IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALLDIVISION
`
`LUMINATI NETWORKSLTD.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`V.
`
`TESO LT, UAB, METACLUSTERLT,
`UAB, OXYSALES, UAB,
`
`Defendants.
`
`§
`
`:
`
`§
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:19-CV-00395-JRG
`
`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
`
`Before the Court is Defendants Teso LT, UAB, Metacluster LT, UAB, and Oxysales,
`
`UAB’s (collectively, “Teso”) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c)
`
`and 35 U.S.C. § 101 (the “Motion”). (Dkt. No. 210). On February 4, 2021, the Court held a hearing
`
`on the Motion. Having considered the Motion,the parties’ arguments, related briefing, and relevant
`
`authority, the Court finds that the Motion should be DENIED.
`
`I.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`Plaintiff Luminati Networks Ltd. (“Luminati”) alleges infringement of U.S. Patent Nos.
`
`10,257,319 (the “319 Patent’), 10,484,510 (the “510 Patent”), and 10,469,614 (the “614
`
`Patent”) (collectively, the “Patents-in-Suit”). (Dkt. No. 1). Luminati accuses Teso ofinfringing:
`
`Claims1, 2, 14, 15, 17, 18, 21, 22, 24-27 of the °319 Patent; Claims 1, 2, 8-11, 13, 15, 16, 18-20,
`
`22, and 23 of the °510 Patent; and Claims1, 2, 4-6, 9-12, 15-20, 22, 23, 25, 26, and 29 of the ’614
`
`Patent (collectively, the “Asserted Claims”). (Dkt. No. 224 at 2).
`
`Previously, Teso filed a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (the “Motion to Dismiss’)
`
`contending that the Asserted Claims were unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (Dkt. No. 20 at 2—
`
`Code200, UAB,et al. v. Bright Data Ltd.
`IPR2022-01109, EX. 2018
`
`The Data Company TechnologiesInc. v. Bright DataLid,
`
`IPR2022-00135, EX. 2007
`1 of 12
`
`

`

`21). Noting that “claim construction could be of benefit in addressing this issue as it is presented
`
`in this case,” the Court denied Teso’s Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 85 at 5). On December7, 2020,
`
`Magistrate Judge Payne entered a Claim Construction Opinion and Orderin this case. (Dkt. No.
`
`191). On December 30, 2020, Teso filed the instant Motion, re-raising the issue ofpatent-eligibility
`
`of the Patents-in-Suit under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (Dkt. No. 210).
`
`II.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`
`A. Rule 12(c)
`
`After the pleadings are closed, but early enough not to delaytrial, a party may move for
`
`judgmenton the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “The standard for deciding a Rule 12(c) motion
`
`is the same as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss .
`
`.
`
`. [t]he plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to
`
`state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Guidry v. American Public Life Ins. Co., 512
`
`F.3d 177, 180 (Sth Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). In a
`
`patent case, the Federal Circuit reviews procedural aspects of motions for judgment on the
`
`pleadings using regional circuit law. RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., Lid., 855 F.3d 1322,
`
`1325—26 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
`
`B. Patent Eligibility
`
`Anyone who“invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
`
`composition of matter, or any new and useful
`
`improvement thereof’ may obtain a patent.
`
`35 U.S.C. § 101. Since patent protection does not extend to claims that monopolize the “building
`
`blocks of human ingenuity,” claims directed to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
`
`ideas are not patent eligible. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
`
`The Supreme Court instructs courts to distinguish between claimsthat set forth patent-ineligible
`
`subject matter and those that “integrate the building blocks into something more.” Jd.
`
`2
`
`seerOPR2022.01109,EX.2018
`The Data Company TechnologiesInc. v. Bright DataLid,
`
`IPR2022-00135, EX. 2007
`2 of 12
`
`

`

`First, the court “determine[s] whether the claimsat issue are directed to a patent-ineligible
`
`concept.” Jd. at 2355. In doing so, the court must be wary notto over generalize the invention, as
`
`“all inventions .
`
`.
`
`. embody,use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or
`
`abstract ideas.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (omission in original).
`
`In other words, the court must
`
`distinguish between “ineligible ‘abstract-idea-based solution[s]
`
`implemented with generic
`
`technical components in a conventional way’ from the eligible ‘technology-based solution’ and
`
`‘software-based invention[] that improve[s] the performance of the computer system itself.’”
`
`Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting
`
`Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016))
`
`(alteration in original).
`
`If the challenged claimsrecite a patent-ineligible concept, the court then “consider[s] the
`
`elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether
`
`the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent eligible application.”
`
`Alice, 134 8. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S.
`
`66, 78-79 (2012)). This step is satisfied when the claim limitations “involve more than
`
`performance of ‘well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the
`
`industry.” Content Extraction & Transmission LLC y. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass’n, 776 F.3d
`
`1343, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359). The Federal Circuit has
`
`explained that “[w]hile the ultimate determination ofeligibility under § 101 is a question of law,
`
`like many legal questions, there can be subsidiary fact questions which must be resolved en route
`
`to the ultimate legal determination.” Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882
`
`F.3d 1121, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 2018). As such, “[t]he question of whether a claim element or
`
`combination of elements is well-understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in the
`
`3
`
`seerOPR2022.01109,EX.2018
`The Data Company TechnologiesInc. v. Bright DataLid,
`
`IPR2022-00135, EX. 2007
`3 of 12
`
`

`

`relevant field is a question of fact” that must be “proven by clear and convincing evidence.”
`
`Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
`
`Something is not necessarily well-understood, routine, and conventional simply becauseit
`
`is disclosed in a prior art reference. Exergen Corp. v. KAZ USA, Inc., 725 Fed. App’x. 959, 965
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2018). There are many obscure references that may qualify as prior art but are
`
`insufficient to establish something is a “well-understood, routine, and conventional activity
`
`previously engagedin by scientists who workin the field.” Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79. Additionally,
`
`specific improvements described in a patent specification, “to the extent they are captured in the
`
`claims, create a factual dispute regarding whetherthe invention describes well-understood, routine,
`
`and conventionalactivities.” Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1369. However, “[w]henthere is no genuine
`
`issue of material fact regarding whether the claim element or claimed combination is well-
`
`understood, routine, conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevantfield, [patent eligibility] can
`
`be decided on summary judgmentas a matter of law.” Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1368.
`
`III.
`
`DISCUSSION
`
`A. Representativeness
`
`The Court first notes that Teso bears the burden of either addressing the eligibility of each
`
`Asserted Claim or making a showing of the representativeness of any claims asserted to be
`
`representative. See PPS Data, LLC v. Jack Henry & Assocs., Inc., 404 F. Supp. 3d 1021 (E.D. Tex.
`
`2019). Teso addresses each Asserted Claim in its Motion. (See Dkt. No. 210). The parties focused
`
`their argument at the hearing on the independent claims asserted from the Patents-in-Suit. (See
`
`Dkt. No. 293 at 6:6—23). Accordingly, the Court’s analysis is likewise focused on Claim 1 of each
`
`Patent-in-Suit.
`
`4
`
`Code200, UAB,et al. v. Bright Data Ltd.
`IPR2022-01109, EX. 2018
`4 of 12
`The Data Company TechnologiesInc. v. Bright Data Ltd.
`IPR2022-00135, EX. 2007
`4 of 12
`
`

`

`B. The Patents-in-Suit
`
`Claim 1 of the ’319 Patent, the only independent claim asserted from the °319 Patent,
`
`recites:
`
`A method for use with a first client device, for use with a first server that
`comprises a web serverthat is a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) serverthat
`responds to HTTP requests,the first server stores a first content identified by a first
`content identifier, and for use with a second server, the methodbythefirst client
`device comprising:
`receiving, from the second server, the first content identifier;
`sending, to the first server over the Internet, a Hypertext Transfer Protocol
`(HTTP) request that comprisesthe first contentidentifier;
`receiving,the first content from the first server over the Internet in response
`to the sending ofthe first content identifier; and
`sending, the first content by the first client device to the second server, in
`responseto the receiving ofthe first content identifier.
`
`(Dkt. No. 1-2 at 19:16—32). Claim 1 of the ’510 Patent, the only independentclaim asserted from
`
`the °510 Patent, recites:
`
`A method for use with a web server that responds to Hypertext Transfer
`Protocol (HTTP) requests and stores a first content identified by a first content
`identifier, the method bya first client device comprising:
`establishing a Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection with a
`second server;
`sending, to the web server overan Internet, the first content identifier;
`receiving, the first content from the web serveroverthe Internet in response
`to the sending ofthe first content identifier; and
`sending the received first content, to the second server over the established
`TCP connection,
`in response to the receiving of the first content
`identifier.
`
`(Dkt. No. 1-3 at 19:18—-31). In the Claim Construction Order, the term “client device” in the ’319
`
`and 510 Patents is construed as “communication device that is operating in the role of a client.”
`
`(Dkt. No. 191 at 10-12). The term “second server” is construed as “server that is not the client
`
`device.” (/d. at 13-14). Claim 1 of the ’614 Patent, the only independentclaim asserted from the
`
`°614 Patent, recites:
`
`A method for use with a resource associated with a criterion in a client
`device that communicates with a first server over the Internet, the client device is
`
`5
`
`Code200, UAB,et al. v. Bright Data Ltd.
`IPR2022-01109, EX. 2018
`5 of 12
`The Data Company TechnologiesInc. v. Bright Data Ltd.
`IPR2022-00135, EX. 2007
`5 of 12
`
`

`

`identified in the Internet using a first identifier and is associated with first and
`second state according to a utilization of the resource, the method comprising:
`initiating, by the client device, communication with the first server over the
`Internet in response to connecting to the Internet, the communication
`comprises sending, by the client device, the first identifier to the first
`server overthe Internet;
`when connected to the Internet, periodically or continuously determining
`whetherthe resource utilization satisfies the criterion;
`responsive to the determiningthat the utilization of the resourcesatisfies the
`criterion, shifting to the first state or staying in thefirst state;
`responsive to the determining that the utilization of the resource does not
`satisfy the criterion, shifting to the second state or staying in the second
`state;
`responsive to being in the first state, receiving, by the client device, a
`request from the first server; and
`performing a task, by the client device, in response to the receiving of the
`request from thefirst server,
`wherein the methodis further configured for fetching over the Internet a
`first contentidentified by a first content identifier from a web serverthat
`is distinct from the first server, and the task comprising:
`receiving, by the client device, the first content identifier from the
`first server;
`sending, by the client device, the first content identifier to the web
`server;
`receiving, by the client device, the first content from the web server
`in responseto the sending ofthe first content identifier; and
`sending, by the client device, the received first content to the first
`server.
`
`(Dkt. No. 1-1 at 173:44~-174:13). In the ’614 Patent, “client device” is construed as “device
`
`operating in the role of a client by requesting services, functionalities, or resources from the
`
`server.” (Dkt. No. 191 at 14—15). The term “first server” is construed as “server that is not the
`
`client device.” (/d. at 16).
`
`C. The Parties’ Contentions
`
`Teso argues that the Court’s claim construction and Luminati’s arguments at the claim
`
`construction hearing support Teso’s argument that the client and server terms merely refer to
`
`general purpose computers running software. (Dkt. No. 210 at 3-5). Since the Patents-in-Suit refer
`
`to software roles running on general purpose computers, Teso argues that they claim no more than
`
`6
`
`Code200, UAB,et al. v. Bright Data Ltd.
`IPR2022-01109, EX. 2018
`6 of 12
`The Data Company TechnologiesInc. v. Bright Data Ltd.
`IPR2022-00135, EX. 2007
`6 of 12
`
`

`

`general purpose computers sending or receiving information over
`
`the Internet using an
`
`intermediary device. (/d.at 5).
`
`Teso argues that Claim 1 of the °319 Patent and Claim 1 of the *510 Patent merely claim
`
`the sending and receiving of information over the Internet betweenclient devices and servers, and
`
`are therefore abstract. (Jd. at 15). The addition of the status determination step in Claim 1 of the
`
`°614 Patent adds “nothing beyond the routine and conventional step of indicating a device’s
`
`availability based upon standard criteria such as its connectivity, battery power, or CPU usage.”
`
`(Ud. at 16). Further, Teso argues, the dependent claimsasserted in this case do not add anything
`
`more than conventionalsteps recited at a high level, and thus fail for the same reasons. (/d. at 15,
`
`16) (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 82). In essence, Teso’s argument is that the Asserted Claims are
`
`abstract because they describe the typical human interaction of communicating through an
`
`intermediary being performed by general purpose computers. (/d. at 17-18). Teso also argues that
`
`nothing in the Asserted Claims converts the abstract idea into an inventive concept under Step
`
`Two ofAlice. (Id. at 19).
`
`Luminati argues that the claimed invention goes beyond mere communications between
`
`devices overthe Internet, but that the Patents-in-Suit are directed to a new and improved network
`
`architecture that operates over the Internet. (Dkt. No. 224 at 12). The invention solves a technical
`
`problem with fetching Internet content, Luminati argues, and is therefore not abstract. (/d.) The
`
`traditional client-server architecture limited client devices to making requests and receiving
`
`content, but not acting as peer-proxies. (/d. at 13). Luminati argues that the situation is different
`
`from human interactions, in part because the Patents-in-Suit recite modifications to client devices,
`
`such as software installation, to allow client devices to perform in the recited roles. (/d. at 14).
`
`Should the Court reach Alice Step Two, Luminati argues that Step Twois satisfied because the
`
`7
`
`Code200, UAB,et al. v. Bright Data Ltd.
`IPR2022-01109, Ex 2018
`The Data Company TechnologiesInc. v. Bright Data Ltd.
`IPR2022-00135, EX. 2007
`7 of 12
`
`

`

`claims recite inventive concepts. (/d. at 20). Further, Luminati argues that judgment on the
`
`pleadingsis an inappropriate disposition of the factual inquiry involved in Alice Step Two. (id. at
`
`23).
`
`D. Alice Step One
`
`Teso cites Specialized Monitoring Solutions, LLC v. ADT LLC, in which the asserted
`
`patents claimed a database which stored coded messages and provided access to such messages
`
`over the Internet. 367 F. Supp. 3d 575, 585 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2019) (Bryson, Circuit Judge). In
`
`that case, “[t]he claims [did] not recite improvements in technology that help[ed] perform those
`
`steps or describe[d] any means of accomplishing those steps other than throughthe use of a generic
`
`computer and commonplace communication networks. . .” Jd. In contrast, the methods claimed in
`
`this case, while including generic computers and common Internet communication protocols,
`
`recite a broader networkthatis itse/fthe claimed improvement. Rather than a mere categorization
`
`of data, the pairing of servers and peer-proxies describes a network structure that improves the
`
`ability of those actors to communicate.
`
`Teso analogizes this case to Reese v. Sprint Nextel Corp., in which the Federal Circuit held
`
`that claims reciting methods for the sending and receiving of information were abstract. (/d. at 13)
`
`(citing 774 Fed. App’x. 656 (Fed. Cir. 2019)). In Reese, the patent claims were directed to
`
`receiving information—a calling phone number—and sending information—a tone. 774 Fed.
`
`App’x. at 660. However, unlike in this case, the patents in Reese were “akin to concepts of
`
`receiving and displaying (indicating) information .
`
`.
`
`. that fall into a familiar class of claims
`
`directed to abstract ideas.” Jd. If the claimed methods in this case were simply the receipt and
`
`forwarding of information over the Internet, Teso might have a compelling argument. However,it
`
`8
`
`Code200, UAB,et al. v. Bright Data Ltd.
`IPR2022-01109, EX. 2018
`8 of 12
`The Data Company TechnologiesInc. v. Bright Data Ltd.
`IPR2022-00135, EX. 2007
`8 of 12
`
`

`

`is the use of non-traditional client devices that transforms the Asserted Claims into non-abstract
`
`subject matter.
`
`Teso also comparesthis case to Elec. Pwr. Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., another case in which
`
`the Federal Circuit held that the act of collecting and receiving information, without more, is
`
`abstract. (/d. at 14) (citing 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). In Electric Power, the Federal
`
`Circuit categorized the collection of information, the mere analysis of information akin to mental
`
`steps or by algorithms, and the resulting presentation of that collection and analysis, as abstract.
`
`830 F.3d at 1353-54. As noted above, it is not the individual steps of the method that render the
`
`Asserted Claims non-abstract, it is the network architecture as a whole.
`
`Teso argues that Ericsson Inc. vy. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings Ltd., 955 F.3d 1317 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2020) is “right on point.” (Dkt. No. 293 at 29:19). In Ericsson, the claimed process of
`
`controlling access to resources was “exactly the sort ofprocessthat ‘can be performedin the human
`
`mind, or by a human using a pen and paper... .”” 955 F.3d at 1327 (quoting CyberSource Corp.
`
`v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011). However, this case differs from
`
`Ericsson in that an improvement in network design that addresses the problem of congested
`
`networks goes beyond the mere control of access to resources. This is not something a human
`
`being can perform using a pen and pad.
`
`The Court finds the instant situation more comparable to SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`
`in which the Federal Circuit concludedthat the claimed invention was“directed to an improvement
`
`in computer network technology.” 930 F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Although the purpose of
`
`the invention in SRJ was to improve security by monitoring network traffic, and the Asserted
`
`Claims in this case are not designed to improve network security, the Court concludes that the
`
`Asserted Claims here are similarly “directed to a technological solution to a technological
`
`9
`
`samyONBR2022.01109,EX.2018
`The Data CompanyTechnologiesInc. v. Bright DataLa.
`
`IPR2022-00135, EX. 2007
`9 of 12
`
`

`

`problem.” Jd. The specifications of the Patents-in-Suit state that the inventions were designed to
`
`solve a technological problem: the increased use of bandwidth on the Internet, which slows down
`
`networksand increases costs for content providers and Internet Service Providers. (See, e.g., Dkt.
`
`No.1-1 at 1:42—57; Dkt. No. 1-3 at 1:32-60). The use of a non-traditional network structure with
`
`a client device acting as a proxy is designed to produce “faster and more efficient data
`
`communication within a communication network.” (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 4:41-43).
`
`Even more analogousto this case is Packet Intelligence LLC v. NetScout Sys., Inc., 965
`
`F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2020). In Packet Intelligence, the Federal Circuit held that a method for
`
`monitoring a stream of packets (a “connection flow”) exchanged over a computer network was not
`
`abstract. Jd. at 1309-10. Affirming this Court’s findings in that case, the Federal Circuit described
`
`the representative claim as “meet[ing] a challenge unique to computer networks, identifying
`
`disjointed connection flowsin a network environment.” Jd. at 1309. Here, as in Packet Intelligence,
`
`the Asserted Claims address a technological problem unique to computer networks. The Federal
`
`Circuit also found that the patent in Packet Intelligence “solves a technological problem by
`
`identifying and refining a conversational flow such that different connection flows can be
`
`associated with each other and ultimately with an underlying application or protocol.” Jd.
`
`Likewise, the Asserted Claims here provide a technological solution by routing server requests
`
`and receipts through non-traditional client devices, and adding in the ’614 Patent the additional
`
`step of determining whetherthe client device is available to perform that function.
`
`The Court is not persuaded that the use of general purpose computers transformsthe idea
`
`into something abstract. “Software can make non-abstract improvements to computer technology
`
`just as hardware improvements can, and sometimes the improvements can be accomplished
`
`through either route.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335. The Court here notes that
`
`in their claim
`
`10
`
`saeONBR2022.01109,EX.2018
`
`10 of 12
`The Data CompanyTechnologiesInc. v. Bright DataLtd.
`IPR2022-00135, EX. 2007
`10 of 12
`
`

`

`construction briefing, Teso specifically represented that they would nottake the position that they
`
`wouldlater assert that client devices and servers are interchangeable general use computers. (See
`
`Dkt. No. 138 at 11). However, they appear to have taken that position anyway.! (See id.). The
`
`Court finds that the Patents-in-Suit are not abstract because they make use of general-purpose
`
`computers, given that the specifications” of the Patents-in-Suit describe the functionality as being
`
`“provided by software stored within each communication device.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 83:6—15; Dkt.
`
`No. 1-2 at 5:46-48; Dkt. No. 1-3 at 4:48—50). Teso’s counsel acknowledged in the hearing that if
`
`the claims “concerned a non-abstract software .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`that actually caused a technological
`
`improvement .
`
`.
`
`. putting it on a general purpose computer or using that does not .
`
`.
`
`. somehow
`
`cause it to becomeabstract.” (Dkt. No. 293 at 16:14—18). Teso’s counsel also acknowledged that
`
`a technological solution could be brought about through the sending and receiving of information
`
`through general purpose computers—in other words, that the use of a general purpose computer
`
`sending and receiving information was not per se abstract. (/d. at 32:2—33:6). This reality aside,
`
`the Step One analysis leads the Court to conclude that these claims are not abstract but, in fact,
`
`bring a new technological solution to an existing technological problem.
`
`E. Alice Step Two
`
`Having concluded that the Asserted Claimsare not abstract, the Court does not reach Alice
`
`Step Two. However, even if the Court reached the opposite conclusion regarding Step One, the
`
`question as to whether the Asserted Claims are well-understood, routine, and conventional would
`
`contain questions of fact. See Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1369. On the face of the pleadings, there
`
`are factual disputes between the parties on this issue. Accordingly, a judgment on the pleadings
`
`' Notably, Magistrate Judge Payne took specific note of Teso’s position in the Claim Construction Order.
`(Dkt. No. 191 at 15).
`? Whendetermining patent-eligibility, the Court considers the claims as a whole and reads the claims in
`light of the specification. Data Engine Techs. LLC. v. Google LLC, 906 F.3d 999, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
`
`11
`
`Code200, UAB,etal. v. Bright Data Ltd.
`IPR2022-01109, EX. 2018
`11 of 12
`The Data Company TechnologiesInc. v. Bright Data Ltd.
`IPR2022-00135, EX. 2007
`11 of 12
`
`

`

`Code200, UAB, et al. v. Bright Data Ltd.
`IPR2022-01109, EX. 2018
`12 of 12
`
`