throbber
1
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`*
`CAROLYN W. HAFEMAN
`April 27, 2022
` *
`
`VS.
`*
`
` * CIVIL ACTION NO. W-21-CV-696
`
`LG ELECTRONICS INC. ET AL
`
`BEFORE THE HONORABLE DEREK T. GILLILAND
`MARKMAN and MOTIONS HEARING (via Zoom)
`
`APPEARANCES:
`For the Plaintiff:
`
`For the Defendant:
`
`Krisina J. Zuniga, Esq.
`Thomas V. DelRosario, Esq.
`Max L. Tribble, Jr., Esq.
`Susman Godfrey, LLP
`1000 Louisiana St., Suite 5100
`Houston, TX 77002
`Jason C. Linger, Esq.
`Lawrence M. Hadley, Esq.
`Glaser Weil Fink Howard Avchen &
` Shapiro LLP
`10250 Constellation Blvd., FL 19
`Los Angeles, CA 90067
`Celine Jimenez Crowson, Esq.
`Hogan Lovells US LLP
`555 Columbia Square
`Washington, DC 20004
`Kirstin L. Stoll-DeBell, Esq.
`Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP
`1144 15th Street, Suite 3400
`Denver, CO 80202
`Carrie A. Beyer, Esq.
`Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP
`320 South Canal Street
`Chicago, IL 60606-5707
`Brianna L. Silverstein, Esq.
`Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP
`1500 K Street Nw, Suite 1100
`Washington, DC 20005
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`KRISTIE M. DAVIS, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (WACO)
`
`Hafeman, Exhibit 2001
`Google LLC et al. v. Hafeman
`IPR2022-01192
`
`

`

`2
`
`Nitin Gambhir, Esq.
`Hogan Lovells US LLP
`3 Embarcadero Center, Ste 1500
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Gurtej Singh, Esq.
`Hogan Lovells US LLP
`4085 Campbell Avenue, Suite 100
`Menlo Park, CA 94025
`J. Stephen Ravel, Esq.
`Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP
`303 Colorado Street, Suite 2000
`Austin, TX 78701
`Michael E. Jones, Esq.
`Shaun William Hassett, Esq.
`Potter Minton PC
`110 N College, Suite 500
`Tyler, TX 75702
`Kristie M. Davis, CRR, RMR
`PO Box 20994
`Waco, Texas 76702-0994
`(254) 340-6114
`Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography,
`transcript produced by computer-aided transcription.
`
`Court Reporter:
`
`KRISTIE M. DAVIS, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (WACO)
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`Hafeman, Exhibit 2001
`Google LLC et al. v. Hafeman
`IPR2022-01192
`
`

`

`3
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`(Hearing begins.)
`DEPUTY CLERK: Calling Case No.
`WA-21-CV-696, styled Carolyn W. Hafeman versus LGE
`Electronics Incorporated, et al, called for a Markman
`and motions hearing.
`THE COURT: And could I have
`announcements, starting with the plaintiffs, please?
`MR. TRIBBLE: Yes, Your Honor. This is
`Max Tribble. And with me today is Krisina Zuniga, Tom
`DelRosario, Larry Hadley and Jason Linger and our
`client, Carrie Hafeman.
`THE COURT: Excellent. Well, welcome to
`all of the counsel and especially to Ms. Hafeman for
`appearing today.
`Could I get announcements from the
`defense, please?
`MR. RAVEL: Your Honor, Steve Ravel for
`LG Electronics, Inc., the one and only LG entity that's
`left in the case.
`First and foremost are our three client
`representatives, Jay Jin, Eden Kim, TG Kong. It's a
`little after 11:00 tonight where they are, last full
`measure of devotion.
`My local co-counsel, Mike Jones, needs no
`introduction. And neither do any of the other four
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`KRISTIE M. DAVIS, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (WACO)
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`Hafeman, Exhibit 2001
`Google LLC et al. v. Hafeman
`IPR2022-01192
`
`

`

`4
`
`lawyers who are going to be our primary speakers today,
`but I'll introduce them anyway. Kirstin Stoll-DeBell,
`Celine Crowson, Carrie Beyer and Tej Singh may all
`speak.
`
`So we're here and ready to proceed, Your
`
`Honor.
`
`THE COURT: Excellent. Well, welcome,
`everybody, and especially to the LG clients. I know
`it's late and likely to be much later -- or earlier in
`the morning before this concludes. So we really do
`appreciate your attendance.
`And with that, I think from what I was --
`from what memory serves, I think it's defendants that
`would like to address or argue terms. As I understood
`it, I think the plaintiffs didn't have -- had no terms
`that they wanted to argue -- or plaintiff.
`So with that, why don't we turn to
`defense counsel. And the first term, which I
`understand is "computer recovery information" and those
`related terms. So we'll start with that starting with
`the defendant.
`MR. CROWSON: That's right, Your Honor.
`Thank you very much. This is Celine Crowson speaking.
`Good morning to you.
`THE COURT: Good morning.
`
`KRISTIE M. DAVIS, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (WACO)
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`Hafeman, Exhibit 2001
`Google LLC et al. v. Hafeman
`IPR2022-01192
`
`

`

`5
`
`MR. CROWSON: And, Mr. Singh, if we could
`start with our slides.
`Now, let's take a look at the first slide
`where we start to talk about -- we've got a couple
`issues that we'd like to talk about with respect to the
`claim term "recovery information" and "return
`information."
`We did, of course, receive the Court's
`preliminary construction of that term which is along
`the lines of plaintiff's, I guess, alternative
`construction. And we'd like to talk about a couple of
`things, as I mentioned.
`The first is we have a suggested
`proposal, really a tweak or a small modification to the
`Court's preliminary construction. And I can talk about
`that in a minute.
`And then we'd also like to say a couple
`things about the printed matter doctrine.
`Next slide, please.
`So first about the proposal for
`clarification to the Court's preliminary construction.
`So the construction in this preliminary form is the
`information, you know, provided by the owner so that
`the device can be returned to the owner.
`And what we'd like to have clarified is
`
`KRISTIE M. DAVIS, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (WACO)
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`Hafeman, Exhibit 2001
`Google LLC et al. v. Hafeman
`IPR2022-01192
`
`

`

`6
`
`that the information that's provided should be contact
`information and that it shouldn't only be a name.
`And what concerns us about plaintiff's
`alternative construction, which has been adopted, is
`that plaintiff appears, in its briefing, to take the
`position that the owner's name, such as John Smith,
`would be enough to satisfy this claim limitation.
`And we don't think that should be the --
`that should be the case because it really needs to be
`information that enables return or recovery. And
`simply the owner's name, John Smith, wouldn't do that.
`So, again, we're proposing a
`clarification to the construction that says that the
`information provided needs to be contact information,
`and that it's not only a name of the owner.
`Next slide, please.
`And I should say too that the patent
`supports this clarification. Plaintiffs, in its brief,
`has pointed in support of its construction, for
`example, to Column 6 at about Lines 55 to 65. And if
`you look at that portion of the patent, it refers to --
`it says, see Figure 2. Plaintiff didn't mention that
`in its brief, but it says see Figure 2.
`And if you look at Figure 2 -- and it's
`the same for Figure 6 as well -- you can see that not
`
`KRISTIE M. DAVIS, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (WACO)
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`Hafeman, Exhibit 2001
`Google LLC et al. v. Hafeman
`IPR2022-01192
`
`

`

`7
`
`only the name is required. We've highlighted there on
`the left side of the slide there in blue, it says
`required. But also something like a phone number and
`an e-mail, that's required as well.
`So, again, we think that the
`clarification will help make things clearer to the fact
`finder and make sure that it's really contact
`information, which is not just a name that's required
`by the limitation.
`Next slide, please.
`And as I mentioned, we also wanted to say
`a couple things about the printed matter doctrine. In
`addition to the construction, we think the concept of
`the printed matter problems also come into play in
`connection with the invalidity analysis.
`And the couple of points are as follows:
`If you look at the way the claims --
`(Clarification by the reporter.)
`MR. CROWSON: Yeah. So as I was saying,
`if we look at the way that the claims of the asserted
`patents are set up -- we're looking, for example, at
`Claim 4 here -- we can see that the claim is really
`directed to an apparatus for displaying information.
`And that has the computer with a display. And there's
`a processor and communication with the display. And
`
`KRISTIE M. DAVIS, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (WACO)
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`Hafeman, Exhibit 2001
`Google LLC et al. v. Hafeman
`IPR2022-01192
`
`

`

`8
`
`that the processor's initiating or changing information
`through remote communication done through an
`interactive program. That's really the crux of the
`structure of the claim.
`Now, the claim recites that the
`information that's being displayed and changed is
`computer recovery information. But really the way the
`claim is set up, that particular content, it's not
`connected with any other parts of the claim to create a
`new functionality.
`One could substitute for "recovery
`information" advertising information, medical
`information. And so that's the problem with giving
`that portion "recovery information" or return
`information, patentable weight. Is because it really
`doesn't, in a classic fashion, when you look at really
`how the claim is set up, fall into the printed matter
`doctrine that says the content that's merely displayed
`and that's not connected to the other portions of the
`claim structurally to perform a new function, shouldn't
`be given patentable weight.
`Next slide, please.
`And really I think, you know, one thing
`that's interesting to think about in addition to the
`fact other type -- any type of information could be
`
`KRISTIE M. DAVIS, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (WACO)
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`Hafeman, Exhibit 2001
`Google LLC et al. v. Hafeman
`IPR2022-01192
`
`

`

`9
`
`substituted in that claim for recovery information, is
`that the printed matter doctrine may not apply, for
`example, if there was a limitation in the claim, an
`added step or component, that actually required use of
`the content to activate, for example, return, or to
`accomplish the return.
`That might be an example of a claim where
`the printed matter doctrine doesn't apply.
`But those -- the claims that we're
`looking at that are asserted in this case are not set
`up that way. And so we thought that would be helpful
`to illustrate why LG believes that the printed matter
`doctrine should apply to the "recovery/return
`information" term, such that it shouldn't be given
`patentable weight in the invalidity analysis.
`Thank you very much.
`THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask you this,
`Ms. Crowson, real quick. If we go to Slide 6 looking
`at Claim 4. In addition to the computer recovery
`information like the second element of the claim, it
`requires a computer recovery information for returning
`to the computer -- or returning the computer to the
`owner.
`
`And I think somewhere I thought I saw
`another reference to that effect. But the claim
`
`KRISTIE M. DAVIS, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (WACO)
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`Hafeman, Exhibit 2001
`Google LLC et al. v. Hafeman
`IPR2022-01192
`
`

`

`10
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`appears to be directed towards providing information to
`allow the return of the computer to its proper owner.
`So how is that not functionally tying computer recovery
`information to the claim?
`MR. CROWSON: Yeah. And you're correct,
`Your Honor. Some of the other claims in the preamble,
`they talk about that being -- that being an intended
`use. You know, we think with apparatus claims that
`shouldn't be given any weight, you know, in the method
`claim. Although that is describing a method.
`The problem, though, is that the content,
`the way the claim is written, the mere display, it's
`not tied functionally to what happens in the claim.
`Perhaps if the claim said -- even the method claim said
`whereby that content is used, for example, to activate
`or to actually return the computer to the owner, that
`may be something that gives that content some
`connection structurally to the claim.
`But the claim, even the method claim, is
`really missing the piece that would provide patentable
`weight to that portion of the claim regarding the
`recovery/return information.
`THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
`If I could hear from plaintiffs on this
`term, please.
`
`KRISTIE M. DAVIS, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (WACO)
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`Hafeman, Exhibit 2001
`Google LLC et al. v. Hafeman
`IPR2022-01192
`
`

`

`11
`
`MS. ZUNIGA: Good morning, Your Honor.
`This is Krisina Zuniga from Susman Godfrey. And I'll
`be providing argument for the plaintiff, Ms. Hafeman.
`I'm going to go ahead and share my screen now.
`THE COURT: Very good, and welcome.
`MS. ZUNIGA: Thank you. Can you see that
`
`okay?
`
`THE COURT: I can. Thank you.
`MS. ZUNIGA: Great. Thank you.
`So on the terms "computer recovery
`information," "recovery information" and "return
`information," we believe the Court's preliminary
`construction got it right. And that's information
`provided by the owner so that the device can be
`returned to the owner.
`LG today wants the Court to add contact
`information to its construction. But I still don't
`understand what contact adds. I haven't figured out
`what that's going to change from the Court's
`construction, which is information that allows the
`device to be returned to the owner.
`As for LG's argument about a conventional
`name, as they say, something like John Smith, again, LG
`hasn't explained why that's not enough. If a device
`got lost at a school, for example, where the student
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`KRISTIE M. DAVIS, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (WACO)
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`Hafeman, Exhibit 2001
`Google LLC et al. v. Hafeman
`IPR2022-01192
`
`

`

`12
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`knows he's the only one with the name John Smith, he
`could easily put in his device, please return to John
`Smith. I'm the only John Smith, and they'll know how
`to get it to me. It's a small school.
`There's no reason for the Court to add
`limitations that don't exist in the claim language and
`don't exist in the specification.
`LG again points to Figure 2 from the '287
`patent. Initially, in its initial proposed
`construction, LG wanted certain of this information to
`be options that could be return or recovery
`information, such as the owner's address.
`But this figure makes clear that that
`information is not required. And information that is
`required in this one embodiment, which our position is
`the invention should not be limited to, is not part of
`LG's proposed construction anymore.
`Because what the patent language makes
`clear and what the specification makes clear is that
`the return and recovery information is not limited to
`the examples that Ms. Hafeman included in the
`specification. These were just that, examples. A
`name, a telephone number, an e-mail, even an
`international website recovery site.
`This specification explained the types of
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`KRISTIE M. DAVIS, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (WACO)
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`09:15
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`09:15
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`09:15
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`09:15
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`09:15
`
`Hafeman, Exhibit 2001
`Google LLC et al. v. Hafeman
`IPR2022-01192
`
`

`

`13
`
`information that could be used for a device to be
`returned to the owner. And, in fact, there are things
`that exist now that were not contemplated at that time
`that would certainly be recovery information.
`Hafeman gave the example in her briefing,
`and still LG has not responded to it in reply or today,
`of social media information. A LinkedIn profile, why
`that couldn't be used to return a device to its owner,
`LG doesn't explain. And that could be included in the
`return recovery information that would satisfy the
`Court's preliminary construction.
`Briefly, Your Honor, on the printed
`matter doctrine, we believe that this recovery
`information should be given patentable weight. And
`that's under the test that's been well established by
`the Federal Circuit. And that's whether the
`information interacts with the other elements of the
`claim to create a new functionality in a claimed device
`or to cause a specific action in a claimed process.
`Here, like in the cases cited in
`Hafeman's briefing, Gulack and Miller, there is printed
`matter, the return recovery information. There is
`structure, the display screen. And there's new
`functionality initiating the return or recovery
`information which can be initiated or changed remotely.
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`KRISTIE M. DAVIS, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (WACO)
`
`Hafeman, Exhibit 2001
`Google LLC et al. v. Hafeman
`IPR2022-01192
`
`

`

`14
`
`This is in the claim language. And specifically from
`the claim language, before or with a security prompt.
`This was not addressed by LG either, and
`it was a key part of the invention.
`Ms. Hafeman said so in her specification
`repeatedly, saying that this is an important feature,
`that it strategically provided because it's a unique
`and different method to help protect owner information.
`It's important. It's the point of the program.
`Ms. Hafeman wanted to make clear that it
`was very important that return recovery information is
`displayed before or with a security prompt. Because
`otherwise, somebody who has the device who shouldn't
`have the device could access the owner's personal
`information, information on the device to which they
`shouldn't have access.
`In this way, the return and recovery
`information, the printed matter, interacts with the
`functionality. It intersects with the substrate, the
`display screen, so that it creates new functionality.
`So that the information is protected that's on the
`device unless they have the appropriate login
`information way to access the device.
`LG ignores all this language from the
`specification and says that return recovery information
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`KRISTIE M. DAVIS, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (WACO)
`
`Hafeman, Exhibit 2001
`Google LLC et al. v. Hafeman
`IPR2022-01192
`
`

`

`15
`
`shouldn't be given patentable weight. But, in fact,
`it's the part -- the main part of the invention.
`If you look at the claim language, again,
`it says initiating or changing return information,
`initiating or changing of the display screen. The
`return information is what makes the display screen the
`display screen. Without the return recovery
`information, the invention would not have the same
`purpose that it was contemplated to have.
`And, Your Honor, I'm happy to answer any
`
`questions.
`
`THE COURT: I don't think I have any
`questions at this point.
`Let me ask Ms. Crowson, would you agree
`that a, say, Facebook, Twitter, et cetera, ID or
`username would be sufficient to satisfy the contact
`information or recovery information?
`MR. CROWSON: I think that something like
`an address on a social media account, that would be
`something, you know, in addition to just an owner name.
`And so we would agree that that would satisfy the
`proposal that we're making. That it's got to be
`something in addition to a mere username -- a mere
`owner name like John Smith. And if it -- and if it was
`a social media URL type link, I think that would meet
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`KRISTIE M. DAVIS, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (WACO)
`
`Hafeman, Exhibit 2001
`Google LLC et al. v. Hafeman
`IPR2022-01192
`
`

`

`16
`
`that in addition.
`THE COURT: Give me just a second.
`(Pause in proceedings.)
`THE COURT: Okay. After considering the
`arguments, the Court is going to stay with its
`preliminary construction on this one. I think adding
`anything more to it's going to just be improperly
`importing some class of limitation into the claims. So
`we're going to stay with the preliminary construction
`which is the information provided by the owner so that
`the device can be returned to the owner.
`With that --
`MR. CROWSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
`THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Crowson.
`I believe the next term I have on my
`notes here is the "display recovery/recovery return
`limitations." If that's correct, whoever wants to
`argue that, would you let me know? Otherwise, let me
`know if I've got the wrong term.
`MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Yes, Your Honor. I'm
`Kirstin Stoll-DeBell and I represent LG Korea. And I
`will be addressing this term.
`THE COURT: Okay. Very good. Thank you,
`Ms. Stoll-DeBell.
`MS. STOLL-DeBELL: With that, I'm going
`
`KRISTIE M. DAVIS, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (WACO)
`
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`Hafeman, Exhibit 2001
`Google LLC et al. v. Hafeman
`IPR2022-01192
`
`

`

`17
`
`to share, hopefully, my slides.
`So is that working for everyone?
`THE COURT: I see it.
`MS. STOLL-DeBELL: Perfect. So thank
`you, Your Honor.
`We understand that the Court has
`tentatively found against us on the construction of
`these terms, but we wanted to address it briefly
`because this patent is highly unusual. Because it's
`so -- it's so full of clear disclaimers about what the
`present invention includes that I'd like to briefly
`address this issue.
`THE COURT: Very good. Go ahead.
`MS. STOLL-DeBELL: So first, claims
`cannot be broader -- of broader scope than the
`invention that is set forth in the specification. And
`a court should depart from plain and ordinary meaning
`when a patentee disavows the full scope of the claim by
`using the phrase, "the present invention."
`And the Federal Circuit has repeatedly
`held that when an inventor uses this phrase, "the
`present invention," to describe a feature, that the
`claim should be limited to that feature as described.
`And this is really important to serve the public notice
`function of patents.
`
`KRISTIE M. DAVIS, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (WACO)
`
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`Hafeman, Exhibit 2001
`Google LLC et al. v. Hafeman
`IPR2022-01192
`
`

`

`18
`
`And so I have here on this slide, Your
`Honor, just one example of one Federal Circuit case.
`But I think it's really a good example, because you can
`see that the district court and the Federal Circuit
`imported a limitation from the specification into the
`claim in this case.
`What they added was that the retrofitting
`of the shotgun had to happen after the original
`manufacture. And you can see from the claim language
`that's not in the claim language. But in the
`specification it said the present invention includes
`these things. It includes retrofitting and it
`includes, you know, the idea that it's designed to be
`implemented with existing shotguns.
`And based upon this present invention
`language, the Court did depart from the plain and
`ordinary meaning and did add a limitation into the
`claim. And there are many -- we cited many Federal
`Circuit opinions that use this present invention
`language to limit the claim scope.
`So I show here, Your Honor, why I say
`this patent is super unusual. And so we said that it
`used the present invention language in our brief 13
`times. But when I actually went and highlighted it,
`it's actually 14 times. And so you can see that I
`
`KRISTIE M. DAVIS, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (WACO)
`
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`09:25
`
`Hafeman, Exhibit 2001
`Google LLC et al. v. Hafeman
`IPR2022-01192
`
`

`

`19
`
`highlighted each example and put a number to count the
`14 times that it says, the present invention includes
`automatically displaying return recovery information
`during or after boot-up.
`This here are just because it was kind of
`small so you probably couldn't read what it said. I
`have four examples for you that I just wanted to show
`you.
`
`So the Disclaimer 3, for example, so I'm
`going to go at top left. It says, "The present
`invention uses a layered program in the boot-up process
`to provide a display of... return information."
`Disclaimer 6 says, "The present invention
`pertains to a computer return apparatus...[that]
`comprises a return screen that the processor
`automatically causes to appear during or after
`boot-up..."
`
`Disclaimer 8 says, "The present invention
`pertains to a computer readable
`medium...performing...steps [including]...displaying
`automatically a return screen on a display...during or
`after boot-up..."
`Disclaimer 10 says, "The present
`invention pertains to a method...[with a] step
`of...displaying automatically a return screen on a
`
`KRISTIE M. DAVIS, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (WACO)
`
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`09:26
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`Hafeman, Exhibit 2001
`Google LLC et al. v. Hafeman
`IPR2022-01192
`
`

`

`20
`
`display...during or after boot-up..." And it says this
`14 times.
`
`This slide is -- just cites to the slides
`so that you can look at them later, Your Honor.
`But this patent is -- it's not only
`unusual in the number of times that it makes this same
`exact disclaimer, but it's also unusual in how
`consistent the rest of the specification is with this
`disclaimer. And so I wanted to talk about this here.
`Plaintiff argues that it's inconsistent
`with the screen-saver embodiment. And so I want to go
`through that and explain why it's not inconsistent with
`the screen-saver embodiment.
`Plaintiff -- so LG Korea, you know -- LG
`Korea's construction is based upon the present
`invention and the specification -- present invention
`displaying this return recovery information during
`boot-up.
`
`But the specification talks about
`actually three times that return/recovery information
`can be displayed. And that's in my little drawing I
`have here on the left. Left and right are sort of
`elusive concepts for me, Your Honor. So sometimes if I
`say left, I mean right, just go with me because I think
`you probably understand what I'm saying. And then on
`
`KRISTIE M. DAVIS, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (WACO)
`
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`09:28
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`09:28
`
`Hafeman, Exhibit 2001
`Google LLC et al. v. Hafeman
`IPR2022-01192
`
`

`

`21
`
`the right I have the snippets from the patent that
`support the drawing I have on the left.
`And so you can see that on the very left
`we have display of return recovery information which
`always happens automatically during or after every
`boot-up. And there's lots of support, I just showed
`you some of it. But also the top snippet at -- that I
`have here talks about always displaying. So that's
`something that always has to happen.
`But the spec also says, as you can see in
`the bottom snippet, that the -- this retrieve or return
`recovery display not only appears during initial
`boot-up. So, again, that supports this concept that it
`has to happen during initial boot-up.
`But it says it can also -- it "can also
`be" displayed when it's manually initiated by a user.
`So that is the middle blue box. And it can also be
`displayed automatically by the screen-saver timer.
`So these are optional features. They
`don't take away from the fact that it must be displayed
`during boot-up, but it can also be displayed at other
`times.
`
`The fact that plaintiff's disclaimer
`throughout the specification and LG's proposed
`construction require display of this return recovery
`
`KRISTIE M. DAVIS, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (WACO)
`
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`09:29
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`Hafeman, Exhibit 2001
`Google LLC et al. v. Hafeman
`IPR2022-01192
`
`

`

`22
`
`information at every boot-up doesn't mean that it can't
`also be displayed at other times. And our construction
`doesn't say that. It says it has to happen at boot-up,
`but it doesn't say it only happens at boot-up. And it
`doesn't say it can't happen at other times. It just
`doesn't even mention those.
`And so it doesn't prohibit the display of
`the screen-saver timer. It doesn't prohibit automatic
`initiation by the user. It simply says that it has to
`happen during boot-up. And for these reasons, the
`screen saver embodiment and the manually-initiated
`embodiment, frankly, are in addition to, but absolutely
`consistent with, LG's proposed construction.
`And with that, I'd ask if you have any
`questions for me.
`THE COURT: Yeah. I do have one quick
`question. I know in plaintiff's brief they had pointed
`out at least, I guess, it's Figure 1 shows that the
`return scr

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