claims.” Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by
`
`Nautilus, 572 U.S. 898. “Indefiniteness must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”
`
`Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
`
`
`
`“[P]rior orders in related cases do not bar the Court from conducting additional
`
`construction in order to refine earlier claim constructions.” TQP Dev., LLC v. Intuit Inc., No.
`
`2:12-CV-180-WCB, 2014 WL 2810016, at *6 (E.D. Tex. June 20, 2014) (Bryson, J., sitting by
`
`designation).
`
`
`
`In general, however, prior claim construction proceedings involving the same patents-in-
`
`suit are “entitled to reasoned deference under the broad principals of stare decisis and the goals
`
`articulated by the Supreme Court in Markman, even though stare decisis may not be applicable
`
`per se.” Maurice Mitchell Innovations, LP v. Intel Corp., No. 2:04-CV-450, 2006 WL 1751779,
`
`at *4 (E.D. Tex. June 21, 2006) (Davis, J.); see TQP, 2014 WL 2810016, at *6 (“[P]revious
`
`claim constructions in cases involving the same patent are entitled to substantial weight, and the
`
`Court has determined that it will not depart from those constructions absent a strong reason for
`
`doing so.”); see also Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 839–40 (“prior cases will sometimes be binding because
`
`of issue preclusion and sometimes will serve as persuasive authority”) (citation omitted); Finisar
`
`Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting “the importance of
`
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`uniformity in the treatment of a given patent”) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`
`517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996)).
`
`III. AGREED TERMS
`
`
`
`In their March 14, 2022 P.R. 4-3 Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement, the
`
`parties submitted that “[t]he parties do not presently have agreed claim constructions.” (Dkt.
`
`No. 107, at 2.)
`
`IV. DISPUTED TERMS IN MULTIPLE PATENT FAMILIES
`
`
`
`The term numbering used herein corresponds to the numbering used by Plaintiff in
`
`Exhibit A to the March 14, 2022 P.R. 4-3 Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement.
`
`(Dkt. No. 107, Ex. A.)
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`1. “transceiver”
`
`
`
`“transceiver”
`
`’686 Patent, Claims 17, 36, 37
`(Family 1)
`
`’881 Patent, Claims 17, 18, 23
`’193 Patent, Claims 1, 9
`’601 Patent, Claims 8, 15
`’014 Patent, Claims 1, 3
`(Family 2)
`
`’882 Patent, Claims 9, 13
`’048 Patent, Claims 1, 5
`’5473 Patent, Claims 10, 28
`’608 Patent, Claim 2
`’510 Patent, Claim 22
`(Family 3)
`
`’835 Patent, Claim 8
`’112 Patent, Claims 8, 10
`(Family 6)
`
`’411 Patent, Claims 10, 18
`’577 Patent, Claim 16
`’348 Patent, Claims 1, 9
`’055 Patent, Claims 11, 17
`’809 Patent, Claims 4, 6, 8, 11, 13
`(Family 9)
`
`
`Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`
`is:
`Plain and ordinary meaning, which
`of
`“communications
`device
`capable
`transmitting and receiving data wherein the
`transmitter portion and receiver portion share
`at least some common circuitry.”
`
`
`(Dkt. No. 107, Ex. A, at 1–2; id., Ex. B, at 1; Dkt. No. 146, App’x A, at 2; Dkt. No. 149,
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning, which
`“communications
`device
`capable
`transmitting and receiving data”
`
`is
`of
`
`App’x A, at 2, 4, 9 & 16.)
`
`
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`Case 2:21-cv-00310-JRG Document 169 Filed 06/08/22 Page 13 of 116 PageID #: 6155
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`
`
`
`
`(a) The Parties’ Positions
`
`Plaintiff argues that “[o]ne of ordinary skill in the art would understand that a transceiver
`
`shares at least some common circuitry, as the Delaware Court concluded for this term.” (Dkt.
`
`No. 124, at 2–3.)
`
`
`
`Defendants respond that Plaintiff’s proposal of requiring “common circuitry” lacks
`
`support in the intrinsic record, and Defendants argue that the Delaware construction is not
`
`binding and is inconsistent with this Court’s construction of “transceiver” in another case. (Dkt.
`
`No. 135, at 3.)
`
`
`
`Plaintiff replies: “The accepted meaning of ‘transceiver’—which refers to a single device
`
`that can both transmit and receive—requires that the transmitter and receiver portions share
`
`common circuitry, as the Delaware Court found. Otherwise, it would not be a single device.”
`
`(Dkt. No. 140, at 1.)
`
`
`
`At the June 1, 2022 hearing, Plaintiff argued that “transceiver” is a portmanteau of
`
`“transmitter” and “receiver” and thus connotes something more specific than merely putting a
`
`transmitter and a receiver together. Defendants responded that the transmitter and the receiver
`
`within a transceiver may share circuitry, but not necessarily.
`
`
`
`
`
`(b) Analysis
`
`The District of Delaware noted that “[t]he specification does not provide an explicit
`
`definition of transceiver,” found that “[e]valuating the intrinsic evidence in light of the dictionary
`
`definitions provided [by Plaintiff] suggests that a POSA would understand the transmitter and
`
`receiver portions to share common circuitry or components,” and construed the term
`
`“transceiver” in these patents to mean “a communications device capable of transmitting and
`
`
`
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`

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`Case 2:21-cv-00310-JRG Document 169 Filed 06/08/22 Page 14 of 116 PageID #: 6156
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`receiving data wherein the transmitter portion and receiver portion share at least some common
`
`circuitry.” Delaware Family 1 CC Opinion at 4–5 (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318).
`
`
`
`Defendants do not persuasively justify departing from the Delaware construction. In
`
`particular, the dictionary definitions of “transceiver” cited by Plaintiff and considered by the
`
`District of Delaware are persuasive that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the
`
`term “transceiver” as referring not merely to a device that includes both a transmitter and a
`
`receiver but rather to a device in which a transmitter portion and a receiver portion share at least
`
`some common circuitry. (See id.; see also Dkt. No. 124, at 3; id., Ex. 16, Merriam Webster
`
`Dictionary 1253 (10th ed. 1998) (“a radio transmitter-receiver that uses many of the same
`
`components for both transmission and reception”); id., Ex. 17, IEEE Standard Dictionary of
`
`Electrical and Electronics Terms 1028 (1988) (“The combination of radio transmitting and
`
`receiving equipment in a common housing . . . and employing common circuit components for
`
`both transmitting and receiving.”); Delaware Family 1 CC Opinion at 4; TQ Delta, LLC v.
`
`2Wire, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-01835 (D. Del.), Dkt. No. 342, Aug. 22, 2017 Joint Claim
`
`Construction Brief, at 24.) Defendants do not show any error in the consideration of this
`
`evidence by the District of Delaware. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318 (“Because dictionaries, and
`
`especially technical dictionaries, endeavor to collect the accepted meanings of terms used in
`
`various fields of science and technology, those resources have been properly recognized as
`
`among the many tools that can assist the court in determining the meaning of particular
`
`terminology to those of skill in the art of the invention.”) (citation omitted).
`
`The specification disclosures cited by Defendants do not compel otherwise, as disclosure
`
`of a “transmitter section” and a “receiver section” is not inconsistent with “transceiver” being
`
`understood to connote at least some amount of overlap between “sections.” (See Dkt. No. 135,
`
`
`
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`- 14 -
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`Case 2:21-cv-00310-JRG Document 169 Filed 06/08/22 Page 15 of 116 PageID #: 6157
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`at 2–3; see also ʼ686 Patent at 2:1–5 (“Each modem includes a transmitter section for
`
`transmitting data and a receiver section for receiving data . . . .”)).) Also, Plaintiff points out that
`
`the ’882 Patent appears to contemplate overlap of circuitry, disclosing for example than “an
`
`exemplary transceiver could comprise a shared interleaver/deinterleaver memory.” ’882 Patent
`
`at 5:33–39.
`
`
`
`Finally, Defendants cite this Court’s construction of the term “transceiver” in different
`
`patents as meaning “a device that transmits and receives data.” Wi-LAN Inc. v. HTC Corp.,
`
`No. 2:11-CV-68-JRG, Dkt. No. 302, slip op. at 8 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2013). That construction
`
`was agreed upon by the parties in that case (see id.), and Defendants show no indication that
`
`those parties had any dispute regarding whether the transmitter portion and receiver portion share
`
`at least some common circuitry. Defendants’ reliance on Wi-LAN is therefore unpersuasive.
`
`
`
`The Court accordingly hereby construes “transceiver” to mean “a communications
`
`device capable of transmitting and receiving data wherein the transmitter portion and
`
`receiver portion share at least some common circuitry.”
`
`
`
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`Case 2:21-cv-00310-JRG Document 169 Filed 06/08/22 Page 16 of 116 PageID #: 6158
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`2. “configurable to,” “operable,” and “operable to”
`
`
`
`“configurable to”
`“operable”
`“operable to”
`
`’193 Patent, Claims 1, 9
`’601 Patent, Claim 8
`’014 Patent, Claim 1
`(Family 2)
`
`’608 Patent, Claim 2
`’510 Patent, Claim 22
`(Family 3)
`
`’112 Patent, Claim 8
`(Family 6)
`
`’577 Patent, Claim 16
`’348 Patent, Claims 1, 9
`’055 Patent, Claim 11
`(Family 9)
`
`’354 Patent, Claim 10
`’988 Patent, Claim 16
`(Family 10)
`
`
`Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning, which is: “able to
`be configured” / “capable” / “capable to”
`
`
`(Dkt. No. 107, Ex. A, at 39–40; id., Ex. B, at 5; Dkt. No. 146, App’x A, at 3; Dkt. No. 149,
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning, not mere
`capability
`
`App’x A, at 24, 27, 28, 29 & 32.)
`
`(a) The Parties’ Positions
`
`Plaintiff argues:
`
`A plain reading of the claims indicates that the “operable to” / “configurable to”
`terms mean that the claimed transceivers must be capable of performing the
`recited claim elements. Defendants, through their negative limitation “not mere
`capability,” attempt to read out functionality present in an accused transceiver but
`
`
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`Page 16 of 116
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`