Case 6:21-cv-00816-ADA Document 39 Filed 04/01/22 Page 1 of 24
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
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`WAG ACQUISITION, L.L.C.,
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`– against –
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`GOOGLE LLC and
`YOUTUBE, INC.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`Defendants.
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`§
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`§
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`No. 6:21-cv-00816-ADA
`Patent Case
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`PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
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`Amazon / WAG Acquisition
`Exhibit 1025
`Page 1
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00816-ADA Document 39 Filed 04/01/22 Page 2 of 24
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`“as required to maintain about a predetermined number of media data elements”
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`“each sending is at a transmission rate as fast as the data connection between the
`server system and each requesting user system allows” (ʼ824 Patent, claims 1, 5,
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`“all of the media data elements that are sent by the server system to the
`requesting user systems are sent from the data structure under the control of the
`server system as the media data elements were first stored therein” (ʼ824 Patent,
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`“supplying, at the server system, media data elements representing the program”
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`
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`VI.
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`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................... ii
`I.
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1
`II.
`BACKGROUND .................................................................................................. 1
`A. Technological Overview ....................................................................................... 1
`III.
`LEGAL PRINCIPLES ........................................................................................ 4
`IV.
`ATTORNEY STATEMENTS IN MEET AND CONFERS ............................ 6
`V.
`DISPUTED CONSTRUCTIONS ....................................................................... 7
`A.
`(ʼ594 Patent, claims 1, 6, 11) (alleged indefinite) ................................................. 7
`“a predetermined number of media data elements” (ʼ594 Patent, claims 1, 6, 11) 9
`B.
`“the media source” (ʼ594 Patent, claims 1, 6, 11) ............................................... 11
`C.
`D.
`9; ʼ636 Patent, claims 1, 5, 9) (alleged indefinite) .............................................. 13
`E.
`claims 1, 5, 9; ʼ636 Patent, claims 1, 5, 9) (alleged indefinite) ........................... 16
`F.
`(ʼ824 Patent, claims 1, 5, 9; ʼ636 Patents, claims 1, 5, 9) ................................... 17
`CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 18
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`
`
`i
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`Amazon / WAG Acquisition
`Exhibit 1025
`Page 2
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`Case 6:21-cv-00816-ADA Document 39 Filed 04/01/22 Page 3 of 24
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`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`PAGE(S)
`
`Cases
`
`
`3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp.,
`
`725 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2013).......................................................................................... 5
`
`Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.,
`
`No. 2:15-CV-1455-WCB, 2016 WL 7210837 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2016) ..................... 10
`
`Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co.,
`
`927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ......................................................................................... 9
`
`Azure Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC,
`
`771 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ......................................................................................... 4
`
`BASF Corp. v. Johnson Matthey Inc.,
`
`875 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017).......................................................................................... 6
`
`Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc.,
`
`783 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ......................................................................................... 7
`
`Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp.,
`
`543 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008).......................................................................................... 9
`
`Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp.,
`
`156 F.3d 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ......................................................................................... 4
`
`CUPP Cybersecurity, LLC v. Trend Micro, Inc.,
`
`No. 3:18-cv-1251- M, 2021 WL 5865393 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2021) ............................ 17
`
`Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc.,
`
`417 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005).......................................................................................... 7
`
`David Netzer Consulting Eng’r LLC v. Shell Oil Co.,
`
`824 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2016).......................................................................................... 19
`
`Application of Eltgroth,
`
`419 F.2d 918 (C.C.P.A. 1970) ......................................................................................... 15
`
`Epos Techs. Ltd. v. Pegasus Techs. Ltd.,
`
`766 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014).......................................................................................... 5
`
`Immersion Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc.,
`
`No. 2:17-CV-572-JRG, 2018 WL 5005791 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2018) ........................... 10
`
`ii
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`Amazon / WAG Acquisition
`Exhibit 1025
`Page 3
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`Case 6:21-cv-00816-ADA Document 39 Filed 04/01/22 Page 4 of 24
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`Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.,
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`766 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014).......................................................................................... 7
`
`Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
`
`358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004)............................................................................................ 4
`
`Max Blu Techs., LLC v. Cinedigm Corp.,
`
`No. 2:15-CV-1369-JRG, 2016 WL 3688801 (E.D. Tex. July 12, 2016) ........................ 11
`
`Media Rts. Techs., Inc. v. Cap. One Fin. Corp.,
`
`800 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2015)........................................................................................ 17
`
`Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`
`572 U.S. 898 (2014) ....................................................................................................... 6, 8
`
`Neodron, Ltd. v. Fujitsu Am., Inc.,
`
`No. 220CV00239JRGRSP, 2021 WL 2646214 (E.D. Tex. June 28, 2021) ................... 10
`
`Oatey Co. v. IPS Corp.,
`
`514 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2008).......................................................................................... 5
`
`Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd.,
`
`476 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2007).......................................................................................... 9
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
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`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ..................................................................... 4, 7
`
`Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
`
`574 U.S. 318 (2015) ........................................................................................................... 7
`
`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,
`
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012).......................................................................................... 5
`
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
`
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996)............................................................................................ 5
`
`W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc.,
`
`721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ....................................................................................... 10
`
`
`iii
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`Amazon / WAG Acquisition
`Exhibit 1025
`Page 4
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`Case 6:21-cv-00816-ADA Document 39 Filed 04/01/22 Page 5 of 24
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
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`U.S. Patent Nos. 9,742,824 (Compl. Ex. A) (the “’824 Patent”); 9,729,594 (Compl. Ex.
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`B) (the “’594 Patent”); and 9,762,636 (Compl. Ex. C) (the “’636 Patent”) to Harold Price
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`(collectively, the “Asserted Patents”), disclose and claim systems and methods for distributing
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`audio-visual media over the Internet. The Asserted Patents each claim priority to provisional
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`application no. 60/231,997, dated September 12, 2000. They share similar disclosures, but claim
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`different aspects of the disclosure.
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`WAG holds full title to the Asserted Patents and accuses Defendants Google LLC and
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`YouTube, Inc. (“Defendants” or “Google”) of infringing (1) claims 1-17 of the ’594 Patent; (2)
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`claims 1-12 of the ’636 Patent; and (3) claim 1-12 of the ’824 Patent (collectively, the “Asserted
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`Claims”). WAG believes that the language of the claims is clear and that the Disputed Terms
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`require no construction.
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`II.
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`BACKGROUND
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`A. Technological Overview
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`The Asserted Claims address the problem of how to achieve the perception of immediate
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`startup (“Instant-On”) of Internet streaming when the user clicks on an audio-visual media
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`stream, as well as thereafter maintaining uninterrupted delivery. See, e.g., ’594 Patent, 3:45-58
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`(“respond on demand without objectionable buffering delay”); see also id., 6:15-18 (“Immediate
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`playing on a user’s computer is afforded”).
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`Audio and visual media transmitted over a computer network are simply streams of data
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`– sets of time-sequenced data elements. Id., 6:30-32. When delivered over the network, the data
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`stream flows from the source (server) to the player (client) for playback. Id., 6:59-65.
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`A problem arises when the aim is to distribute a media program via streaming over the
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`Internet, as opposed to transferring (downloading) an entire recorded version of the program and
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`Plaintiff’s Responsive Claim Construction Brief (Amazon)
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` Page 1
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`Amazon / WAG Acquisition
`Exhibit 1025
`Page 5
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`Case 6:21-cv-00816-ADA Document 39 Filed 04/01/22 Page 6 of 24
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`playing it back after the entire recording has been transferred, because the Internet is a patchwork
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`of relayed connections and, while it can work well for delivering data, does not guarantee timely
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`delivery of data between nodes. See, e.g., ’594 Patent, 2:34-38 (citing “delays and losses that are
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`inherent in many Internet protocols), 3:5-6, 5:7-15. The Internet can ensure that all data items
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`will be delivered, but cannot assure when any individual item will arrive. Thus, since media
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`programming relies on time-sequenced data, the Internet is inherently susceptible to transmission
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`delays of varying magnitude, for delivering such programming. See Declaration of Keith Teruya,
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`(“Teruya Decl.”) ¶ 12-18 (Ex. A).1
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`Internet delivery delays result (inter alia) from transient congestion and contention at
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`routing nodes. Larger delays in data transit potentially result in sustained interruptions for the
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`data consumer (see, e.g., ’594 Patent, 2:38-42). Internet delivery delay of a stream can result in a
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`stuttering startup and frequent recurring interruptions. See id., 6:11-12 (“startup delays and
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`dropouts”).
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`A long-standing partial solution is to add a buffer to the client device. Id., 2:42-45.
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`Allowing the client-side buffer first to receive and accumulate a portion of the stream, amounting
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`to, e.g., 30 seconds’ worth of data, before beginning playback, allows the playback to withstand
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`up to 30 seconds (cumulatively) of transmission delays before the client-side buffer runs out of
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`data, which if it occurred would cause a playback interruption. See, e.g., id., 3:16-27. The
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`drawback of this approach is the need to wait on streaming startup in order to fill the client-side
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`buffer in advance, before playback can begin. See id., 2:50-55. This startup delay was the
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`“hourglass” streaming experience that was prevalent before Plaintiff’s patents, and it was very
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`1 The Teruya Declaration is of course extrinsic evidence. Plaintiff has not submitted that
`declaration to argue its claim construction positions, but rather has limited it to only those points
`where it believes technical expert input will be of assistance to the Court.
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`Plaintiff’s Responsive Claim Construction Brief (Amazon)
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`Amazon / WAG Acquisition
`Exhibit 1025
`Page 6
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`Case 6:21-cv-00816-ADA Document 39 Filed 04/01/22 Page 7 of 24
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`frustrating to users, severely limiting the marketability of programming streamed over the
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`Internet. Id., 3:35-41.
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`In one embodiment (referred to herein as the “buffering” embodiment), Harold Price’s
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`invention uses two buffers, one on the server side, and one on the client side, which interact in a
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`particular way. See ’594 Patent, 8:1-26. The server waits until the server-side buffer is full before
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`sending this data to the client. In this embodiment, the buffer operates on a first-in-first-out
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`(FIFO) basis – starting delivery back from the point the data was buffered from – so that there is
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`a block of accumulated data at the server that can be sent quickly in order to jump-start the
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`transmission to the client. See, e.g., id., 9:36-45; Teruya Decl. ¶ 20.
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`In a separate embodiment (see ’594 Patent, 14:42-15:18), which is the embodiment most
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`pertinent to the claims asserted in this case, the pace of transmission of a stream can instead be
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`regulated by player requests for elements of the stream. This is referred to herein as the “pull”
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`embodiment. In the pull embodiment, streaming data elements are accumulated on the server
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`side from a media source (similar to the “buffer” in the above-described embodiment), and are
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`each associated with serial identifiers. In the pull embodiment, the player monitors the state of its
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`own buffer, including without limitation the level of the buffer and what elements it needs for
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`continuous playback, and requests them from the server by their serial identifiers, as needed to
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`provide uninterrupted playback. So long as the connection allows each element to be sent in less
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`time than it takes to play it back, this technique, referred to as “pull,” also serves as an effective
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`stream control mechanism. The first so-identified element in this embodiment corresponds to the
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`initial buffer-load of data in the buffering embodiment, and its rapid transfer likewise jump-starts
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`the filling of the player buffer and the ability to begin playback, providing a startup benefit
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`comparable to that provided by the buffering embodiment. See Teruya Decl. ¶ 22.
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`Plaintiff’s Responsive Claim Construction Brief (Amazon)
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` Page 3
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`Amazon / WAG Acquisition
`Exhibit 1025
`Page 7
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`Case 6:21-cv-00816-ADA Document 39 Filed 04/01/22 Page 8 of 24
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`III. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
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`Claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meaning. Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
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`415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Azure Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC, 771 F.3d
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`1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“There is a heavy presumption that claim terms carry their
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`accustomed meaning in the relevant community at the relevant time.”) (internal quotations and
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`citation omitted), vacated on other grounds, 575 U.S. 959 (2015). The plain and ordinary
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`meaning of a term is the “meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the
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`art in question at the time of the invention.” Philips, 415 F.3d at 1313.
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`“‘Although the specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed
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`claim language, particular embodiments and examples appearing in the specification will not
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`generally be read into the claims.’” Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182,
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`1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571
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`(Fed. Cir. 1988)). “[I]t is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment described in
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`the specification—even if it is the only embodiment—into the claims absent a clear indication in
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`the intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claims to be so limited.” Liebel-Flarsheim Co.
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`v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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`The “only two exceptions to [the] general rule” that claim terms are construed according
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`to their plain and ordinary meaning are when the patentee (1) acts as his/her own lexicographer
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`or (2) disavows the full scope of the claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.
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`Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). To act as
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`his/her own lexicographer, the patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim
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`term,” and “clearly express an intent to define the term.” Id. (internal quotations and citations
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`omitted). To disavow the full scope of a claim term, the patentee’s statements in the specification
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`or prosecution history must represent “a clear disavowal of claim scope.” Id. at 1366 (internal
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`Plaintiff’s Responsive Claim Construction Brief (Amazon)
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`quotations and citations omitted). When “an applicant’s statements are amenable to multiple
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`reasonable interpretations, they cannot be deemed clear and unmistakable.” 3M Innovative
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`Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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`Further, absent clear disclaimer in the specification or prosecution history, it is improper
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`to “interpret claim terms in a way that excludes embodiments disclosed in the specification.”
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`Oatey Co. v. IPS Corp., 514 F.3d 1271, 1277-78 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Epos Techs. Ltd. v.
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`Pegasus Techs. Ltd., 766 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
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`Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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`A claim, when viewed in light of the intrinsic evidence, must “inform those skilled in the
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`art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig
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`Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 910 (2014). Whether a claim is indefinite is determined from the
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`perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art as of the time the application for the patent was
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`filed. Id. at 908. As it is a challenge to the validity of a patent, the failure of any claim in suit to
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`comply with § 112 must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. BASF Corp. v. Johnson
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`Matthey Inc., 875 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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`When a term of degree is used in a claim, “the court must determine whether the patent
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`provides some standard for measuring that degree.” Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc.,
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`783 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). Similarly, when a subjective
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`term is used, the court must determine whether the patent's specification supplies some objective
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`standard for measuring the scope and boundaries of the term. See Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL,
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`Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d
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`1342, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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`Plaintiff’s Responsive Claim Construction Brief (Amazon)
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` Page 5
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`Amazon / WAG Acquisition
`Exhibit 1025
`Page 9
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`Case 6:21-cv-00816-ADA Document 39 Filed 04/01/22 Page 10 of 24
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`Extrinsic evidence can also be useful in claim interpretation, but it is “‘less significant
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`than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.’”
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`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 862
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`(Fed. Cir. 2004)); see also Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 331-32 (2015)
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`(reliance on extrinsic evidence directed to “evidentiary underpinnings” of a claim interpretation).
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`IV. ATTORNEY STATEMENTS IN MEET AND CONFERS
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`WAG has two parallel cases in this Court, but this section of the present brief concerns
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`only WAG’s case against Google et al. (not WAG’s case against Amazon). Google appears to
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`have a different view about the meet and confer process than Plaintiff. Plaintiff met and
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`conferred with Google’s counsel in a good faith to attempt to narrow terms in dispute in this
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`case. In those meet and confer sessions, Google inappropriately insisted on turning these
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`discussions into a process of obtaining and making a written record of the parties’ claim
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`construction arguments. Such discussions are not part of the file history of the patents and they
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`are not evidence about the meaning of the terms. After Google’s counsel one-sidedly sent a
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`written record that it created of the first such discussion, Plaintiff’s counsel told Google’s
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`counsel that this was inappropriate and that discussions would need to be limited to the stated
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`purpose of whether terms in dispute could be narrowed. Google now uses this to argue claim
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`construction based on Plaintiff’s alleged “silence” about the meaning of terms.
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`Without any authority, under the rubric of “meet and confer,” Google propounded what
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`amounted to written interrogatories concerning claim construction arguments. Not satisfied that
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`Plaintiff objected to the same, its counsel then opted to submit an attorney declaration in the
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`present briefing, attaching Google’s email record of the meet & confer process. See Exhibit A to
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`the Declaration of Cameron Vanderwall, D.I. 37-2. Plaintiff respectfully submits that this
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`submission of M&C correspondence is inappropriate and should be ignored or stricken. Plaintiff
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`Plaintiff’s Responsive Claim Construction Brief (Amazon)
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`Amazon / WAG Acquisition
`Exhibit 1025
`Page 10
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`Case 6:21-cv-00816-ADA Document 39 Filed 04/01/22 Page 11 of 24
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`does not believe it needs to respond herein to the various statements in Google’s opening claim
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`construction brief about meet and confer discussions.
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`V.
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`DISPUTED CONSTRUCTIONS2
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`A. “as required to maintain about a predetermined number of media data elements”
`(ʼ594 Patent, claims 1, 6, 11) (alleged indefinite)
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`Terms such as “about” or “approximately” are not inherently definite or indefinite, since
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`“the definiteness requirement must take into account the inherent limitations of language,” and as
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`such, “[s]ome modicum of uncertainty … is the price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for
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`innovation.” Nautilus, 572 U.S. at 909 (internal quotations omitted). Words like “approximate”
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`and “about” are thus appropriately used to “avoid[ ] a strict numerical boundary to the specified
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`parameter.” Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 476 F.3d 1321, 1326 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2007). When a word of approximation is used, the related “range must be interpreted in its
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`technological and stylistic context,” and as such “depends upon the technological facts of the
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`particular case.” Id. The Court “must look to the purpose that the [] limitation serves” to
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`determine the scope of the claimed variance indicated by the claim language. Cohesive Techs.,
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`Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008). When “nothing in the specification,
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`prosecution history, or prior art provides any indication as to what range ... is covered,” the claim
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`can be found indefinite. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1218 (Fed. Cir.
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`1991). Unlike the situation in Amgen, the intrinsic record here provides ample support to apprise
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`a POSITA as to the scope and purpose of the “about a predetermined number of media data
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`elements” limitation.
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`2 WAG contends that, unless otherwise noted, the Disputed Terms may be construed consistently
`across the Asserted Patents.
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`Plaintiff’s Responsive Claim Construction Brief (Amazon)
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`Amazon / WAG Acquisition
`Exhibit 1025
`Page 11
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`Case 6:21-cv-00816-ADA Document 39 Filed 04/01/22 Page 12 of 24
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`The description of the pull embodiment discloses that, like the buffering embodiment, the
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`player plays out media from a buffer in the player. See ’594 Patent, 15:9-15. The buffer is there
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`for the same reason as the other embodiment – to ensure a steady flow of media for continuous
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`playback. The disclosure states:
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`As data is played out, the next sequential data elements are requested from the server in
`such a fashion as to approximately maintain the predetermined number of data elements
`in the user's buffer.
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`Id., 15:15-18. Clearly, “approximately” is equivalent to, and supports, the claim term “about.”
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`The reason why the amount sought to be maintained in the buffer is (and in general must
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`be) “approximate” is because the size of the data elements can vary as a result of variable bitrate
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`(VBR) encoding. This is specifically addressed in the Asserted Patents: “Statements in this
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`specification concerning “constant data rates and the like should be understood as subject to
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`appropriate variation where VBR-encoded data may be involved.” Id., 5:3-6. Due to this
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`potential swing in bitrates in the encoding, as the specification discloses, it follows that the size
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`of the elements can vary (within bounds), and that target buffer levels may therefore must be
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`approximate.
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`Read in context, the specification says that there is a dynamic process of refilling the
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`player buffer to a target level as elements are played out (i.e., at the playback rate) and that, due
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`to encoding variability as well as the granular nature of the elements, the process is of necessity
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`approximate. There is no evidence or suggestion that a POSITA would not understand how to do
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`this, or that minor differences in what is regarded as “approximate” as a floor buffer level make
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`any operational difference. See Teruya Decl. ¶¶ 27-29.
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`The claim language here thus reflects a well-understood variability introduced by the
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`underlying technology itself. See id. ¶ 29. Courts routinely find similar terms definite under
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`similar circumstance. See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1557
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`Plaintiff’s Responsive Claim Construction Brief (Amazon)
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` Page 8
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`Amazon / WAG Acquisition
`Exhibit 1025
`Page 12
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`Case 6:21-cv-00816-ADA Document 39 Filed 04/01/22 Page 13 of 24
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`(Fed. Cir. 1983) (“stretching … at a rate exceeding about 10% per second” not indefinite since
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`“[i]nfringement is clearly assessable through use of a stopwatch.”); Neodron, Ltd. v. Fujitsu Am.,
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`Inc., No. 220CV00239JRGRSP, 2021 WL 2646214, at *6–8 (E.D. Tex. June 28, 2021)
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`(“approximately 10 μm,” “approximately 5%,” and “approximately 90%” not indefinite since
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`their meanings were “reasonably certain given the explanation of the purposes of the parameters
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`in the ’574 Patent”); Immersion Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 2:17-CV-572-JRG, 2018
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`WL 5005791, at *17-20 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2018) (“approximately planar” not indefinite since
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`the “specification discloses features that might prevent the surface from being perfectly planar”
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`and “provides context for understanding the meaning of the term”); Allergan, Inc. v. Teva
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`Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1455-WCB, 2016 WL 7210837, at *15-19 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 13,
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`2016) (“the specification and the nature of the art suggest limits to the term ‘about’ that are
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`defined by the understandings of persons of skill in the art as to the general range of variation of
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`components such as those in this case that are permissible in the industry and not considered so
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`great as to alter the nature of the product.”); Max Blu Techs., LLC v. Cinedigm Corp., No. 2:15-
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`CV-1369-JRG, 2016 WL 3688801, at *30 (E.D. Tex. July 12, 2016) (“less than approximately”
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`not indefinite since “the parameter’s range must be interpreted in its technological and stylistic
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`context.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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`B. “a predetermined number of media data elements” (ʼ594 Patent, claims 1, 6, 11)
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`There is nothing so confusing about this language that it requires interpretation for a jury
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`to understand. Defendants assert no explicit definitions in the specification or disavowal of claim
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`scope with regard to this claim term. The Court should thus accord this term its plain and
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`ordinary meaning.
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`Plaintiff’s Responsive Claim Construction Brief (Amazon)
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` Page 9
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`Amazon / WAG Acquisition
`Exhibit 1025
`Page 13
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00816-ADA Document 39 Filed 04/01/22 Page 14 of 24
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`“Predetermined” simply means “determined beforehand.” See https://www.merriam-
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`webster.com/dictionary/predetermine. The dispute between the parties is nothing more than
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`“before what,” and for that the Court need look no further than the claim language itself.
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`According to the claims, “as the received media data elements are played, the media
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`player automatically send[s] additional requests for subsequent media data elements for storage
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`in the memory of the media player as required to maintain about a predetermined number of
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`media data elements in the memory of the media player during playing.” ’594 Patent, 16:53-57.
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`Functionally, “predetermined” arises in the context of the media player “sending additional
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`requests for subsequent media data elements for storage in the memory of the media player.” In
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`this context, then, the “predetermined number of media data elements” is determined at least
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`before this sending of additional requests. The plain language of the claims requires no earlier
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`time.
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`Defendants, however, would further limit the “predetermination” to occur not only before
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`sending the additional requests (as the plain language would indicate), but instead move it all the
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`way back to “prior to the start of playback of the audio or video program.” Defendants have
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`pointed to nothing in the intrinsic record that would rise to the level of disclaimer as to any later
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`predetermination period explicitly contemplated by the claim language. Instead, Defendants are
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`simply seeking a construction driven by non-infringement arguments, ruling out scenarios in
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`which the player monitors network conditions and can change the target level for a minimum
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`buffer during execution. Neither the claim language nor the specification, however, rule out
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`changing the “predetermined” number of media data element during the course of playback, so
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`long as this number is set in advance of the sending of the respective requests.
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`The plain and ordinary meaning for this term should therefore be adopted.
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`Plaintiff’s Responsive Claim Construction Brief (Amazon)
`
` Page 10
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`Amazon / WAG Acquisition
`Exhibit 1025
`Page 14
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`

`

`Case 6:21-cv-00816-ADA Document 39 Filed 04/01/22 Page 15 of 24
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`C. “the media source” (ʼ594 Patent, claims 1, 6, 11)
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`The plain and ordinary meaning of “media source” requires no construction – it refers
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`simply to a source of media. The term is used in this conventional sense in the claims of the ’594
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`patent, which recite a “method for operating a media player to receive and play an audio or video
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`program, from a remote media source via a data connection over the Internet….” ’594 Patent,
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`16:30-32. The very first recited step of this method includes “sending requests from the media
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`player to the media source via the data connection,” in order to obtain the underlying media. Id.,
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`16:34-35. Exactly how this media data came to be on the media source itself (i.e., the media
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`source of the media source) is not claimed or even particularly relevant to the underlying
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`invention.
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`Nonetheless, the specification offers a specific examples of where and how a media
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`source may obtain the underlying media data, observing that “[t]here are two fundamental types
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`of streaming media, which affect, in some respects, the requirements for smooth and continuous
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`delivery: (i) material that originates from a source having a realtime nature, such as a radio or TV
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`broadcast, and (ii) material that originates from a non-realtime source such as from a disk file.”
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`Id., 5:33-38. That is, the discussion concerns the types of media, not the types of media sources.
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`Regardless of how this media is ultimately originated, “there is in each case at least one user
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`computer 18 (or similar device) connected to the server 12 via the Internet 10” to receive the
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`media data from the server. See id., 6:42-7:5. Moreover, the specification explicitly contemplates
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`that “the buffer concept of this invention can be daisy-chained between multiple Servers. For
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`example, a system might include a source server computer co-located in a radio station studio,
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`which transmits to a network distribution server resident in a data center, to which users would
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`connect.” Id., 12:46-51. Hence, regardless of the type of media, from the perspective of the user
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`computer, to which the claims of the ’594 Patent are directed, the “media source” is whatever
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`Plaintiff’s Responsive Claim Construction Brief (Amazon)
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` Page 11
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`Amazon / WAG Acquisition
`Exhibit 1025
`Page 15
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`

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`Case 6:21-cv-00816-ADA Document 39 Filed 04/01/22 Page 16 of 24
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`server the user computer connects to so as to obtain the underlying media data. “Media source”
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`has no more specialized meaning than this – its plain and ordinary meaning.
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`Defendants go seriously astray by injecting the phrase “from which the streaming
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`material originates” into the plain meaning of this term. In justifying this position, Defendants
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`(incorporating clai