Case 6:21-cv-00603-ADA Document 79 Filed 10/12/22 Page 1 of 28
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`SMART MOBILE TECHNOLOGIES LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`APPLE INC.
`
`Defendant.
`
`SMART MOBILE TECHNOLOGIES LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., and
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,
`INC.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`Case No. 6:21-cv-00603-ADA
`
`
`
`
`Case No. 6:21-cv-00701-ADA
`
`
`
`
`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`REGARDING THE ’434 PATENT FAMILY
`
`
`
`
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`Smart Mobile Technologies LLC, Exhibit 2007
`Page 1 of 28
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`

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`I. 
`
`II. 
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`
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`Case 6:21-cv-00603-ADA Document 79 Filed 10/12/22 Page 2 of 28
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`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`REPLY TO SMART MOBILE’S CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ARGUMENTS .............. 1 
`A. 
`“system on a chip” (’291) ...................................................................................... 1 
`B. 
`“is configured to” (’434) ........................................................................................ 1 
`C. 
`“wherein a [first] transmission interface is created . . .” (’653, ’946) ................... 2 
`D. 
`“wherein . . . using one or more antennas simultaneously” (’653, ’946) ............... 3 
`E. 
`“USB communication” (’291, ’946) ...................................................................... 4 
`F. 
`“dynamically” (’434) ............................................................................................. 5 
`G. 
`“ports” (’653, ’863, ’291, ’946, ’083, ’075) .......................................................... 6 
`H. 
`“application” (’434, ’653, ’863, ’291, ’946) .......................................................... 8 
`I. 
`“one or more subtasks are assigned to one or more channels” (’943) ................... 9 
`J. 
`“channel” (’943, ’083) ......................................................................................... 10 
`K. 
`“the device is … further configured with enhanced capabilities to
`differentiate between various signals or to combine multiple paths into a
`single communication channel” (’943) ................................................................ 13 
`“interface” (’653, ’836, ’946) .............................................................................. 15 
`SMT’s construction would render the claims invalid for lack of
`1. 
`written description and/or failure to enable the claims. ........................... 15 
`SMT’s remaining citations fail to disclose “a virtual … point of
`connection between software.” ................................................................ 17 
`“multiplex / multiplexes / multiplexed / multiplexing” (’653, ’083, ’075,
`’943, ’946, ’291) .................................................................................................. 19 
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 21 
`
`L. 
`
`M. 
`
`2. 
`
`i
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`Case 6:21-cv-00603-ADA Document 79 Filed 10/12/22 Page 3 of 28
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Affymetrix, Inc.,
`567 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................................................16
`
`AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine,
`344 F.3d 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2003)................................................................................................14
`
`Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,
`314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003)..........................................................................................16, 18
`
`Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
`598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010)................................................................................................16
`
`Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,
`881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)................................................................................................14
`
`Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc.,
`No. 17-CV-05928-YGR, 2021 WL 1417419 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2021) ..........................5, 6, 7
`
`Celltrace LLC v. AT&T Inc.,
`No. 6:09-CV-294-LED-JDL, 2011 WL 738927 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2011) ..............................5
`
`Eon Corp. IP Holdings v. Silver Spring Networks,
`815 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................6
`
`Fundamental Innovation Systems Int’l LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd.,
`2018 WL 647734 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2018) ..............................................................................5
`
`In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig.,
`639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011)..................................................................................................8
`
`Nazomi Communs., Inc. v. ARM Holdings, PLC,
`403 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005)............................................................................................3, 14
`
`Novo Indus., L.P. v. Micro Molds Corp.,
`350 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003)..................................................................................................3
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)........................................................................................8, 9, 15
`
`Soverain Software LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`No. 6:04-CV-14, 2005 WL 6225276 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2005) .................................................5
`
`SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enter., Inc.,
`358 F.3d 870 ..............................................................................................................................5
`
`iii
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`Smart Mobile Technologies LLC, Exhibit 2007
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`Case 6:21-cv-00603-ADA Document 79 Filed 10/12/22 Page 4 of 28
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`
`
`Thorner v. Sony Comput. Ent. Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..........................................................................................19, 20
`
`Trustees of Bos. Univ. v. Everlight Elecs. Co.,
`896 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................8
`
`VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`792 Fed. Appx. 796 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .......................................................................................12
`
`
`
`iv
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`Case 6:21-cv-00603-ADA Document 79 Filed 10/12/22 Page 5 of 28
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`
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`I.
`
`REPLY TO SMART MOBILE’S CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ARGUMENTS
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`Smart Mobile agrees that the preamble for claim 5 of the ’291 patent is limiting.
`
`Defendants’ brief thus focuses on the remaining terms from the ’434 patent family below.
`
`A.
`
`“system on a chip” 1 (’291)
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`The ordinary meaning of “system on a chip” requires a “system” that is contained on a
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`chip. D46 at 4. SMT’s construction focuses on the number of components included in the chip
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`(whether all or most), which is irrelevant as to whether the chip contains a system.
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`Defendants explained why SMT’s requirement of multiple components was both over and
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`under inclusive. Id. at 5. SMT does not address that criticism. It offers a new construction, which
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`adds the requirement of multiple functions being supported on the chip, but that construction is
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`subject to the same criticism of being limited only by numerosity (and not if the chip is a “system”).
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`This new construction also runs contrary to SMT’s own dictionary definition, which defines a
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`“system on a chip” in terms of its contribution to the system (“contribute to a functional computer
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`system”) and not the number of components on the chip.
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`B.
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`“is configured to” (’434)
`
`SMT provided its proposed construction for the first time in its responsive claim
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`construction brief. Defendants do not dispute this limitation could be satisfied by a particular
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`hardware configuration and given SMT’s acknowledgement that “actually” is understood to be a
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`part of its construction, Defendants adopt SMT’s proposed construction. In doing so, Defendants
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`do not agree with SMT’s argument as to what constitutes infringement under the proposed
`
`constructions, but such a determination is based on attributes of the accused product and irrelevant
`
`
`1 Similar to Defendants’ brief for the ’501 patent family, the disputed terms are in shorthand
`and can be found in the parties’ initial briefs for the ’434 patent family. See D46; D66, as
`filed in the Apple case. Emphasis added except where otherwise noted.
`
`1
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`Case 6:21-cv-00603-ADA Document 79 Filed 10/12/22 Page 6 of 28
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`
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`to the claim construction issue before the Court.
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`C.
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`“wherein a [first] transmission interface is created . . .” (’653, ’946)
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`SMT fails to rebut Defendants’ four indefiniteness arguments. First, SMT’s citation to
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`functional language in the claims cannot cure the fact that there is no clear delineation between the
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`three “interfaces.” For example, SMT cites the “transmission interface” and “IP enabled interface”
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`as exemplar functional descriptions that differentiate the interfaces, but fails to recognize that IP
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`(i.e., Internet Protocol) is a form of communication, and as a result an “IP enabled interface” is a
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`type of “transmission interface.” SMT’s citation to a “single interface comprised of multiplexed
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`signals” injects more confusion, because Defendants’ principal argument—which SMT does not
`
`rebut—is that this phrase is not commonly understood to a POSITA, and therefore does not help
`
`distinguish one interface from another. SMT reinforces this point by asserting that an interface
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`“comprised” of multiplexed signals means the interface “includes” multiplexed signals (D66 at
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`10)—but SMT simultaneously offers a construction of “interface” that refers to virtual or physical
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`“connections” and not the signals sent over them. Id. at 9. Also unhelpful is SMT’s citation to
`
`passages using the verb “interfaced” (id.), which says nothing about what an “interface” is or what
`
`it means for a mobile device to “enable a single interface comprised of multiplexed signals.”
`
`Second, it remains unclear how one interface would “use” another, as recited in the claims.
`
`SMT’s proffered explanation, that “a signal or data stream from the first (using) interface is sent
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`through the second (used) interface” (D66 at 12), does not find any support in the patents
`
`themselves. And again, SMT’s explanations are contradictory, as SMT contends the “interface”
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`is the sender or recipient of a signal but elsewhere argues that an interface “includes” signals—
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`and elsewhere defines “interface” as a connection point.
`
`Third, the “which utilize” clause still cannot be reconciled with its surrounding claim
`
`language. SMT’s interpretation of the “which utilize” clause into the claim (color coded below)
`
`2
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`results in (1) a “first interface” that uses a “plurality of interfaces”; and (2) the “plurality of
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`interfaces” use “transmit and receive units” to provide a “single interface”:
`
`wherein said first interface for transmission uses a plurality of
`interfaces for Internet Protocol communication on the mobile device
`which [plurality of IP enabled interfaces] utilize the plurality of
`wireless transmit and receive units on the mobile device to enable a
`single interface . . .
`
`SMT disputes that the “single interface” is comprised of the “transmit and receive units” (in blue)
`
`but that is evident from the claim itself, which refers to the “transmit and receive units . . .
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`enabl[ing] a single interface.” SMT does not otherwise explain the meaning of this language.
`
`Fourth, SMT fails to resolve the problem that there are multiple ways to interpret “single.”
`
`Defendants offered two ways to interpret “single” in this term. D46 at 13. SMT criticizes both,
`
`but fails to provide any justification for this criticism. Indeed, SMT’s solution appears to be simply
`
`reading the word “single” out of the claim. D66 at 13-14. This type of re-write is improper.
`
`Nazomi Communs., Inc. v. ARM Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[C]ourts
`
`should not rewrite claims to preserve validity.”). This term is indefinite.
`
`D.
`
`“wherein . . . using one or more antennas simultaneously” (’653, ’946)
`
`The term is indefinite because the word “simultaneously” cannot be reconciled with the
`
`surrounding claim language. SMT implicitly acknowledges this problem because it asks the Court
`
`to change it to “using one antenna, or multiple antennas simultaneously.” D66 at 14. But the
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`Court cannot rewrite claims where there is “reasonable debate” about what the claims mean. Novo
`
`Indus., L.P. v. Micro Molds Corp., 350 F.3d 1348, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Here, the claim language
`
`could reasonably be interpreted to refer to simultaneous communications using multiple antennas,
`
`using multiple transmit and receive components simultaneously, or sending and receiving data
`
`simultaneously. Each of these options is plausible based on the literal language of the claim. But
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`none is clearly correct, because each would be inconsistent with surrounding claim language and
`
`3
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`the patent provides no guidance. D46 at 13-15.
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`SMT fails to explain why its rewrite is more appropriate than rewriting the claim in some
`
`other way (e.g., to address other plausible but also contradictory interpretations of the clause in
`
`Defendants’ brief). The specification only confirms the ambiguity in the claim as it also refers to
`
`using multiple transmit and receive components simultaneously and sending and receiving
`
`simultaneously—making each interpretation equally plausible. ’653 patent, Abstract (referring to
`
`“simultaneous[]” use of “multiple T/R units”); 6:26-29 (similar). The term is indefinite.
`
`E.
`
`“USB communication” (’291, ’946)
`
`SMT agrees that a claim term should be interpreted as of the patent’s filing date, but argues
`
`that “USB communication” should not be interpreted as the USB technology at use in 1999.2
`
`However, the case that is directly on point—Fundamental Innovation Sys. Int’l LLC v. Samsung
`
`Elecs. Co.—makes clear that “USB” in a claim refers to a known standard, and should be limited
`
`to the standard in existence as of the filing date.
`
`SMT makes three counter-arguments based in caselaw, and each is unavailing. First, SMT
`
`distinguishes Fundamental by claiming that SMT’s patents use “generic” references to USB. D66
`
`at 17. This does not alter the fact that “USB” was a well-established technology standard in 1999,
`
`and SMT does not show that the patentees were referring to anything but the USB standard.
`
`Second, SMT argues that Uniloc helps SMT’s position because the court in that case
`
`allowed the construction to cover features from Bluetooth 1.1 “that remain in later versions” of the
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`standard. D66 at 18. This argument misses Defendants’ point: Uniloc demonstrates that “USB”
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`cannot be construed to cover functionality (e.g., USB-C) that did not exist at patent filing.
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`Third, the authority SMT relies upon does not support its argument. For example, SMT
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`2 SMT accuses devices using newer versions of USB such as USB-C.
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`4
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`cites several cases where the terms in dispute were not a known standard like USB, and therefore
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`have limited applicability here. SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enter., Inc., 358 F.3d 870
`
`(construing “regularly received television signal”); Soverain Software LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`
`No. 6:04-CV-14, 2005 WL 6225276, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2005) (construing “hypertext transfer
`
`protocol,” which only existed in “draft” form at the relevant time). Other cases have been taken
`
`out of context by SMT, such as Celltrace, where the construed term (“GSM-compatible”) appeared
`
`only in the preamble (as opposed to appearing in a structural term like in SMT’s patents) and “[t]he
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`primary dispute between the parties [was] the interpretation of ‘compatible,’” which made it harder
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`to determine whether the specific standard applied. Celltrace LLC v. AT&T Inc., No. 6:09CV294
`
`LED-JDL, 2011 WL 738927, at 1, 15-16 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2011). Finally, SMT cites a case,
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`Cellspin Soft, where the dispute in question was whether to limit “Bluetooth” to any particular
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`version of the standard, but here Defendants do not seek to limit the term to a specific version
`
`number, but rather the USB technology that was known at the time of the patent filing. Cellspin
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`Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., No. 17-CV-05928-YGR, 2021 WL 1417419, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14,
`
`2021) (“Bluetooth has a well-understood meaning at present independent of any version”).
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`Thus, a POSITA would have understood the patent’s references to “USB communication”
`
`to mean USB technology at use at the time of filing, as an invention cannot comply with standards
`
`not yet in existence. Fundamental Innovation, 2018 WL 647734, at *9.
`
`F.
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`“dynamically” (’434)
`
`SMT attempts to define this term by reference to the specification’s discussion of software
`
`that dynamically determines factors for “best” data transfer. D66 at 20. However, none of these
`
`factors relate to switching antennas, which means the patent does not explain what it means to
`
`“dynamically” switch between a first and second antenna, thereby rendering the term indefinite.
`
`As to the extrinsic evidence, SMT’s cherry-picked dictionary definitions shed no light on the issue,
`
`5
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`and SMT’s introduction of the vague term “need” in its proposed construction only serves to
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`further confuse the meaning of this term.
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`G.
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`“ports” (’653, ’863, ’291, ’946, ’083, ’075)
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`SMT fails to identify a single disclosure of “a virtual … point of connection through which
`
`information may be transferred,” because none exist. See D66 at 21-25. Instead, SMT relies on
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`the flawed premise that wireless communication units require “virtual ports.” Id. at 23. SMT
`
`ignores that, even in the case of wireless communications, the wireless transmit/receive component
`
`is a physical device that transmits over a physical medium (i.e., the air). Beyond these conclusory
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`statements, SMT fails to prove that a wireless connection requires a software-based “virtual port”
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`(it does not). Defendants’ construction correctly captures the plain meaning of “ports,” in light of
`
`the intrinsic evidence, as “a jack or socket that a cable connector plugs into.” D46 at 17-22.
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`Disclaimer is not necessary to adopt Defendants’ (correct) construction, because the
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`intrinsic record is replete with examples confirming Defendants’ hardware “ports” construction.
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`D46 at 17-22. The specification expressly teaches using physical cable connectors to enable both
`
`wired and wireless communications. Id. For example, plugging a device into a cradle adapter
`
`enables wireless communications: “[t]he enabling attachment can make any non-wireless device
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`(NWD) unit 613 wireless enabled while being plugged into the cradle adapter 604, as shown for
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`CT/MD 612, to access a number of wired, optical or wireless communication paths through the
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`ports 608.” ’653 patent, 6:4-8 (emphasis added). Similarly, “[i]n FIG. 6, a wireless device,
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`CT/MD 602 with I/O ports 610 and CT/MD 612 with the ability to interface through a cradle
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`adapter 604 having both wireless and wired connections 606 interfacing with multiple input/output
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`(I/O) ports 608 is shown.” Id. at 5:48-52 (emphasis added); see also id. at Fig. 6; D46 at 18-20.
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`Thus, even for wireless communications, the patents teach physically connecting the claimed
`
`device to a cradle adapter, consistent with Defendants’ construction. “[T]he ordinary meaning of
`
`6
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`
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`a claim term is its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent.’” Eon Corp. IP
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`Holdings v. Silver Spring Networks, 815 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Here,
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`the intrinsic evidence clearly supports Defendants’ position.3
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`SMT has failed to identify any disclosure in the intrinsic record of a mobile device with a
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`wireless transmit/receive unit that lacks physical connections, for example, to a cradle adapter.
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`See D66 at 21-25. And regardless, a POSITA would understand that such a device would require
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`an antenna—a hardware component plugged into the device—to enable wireless communication,
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`consistent with Defendants’ construction. See also id. at 21 (“all of the claims at issue recite ‘a
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`plurality of ports’ that are a part of a wireless or handheld device that includes wireless
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`communication units/components and antennas.”) (emphasis added).
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`The specification contains no disclosures of virtual (i.e., software-based) ports, let alone
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`that virtual ports are needed to enable wireless communication. SMT labors to argue, for example,
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`that claims 27 and 28 of the ’653 patent “require[] a plurality of virtual ports” for communication
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`over wireless network paths (D66 at 22). But claim 28 only requires that “the mobile device is
`
`configured to receive multiple IP data packets on a plurality of ports,” and says nothing of “virtual”
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`ports. Further, as discussed above, wireless communication requires the use of hardware devices
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`operating over a physical medium; wireless does not in and of itself require “virtual ports,” and
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`SMT has failed to prove otherwise. SMT attempts to backfill this lack of intrinsic evidence with
`
`a conclusory statement from its expert: “in 1999 and 2000 (as today), wireless ports were typically
`
`implemented via a virtual port.” Id. But neither SMT nor its expert cite any evidence that “wireless
`
`
`3 SMT’s proposal also attempts to encompass any “virtual … point of connection” within a
`device, including even in software, and with no bounds to the phrase “point of connection.”
`But this is contrary to the context of the specification that makes clear the “ports” are physical
`input/output connections to the device. See, e.g., D46 at 19.
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`7
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`port” was a term of art or that wireless communication was “typically implemented via virtual
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`port”—the Court should ignore this conclusory extrinsic evidence.
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`SMT would construe “ports” and “interface” almost identically by including “virtual…
`
`point[s] of connection.” This is an apparent attempt to cover software Application Programming
`
`Interfaces (“APIs”) in the accused products. But neither APIs nor “virtual ports” are found in the
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`intrinsic record. Furthermore, SMT and its expert fail to demonstrate that a “virtual… point of
`
`connection” is consistent with a “virtual port” in the art, or how a “virtual port” would support
`
`SMT’s construction. SMT has also failed to explain how a “point of connection” can be “virtual”
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`at all. SMT’s constructions improperly attempt to expand SMT’s infringement allegations.
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`Regardless, even if a POSITA would have known about “virtual ports” at the time of the
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`invention (which SMT has failed to prove), SMT’s proposal would still render the claims invalid
`
`for lack of written description and enablement. See D46 at 22. “[O]ne cannot ‘bootstrap’ the
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`knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art (‘POSITA’) into the [written description] analysis
`
`and fill the gap in the disclosure through obviousness,” as SMT attempts to do here. In re Katz
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`Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011). SMT has not
`
`identified any disclosures in the patent that demonstrate that the patentees possessed the concept
`
`of “a virtual … point of connection through which information may be transferred” in the context
`
`of the claimed invention. Likewise, SMT has failed to identify where the patents teach how to use
`
`“virtual ports” in the context of the claimed invention, so SMT’s construction would also render
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`the claims invalid for lack of written description and enablement. See D46 at 22; Phillips v. AWH
`
`Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Trustees of Bos. Univ. v. Everlight Elecs. Co., 896
`
`F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018). SMT’s construction should thus be rejected.
`
`H.
`
`“application” (’434, ’653, ’863, ’291, ’946)
`
`Defendants accept SMT’s construction as it applies to ’168 claims 5, 19, 22; ’434 claim 2;
`
`8
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`’653 claims 10, 11, 17; ’863 claims 6, 12; ’291 claim 12; and ’946 claims 6, 10, 11. The remaining
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`dispute is whether “application” means “use, role or task” in some ’501 family claims. As
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`explained in the concurrently filed ’501 brief, some claims require “application” to be construed
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`as “use, role or task” because otherwise they do not fit into the claim language.
`
`I.
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`“one or more subtasks are assigned to one or more channels” (’943)
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`SMT argues that this phrase needs no further construction. D66 at 26. However, SMT’s
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`overbroad infringement contentions make construction necessary. See D46 at 28.
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`Instead, SMT opposes Defendants’ construction as “import[ing] numerous limitations from
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`the ’943 and ’789 Patent specifications.” D66 at 26. However, the three purported “limitations”
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`identified by SMT are not actually limitations. The first—the “channel” term—is discussed below,
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`and is the appropriate interpretation in light of the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. See Section
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`I.J. The second and third—“dedicated” and “pre-defined”—reflect the ’943 specification and the
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`specification of the ’789 priority patent. See D48-18 (Ex. 18), ’789 patent, 14:25-38 (“It is also
`
`possible to define and dedicate certain channels for various pre-defined or programmable tasks
`
`only.”), 16:66-17:15 (describing the “dedicated” channels of “the multichannel multiplexing
`
`transmitter/receiver”). Thus, Defendants’ proposal comports with the well-established proposition
`
`that the claims must “be read in view of the specification.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-13 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2005) (internal quotes and cites omitted).
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`SMT asks the Court to disregard the specification for no other reason than the patents’
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`boilerplate language about embodiments being for purposes of illustration only. SMT has no basis
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`for its unreasonably overbroad application of this term.4
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`4 Regarding “subtasks,” SMT confusingly argues that “it is ‘data relating to tasks and subtasks’
`that is sent via communication channels, as opposed to the subtasks themselves.” D66 at 27.
`This statement aligns with Defendants’ position that the ’943 specification states that “data
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`9
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`J.
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`“channel” (’943, ’083)
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`The ’083 and ’943 patents use “channel” consistent with the ordinary meaning proposed
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`by Defendants, i.e., as a communication path between a transmitter and a receiver. Relevant
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`treatises and dictionaries support this definition. See D46 at 29 (citing Exs. 47 and 48). SMT
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`would graft “processing channels” onto this term, and attempts to co-opt the first definition (Ex.
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`48) for this purpose by claiming it is “so broad … that it supports [SMT]’s construction.” D66 at
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`28. This is wrong, however, because SMT’s construction—unlike The Communications
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`Handbook (Ex. 48) definition—adds a “processing channel” concept and does not require a
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`“receiver.” SMT also dismisses The Electrical Engineering Handbook (Ex. 47) and its definition
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`of a “communication channel” as “beside the point” (D66 at 27-28), which is incorrect because
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`the claims here are directed to communication devices. See, e.g., ’943 patent, claims 1, 5, 8, and
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`12 (reciting “a wireless communication device”). SMT acknowledges as much for the ’083 patent,
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`and relies on this communication capability for the “ports” term. D66 at 21.
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`To support its construction, SMT purports to provide a “more pertinent” definition of
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`“channel” from The Microsoft Computer Dictionary, excerpted below. D66 at 28.
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`relating to tasks or subtasks are assigned or allocated to the different communication paths.”
`D46 at 25. Thus, SMT appears to have inadvertently agreed to Defendants’ position.
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`D68-6, Ex. 1006 at 81. SMT’s construction, however, deviates from these allegedly “pertinent”
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`definitions. For example, SMT includes information paths or links “within” a device and within
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`or between “components,” which the dictionary definitions do not support.
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`SMT argues that the dictionary excerpt above allegedly “defines the term to cover both
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`internal (processing) and external channels as well as communication channels” (D66 at 28), but
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`this is wrong for two reasons. First, neither definition refers to internal “processing” channels.
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`The first definition states that a channel can be “internal or external to a microcomputer,” but a
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`microcomputer—i.e., a stand-alone computer like a PC5—can have either internal or external
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`transmitters and receivers (and associated channels). The patents confirm this in Figure 2, which
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`shows computers (202, 204) communicating via transmit/receive (“T/R”) components that may be
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`“located within or in proximity to” each computer, i.e., internally or externally. ’943 patent, 3:35-
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`48; ’083 patent, 3:35-48. The “parallel paths” between the T/R components are the channels.
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`Thus, the definition aligns with Defendants’ proposal.
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`Second, SMT ignores that its “pertinent” dictionary includes a definition of “channel” in
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`the context of “communications” (Ex. 1006), and that the definition supports Defendants’
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`proposal. The patents describe a channel as a path like a cable or fibre optic channel (D46 at 31),
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`which echoes the definition in Ex. 1006 (“a physical link, such as the cable connecting two stations
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`in a network”) and aligns with Defendants’ proposal.
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`SMT also argues that the ’083 claims use “channel” to refer to processing channels (D66
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`at 286), but this cannot be correct. The claims say the device is configured “to process multiple
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`5 See Ex. 55, THE MICROSOFT COMPUTER DICTIONARY 289 (Fourth Ed. 1999) (stating that a
`“microcomputer” is “essentially, in today’s terms, a desktop PC”).
`6 SMT’s suggestion that the ’083 patent claims’ reference to processing data or signal streams
`in parallel, including “via multiple channels,” also misrepresents the claims and specifications.
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`channels,” not to process on multiple channels. See, e.g., ’083 patent, claim 1. Thus, the claims’
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`recitation of “process[ing] multiple channels” refers to channel inputs. This is consistent with
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`Figure 6 of the priority ’789 patent, which discloses processor(s) that process data received from
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`the channel inputs. See D46 at 31 (citing Ex. 18, ’789 patent, Fig. 6 (excerpt) and 13:24-26); id.
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`at 27 (discussing the ’789 patent’s references to “input/output” or “input and output” channels).
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`Similarly, the ’943 claim language reciting a processor that “comprises multiple channels” refers
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`to having one or more channel inputs from which the processor receives “data streams” that are
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`“process[ed] … in parallel.” ’943 patent, claim 1. SMT debates this reading (D66 at 28), but it is
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`the only reasonable way to read the claims without re-writing them, as SMT’s ambiguous
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`construction (with three “or’s”) would do.7
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`The specifications of