throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`
`Paper No. 39
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`META PLATFORMS, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`ANGEL TECHNOLOGIES GROUP LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`IPR2023-00057 - Patent 8,954,432 B2
`IPR2023-00058 - Patent 9,959,291 B2
` IPR2023-00059 - Patent 10,417,275 B2
` IPR2023-00060 - Patent 10,628,480 B2
`____________
`
`Record Of Oral Hearing
`Held: February 13, 2024
`____________
`
`
`
`
`Before MIRIAM L. QUINN, SHARON FENICK, and
`MICHAEL T. CYGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2023-00057 - Patent 8,954,432 B2
`IPR2023-00058 - Patent 9,959,291 B2
`IPR2023-00059 - Patent 10,417,275 B2
`IPR2023-00060 - Patent 10,628,480 B2
`
`
`
`APPEARANCES:
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
`
`
`ALAN M. BILLHARZ, ESQUIRE
`LISA K. NGUYEN, ESQUIRE
`KATIE BROCKWAY, ESQUIRE
`DAVID M. TENNANT, ESQUIRE
`CHITRAJIT CHANDRASHEKAR, ESQUIRE
`Allen & Overy LLP
`1101 New York Avenue, NW.
`Washington, D.C. 20005
`
`
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PATENT OWNER:
`
`
`SCOTT W. HEJNY, ESQUIRE
`ARVIND JAIRAM, ESQUIRE
`ELIZABETH BERNARD, ESQUIRE
`KAYLEE HOFFNER, ESQUIRE
`McKool Smith, P.C.
`1999 K Street, NW., Suite 600
`Washington, D.C. 20006
`
`
`
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Tuesday, February 13,
`2024, commencing at 10:00 a.m., at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
`600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, Virginia.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`IPR2023-00057 - Patent 8,954,432 B2
`IPR2023-00058 - Patent 9,959,291 B2
`IPR2023-00059 - Patent 10,417,275 B2
`IPR2023-00060 - Patent 10,628,480 B2
`
`
`P R O C E E D I N G S
`- - - - -
`JUDGE FENICK: All right, thank you. Please be seated. It will take
`one second to log on to our computers -- thank you.
`Good morning. We are convened today for oral arguments in
`IPR2023-00057, 00058, 00059, and 00060, in which are challenged,
`respectively, claims of patents 8,954,432; 9,959,291; 10,417,275; and
`10,628,480. I'm Judge Fenick and my colleagues are Judges Cygan and
`Quinn. Judge Quinn is joining us remotely.
`Judge Quinn, can you see and hear us?
`JUDGE QUINN: Yes, I can see and hear you.
`JUDGE FENICK: Thank you. The hearing order, which is paper 32
`in IPR2023-00057, provided that each party has 90 minutes total time to
`argue their case. Today we are welcoming a LEAP practitioner for
`Petitioner, so Petitioner will have 15 extra minutes to provide for the LEAP
`practitioner's meaningful and substantive opportunity to argue before the
`Board. We are glad to have parties participate in this important program.
`Petitioner has the ultimate burden of establishing unpatentability.
`Therefore, Petitioner will open the hearing by presenting its case as
`presented in its petition regarding the alleged unpatentability of the
`challenged claims. Petitioner may reserve rebuttal time, but no more than
`half of its total argument time. Thereafter, Patent Owner will respond to
`Petitioner's arguments. Patent Owner may reserve surrebuttal time, no more
`than half of its total argument time, to respond to Petitioner's rebuttal.
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`IPR2023-00057 - Patent 8,954,432 B2
`IPR2023-00058 - Patent 9,959,291 B2
`IPR2023-00059 - Patent 10,417,275 B2
`IPR2023-00060 - Patent 10,628,480 B2
`
`Otherwise, the parties may use their allotted time to discuss the case as they
`choose.
`We ask that you make it clear which challenges and claims you are
`addressing for the clarity of the record. Also following the hearings, please
`wait and provide the court reporter a chance to ask for any spellings or other
`clarifications. We ask the parties hold any objections regarding a party's
`arguments until it is their time at the podium. We will not take objections
`during a party's argument and you must wait until it is your time at the
`podium to note any objections. I will maintain a clock which you'll see
`behind me.
`So now if we can get started with appearances for both sides, starting
`with Petitioner, please.
`MR. BILLHARZ: Good morning, Your Honor. Alan Billharz on
`behalf of Petitioner, Meta Platforms, Incorporated. I'm joined by lead
`counsel for Petitioner, Lisa Nguyen, and also by in-house counsel, Katie
`Brockway.
`JUDGE FENICK: Thank you. And for Patent Owner, please?
`MR. HEJNY: Your Honor, may it please the Board, Lead Counsel
`Scott Hejny on behalf of Angel Technologies. With me today in presenting
`oral argument on behalf of Angel Technologies is Ms. Elizabeth Bernard
`and Mr. Arvind Jairam. Present via the remote feed are Kaylee Hoffner of
`McKool Smith and the inventor and owner of Angel Technologies, Mr.
`Mark Frigon.
`JUDGE FENICK: Thank you. And we'll start with the Petitioner.
`Mr. Billharz, would you like to reserve rebuttal time?
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`IPR2023-00057 - Patent 8,954,432 B2
`IPR2023-00058 - Patent 9,959,291 B2
`IPR2023-00059 - Patent 10,417,275 B2
`IPR2023-00060 - Patent 10,628,480 B2
`
`
`MR. BILLHARZ: Yes, Your Honor, we'd like to reserve 30 minutes
`for rebuttal.
`JUDGE FENICK: Okay. Please begin when you're ready.
`MR. BILLHARZ: Yes, Your Honor. Good morning, Your Honors,
`and may it please the Board, Alan Billharz on behalf of Petitioner Meta
`Platforms. I'm joined by Lead Counsel Lisa Nguyen and by in-house
`counsel for Meta, Katie Brockway. So I'm grateful to participate in today's
`program via the LEAP program, and I do expect to address all of the issues
`in today's proceeding. But I may need to confer with lead counsel from time
`to time. And I'd ask for an opportunity to confer with lead counsel before
`we begin a rebuttal.
`Unless there are any questions from the Board, I intend to proceed
`with the demonstratives that we prepared for today. I have paper copies of
`those demonstratives, if the Board would like a copy.
`JUDGE FENICK: We have them here.
`MR. BILLHARZ: Okay. Well, Your Honor, with that then, I will
`turn to slide 2 of our demonstratives. On slide 2, we have a roadmap for
`today's proceeding. I intend to present a brief overview of the patents, of the
`challenged patents, and the prior art, and then proceed with three modules of
`disputed issues: the first being the Sharpe alone or in view of a POSA's
`knowledge ground; the second being the combination of Sharpe and
`Eintracht; and the third being Robertson and Lloyd-Jones, which is the
`combination at issue for the '480 patent only.
`Turning to slide 5, Your Honors, there are four challenged patents at
`issue in these proceedings. They're all related patents with a common
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`IPR2023-00057 - Patent 8,954,432 B2
`IPR2023-00058 - Patent 9,959,291 B2
`IPR2023-00059 - Patent 10,417,275 B2
`IPR2023-00060 - Patent 10,628,480 B2
`
`specification. The '432 patent is the first patent in the series which was filed
`in 2001. Now, the '432 patent issued after nearly 15 years of prosecution.
`And then the applicant proceeded to file several continuations, the last of
`which is the '480 patent which issued in 2000, nearly 20 years after the filing
`of the original application. Now, all of these patents are expired except for
`the '291 patent, which, due to patent term adjustment, will expire at the end
`of this month.
`Turn to slide 6, Your Honors. The challenged patents on their face
`are nominally directed to photo tagging. But the disputed issues in these
`proceedings are not about photo tagging. They're about implementation
`details in a photo tagging application. And why is that?
`Turning to slide 8, Your Honors, it's because photo tagging was
`known in the art. On slide 8, for example, we have the PhotoFinder
`application, which appears on the left of slide 8, in which a user, this is a
`prior art application, in which a user could tag photos and identify
`individuals depicted in those photos. As I'm illustrating here with the red
`dot which appears in the lower right-hand corner of the figure from
`PhotoFinder.
`FotoFile, which is one of the secondary references at issue in these
`proceedings, was another photo tagging application that predates the
`challenged patents with PhotoFinder -- I'm sorry, with FotoFile you could
`tag individuals in photos and actually look for other photos in which that
`same individual was tagged.
`Now, the Examiner, in prosecuting these patents or examining these
`patents, recognized this fact. And that's why these patents, turning to slide
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR2023-00057 - Patent 8,954,432 B2
`IPR2023-00058 - Patent 9,959,291 B2
`IPR2023-00059 - Patent 10,417,275 B2
`IPR2023-00060 - Patent 10,628,480 B2
`
`9, spent more than 13 years of back and forth with the Examiner, with
`rejection after rejection after rejection. And when these patents were finally
`allowed, when the '432 patent was allowed, the Examiner made clear that
`photo tagging was not the basis for allowance.
`Instead, the basis for allowance, turning to slide 10, was a series of
`three distinct and separate databases which the Examiner identified in a
`telephone interview with the applicant, suggested that the applicant add
`those to the claims to make them allowable.
`So, turning to slide 11, that's what the applicant did in the '432 patent.
`The claims recite three distinct and separate databases that were the
`purported basis for a point of novelty.
`Now, turning to slide 12, Your Honors, when the Examiner allowed
`the '432 patent, the Examiner made clear, as you see on slide 12, that it was
`the three distinct and separate databases, not photo tagging, that was the
`basis for allowance.
`Turning to slide 13, when the applicant began filing continuation
`applications, the basis for allowance for the '291 patent was, again, not photo
`tagging. The basis for allowance was selecting a tagged user from a contact
`list, an implementation detail, again, and a photo tagging system.
`Turning to slide 15, the same basis for allowance applied to the '275
`patent, the third in the series. Selecting a tagged user from a contact list was
`the basis for allowance, and the Examiner made clear that it was not photo
`tagging which was known in the art.
`Now, the applicant, in pursuing the fourth patent in the series, turning
`to slide 17, the applicant ran into a problem, which is the Examiner
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`IPR2023-00057 - Patent 8,954,432 B2
`IPR2023-00058 - Patent 9,959,291 B2
`IPR2023-00059 - Patent 10,417,275 B2
`IPR2023-00060 - Patent 10,628,480 B2
`
`discovered the Carey reference and held that Carey, which is a secondary
`reference in these proceedings, discloses the purported point of novelty in
`the '275 and the '291 patents, selecting a tagged user from a contact list. So
`the applicant had to turn to another implementation detail, which, turning to
`slide 18 was the prompt to a viewing user of a photo to add a tagged user to
`that viewing user's contact list.
`So, Your Honors, turning to slide 21, the basis for allowance for the
`patents at issue in these proceedings was not photo tagging, which was well
`known in the art. The basis was a series of implementation details about
`how photos are stored and how tagged users are selected to appear in photos,
`and also a prompt to add that contact or add contacts based on the tagged
`photo. And as we made clear in the petition and the supporting briefing,
`these implementation details were obvious in view of the prior art.
`So with that, I'll turn to the prior art at issue in this proceeding. Your
`Honors, turning to slide 23. On slide 23, we have an overview of the
`instituted grounds in these proceedings. And just at a high level, the primary
`reference that we'll discuss for the '432, '291, '275 patents is the Sharpe
`reference. And there's also the Sharpe in view of Eintracht combination for
`those. Carey and FotoFile are secondary references that are not at issue in
`these proceedings. Their disclosures are not disputed and so we won't be
`discussing them in any substantive way today. And then the '480 patent has
`a different pair of prior art that we'll come back to later in the proceeding.
`So, turning to Sharpe on slide 24, Sharpe was not considered during
`the prosecution of the challenged patents. But like the challenged patents,
`Sharpe discloses a photo tagging system in which groups of people
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`IPR2023-00057 - Patent 8,954,432 B2
`IPR2023-00058 - Patent 9,959,291 B2
`IPR2023-00059 - Patent 10,417,275 B2
`IPR2023-00060 - Patent 10,628,480 B2
`
`collaborate to annotate photos to identify the people in those photos, the
`events at which those photos were taken, the dates on which those photos
`were taken, and so on.
`Now, Sharpe discloses a web-based application, just like the
`challenge patents and Sharpe discloses specifically, as you see on slide 24,
`figure 4 is a user interface of Sharpe in which individuals, for example, with
`the drop-down box 55, users of the system can tag individuals in photos, and
`the photos appear in what's called the workspace 51 of Sharpe's figure 4.
`Now, importantly, Sharpe also discloses the database back end,
`similar to or actually the same as the challenge patents. Sharpe discloses the
`use of databases to store the information relating to the photos. And indeed,
`Sharpe discloses the use of multiple databases, the three distinct and
`separate databases that were the basis for allowance for the '432 patent, and
`that's not disputed in these proceedings.
`It's also not disputed that Sharpe discloses, turning to slide 27, Sharpe
`discloses the selecting of a tagged user from contact list, which was the basis
`for allowance for the '291 and the '275 patents.
`So with that, Your Honors, I will turn to what is disputed about
`Sharpe in these proceedings if you'll turn to slide 35, which I'm presenting
`now. There are two groups of issues that I'll address for the Sharpe alone
`ground. The first is single reference obviousness and the second is a series
`of disputed limitations about Sharpe's disclosure.
`So, turning to slide 37 of our demonstratives, Your Honor, Patent
`Owner disputes that we presented Sharpe alone or in view of the knowledge
`of a POSA as an obviousness ground. But based on the disclosures that we
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`IPR2023-00057 - Patent 8,954,432 B2
`IPR2023-00058 - Patent 9,959,291 B2
`IPR2023-00059 - Patent 10,417,275 B2
`IPR2023-00060 - Patent 10,628,480 B2
`
`present on slide 37, it's plainly obvious, plainly clear that we presented
`Sharpe alone or view of the knowledge of a POSA as an obviousness
`ground. I would think Patent Owner takes issue with our use of the word
`"discloses," but disclosure is the epitome of obviousness, and the Board
`understood this. In the Institution decision, the Board acknowledged Sharpe
`alone or in view of the knowledge of a POSA as a 103 obviousness ground.
`Turning to slide 38, Patent Owner also argues that if Sharpe alone or
`in view of the knowledge of a POSA is an obviousness ground, then we
`failed to present motivation to combine for that obviousness ground. And
`that's simply incorrect, Your Honor. As the Board recognized in the
`Institution decision, I have footnote 11 of page 27 of the '432 Institution
`decision on the slide, the Board recognized that motivation combined is not
`required for a single reference obviousness challenge.
`JUDGE FENICK: Mr. Billharz, can you discuss, for example, with
`respect to claim 6 of the '432 patent for the 00057 petition, what in the
`petition -- what elements of the claim required obviousness rather than
`disclosure according to the petition?
`MR. BILLHARZ: Your Honor, so our view is that Sharpe discloses
`the elements, but in view of a POSA's knowledge. So there are certain
`disclosures of Sharpe that are not expressed, for example, how databases
`work and how a POSA would have understood that the tables, for example,
`in Sharpe's figure 6, relate to each other with the use of primary keys. And
`that's why we brought this as an obviousness ground, because there is an
`element of knowledge that a POSA would have about Sharpe's disclosures,
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`IPR2023-00057 - Patent 8,954,432 B2
`IPR2023-00058 - Patent 9,959,291 B2
`IPR2023-00059 - Patent 10,417,275 B2
`IPR2023-00060 - Patent 10,628,480 B2
`
`and Sharpe does not expressly discuss those concepts because a person,
`ordinary skill in the art, would have understood those concepts.
`JUDGE FENICK: Thank you.
`MR. BILLHARZ: Your Honor, just to close out this point, turning to
`slide 39, we pointed to the Realtime Data case in our briefs, which makes
`clear, the Federal Circuit makes clear that when presenting a ground like
`this, motivation to combine is not required and the Board does not need to
`find motivation combined.
`And turning to slide 40, Patent Owner is only pointed to a footnote in
`the Stepan case for the legal proposition that motivation is combined -- to
`combine is required for a single reference obviousness ground. But the facts
`here are distinguishable from Stepan. Stepan dealt with combining multiple
`embodiments from a single reference or selecting from large lists of
`elements. I believe it was the latter in Stepan that the Federal Circuit was
`addressing.
`JUDGE QUINN: Well, Counsel, if I could ask you a question.
`MR. BILLHARZ: Yes, Your Honor.
`JUDGE QUINN: It seems to me, though, that you did provide some
`motivations to combine when encountering the issue of the username
`limitation. To the extent that it's a rationale rather than a motivation to
`combine, such as obvious to try, there may be multiple ways in which a
`person of skill in the art implements that limitation. Can you explain that?
`MR. BILLHARZ: Yes, Your Honor. Yes, we did provide the
`rationale for why a person of ordinary skill in the art in implementing
`Sharpe would have recognized the username as a unique user identifier and
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`
`
`11
`
`

`

`IPR2023-00057 - Patent 8,954,432 B2
`IPR2023-00058 - Patent 9,959,291 B2
`IPR2023-00059 - Patent 10,417,275 B2
`IPR2023-00060 - Patent 10,628,480 B2
`
`would have used it as a primary key in relating the tables in Sharpe's
`database. So we did speak to both why a POSA would have understood that
`and then why a POSA would have used the username in particular for that
`limitation.
`JUDGE QUINN: And just to follow up on that.
`MR. BILLHARZ: Yes, ma'am.
`JUDGE QUINN: The evidence that you have is strictly Mr.
`Bederson's testimony, is that right?
`MR. BILLHARZ: No, Your Honor. There's additional evidence
`there. So it's Dr. Bederson's testimony.
`I would also -- let me take you to a slide, Your Honor. I'm now
`projecting slide 44, Your Honor. So in addition to Dr. Bederson's testimony,
`which if you review his declaration, he goes through a series of database
`treatises, his own explanations, and his own experience with implementing
`databases, but on top of that, on reply, Your Honor, we have, when Patent
`Owner challenged that this was -- to the extent Patent Owner challenged that
`this is a way that a POSA would have recognized that you could implement
`Sharpe's system, we pointed to an example. This is Exhibit 1042, the
`Falquet reference. Exhibit 1042 makes clear this is just an example of a
`person, a POSA, using the username as a primary key to implement a
`system. Because as it says on slide 44, all users must have a different
`username.
`JUDGE QUINN: So you say that this came in at the reply stage, is
`that correct?
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`
`
`12
`
`

`

`IPR2023-00057 - Patent 8,954,432 B2
`IPR2023-00058 - Patent 9,959,291 B2
`IPR2023-00059 - Patent 10,417,275 B2
`IPR2023-00060 - Patent 10,628,480 B2
`
`
`MR. BILLHARZ: Yes, Your Honor, and it was in response to Patent
`Owner's disputing of that a POSA would have recognized to the extent
`Patent Owner disputes that we pointed to this reference. But if you look at
`Dr. Bederson's declaration, he provides all the explanation in support of the
`petition. The theory, Your Honor, certainly was not new.
`JUDGE QUINN: Right. That was my question to you earlier. The
`petition, I think does express Mr. Bederson's opinion that it would have been
`obvious to try but didn't go into details. Perhaps he didn't say, obvious to try
`this design choice.
`MR. BILLHARZ: Yes, Your Honor. He said it would have been a
`known design choice, and it would have been, in fact, the most obvious
`design choice to implement the system. That's not a requirement of
`obviousness, but he just pointed to, in view of Sharpe's disclosures, the
`username was already present. It's a known aspect of the system, you need
`to relate users to images. It was available and a POSA implementing
`Sharpe's system would have recognized that as the primary key to use to
`make those relationships.
`JUDGE QUINN: Thank you.
`MR. BILLHARZ: Your Honor. I will turn now to slide 41, the
`disputed limitations of Sharpe. We've already discussed, turning to slide 42,
`the unique user identifier, so, you know, I will not belabor that point. But
`we established in the petition that a POSA would have recognized Sharpe's
`username as unique user identifier. And I don't think that there is a dispute
`about what Sharpe teaches here. There's only a dispute about whether we
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`
`
`13
`
`

`

`IPR2023-00057 - Patent 8,954,432 B2
`IPR2023-00058 - Patent 9,959,291 B2
`IPR2023-00059 - Patent 10,417,275 B2
`IPR2023-00060 - Patent 10,628,480 B2
`
`have argued inherency for this limitation. And Your Honor, we certainly
`have not argued inherency for this limitation.
`Pointing -- turning to slide 46, Your Honors, these are just some
`examples from the petition and Dr. Bederson's declaration where we make
`the argument that this is an obvious design choice in view of Sharpe's
`teachings. Not that it must be the only way to implement Sharpe, but it's
`something that a POSA would have recognized and is, therefore, obvious.
`Your Honors, turning to slide 47, the next disputed issue for Sharpe
`alone is the request for said image data. And the claims require, as you see
`on slide 47, that there is a request for the image data recited earlier in the
`claim, and that image data is one that was uploaded and then tagged. So
`Patent Owner has taken the position that the request for said image data must
`be a request for a single and particular image, not multiple images. And we
`think our position is that is contrary to the plain language of the claim,
`contrary to the disclosures of the specification, and it would exclude an
`embodiment improperly. So the claims themselves are comprising claims,
`open-ended claims. The term "image data" is not singular. In fact, the
`specification uses image data to describe multiple images, and we cite to that
`in our briefs.
`JUDGE QUINN: I have a question, though --
`MR. BILLHARZ: Yes, Your Honor.
`JUDGE QUINN: -- because the claim language says, "obtaining
`image data from at least one uploading user," but then, "assigning a unique
`image identifier to said image data," if you're assigning a unique identifier,
`it's got to be a single photo or a single image file.
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`
`
`14
`
`

`

`IPR2023-00057 - Patent 8,954,432 B2
`IPR2023-00058 - Patent 9,959,291 B2
`IPR2023-00059 - Patent 10,417,275 B2
`IPR2023-00060 - Patent 10,628,480 B2
`
`
`MR. BILLHARZ: So, Your Honor, I believe we addressed this in our
`briefing, but standard claim interpretation techniques is that "a" means one
`or more. And so our understanding of this claim is that if there were, in fact,
`multiple images, then it would assign a unique identifier to each of those
`images. The claim can accommodate that. But even if that were not the
`Board's interpretation of this claim, I'd still argue that this is a comprising
`claim, so it's open ended. So imagine, for example, there's a request for an
`image, and there's also a request for additional images. That would not put
`you outside the scope of this claim.
`JUDGE QUINN: Then how do you reconcile that with Sharpe, which
`does not assign identifiers to each image? It indexes the images based on
`people, events.
`MR. BILLHARZ: Your Honor, Sharpe does assign a unique image
`identifier to each image. I can find you the cite for that, but we certainly
`argued that in our petition. And in fact, I don't believe that's disputed in this
`proceeding. I think the dispute here is just whether the request has to be for
`a particular image or if it can accommodate multiple images.
`JUDGE QUINN: Column 2 of Sharpe says, "Thus the indexing
`system does not uniquely identify individual digital media items." How do
`you explain that?
`MR. BILLHARZ: Your Honor -- column 2, Your Honor? Yes,
`Sharpe -- what Sharpe is addressing there is that the purpose of its system is
`to identify photos for nostalgic retrieval, right? That means when a user or
`series of users are using the system, they're annotating photos such they can
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`
`
`15
`
`

`

`IPR2023-00057 - Patent 8,954,432 B2
`IPR2023-00058 - Patent 9,959,291 B2
`IPR2023-00059 - Patent 10,417,275 B2
`IPR2023-00060 - Patent 10,628,480 B2
`
`be retrieved to describe an event, so on and so forth. That does not mean
`that Sharpe does not apply a unique user identifier to each image.
`And I think we've established in the petition that Sharpe does apply a
`unique user identifier. And I think that is supported at least by figure 6 of
`Sharpe, which has item identifiers for each image. I believe there are some
`disclosures. I have to find those for you, Your Honor, but they're later in
`Sharpe where they talk about the upload process. And that upload process
`includes assigning image identifiers to the images at the time of upload.
`So just because Sharpe's purpose is to support nostalgic retrieval does
`not mean Sharpe does not practice these claims or disclose these claims,
`Your Honor.
`So, Your Honors, turning to slide 49, there is an embodiment
`described in the challenged patents, in which it's expressly discussed that the
`client sends a request for multiple images, an image or a list of images, in
`which the specified user or several users have been identified. And so if the
`claims were limited to requests for a single image, they would exclude this
`embodiment. Now, that's not necessarily -- that's not issue dispositive, but
`the Federal Circuit encourages us to -- or an interpretation of a claim that
`would exclude an embodiment like this is disfavored.
`Also, Your Honors, even if Patent Owner's interpretation is correct, so
`I'm on slide 50 at this time, even if the claims are limited to requests for a
`single particular image, Sharpe discloses that because Sharpe discloses a
`narrowing process where a series of searches are performed with additional
`parameters to get to a smaller number of images. And as Dr. Bederson
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`
`
`16
`
`

`

`IPR2023-00057 - Patent 8,954,432 B2
`IPR2023-00058 - Patent 9,959,291 B2
`IPR2023-00059 - Patent 10,417,275 B2
`IPR2023-00060 - Patent 10,628,480 B2
`
`explained, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood this
`disclosure to teach the eventual request for a single in particular image.
`And, Your Honors, just turning back on the unique user identifier
`issue, I would direct the Board to Sharpe at column 3, line 64, through
`column 5, line 6, for discussing about unique identifiers being applied to
`images.
` Your Honors, the next disputed issue for Sharpe alone or in view of
`the knowledge of a POSA is the list of pictured users. Now, for this
`limitation, we have pointed to Sharpe's drop-down list 55, which appears in
`figure 4 on slide 51. I'm highlighting it now. Patent Owner's argument here
`is that the drop-down list 55 cannot be both a list of individuals in a group
`and a list of individuals pictured in an image. But the important realization
`here is that Sharpe's UI, figure 4, is used for both archival and retrieval of
`images. And as we explained in the petition, a person of ordinary skill in the
`art would have recognized that in implementing Sharpe's figure 4, this
`people drop-down box would have displayed both the total number of users
`in the group or the total users in the group, and then the pictured users in the
`particular images loaded in the workspace.
`JUDGE FENICK: Is the --
`MR. BILLHARZ: Yes, Your Honor?
`JUDGE FENICK: Is the argument that the pictured users would
`somehow be highlighted the way Dr. Bederson highlighted them in this
`figure, or that they would just appear because they wouldn't disappear after
`having been selected?
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`
`
`
`17
`
`

`

`IPR2023-00057 - Patent 8,954,432 B2
`IPR2023-00058 - Patent 9,959,291 B2
`IPR2023-00059 - Patent 10,417,275 B2
`IPR2023-00060 - Patent 10,628,480 B2
`
`
`MR. BILLHARZ: Your Honor, the argument is more the former, as
`you described it, that the list itself would still continue to include all
`members of the group because you would need to be able to select other
`members of the group for purposes of additional retrieval or additional
`archival, but that the individuals in the group, and there are plenty of ways to
`implement this. This is not the only way. This is just one obvious way to do
`it, would be to highlight the individuals in the group who are currently
`selected for the current retrieval of images.
`JUDGE FENICK: And that's supported by Dr. Bederson at 340. Is
`that the first declaration, sorry, of Dr. Bederson?
`MR. BILLHARZ: Dr. Bederson's the declaration at 340. Your
`Honor, I'd have to get that cite for you. I'll get that for you in rebuttal. But
`to support there, yes, Your Honor, Dr. Bederson goes into detail. Oh, I
`understand it's 340 through 345, Your Honors. Paragraphs 340 through 345
`of the '432 declaration where he discusses this feature.
`JUDGE FENICK: Dr. Bederson says that the list would be updated to
`reflect the current selected set of users.
`MR. BILLHARZ: Yes, Your Honor.
`JUDGE FENICK: And what would that update -- that update would
`be the highlighting?
`MR. BILLHARZ: Yes, Your Honor, it would be the highlighting. I
`believe we have figures that are annotated in Dr. Bederson's declaration and
`in the petition illustrating what this sort of highlighting would appear. But I
`do want to emphasize that that's just one example of how this would be
`implemented. We're not saying that that is the only way, it's just one
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`
`
`
`18
`
`

`

`IPR2023-00057 - Patent 8,954,432 B2
`IPR2023-00058 - Patent 9,959,291 B2
`IPR2023-00059 - Patent 10,417,275 B2
`IPR2023-00060 - Patent 10,628,480 B2
`
`obvious way that a POSA would have recognized at the time that in
`implementing Sharpe's system one way and someone implementing Sharpe's
`system would have indicated who's tagged in the currently loaded photos.
`And Your Honors, if I may turn your attention to slide 53. On reply,
`we pointed to additional evidence. Patent Owner's position appears to be
`that this drop-down box, people drop-down box in Sharpe's figure 4 cannot
`be both. But ,in fact, it was well known there were UI paradigms at the
`time, as Dr. Bederson described, that were, in fact, exactly like this: a drop-
`down list that both indicated the current selection and allowed you to make
`additional selections.
`And you see on the lower left-hand side of slide 53, this is an example
`from the Apple Mac OS operating system that there were a series of menus,
`drop-down menus, that would both indicate the currently selected
`individuals with a chec

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket