Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 41 Filed 08/23/22 Page 1 of 36
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`SPEIR TECHNOLOGIES LTD.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Case No. 6:22-cv-00077-ADA
`
`v.
`
`APPLE INC.,
`
`Defendant.
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`PLAINTIFF SPEIR TECHNOLOGIES LTD.’S RESPONSIVE
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`APPLE 1018
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`1
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`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 41 Filed 08/23/22 Page 2 of 36
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1
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`II. DISPUTED TERMS ............................................................................................................... 1
`
`A. U.S. Patent Nos. 7,110,779 (“the ’779 Patent”) and 7,321,777 (“the ’777 Patent”) ...... 1
`
`i. “known device latency,” ’779 Patent, Claim 18; ’777 Patent Claims 1, 12, 20 ..... 1
`
`B. U.S. Patent No. 7,765,399 (“the ’399 Patent”) ............................................................... 4
`
`i. “human/machine interface”, Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 9 ......................................... 4
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`ii. “distinct”, Claims 1, 7, and 9 .................................................................................. 8
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`1. No construction of “distinct” is necessary.....................................................8
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`2. The ’399 Patent claims contradict Apple’s construction ...............................9
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`3. The specification and figures contradict Apple’s construction ...................11
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`4. The prosecution history does not support Apple’s construction .................13
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`iii. “classified” / “unclassified”, Claim 1, 7, and 9..................................................... 14
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`1. The terms “classified” and “unclassified” are not subjective terms of
`degree ..........................................................................................................15
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`2. The terms “classified” and “unclassified” are easily understood in light
`of the intrinsic evidence...............................................................................16
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`3. Apple’s indefiniteness arguments are misguided ........................................18
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`4. Apple’s proposed construction should be rejected ......................................19
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`iv. “The mobile PDA computer system according to claim 1”, Claim 7 ................... 20
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`v. “physically secure enclosure”, Claim 9 ................................................................ 21
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`C. U.S. Patent No. 8,345,780 (“the ’780 Patent”) ............................................................. 22
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`i. “short term” / “long term”, Claims 1, 9, and 12 ................................................... 22
`
`1. The ’780 Patent informs the scope of the invention with reasonable
`certainty .......................................................................................................23
`
`2. The prosecution history further informs the scope of the invention with
`reasonable certainty .....................................................................................26
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`ii. Apple’s proposed alternative construction is wrong ............................................. 27
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`iii. “self interference”, Claims 1, 9, and 12 ................................................................ 27
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`III. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 30
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`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 41 Filed 08/23/22 Page 3 of 36
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`AlexSam, Inc. v. Simon Prop. Grp. (Texas), L.P.,
`No. 2:19-CV-331-RWS-RSP, 2022 WL 807434 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2022) ........................... 12
`
`AlexSam, Inc. v. Simon Prop. Grp., L.P.,
`No. 2:19-CV-331-RWS-RSP, 2021 WL 7709964 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2021) ........................ 12
`
`Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc.,
`842 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .................................................................................................. 8
`
`Aristocrat Techs. Australia Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech.,
`709 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ................................................................................................ 11
`
`Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co.,
`441 F.3d 945 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .................................................................................................... 2
`
`CyWee Grp., Ltd. v. Huawei Device Co.,
`No. 2:17-CV-00495-WCB-RSP, 2018 WL 6419484 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2018) ...................... 23
`
`Energizer Holdings, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`435 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ................................................................................................ 20
`
`Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`No. 6:15-CV-01038, 2016 WL 7155294 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2016) ......................................... 19
`
`Epos Techs Ltd. v. Pegasus Techs.,
`766 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .......................................................................................... 11, 22
`
`Exmark Mfg. Co. v. Briggs & Stratton Power Prods.,
`879 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ................................................................................................ 25
`
`Fractus, S.A. v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
`No. 2:18-CV-00135-JRG, 2019 WL 1641357 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2019) ............................... 18
`
`Guangdong Alison Hi-Tech Co. v. Int’l Trade Com’n,
`936 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ................................................................................................ 25
`
`Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp.,
`755 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014 .......................................................................................... 1, 8, 19
`
`Jack Guttman, Inc. v. Kopykake Enters., Inc.,
`302 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ................................................................................................ 28
`
`Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instrus. Inc.,
`520 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................................................................................ 20
`
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`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 41 Filed 08/23/22 Page 4 of 36
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`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instrus., Inc.,
`572 U.S. 898 (2014) ............................................................................................................ 14, 23
`
`Niazi Licensing Corp. v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc.,
`30 F.4th 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ................................................................................................. 23
`
`One-E-Way, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`859 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ................................................................................................ 23
`
`Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd.,
`476 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ................................................................................................ 26
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .................................................................................................. 9
`
`Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc.,
`724 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .................................................................................................. 7
`
`Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. Polypap, S.A.R.L.,
`318 F.3d 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .................................................................................................. 5
`
`RetailMeNot, Inc. v. Honey Sci. Corp.,
`No. 18-937-CFC-MPT, 2019 WL 6337719 (D. Del. Nov. 27, 2019) ................................ 20, 21
`
`Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc.,
`174 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ................................................................................................ 10
`
`Ruckus Wireless, Inc. v. Innovative Wireless Sols., LLC,
`824 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................................ 21, 27
`
`Skedco, Inc. v. Strategic Operations, Inc.,
`685 F. App’x 956 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ........................................................................................... 10
`
`Sonix Tech. Co. v. Pubs. Int’l, Ltd.,
`844 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .................................................................................... 14, 18, 23
`
`Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ........................................................................................ 1, 6, 10
`
`Toshiba Corp. v. Imation Corp.,
`681 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ........................................................................................ 4, 5, 22
`
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) .................................................................................................. 28
`
`Vstream Techs., LLC v. PLR Holdings, LLC,
`No. 6:15-CV-974-JRG-JDL, 2016 WL 6159624 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2016) ........................... 16
`
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`4
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`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 41 Filed 08/23/22 Page 5 of 36
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`Vstream Techs., LLC v. PLR Holdings, LLC,
`No. 6:15CV974-JRG-JDL, 2016 WL 6211550 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2016) ............................. 16
`
`Wright Med. Tech., Inc. v. Osteonics Corp.,
`122 F.3d 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1997) .................................................................................................. 7
`
`WSOU Invs., LLC v. F5 Networks, Inc.,
`No. 2:20-CV-01878-BJR, 2022 WL 268825 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2022) .............................. 16
`
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`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 41 Filed 08/23/22 Page 6 of 36
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
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`Plaintiff Speir Technologies Ltd. (“Speir”) submits this responsive claim construction brief
`
`in response to Defendant Apple Inc.’s Opening Claim Construction Brief (Dkt. No. 36, “Br.”).
`
`II. DISPUTED TERMS
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`A. U.S. Patent Nos. 7,110,779 (“the ’779 Patent”) and 7,321,777 (“the ’777 Patent”)
`
`i. “known device latency,” ’779 Patent, Claim 18; ’777 Patent Claims 1, 12,
`20
`
`Speir’s Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary1
`
`Apple’s Proposed Construction
`“predetermined latency for the given device
`type of the target wireless communication
`device”
`
`
`
`The term “known device latency” should be construed in light of its plain and ordinary
`
`meaning. Claim terms “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning as understood
`
`by a person of ordinary skill in the art when read in the context of the specification and prosecution
`
`history.” Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “There
`
`are only two exceptions to this general rule: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his
`
`own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of the claim term either in the
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`specification or during prosecution.” Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371
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`(Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Apple maintains that “known device latency” must be
`
`“predetermined.” Br. at 3. But Apple does not point to any disclaimer or otherwise argue that the
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`patentee acted as its own lexicographer in proposing its unduly narrow construction. Thus, the
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`term’s plain and ordinary meaning controls.
`
`The teachings of the ’779 and ’777 Patent specifications undercut Apple’s proposed
`
`
`1 For terms/phrases where Speir has indicated that no construction is necessary, Speir contends
`that either no construction is necessary or the term should be construed according to its plain and
`ordinary meaning.
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`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 41 Filed 08/23/22 Page 7 of 36
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`construction. Specifically, the ’779 and ’777 Patents teach the following regarding the “known
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`device latency”:
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`[T]he controller 42 will have access to the known device latency (i.e., a mean
`latency) for the given device type of the target device 34, which provides a close
`approximation of the actual device latency tDL. The known device latency
`could be a measured value based upon collected data, it could be provided by
`manufacturers, or it could be based upon a value set in a communications standard,
`as discussed above, for example.
`
`
`See ’779 Patent at 7:12-19.2 The specification is clear that the “known device latency” provides
`
`“a close approximation of the actual device latency.” See also id., 7:25-29 (“[A] close
`
`approximation of the total propagation delay (i.e., time tPD1+time tPD2) may therefore be obtained
`
`by substituting the known device latency for the actual device latency tDL, and subtracting this
`
`value from the time between times t1 and t4.”). The specification is also clear that the “known
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`device latency” can “be a measured value based upon collected data.” A “known device latency”
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`that is “a measured value based upon collected data” is not “predetermined” (such as when the
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`value is “provided by manufacturers”), as required by Apple’s proposed construction. To that end,
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`Apple’s proposed construction excludes preferred embodiments and must be rejected. See Bicon,
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`Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (rejecting construction that “would be
`
`contrary to the specification, which describes the features of the claimed abutment in detail … in
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`the description of the preferred embodiments ….”).
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`Apple is wrong that Speir seeks to construe “known device latency” as “actual device
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`latency.” Br. at 5. There is no dispute that the ’779 and ’777 Patents distinguish “known device
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`latency” from “actual device latency.” For context, the ’779 and ’777 Patents describe the “round
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`trip” timing between the start of transmission of a location finding signal from the wireless device
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`2 All emphasis added unless stated otherwise.
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`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 41 Filed 08/23/22 Page 8 of 36
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`locator (WDL) to a target device and the complete reception at the WDL of the target device’s
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`reply. Figure 3 of the ’779 and ’777 Patents is illustrative:
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`
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`’779 Patent, Fig. 3. The “round trip” timing includes the following transmission components: (1)
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`the time it takes at the WDL “from the beginning of the location finding signal transmission (time
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`t0) to end thereof (time t1),” id., 6:53-54; (2) the propagation delay (tPD1) from the WDL to the
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`target “(i.e., from time t1 to t2),” id., 6:60-62; (3) the propagation delay from the target back to the
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`WDL (tPD2) “(i.e., from time t3 to t4),” id., 6:67 – 7:1; and (4) the reception time by the WDL “(i.e.,
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`from time t4 to t5),” id., 7:2-3. The time from t2 to t3 is the “actual device latency” (tDL), the time
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`taken at the target device to “receive, process, and transmit a reply signal,” id., 6:62-66. The
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`“actual device latency” “will likely vary somewhat from one transmission to the next for any
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`wireless communications device, potentially by as little as a few nanoseconds to a few
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`microseconds, depending upon device configurations, processing loads, etc.” Id., 7:20-25. In
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`other words, the “actual device latency” will not always be consistent, or readily determined.
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`Instead of the “actual device latency,” the ’779 and ’777 Patents provide for the “known
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`device latency” to “provide[] a close approximation of the actual device latency.” Id., 7:13-15;
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`see also id., 7:25-29 (“[A] close approximation of the total propagation delay (i.e., time tPD1+time
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`tPD2) may therefore be obtained by substituting the known device latency for the actual device
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`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 41 Filed 08/23/22 Page 9 of 36
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`latency tDL ….”). As noted above, the specification describes how the “known device latency”
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`may be obtained: “The known device latency could be a measured value based upon collected
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`data, it could be provided by manufacturers, or it could be based upon a value set in a
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`communications standard, as discussed above, for example.” Id., 7:15-19. These three sources
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`for the “known device latency” are each exemplary, do not limit the “known device latency” to a
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`predetermined value, and are distinguished from the “actual device latency.” There is no
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`disavowal, either explicitly or implicitly, in the patents that would suggest that the “known device
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`latency” cannot be actively determined, including from “a measured value based upon collected
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`data.” See Toshiba Corp. v. Imation Corp., 681 F.3d 1358, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Absent
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`disclaimer or lexicography, the plain meaning of the claim controls.”). Because the ’779 and ’777
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`Patents clearly contemplate approximations of the “device latency” that are not predetermined,
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`Apple’s construction should be rejected.
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`Apple’s proposed construction is also wrong because the ’779 and ’777 Patent specification
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`does not use the term “predetermined” with respect to “known device latency.” This is notable
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`because the specification uses “predetermined” in at least one other context, but does not use the
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`term in connection with “known device latency.” See ’779 Patent at 1:35-40 (“[I]n one
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`embodiment, … a plurality of locator signals may be sent from a locator at a standard repetition
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`rate. The locator’s receiver then only listens for responses during predetermined windows
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`following each transmission.”). Accordingly, Apple’s proposed construction is unjustified and the
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`plain and ordinary meaning should govern.
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`B. U.S. Patent No. 7,765,399 (“the ’399 Patent”)
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`i. “human/machine interface”, Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 9
`
`Speir’s Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary
`
`
`Apple’s Proposed Construction
`“an interface by which a user inputs
`information to, and receives information,
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`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 41 Filed 08/23/22 Page 10 of 36
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`
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`The parties agree that the plain and ordinary meaning applies to the term “human/machine
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`from a device”
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`interface” (“HMI”). Br. at 6. However, the parties disagree whether the secure and non-secure
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`HMI must be a single “interface” that is capable of inputting and outputting information.3 That is,
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`Apple maintains that the secure/non-secure HMIs must each comprise a single component capable
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`of both inputting and outputting information to a user. Apple’s proposed construction is wrong—
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`it imports extraneous limitations, excludes preferred embodiments, contradicts the intrinsic
`
`evidence, and is otherwise redundant of the surrounding claim language.
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`“Claim construction begins with the words of the claim.” Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. Polypap,
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`S.A.R.L., 318 F.3d 1143, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Independent claims 1, 9, and 12 all expressly
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`require that the secure and non-secure HMI’s “enabl[e] bi-directional communication” of
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`information. See ’399 Patent at Claims 1, 9, and 12. However, contrary to Apple’s proposed
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`construction, the claims do not require that the “bi-directional” communication of information
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`utilize only a single “interface.” “Absent disclaimer or lexicography, the plain meaning of the
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`claim controls.” See Toshiba, 681 F.3d at 1369. There is no definition or disavowal that justifies
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`limiting the ordinary meaning of the term to Apple’s narrow construction of a single HMI interface.
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`Apple’s proposed construction is contradicted by Figures 4 and 5 of the ’399 Patent and
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`related disclosures. Both Figures 4 and 5 show that the secure and non-secure HMIs may comprise
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`of several components for enabling “bi-directional” communication of information:
`
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`3 Apple’s suggestion that Speir accuses only “one half of a human/machine interface’s claimed
`functionality” is wrong. Br. at 7. Apple mischaracterizes Speir’s infringement contentions. As
`detailed in Speir’s claim charts, Speir accuses functionality in the accused products that includes
`“bi-directional communication.” See, e.g., Ex. 1 (’399 Claim Chart) at 28-49.
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`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 41 Filed 08/23/22 Page 11 of 36
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`
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`For example, with respect to Figure 4, the ’399 Patent specification teaches that “[n]on-secure
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`HMI 310 can include a conventional color display 416 and touch screen controller 414…. [and]
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`can also include a keypad/pointing device 412.” ’399 Patent at 6:44-47. Similarly, with respect
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`to Figure 5 the ’399 Patent teaches:
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`Referring now to FIG. 5, it can be observed that the secure HMI 308 can be
`comprised of several components. For example, secure HMI 308 can include one
`or more input devices which allow a user to input control commands and input data.
`According to one embodiment, these input devices can include a pointing
`keypad/pointing device 508 and a touch screen controller 510. However, the
`invention is not limited in this regard. The secure HMI 308 can also include a
`display 512, which can present alphanumeric and graphical data. The display 512
`can be a color or monochrome type display. Further, one or more data ports (not
`shown) can be provided as part of the human/machine interface.
`
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`’399 Patent at 7:62 – 8:13.
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`Based on the forgoing, the ’399 Patent is clear that (1) the secure and non-secure HMIs
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`may comprise of multiple components and (2) the component that inputs data may be different
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`from the component that outputs data. That is, a user may use a “keypad” for inputting data and a
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`“display” may be used to output data. Thus, Apple’s proposed construction that the secure and
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`non-secure HMI constitute a single interface is an extraneous limitation that is not supported by
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`the teachings of the ’399 Patent. See Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366 (“We do not read limitations from
`
`the specification into claims; we do not redefine words.”). Relatedly, Apple’s proposed
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`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 41 Filed 08/23/22 Page 12 of 36
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`construction excludes the preferred embodiments of Figures 4 and 5 and is therefore incorrect as
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`a matter of law. See, e.g., Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., 724 F.3d 1343, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
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`(proposed construction “would improperly limit the broadly drafted claims to one preferred
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`embodiment (thereby excluding others) or would be the result of improperly importing a limitation
`
`from the specification into the claims.”).
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`Further, dependent claims 2, 3, 4, and 5 also undercut Apple’s proposed construction. For
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`example, dependent claim 2 recites that the secure HMI of claim 1 “comprises at least one input
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`device to allow said user to control the secure user processor.” ’399 Patent, Claim 2. Dependent
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`claim 3 (which depends on claims 1 and 2), recites that the secure HMI of claims 1 and 2 further
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`“comprises at least one output device to allow the secure user processor to inform said user.” Id.,
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`Claim 3. Dependent claims 4 and 5 recite the same limitations regarding the use of at least one
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`“input” and at least one “output” device for the non-secure HMI. Id., Claims 4 and 5. The fact
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`that these dependent claims contemplate the use of “at least one” “input” or “output” device for
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`the secure and non-secure HMIs underscores that the HMIs recited in independent claim 1 are
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`understood to cover (1) one or more interfaces and (2) the use of separate input and output devices
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`for the HMIs. Thus, contrary to Apple’s proposed construction, the term “human/machine
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`interface” is not limited to a single interface of inputting and outputting information. See Wright
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`Med. Tech., Inc. v. Osteonics Corp., 122 F.3d 1440, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“we must not interpret
`
`an independent claim in a way that is inconsistent with a claim which depends from it.”).
`
`
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`Finally, Apple’s proposed construction adds redundancy to the ’399 Patent claims and is
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`not helpful to the jury. As noted above, the ’399 Patent claims already require that the secure and
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`non-secure HMIs enable “bi-directional” communication of information. However, under Apple’s
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`proposal, the term “human machine interface” requires that a user “input” and “receive”
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`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 41 Filed 08/23/22 Page 13 of 36
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`information, which adds redundancy to the claims and renders the “bi-directional communication”
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`limitation superfluous. See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1238 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2016) (rejecting proposed construction because “construing a claim term to include features of that
`
`term that are already recited in the claims would make those expressly recited features
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`redundant.”). Apple’s proposed construction should be rejected.
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`ii. “distinct”, Claims 1, 7, and 9
`
`Speir’s Proposed Construction
`No construction necessary
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`Apple improperly seeks a construction of “distinct” in Claims 1 and 9 to require the secure
`
`Apple’s Proposed Construction
`“physically separate”
`
`
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`HMI and non-secure HMI to be “physically separate”—a requirement that is expressly
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`contradicted by the intrinsic record. Further, Apple requests that the Court also construe dependent
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`Claim 7 to require the first and second “file system[s]” be “physically separate.” But Claim 7
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`already requires that the two file systems be distinct “so as to provide physical separation,”
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`meaning Apple’s proposed construction is redundant and renders that claim language superfluous.
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`The Court should reject Apple’s proposed construction because it is contradicted by the intrinsic
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`record, imports extraneous limitations, and is unhelpful to the jury.
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`1. No construction of “distinct” is necessary
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`Courts “depart from the plain and ordinary meaning of claim terms based on the
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`specification in only two instances: lexicography and disavowal.” Hill-Rom, 755 F.3d at 1371.
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`Apple cannot identify any definition or disavowal that justifies limiting the ordinary meaning of
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`“distinct” to its unduly narrow construction—there is nothing in the intrinsic record that precludes
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`the HMIs from sharing any physical components.
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`Further, the term “distinct” is a word that is readily understandable by the jury and does
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`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 41 Filed 08/23/22 Page 14 of 36
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`not require construction. Contrary to Apple’s proposal, the term “distinct” is not readily
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`understood to require complete and total “physical separation” between two objects:
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`• “distinct”: “distinguishable to the eye or mind as being discrete or not the same.” Ex.
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`2 (Merriam-Webster Dictionary).
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`• “distinct”: “distinguished as not being the same; not identical; separate” or “different
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`in nature or quality; dissimilar.” Ex. 3 (dictionary.com).
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`See also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“the ordinary meaning of
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`claim language … may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases
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`involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood
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`words…. In such circumstances, general purpose dictionaries may be helpful.”). Indeed, Apple’s
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`own cited dictionary definitions further demonstrate that the term “distinct” does not require
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`“physical separation”:
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`• “distinct”: “1. Readily distinguishable from all others…; 3. clearly defined….” Ex. 4
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`(The American Heritage Dictionary at -199); Ex. 5 (Webster’s II New College
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`Dictionary at -471) (same).
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`• “distinct”: “1. Recognizably different in nature from something else of a similar
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`type….” Ex. 6 (The Oxford American College Dictionary at -235).4
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`Because the term “distinct” is not readily understood to require total and complete “physical
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`separation,” there is no reason to depart from its plain and ordinary meaning.
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`2. The ’399 Patent claims contradict Apple’s construction
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`Claims 1 and 9 of the ’399 Patent recite that the secure HMI is “distinct” from the non-
`
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`4 While the Oxford American College Dictionary does include “physically separate” as a potential
`definition of “distinct,” it is not the only definition provided which underscores that “distinct” can
`mean something less than “physical separate.” Id.
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`14
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`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 41 Filed 08/23/22 Page 15 of 36
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`secure HMI, but are otherwise silent as to whether the HMIs are required to otherwise be
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`“physically separate.” To that end, it is improper to limit the scope of Claims 1 and 9 to require
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`complete and total physical separation of the secure and non-secure HMIs when the claims are
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`otherwise silent. See, e.g., Skedco, Inc. v. Strategic Operations, Inc., 685 F. App’x 956, 959 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2017) (“nothing in the claims requires the pump and valve to be physically separated.”);
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`Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1367 (“The patentee is free to choose a broad term and expect to obtain the
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`full scope of its plain and ordinary meaning ….”).
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`Dependent Claims 7 and 18 make clear that the patentee knew how to write claims that
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`require physical separation between certain claimed components and deliberately decided not to
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`require that the secure and non-secure HMIs be “physically separate” in Claims 1 and 9.
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`Specifically, Claim 7 provides:
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`The mobile PDA computer system according to claim 1, further comprising a first
`file system exclusively accessible to said secure user processor for storing classified
`data and a second file system for storing unclassified data, said second file system
`distinct from said first file system so as to provide physical separation of said
`classified data from said unclassified data within said portable mobile computing
`device.
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`Dependent Claim 18 also requires that the first and second file systems be “distinct” in order to
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`“provid[e] physical separation of [] classified data from [] unclassified data.” If the patentee
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`desired to require the secure and non-secure HMIs be “physically separate,” the patentee could
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`have written Claims 1 and 9 with that express requirement, as it did in Claims 7 and 18 with respect
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`to the first and second file systems. See Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 1305
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`(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Had Rodime intended or desired to claim thermal compensation as a function
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`of the positioning means in the asserted claims, it could have done it explicitly, as in claim 11.”).
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`
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`Additionally, because Claims 7 and 18 already require that the first and second file systems
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`be “physical[ly] seprat[e],” a construction of “distinct” as “physically separate” merely adds
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`15
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`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 41 Filed 08/23/22 Page 16 of 36
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`redundancy to Claims 7 and 18 and improperly renders the Claims’ express requirement of
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`physical separateness superfluous. See, e.g., Aristocrat Techs. Australia Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game
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`Tech., 709 F.3d 1348, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (declining to adopt proposed construction because
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`it would render another limitation “superfluous”). As such, Apple’s proposed construction is
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`unhelpful to the jury and should be rejected.
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`3. The specification and figures contradict Apple’s construction
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`Apple’s proposed construction is expressly contradicted by the ’399 Patent specification
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`and figures. Specifically, the ’399 Patent contemplates that the secure HMI and non-secure HMI
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`may share physical components, such as “power supply lines”:
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`According to one embodiment of the invention, the secure HMI 308 can be at least
`partially contained within a shielded enclosure. Moreover, the power supply lines
`for the secure HMI 308 can be filtered to ensure that signals associated with secure
`processor 302 are not communicated along the power supply lines back to the non-
`secure processor 306.
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`’399 Patent at 7:48-53. Certainly, if the non-secure and secure HMIs can share “power supply
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`lines,” then the HMIs are not “physically separate.” To that end, Apple’s proposed construction
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`would improperly limit the claims to exclude preferred embodiments and must be rejected. See,
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`e.g., Epos Techs Ltd. v. Pegasus Techs., 766 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (a “claim
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`construction that excludes a preferred embodiment … is rarely, if ever correct and would require
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`highly persuasive evidentiary support.”) (citation omitted).
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`
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`Additionally, Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate that the secure and non-secure HMIs may
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`comprise multiple “physical” components and do not preclude the possibility that any of these
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`HMI components may be shared by the two HMIs or otherwise share physical components (such
`
`as “power supply lines”):
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`16
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`Case 6:22-cv-00077-ADA Document 41 Filed 08/23/22 Page 17 of 36
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`
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`Rather, Apple’s proposed construction injects ambiguity and invites endless line-drawing
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`exercises for purposes of determining how much “physical separateness” is required between the
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`components of secure and non-secure HMIs. See, e.g., AlexSam, Inc. v. Simon Prop. Grp., L.P.,
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`No. 2:19-CV-331-RWS-RSP, 2021 WL 7709