throbber
Computing Practices
`
`.
`
`Neil F. Johnson
`Sushil Jajodia
`George Mason
`University
`
`26
`
`Computer
`
`Exploring Steganography:
`Seeing the Unseen
`
`Steganography is an ancient art of
`
`hiding information. Digital
`
`technology gives us new ways to
`
`apply steganographic techniques,
`
`including one of the most intriguing—
`
`that of hiding information in digital
`
`images.
`
`Steganography is the art of hiding informa-
`
`tion in ways that prevent the detection of hid-
`den messages. Steganography, derived from
`Greek, literally means “covered writing.”
`It includes a vast array of secret communi-
`cations methods that conceal the message’s very
`existence. These methods include invisible inks,
`microdots, character arrangement, digital signatures,
`covert channels, and spread spectrum communica-
`tions.
`Steganography and cryptography are cousins in the
`spycraft family. Cryptography scrambles a message so
`it cannot be understood. Steganography hides the mes-
`sage so it cannot be seen. A message in ciphertext, for
`instance, might arouse suspicion on the part of the
`recipient while an “invisible” message created with
`steganographic methods will not.
`In this article we discuss image files and how to hide
`information in them, and we discuss results obtained
`from evaluating available steganographic software.
`For a brief look at how steganography evolved, see the
`“Steganography: Some History” sidebar.
`
`IMAGE FILES
`To a computer, an image is an array of numbers that
`represent light intensities at various points (pixels).
`These pixels make up the image’s raster data. A com-
`mon image size is 640 × 480 pixels and 256 colors (or
`8 bits per pixel). Such an image could contain about
`300 kilobits of data.
`Digital images are typically stored in either 24-bit
`or 8-bit files. A 24-bit image provides the most space
`for hiding information; however, it can be quite large
`
`(with the exception of JPEG images). All color varia-
`tions for the pixels are derived from three primary col-
`ors: red, green, and blue. Each primary color is
`represented by 1 byte; 24-bit images use 3 bytes per
`pixel to represent a color value. These 3 bytes can be
`represented as hexadecimal, decimal, and binary val-
`ues. In many Web pages, the background color is rep-
`resented by a six-digit hexadecimal number—actually
`three pairs representing red, green, and blue. A white
`background would have the value FFFFFF: 100 per-
`cent red (FF), 100 percent green (FF), and 100 percent
`blue (FF). Its decimal value is 255, 255, 255, and its
`binary value is 11111111, 11111111, 11111111,
`which are the three bytes making up white.
`This definition of a white background is analogous
`to the color definition of a single pixel in an image.
`Pixel representation contributes to file size. For exam-
`ple, suppose we have a 24-bit image 1,024 pixels wide
`by 768 pixels high—a common resolution for high-
`resolution graphics. Such an image has more than two
`million pixels, each having such a definition, which
`would produce a file exceeding 2 Mbytes. Because such
`24-bit images are still relatively uncommon on the
`Internet, their size would attract attention during
`transmission. File compression would thus be benefi-
`cial, if not necessary, to transmit such a file.
`
`File compression
`Two kinds of compression are lossless and lossy.1
`Both methods save storage space but have different
`results, interfering with the hidden information, when
`the information is uncompressed. Lossless compres-
`sion lets us reconstruct the original message exactly;
`
`0018-9162/98/$10.00 © 1998 IEEE
`
`Sony Exhibit 1052
`Sony v. MZ Audio
`
`

`

`.
`
`therefore, it is preferred when the original informa-
`tion must remain intact (as with steganographic
`images). Lossless compression is typical of images
`saved as GIF (Graphic Interchange Format) and 8-bit
`BMP (a Microsoft Windows and OS/2 bitmap file).
`Lossy compression, on the other hand, saves space
`but may not maintain the original image’s integrity.
`This method typifies images saved as JPEG (Joint
`Photographic Experts Group). Due to the lossy com-
`pression algorithm, which we discuss later, the JPEG
`formats provide close approximations to high-qual-
`ity digital photographs but not an exact duplicate.
`Hence the term “lossy” compression.
`
`Embedding data
`Embedding data, which is to be hidden, into an
`image requires two files. The first is the innocent-look-
`ing image that will hold the hidden information, called
`the cover image. The second file is the message—the
`
`information to be hidden. A message may be plain
`text, ciphertext, other images, or anything that can be
`embedded in a bit stream. When combined, the cover
`image and the embedded message make a stego-
`image.2 A stego-key (a type of password) may also be
`used to hide, then later decode, the message.
`Most steganography software neither supports nor
`recommends using JPEG images, but recommends
`instead the use of lossless 24-bit images such as BMP.
`The next-best alternative to 24-bit images is 256-color
`or gray-scale images. The most common of these
`found on the Internet are GIF files.
`In 8-bit color images such as GIF files, each pixel is
`represented as a single byte, and each pixel merely
`points to a color index table (a palette) with 256 pos-
`sible colors. The pixel’s value, then, is between 0 and
`255. The software simply paints the indicated color
`on the screen at the selected pixel position. Figure 1a,
`a red palette, illustrates subtle changes in color varia-
`
`Steganography: Some History
`Throughout history, people have hidden
`information by a multitude of methods
`and variations.1,2 For example, ancient
`Greeks wrote text on wax-covered tablets.
`To pass a hidden message, a person would
`scrape wax off a tablet, write a message on
`the underlying wood and again cover the
`tablet with wax to make it appear blank
`and unused. Another ingenious method
`was to shave the head of a messenger and
`tattoo a message or image on the messen-
`ger’s head. After the hair grew back, the
`message would be undetected until the
`head was shaved again.
`Invisible inks offered a common form of
`invisible writing. Early in World War II,
`steganographic
`technology consisted
`almost exclusively of these inks.1 With
`invisible ink, a seemingly innocent letter
`could contain a very different message
`written between the lines.3
`Documents themselves can hide infor-
`mation: document text can conceal a hid-
`den message through the use of null
`ciphers (unencrypted messages), which
`camouflage the real message in an inno-
`cent-sounding missive. Open coded mes-
`sages, which are plain text passages,
`“sound” innocent because they purport
`to be about ordinary occurrences.
`Because many open-coded messages don’t
`seem to be cause for suspicion, and there-
`
`fore “sound” normal and innocent, the
`suspect communications can be detected
`by mail filters while “innocent” messages
`are allowed to flow through.1 For exam-
`ple, the following null-cipher message
`was actually sent by a German spy in
`WWII1:
`
`Apparently neutral’s protest is thor-
`oughly discounted and ignored. Isman
`hard hit. Blockade issue affects pretext
`for embargo on by-products, ejecting
`suets and vegetable oils.
`
`Decoding this message by extracting the
`second letter in each word reveals the fol-
`lowing, hidden message:
`
`Pershing sails from NY June 1.
`
`Document layout may also reveal infor-
`mation. Documents can be marked and
`identified by modulating the position of
`lines and words.4
`Message detection improved with the
`development of new technologies that
`could pass more information and be even
`less conspicuous. The Germans developed
`microdot technology, which FBI Director
`J. Edgar Hoover referred to as “the enemy’s
`masterpiece of espionage.”1 Microdots are
`photographs the size of a printed period
`having the clarity of standard-sized type-
`
`written pages, which permits the transmis-
`sion of large amounts of data, including
`drawings and photographs.1
`With every discovery of a message hid-
`den with an existing application, a new
`steganographic application
`is being
`devised. Old methods are given new twists.
`While drawings have often been used to
`conceal or reveal information, computer
`technology has, in fact, sparked a revolu-
`tion in such methods for hiding messages.
`Space limitations prevent further dis-
`cussion here. For more information on
`techniques for hiding information, see
`Peter Wayner’s Disappearing Crypt–
`ography.5
`
`References
`1. D. Kahn, The Codebreakers, Macmillan,
`New York, 1967.
`2. B. Norman, Secret Warfare, Acropolis
`Books, Washington, D.C., 1973.
`3. H.S. Zim, Codes and Secret Writing,
`William Morrow, New York, 1948.
`4. J. Brassilet et al., “Document Marking and
`Identification using Both Line and Word
`Shifting,” Proc. Infocom95, IEEE CS
`Press, Los Alamitos, Calif., 1995.
`5. P. Wayner, Disappearing Cryptography,
`AP Professional, Chestnut Hill, Mass.,
`1996.
`
`February 1998
`
`27
`
`

`

`.
`
`colors is a poor choice, as variances created from the
`embedded message will be noticeable in the solid areas.
`We will see that Figure 1b, the palette for the Renoir
`cover image, makes a very good cover for holding data.
`Once you’ve selected a cover image, you must
`decide on a technique to hide the information you
`want to embed.
`
`CONCEALMENT IN DIGITAL IMAGES
`Information can be hidden many different ways in
`images. To hide information, straight message inser-
`tion may encode every bit of information in the image
`or selectively embed the message in “noisy” areas that
`draw less attention—those areas where there is a great
`deal of natural color variation. The message may also
`be scattered randomly throughout the image.
`Redundant pattern encoding “wallpapers” the cover
`image with the message.
`A number of ways exist to hide information in dig-
`ital images. Common approaches include
`
`(cid:129) least significant bit insertion,
`(cid:129) masking and filtering, and
`(cid:129) algorithms and transformations.
`
`Each of these techniques can be applied, with varying
`degrees of success, to different image files.
`
`Least significant bit insertion
`Least significant bit (LSB) insertion4 is a common,
`simple approach to embedding information in a
`cover file. Unfortunately, it is vulnerable to even a
`slight image manipulation. Converting an image
`from a format like GIF or BMP, which reconstructs
`the original message exactly (lossless compression)
`to a JPEG, which does not (lossy compression), and
`then back could destroy the information hidden in
`the LSBs.
`24-bit images. To hide an image in the LSBs of each
`byte of a 24-bit image, you can store 3 bits in each
`pixel. A 1,024 × 768 image has the potential to hide
`a total of 2,359,296 bits (294,912 bytes) of informa-
`tion. If you compress the message to be hidden before
`you embed it, you can hide a large amount of infor-
`mation. To the human eye, the resulting stego-image
`will look identical to the cover image.
`For example, the letter A can be hidden in three pix-
`els (assuming no compression). The original raster
`data for 3 pixels (9 bytes) may be
`
`(00100111 11101001 11001000)
`(00100111 11001000 11101001)
`(11001000 00100111 11101001)
`
`The binary value for A is 10000011. Inserting the
`binary value for A in the three pixels would result in
`
`(a)
`
`(b)
`
`tions: visually differentiating between many of these
`colors is difficult. Figure 1b shows subtle color changes
`as well as those that seem drastic.
`Many steganography experts recommend using
`images featuring 256 shades of gray.3 Gray-scale images
`are preferred because the shades change very gradually
`from byte to byte, and the less the value changes between
`palette entries, the better they can hide information.
`Figure 2 shows a gray-scale palette of 256 shades. Some
`images are 4-bit, created with 16 shades of gray; obvi-
`ously these images offer many fewer variations.
`While gray-scale images may render the best results
`for steganography, images with subtle color variations
`are also highly effective, as Figure 1 showed.
`When considering an image in which to hide infor-
`mation, you must consider the image as well as the
`palette. Obviously, an image with large areas of solid
`
`Figure 1. Representa-
`tive color palettes. (a)
`A 256-color red
`palette and (b) a 256-
`color Renoir palette.
`The Renoir palette is
`so named because it
`comes from a 256-
`color version of
`Pierre-Auguste
`Renoir’s “Le Moulin
`de la Galette.”
`
`Figure 2. Representa-
`tive gray-scale
`palette of 256
`shades.
`
`28
`
`Computer
`
`

`

`.
`
`Figure 3. Image
`“painted” with the
`watermark: “Invisible
`Man” © 1997, Neil F.
`Johnson.Traditional
`steganography
`conceals information;
`watermarks extend
`information and
`become an attribute
`of the cover image.
`
`visually but that may vary by one bit.5
`These tools take a similar approach with gray-scale
`images. However, the resulting stego-images as applied
`with S-Tools are no longer gray-scale. Instead of sim-
`ply going with adjacent colors as EzStego does,
`S-Tools manipulates the palette to produce colors that
`have a difference of one bit. For example, in a normal
`gray-scale image, white will move to black with the
`following RGB triples
`
`(255 255 255), (254 254 254), ...,
`(1 1 1), (0 0 0)
`
`After processing with S-Tools, the value for white will
`be spread over a range of up to eight colors such as
`
`(255 255 255), (255 255 254), and
`(255 254 255)
`
`Visually, the stego-image may look the same as the
`gray-scale cover image, but it has actually become an
`8-bit color image.
`
`Masking and filtering
`Masking and filtering techniques, usually restricted
`to 24-bit and gray-scale images, hide information by
`marking an image, in a manner similar to paper water-
`marks. Watermarking techniques may be applied with-
`out fear of image destruction due to lossy compression
`because they are more integrated into the image.
`Visible watermarks are not steganography by defin-
`ition. The difference is primarily one of intent.
`Traditional steganography conceals information; water-
`marks extend information and become an attribute of
`the cover image. Digital watermarks may include such
`information as copyright, ownership, or license, as
`shown in Figure 3. In steganography, the object of com-
`munication is the hidden message. In digital water-
`
`February 1998
`
`29
`
`(00100111 11101000 11001000)
`(00100110 11001000 11101000)
`(11001000 00100111 11101001)
`
`The underlined bits are the only three actually changed
`in the 8 bytes used. On average, LSB requires that only
`half the bits in an image be changed. You can hide
`data in the least and second least significant bits and
`still the human eye would not be able to discern it.
`8-bit images. 8-bit images are not as forgiving to LSB
`manipulation because of color limitations. Steganogra-
`phy software authors have devised several approaches—
`some more successful than others—to hide information
`in 8-bit images. First, the cover image must be more care-
`fully selected so that the stego-image will not broadcast
`the existence of an embedded message.
`When information is inserted into the LSBs of the
`raster data, the pointers to the color entries in the
`palette are changed. In an abbreviated example, a sim-
`ple four-color palette of white, red, blue, and green
`has corresponding palette position entries of 0 (00),
`1 (01), 2 (10), and 3 (11), respectively. The raster val-
`ues of four adjacent pixels of white, white, blue, and
`blue are 00 00 10 10. Hiding the binary value 1010
`for the number 10 changes the raster data to 01 00
`11 10, which is red, white, green, blue. These gross
`changes in the image are visible and clearly highlight
`the weakness of using 8-bit images. On the other hand,
`there is little visible difference noticed between adja-
`cent gray values, as Figure 2 shows.
`Implementing LSB. Steganography software pro-
`cesses LSB insertion to make the hidden information
`less detectable. For example, the EzStego tool arranges
`the palette to reduce the occurrence of adjacent index
`colors that contrast too much—before it inserts the
`message. This approach works quite well in gray-
`scale images and may work well in images with
`related colors.
`S-Tools, another steganography tool, takes a differ-
`ent approach by closely approximating the cover image,
`which may mean radical palette changes. As with 24-
`bit images, changing the pixels’ LSB may create new
`colors. (New colors may not be added to an 8-bit image
`due to the palette limit.) Instead, S-Tools reduces the
`number of colors while maintaining the image quality,
`so that the LSB changes do not drastically change color
`values.
`For example, eight color values are required for
`each color if values 000 through 111 are to be stored.
`Reducing the number of unique colors to 32 ensures
`that these values can be used and that the number of
`colors will not exceed 256 (256/8 = 32). Each of the
`32 unique colors in the palette may be expanded to
`eight colors having LSB values of the red, green, blue
`(RGB) triples ranging from 000 to 111. This results
`in multiple colors in the palette that look the same
`
`

`

`.
`
`Steganography’s
`niche in security is to
`supplement
`cryptography, not
`replace it. If a hidden
`message is
`encrypted, it must
`also be decrypted if
`discovered, which
`provides another
`layer of protection.
`
`marks, the object of communication is the cover.
`To create the watermarked image in Figure
`3, we increased the luminance of the masked
`area by 15 percent. If we were to change the
`luminance by a smaller percentage, the mask
`would be undetected by the human eye. Now
`we can use the watermarked image to hide
`plaintext or encoded information.
`Masking is more robust than LSB insertion
`with respect to compression, cropping, and
`some image processing. Masking techniques
`embed information in significant areas so that
`the hidden message is more integral to the cover
`image than just hiding it in the “noise” level.
`This makes it more suitable than LSB with, for
`instance, lossy JPEG images.
`Algorithms and transformations. LSB manip-
`ulation is a quick and easy way to hide infor-
`mation but is vulnerable to small changes resulting
`from image processing or lossy compression. Such
`compression is a key advantage that JPEG images have
`over other formats. High color quality images can be
`stored in relatively small files using JPEG compression
`methods; thus, JPEG images are becoming more abun-
`dant on the Internet.
`One steganography tool that integrates the com-
`pression algorithm for hiding information is Jpeg-
`Jsteg. Jpeg-Jsteg creates a JPEG stego-image from the
`input of a message to be hidden and a lossless cover
`image. According to the Independent JPEG Group,
`the JPEG software we tested has been modified for 1-
`bit steganography in JFIF output files, which are com-
`posed of lossy and nonlossy sections. The software
`combines the message and the cover images using the
`JPEG algorithm to create lossy JPEG stego-images.
`JPEG images use the discrete cosine transform to
`achieve compression. DCT6 is a lossy compression
`transform because the cosine values cannot be calcu-
`lated exactly, and repeated calculations using limited
`precision numbers introduce rounding errors into the
`final result. Variances between original data values
`and restored data values depend on the method used
`to calculate DCT. For details, see Wayne Brown and
`Barry Shepherd’s book on graphic file formats.7
`In addition to DCT, images can be processed with
`fast Fourier transformation and wavelet transforma-
`tion.8 Other image properties such as luminance can
`also be manipulated. Patchwork9 and similar techniques
`use redundant pattern encoding or spread spectrum
`methods10 to scatter hidden information throughout
`the cover images (“patchwork” is a method that marks
`image areas, or patches). These approaches may help
`protect against image processing such as cropping and
`rotating, and they hide information more thoroughly
`than by simple masking. They also support image
`manipulation more readily than tools that rely on LSB.
`
`In using redundant pattern encoding, you must
`trade off message size against robustness. For exam-
`ple, a small message may be painted many times over
`an image as shown in Figure 3 so that if the stego-
`image is cropped, there is a high probability that the
`watermark can still be read. A large message may be
`embedded only once because it would occupy a much
`greater portion of the image area.
`Other techniques encrypt and scatter the hidden
`data throughout an image. Scattering the message
`makes it appear more like noise. Proponents of this
`approach assume that even if the message bits are
`extracted, they will be useless without the algorithm
`and stego-key to decode them. For example, the White
`Noise Storm tool is based on spread spectrum tech-
`nology and frequency hopping, which scatters the
`message throughout the image. Instead of having x
`channels of communication that are changed with a
`fixed formula and passkey, White Noise Storm spreads
`eight channels within a random number generated by
`the previous window size and data channel. Each
`channel represents 1 bit, so each image window holds
`1 byte of information and many unused bits. These
`channels rotate, swap, and interlace among themselves
`to yield a different bit permutation. For instance, bit
`1 might be swapped with bit 7, or both bits may rotate
`one position to the right. The rules for swapping are
`dictated by the stego-key and by the previous win-
`dow’s random data (similar to DES block encryption).
`Scattering and encryption helps protect against hid-
`den message extraction but not against message
`destruction through image processing. A scattered
`message in the image’s LSBs is still as vulnerable to
`destruction from lossy compression and image pro-
`cessing as is a clear-text message inserted in the LSBs.
`Steganography’s niche in security is to supplement
`cryptography, not replace it. If a hidden message is
`encrypted, it must also be decrypted if discovered,
`which provides another layer of protection.
`
`EVALUATION EXAMPLES
`To determine the limitations and flexibility of avail-
`able software, we evaluated several steganographic
`packages. Here we discuss only three: StegoDos, White
`Noise Storm, and S-Tools for Windows. For details on
`other tools, see the sidebar “For More Information.”
`First, we selected message and cover files. In some
`cases, we had to alter the selected images to fit into the
`constraints of the software or had to use other cover
`images. In all, we tested 25 files as cover images. For pur-
`poses of this article, we discuss the results we obtained
`with only two message files and two cover image files.
`The first message file contained this plain text:
`
`Steganography is the art and science of communi-
`cating in a way which hides the existence of the
`
`30
`
`Computer
`
`

`

`.
`
`communication. In contrast to cryptography, where
`the “enemy” is allowed to detect, intercept and
`modify messages without being able to violate cer-
`tain security premises guaranteed by a cryptosys-
`tem, the goal of steganography is to hide messages
`inside other “harmless” messages in a way that does
`not allow any “enemy” to even detect that there is
`a second secret message present [Markus Kuhn
`1995-07-03].
`
`The second message file was an image, the satellite
`image shown in Figure 4.
`The cover images we used were Pierre-Auguste
`Renoir’s “Le Moulin de la Galette” as shown in Figure
`5 and a Droeshout engraving of William Shakespeare
`as shown in Figure 6.
`The image of Shakespeare is too small to contain the
`Airfield, but we embedded the text message without
`any image degradation. All the software we tested
`could handle the 518-byte plain-text message and
`embed it into the Shakespeare cover; however, some
`could not process the Renoir cover and Airfield images.
`
`Figure 4. The satellite image we tested is of a major Soviet strategic bomber base
`(http://edcwww.cr.usgs.gov/dclass).
`
`For More Information
`Additional readings, software, and
`resources are available at http://isse.gmu.
`edu/~njohnson/Steganography and http://
`patriot.net/~johnson/Steganography.
`Other tools are being developed that
`take advantage of emerging technologies
`and the understanding of steganography.
`Steganography applications are available
`on the Internet that run on a variety of
`platforms, including DOS, Windows,
`OS/2, Mac and Unix. Stego for the Mac,
`EzStego for Java, and Stego Online are
`steganography tools by Romana Machado
`(http://www.stego.com). Stego is limited
`to Pict files. EzStego and Stego Online,
`written in Java, are limited to 8-bit GIF
`images. Other applications now being
`developed take advantage of broader band
`multimedia transmissions such as video
`and voice.
`
`Steganography tools: Comments
`Henry Hastur has created two tools:
`Mandelsteg and Stealth. Mandelsteg gen-
`erates Mandelbrot fractal images. If a file
`name is passed as a parameter, the file is hid-
`den in the mandelbrot image. Mandelsteg
`does not manipulate any cover images other
`than the fractal images it creates (ftp://idea.
`
`sec.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/code/).
`Stealth (http://des.ex.ac.uk/~aba/stealth/)
`is not a steganographic program but is cou-
`pled with steganographic software on the
`Internet because it complements stegano-
`graphic methods. Stealth is a filter that
`strips off the PGP header in a PGP-
`encrypted file, leaving the encrypted data.
`Why is this important? Applying steganog-
`raphy to an encrypted message is more
`secure than a plain text message. How-
`ever, many encryption applications add
`header information to the encrypted mes-
`sage. This header information identifies the
`method used to encrypt the data. For
`example, if a cracker has identified hidden
`data in an image and has successfully
`extracted the encrypted message, a header
`for the encryption method would point the
`cracker in the right direction for additional
`cryptanalysis. But if the header is removed
`the cracker cannot determine the method
`for encryption. Some steganography
`programs provide this step in security,
`but others do not. Two that do are Ray
`Arachelian’s White Noise Storm (ftp://
`ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/
`steganography/wns210.zip) and Andy
`Brown’s S-Tools, at ftp://idea.sec.dsi.
`unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/code/s-tools3.
`
`zip (version 3), ftp://idea.sec.dsi.unimi.it/
`pub/security/crypt/code/s-tools4.zip (ver-
`sion 4).
`Hide and Seek by Colin Maroney had
`some problems with minimum image sizes
`(320 × 480). In version 4.1 of the software
`(ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypher-
`punks/steganography/hdsk41b.zip), if the
`image was smaller than the minimum,
`then the stego-image was padded with
`black space. If the cover image was larger,
`the stego-image was cropped to fit. In ver-
`sion 5.0, the same was true with minimum
`image sizes. If any image exceeded 1,024
`× 768, an error message was returned. The
`Hide and Seek Version 1.0 for Windows
`95 seems to have these issues resolved.
`
`Additional steganography tools
`StegoDos—Black Wolf’s Picture
`Encoder v0.90B; public domain: ftp://
`ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/
`steganography/stegodos.zip.
`Jpeg-Jsteg V4, ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/
`steganography.
`PictureMarc, Digimarc, Portland, Ore.,
`http://www.digimarc.com.
`SureSign, Signum Technologies, Chel-
`tenham, England, http://www.signumtech.
`com.
`
`February 1998
`
`31
`
`

`

`.
`
`image. Figure 7 illustrates this distortion when the text
`message is embedded.
`StegoDos uses LSBs to hide messages, and it is less
`successful than other tools. It also appends an end-of-
`file character to the end of the message. But even with
`the EOF character, the message retrieved from the
`altered image is very likely to contain garbage at the
`end. The original text file was 518 bytes. The extracted
`file was around 8 Kbytes, and most of it was garbage.
`
`White Noise Storm
`White Noise Storm is a very effective steganogra-
`phy application for DOS. We easily embedded the text
`message in the cover images and could detect no
`degradation. White Noise Storm could embed the
`Airfield into the Renoir cover image. However, there
`were problems with noise interfering with the image
`integrity, which severely shifted the image’s palette, as
`shown in Figure 8.
`White Noise Storm also includes an encryption rou-
`tine to randomize the bits within an image. (White
`Noise’s use of encryption with steganography is well
`integrated but beyond the scope of this article.) The
`software uses the LSB approach and applies this
`method to IBM Paintbrush (PCX) files. The software
`extracts the LSBs from the cover image and stores
`them in a file. The message is encrypted and applied
`to these bits to create a new set of LSBs. The modified
`bits are then injected into the cover image to create
`the new stego-image. The main disadvantage of apply-
`ing White Noise Storm’s encryption method to ste-
`ganography is the loss of many bits that can be used to
`hold information. Relatively large files must be used
`to hold the same amount of information that other
`methods provide with much smaller cover images.
`
`S-Tools
`S-Tools for Windows is the most versatile steganog-
`raphy tool of all that we tested. Version 3 includes pro-
`grams that process GIF and BMP images and audio
`WAV files. S-Tools will even hide information in the
`“unused” areas on floppy diskettes. Version 4 incorpo-
`rates image and sound file processing into a single pro-
`gram. In addition to supporting 24-bit images, S-Tools
`also includes encryption routines with many options.
`Although S-Tools applies the LSB method to both
`images and audio files, we tested only images. The user
`interface and prompts are easy to use, and the online
`documentation is well developed. A useful feature is
`a status line displaying the largest message size that
`can be stored in an open cover file. This avoids wast-
`ing time attempting to store a message that is too large
`for a cover.
`After the user hides the message, the software displays
`the new stego-image, and the user can toggle between
`the new and original images. At times the stego-image
`
`Figure 5. The Renoir cover file example (access http://www.hs.port.ac.uk/wm/paint/
`auth/renoir/moulin-galette/).
`
`Figure 7. The result of embedding the text in the
`Shakespeare cover with StegoDos.
`
`Figure 6. The Shakespeare cover
`file example (access http://daphne.
`palomar.edu/shakespeare/life.htm).
`
`StegoDos
`StegoDos is public-domain software that works
`only with 320 × 200-pixel images with 256 colors. It
`required too much effort when measured against the
`results we obtained. Message encoding and decoding
`required many steps, and we had to track the original
`and modified files. Decoding the message required a
`third-party program.
`Because of the size restrictions, the Airfield and the
`Renoir cover could not be used. We successfully hid
`the text message in the Shakespeare cover. Little dis-
`tortion occurred within the Shakespeare image itself,
`but it was cropped and fitted into a 320 × 200 pixel
`
`32
`
`Computer
`
`

`

`.
`
`may appear to be grossly distorted; however, after sav-
`ing the stego-image it looks nearly identical to the orig-
`inal. The distorted appearance may be due to memory
`limitations or a bug in S-Tools. On occasion a saved
`image was actually corrupted and could not be read.
`S-Tools provided the most impressive results of any
`package we tested because S-Tools maintained remark-
`able image integrity. We noticed no distortions when the
`text message was embedded in the Shakespeare cover.
`Similarly, S-Tools yielded the result closest to the origi-
`nal when we embedded the Airfield in the Renoir cover.
`S-Tools provides many options for hiding and
`encrypting data. The best covers are made from 24-bit
`images and are processed quickly in S-Tools 4.0. Figure
`9 shows the “after” image using a 24-bit BMP file. The
`original file contains 195,891 unique colors, while the
`resulting stego-image contains 312,340 unique colors.
`To the naked eye, these images are the same.
`S-Tools handles 8-bit images, such as GIF files, a bit
`differently. Two options are available: boost it to a 24-
`bit image or color reduction. To boost it to a 24-bit
`image, the cover image is converted from an 8-bit
`image to a 24-bit image. The result is similar to that
`of Figure 9.
`To apply color reduction instead, S-Tools creates an
`8-bit stego-image by hiding a message in the 8-bit cover.
`Before “spreading” the message across the LSBs of the
`color levels in the image, S-Tools tries to reduce the
`number of colors in the image. The reduction process
`allows colors to be spread over several byte ranges so
`that shifts of the LSBs cause little impact in the image
`resolution. Visually differentiating between a 256-color
`image and one reduced to 32 colors is difficult, accord-
`ing to Andy Brown.5
`Figure 10 illustrates the use of S-Tools on 8-bit
`images. First, we converted the original image to a GIF
`file. The conversion reduced the colors from 195,891
`unique colors to 248 unique colors. In the process of
`hiding the Airfield image, the 8-bit Renoir cover image
`was reduced from 248 to 32 unique colors. Even with
`these apparently severe modifications, the resulting
`s

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