IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
`
`MICROPAIRING TECHNOLOGIES
`LLC,
` Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING
`TEXAS INC.,
` Defendant.
`
`
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
`ORDER
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`SA-21-CV-00940-XR
`
`
`On this date, the Court considered Plaintiff’s opening claim construction brief (ECF No.
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`
`
`
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`30), Defendant’s responsive claim construction brief (ECF No. 32), Plaintiff’s reply claim
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`construction brief (ECF No. 34), Defendant’s surreply claim construction brief (ECF No. 38), the
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`parties’ joint claim construction brief (ECF No. 46), Plaintiff’s notice concerning claim
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`construction (ECF No. 55), Defendant’s supplemental claim construction brief (ECF No. 56), and
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`the parties’ oral argument on claim construction (ECF No. 59). After careful consideration, the
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`Court issues the following order construing thirteen disputed claim terms.
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`BACKGROUND
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`
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`On October 28, 2020, Plaintiff MicroPairing Technologies LLC (“MicroPairing”) filed suit
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`against Defendant Toyota Motor Manufacturing Texas Inc. (“Toyota”) for patent infringement.
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`ECF No. 1. MicroPairing alleges that Toyota has directly infringed upon its U.S. Patent Nos.
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`6,629,033 (“‘033 Patent”), 6,778,073 (“‘073 Patent”), 7,793,136 (“‘136 Patent”), 8,380,383 (“‘383
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`Patent”), 8,953,816 (“‘816 Patent”), 9,697,015 (“‘015 Patent”), and 8,583,292 (“‘292 Patent”). Id.
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`¶¶ 48, 57, 65, 74, 83, 96, 109. MicroPairing also alleges that Toyota has indirectly infringed upon
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`its ‘816 and ‘015 Patents. Id. ¶¶ 87, 100.
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`1
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`AHM, Exh. 1021, p. 1
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`

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`MicroPairing’s asserted patents allegedly disclose novel technology, software, and
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`methods for operating a vehicle’s audio system. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 10–16. MicroPairing alleges that
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`Toyota infringes upon one or more of its asserted patents whenever Toyota makes, uses, sells, or
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`offers to sell a Toyota Tundra or Tacoma with a vehicle audio system called an “infotainment
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`system.” Id. ¶ 3. MicroPairing, therefore, seeks damages and a judgment against Toyota for
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`directly and indirectly infringing upon one or more of its asserted patents. Id. at 29–30.
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`
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`MicroPairing initiated this suit in the Waco Division of the Western District of Texas. See
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`ECF No. 4. On February 8, 2021, Toyota filed a motion to transfer venue to the San Antonio
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`Division. ECF No. 24. On October 1, 2021, United States District Judge Alan D. Albright granted
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`Toyota’s motion to transfer venue, ECF No. 48, and the undersigned was assigned to this case.
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`On June 4, 2021, MicroPairing filed its opening claim construction brief. ECF No. 30. On
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`June 25, 2021, Toyota filed its responsive claim construction brief. ECF No. 32. MicroPairing
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`filed a reply brief, and Toyota filed a surreply brief. ECF Nos. 34, 38. On November 9, 2021,
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`MicroPairing filed a notice concerning claim construction, and Toyota filed a supplemental claim
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`construction brief. ECF Nos. 55, 56. On November 16, 2021, the Court held a hearing and heard
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`argument on the contested claim terms.1 See ECF No. 59.
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`DISCUSSION
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`I. Legal Standard
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`Claim construction is a matter of law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S.
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`370, 372 (1996). “The purpose of claim construction is to ‘determine the meaning and scope of
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`the patent claims asserted to be infringed.’” O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co.,
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`521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d
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`
`1 At the hearing, the Court also heard argument on Toyota’s motion to dismiss, which the Court granted in
`part and denied in part. See ECF Nos. 15, 60.
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`
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`2
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`AHM, Exh. 1021, p. 2
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`

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`967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d 517 U.S. 370 (1996)). “When the parties present a
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`fundamental dispute regarding the scope of a claim term, it is the court’s duty to resolve it.” O2,
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`521 F.3d at 1362; cf. Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 483 F.3d 800, 806 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[A]
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`sound claim construction need not always purge every shred of ambiguity”).
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`Claim terms “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.” Vitronics Corp.
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`v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The ordinary and customary meaning
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`of a term “is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question
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`at the time of invention[.]” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “In some
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`cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art may be
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`readily apparent[.]” Id. at 1314. “[C]laim construction in such cases involves little more than the
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`application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” Id. If the ordinary
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`meaning of claim language is not readily apparent, the Court looks to “the words of the claims
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`themselves, the remainder of the specification, the prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence[.]”
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`Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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`General principles of claim construction also apply to allegations of indefiniteness. HZNO
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`Medicines LLC v. Actavis Laby’s UT, Inc., 940 F.3d 680, 688 (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub
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`nom. HZNP Fin. Ltd. v. Actavis Laby’s UT, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 662 (2020). “[A] patent is invalid for
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`indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the
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`prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope
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`of the invention.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 901 (2014).
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`“Indefiniteness must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ'ns
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`Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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`
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`3
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`AHM, Exh. 1021, p. 3
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`

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`Although earlier Federal Circuit decisions have stare decisis effect, see Key Pharms. v.
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`Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the “Court is not obliged to endorse the
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`constructions adopted in any . . . previous district court opinions construing the patents-in-suit.”
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`Good Tech. Corp. v. Little Red Wagon Techs., Inc., No. 3:11-CV-02373-M, 2013 WL 4052408, at
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`*3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2013). Thus, notwithstanding previous district court opinions construing
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`some of the claims and claim terms the parties contest in this case, “stare decisis does not preclude
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`this Court from an independent analysis” of the same. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Wake Forest Univ.
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`Health Scis., No. SA-11-CV-163-XR, 2013 WL 6164592, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2013) (citing
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`Maurice Mitchell Innovations, L.P. v. Intel Corp., No. 2:04-CV-450, 2006 WL 1751779, at *4
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`(E.D. Tex. June 21, 2006), aff’d, 249 F. App’x 184 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). Instead, the Court gives
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`“reasoned deference to the decisions of other district courts” that have construed the claims and
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`claim terms the parties presently contest. Kinetic, 2013 WL 6164592, at *3.
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`II. Analysis
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`A. Contested Claim Terms
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`The parties ask the Court to construe thirteen claim terms.2 The parties’ proposed
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`
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`constructions for each of the thirteen claim terms establish a fundamental dispute on the scope of
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`the claim terms. Construction of each disputed claim term is therefore necessary.
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`1. “application”
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`The parties submit that the term “application” appears in claims of the asserted ‘033, ‘136,
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`‘383, ‘816, ‘015, and ‘292 Patents.3 See ECF No. 30, at 7 n.1; see also ECF No. 32, at 9 n.4.
`
`
`2 In MicroPairing Technologies LLC v. General Motors LLC, No. 6-20-CV-01002-ADA, the parties asked
`the Court to construe the same thirteen claim terms contested herein. There, the court provided its preliminary claim
`constructions by email. See ECF No. 55-1. To date, the court has not issued a formal claim construction order.
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` In identifying the claims in which the disputed term(s) appear, the Court does not include all claims that
`incorporate the disputed term(s) through dependency.
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` 3
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`
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`4
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`AHM, Exh. 1021, p. 4
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`

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`MicroPairing asks the Court to construe the term according to its plain and ordinary meaning. ECF
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`No. 46-1, at 2. Toyota proposes “entire computer program, other than the operating system, that
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`performs a task to fulfill a specific need of a user and can be added to the system after it is put into
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`use.” Id. As discussed at the claim construction hearing, the Court construes the term “application”
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`as “software, other than operating system and support software, that performs a task to fulfill a
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`specific need of a user.” See ECF No. 59, at 40:24–46:17.
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`2. “priority labels used independently by the individual priority managers to
`determine processing priorities for the individual messages for the individual
`software applications”
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`The parties submit that this term appears in Claim 13 of the asserted ‘033 Patent. See ECF
`
`
`
`No. 30, at 9 n.2; see also ECF No. 32, at 19 n.10. MicroPairing asks the Court to construe the term
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`according to its plain and ordinary meaning. ECF No. 46-1, at 2. Toyota proposes “each individual
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`priority manager independently uses a message’s priority value to control the order in which a
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`message is processed based on a comparison of the message’s priority value to the priority value
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`of other messages in a queue and a ranking of the message’s priority.” Id.
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`MicroPairing submits that the term “is easily understood in the context of the claim in
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`which it appears.” ECF No. 30, at 9. MicroPairing contends that Toyota’s construction improperly
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`limits the term to a particular priority scheme “based on a comparison of the message’s priority
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`value to the priority value of other messages in a queue and a ranking of the message’s priority.”
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`Id. at 10. Because nothing in the intrinsic record suggests a limitation to this term, MicroPairing
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`argues, the term “should be given its full scope.” Id. In MicroPairing’s view, Toyota’s construction
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`is “an attempt to limit claim 13 to the embodiment” described in the specification for the asserted
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`‘033 Patent. Id. Nevertheless, to the extent construction is necessary, MicroPairing asks the Court
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`
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`5
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`AHM, Exh. 1021, p. 5
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`

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`to construe the term as “wherein the individual priority managers independently use a message’s
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`priority label to control when, if at all, a message is processed.”4 ECF No. 59, at 47:8–19.
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`Toyota counters that its construction describes the sole priority scheme disclosed, and
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`therefore patented, in the asserted ‘033 Patent. ECF No. 32, at 20. Citing the asserted ‘033 Patent’s
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`specification, Toyota explains:
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`[T]he specification describes how the “priority manager 44
`determines a priority value for the message that determines how the
`message is processed.” ’033 Patent, 3:49–51. It discloses that “the
`priority manager 44 compares the priority value for the outgoing
`message with the priority values for other messages in the
`processor.” ’033 Patent, 3:58–60. The specification also discloses
`that, as part of determining the order of processing using the priority
`value, the priority manager “ranks the [priority value for the]
`outgoing message with respect to other messages and then sends the
`message.” ’033 Patent, 3:61–62. The specification specifically
`discloses a queue: “[t]he priority manager 44 in block 72 ranks the
`priority of the incoming message in relation to the priorities of all
`the other messages in the processor. The priority manager in block
`74 decides according to the ranking whether the message should
`be put in a queue or sent directly to the application for immediate
`processing.” Id., 4:30–35.
`
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`Id. at 20–21. Toyota contends that its “construction is consistent with the ordinary meaning and
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`the specification’s defined method for determining the processing order of messages[.]” Id. at 21.
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`According to Toyota, its construction is proper because “[t]he patentee consistently declared in the
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`specification that messages are ranked against each other and the message with the highest priority
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`processed.” Id. “Construction is necessary[,]” Toyota argues “to prevent MicroPairing from
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`disregarding important aspects of this claim language.” Id. at 22.
`
`
`4 In its briefing, MicroPairing alternatively proposed “wherein the individual priority managers
`independently use a message’s priority value to control when, if at all, a message is processed.” ECF No. 34, at 7 n.2
`(emphasis added). At the claim construction hearing, MicroPairing asked the Court to construe its alternative proposal
`as follows: “wherein the individual priority managers independently use a message’s priority label to control when,
`if at all, a message is processed.” See ECF No. 59, at 47:8–19 (emphasis added). MicroPairing correctly noted at the
`hearing that Claim 13 of the asserted ‘033 Patent recites the word “label” instead of “value.” See id. The Court,
`therefore, considers MicroPairing’s alternative proposal as stated at the claim construction hearing.
`6
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`
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`AHM, Exh. 1021, p. 6
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`

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`“[T]he person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the
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`context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire
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`patent, including the specification.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313; see also Innova/Pure Water, 381
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`F.3d at 1116 (“A court construing a patent claim seeks to accord a claim the meaning it would
`
`have to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.”). “[T]he specification may
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`resolve ambiguous claim terms ‘where the ordinary and accustomed meaning of the words used in
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`the claims lack sufficient clarity to permit the scope of the claim to be ascertained from the words
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`alone.’” Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I, LLC, 456 F. Supp. 2d 811, 815 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
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`(quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). “Much of
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`the time, upon reading the specification . . . it will become clear whether the patentee is setting out
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`specific examples of the invention . . . or whether the patentee instead intends for the claims and
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`the embodiments in the specification to be strictly coextensive.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
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`Here, a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art at the time of the invention, after reading
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`the term in the context of the claim in which the term appears and the specification, would
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`understand that the patentee intended to patent one priority scheme as it relates to an individual
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`priority manager in an Open Communication system receiving and reading a message. Broadly,
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`the asserted ‘033 Patent’s specification discloses a “communication system for a mobile vehicle”
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`that “includes multiple processors.” ECF No. 1-2, at 1:53–54. The specification provides that
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`“multiple processors each run an Open Communication system that controls how data is
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`transferred between processors based on data content as opposed to the links that connect the
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`processors together.” Id. at 1:54–58. The specification also discloses that the Open Communication
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`system “enables data or messages to be effectively transferred and processed for real-time
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`
`
`7
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`AHM, Exh. 1021, p. 7
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`

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`applications or other server based applications that may be running on the multiple processors in
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`a secure environment regardless of processors, locations, or data links.” Id. at 1:59–63.
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`Significantly, the specification describes a queue by which an individual priority manager
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`in an Open Communication system ranks and processes an incoming message. The specification
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`explicitly discloses that an individual priority manager “decides according to the ranking whether
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`the message should be put in a queue or sent directly to the application for immediate processing.”
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`Id. at 4:33–35. Figure 4, a flow diagram showing how the priority manager receives data in the
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`open communication system, illustrates the described queue:
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`
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`
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`
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`
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`
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`Id. at 6. According to Figure 4, an individual priority manager identifies an incoming message’s
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`priority label and subsequently determines whether the value on the identified incoming message’s
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`priority label is sufficient to run on the processor. Id. If the identified incoming message’s priority
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`label is sufficient to run on the processor, then the individual priority manager ranks the identified
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`incoming message’s priority label by comparing the value of that priority label with the values of
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`priority labels on other incoming messages. Id. If it is not sufficient, then the individual priority
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`manager rejects the message. Id. The individual priority manager ultimately schedules processing
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`of those incoming messages that it did not reject according to priority ranking. Id. This priority
`
`
`
`8
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`AHM, Exh. 1021, p. 8
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`

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`scheme is not simply, as MicroPairing contends, a preferred embodiment; rather, it is the only
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`priority scheme disclosed by the asserted ‘033 Patent’s intrinsic evidence and therefore patented.5
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`However, the term fails to describe the patented priority scheme. While the term discloses
`
`that individual priority managers independently use priority labels to determine priority labels for
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`the individual messages received from individual software applications, the term fails to explain
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`how the individual priority managers use the priority labels. See ECF No. 1-2, at 11:61–64. Claim
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`13 of the asserted ‘033 Patent is similarly deficient; the claim merely describes a vehicle system
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`comprising multiple processors operating a communication system, which further comprises
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`individual priority managers associated with individual software applications that attach priority
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`labels to individual messages transferred between individual software applications in the vehicle.
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`See id. at 11:50–64. Dependent claims also fail to explain how the individual priority managers
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`use priority labels. For instance, Claim 17 recites a “system according to claim 13 wherein the
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`priority managers assign priority values to different sensor data messages according to a likelihood
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`of objects identified in the sensor data colliding with the vehicle[,]” id. at 12:13–16, but the claim
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`fails to describe how the individual priority managers use priority labels.
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`“The construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the
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`patent’s description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction.” Renishaw PLC
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`v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998). While Toyota’s proposed
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`construction provides some clarity on the patented priority scheme, its construction fails to clearly
`
`account for the possibility that an individual priority manager may reject a message upon receiving
`
`
`5 Even if the only priority scheme described in the asserted ‘033 Patent’s specification is, as MicroPairing
`urges, an embodiment, for the reasons discussed, there is “a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the patentee
`intended the claims to be so limited.” Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
`9
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`
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`AHM, Exh. 1021, p. 9
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`and reading the value on the message’s priority label.6 MicroPairing’s alternative proposed
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`construction, however, accounts for this possibility.
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`Therefore, the Court construes “priority labels used independently by the individual
`
`priority managers to determine processing priorities for the individual messages for the individual
`
`software applications” as “wherein the individual priority managers independently use a message’s
`
`priority label to control when, if at all, a message is processed.” A person of ordinary skill in the
`
`relevant art at the time of the invention would have understood that Claim 13 of the asserted ‘033
`
`Patent claims a particular priority scheme, wherein the individual priority managers independently
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`use a message’s priority label to control when, if at all, a message is processed.
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`
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`3. “configured to” / “adapted to”
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`The parties submit that the term “configured to” appears in Claim 10 of the asserted ‘073
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`Patent; Claims 1, 18, and 31 of the asserted ‘136 Patent; Claim 1 of the asserted ‘383 Patent;
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`Claims 1, 6, and 17 of the asserted ‘816 Patent; Claims 1, 6, and 17 of the asserted ‘015 Patent;
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`and Claims 1 and 2 of the asserted ‘292 Patent. See ECF No. 30, at 11 n.3; see also ECF No. 32,
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`at 17 n.8. The parties further submit that the term “adapted to” appears in Claim 25 of the asserted
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`‘033 Patent. See ECF No. 30, at 11 n.3; see also ECF No. 32, at 17 n.8. MicroPairing asks the
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`Court to construe the terms according to their plain and ordinary meaning. ECF No. 46-1, at 2.
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`Toyota proposes “actually configured to and not merely capable to.” Id. The parties agree that the
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`terms should be construed consistently. See ECF No. 17, at 17. As discussed at the claim
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`construction hearing, the Court construes the terms “configured to” and “adapted to” according to
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`their plain and ordinary meaning. See ECF No. 59, at 50:16–53:12.
`
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`6 To the extent Toyota argues that its construction captures the possibility of an individual priority manager
`rejecting a message because “[d]iscarding the message is processing the message according to the ranking of its
`priority against other messages[,]” ECF No. 38, at 11, its construction is unclear. See Kinetic, 2013 WL 6164592, at
`*15 (rejecting proposed construction because “further defining the term would only add to the jury’s confusion”).
`10
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`
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`AHM, Exh. 1021, p. 10
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`4. “audio sources”
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`The parties submit that the term “audio sources” appears in Claim 10 of the asserted ‘073
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`Patent. See ECF No. 30, at 12 n.4; see also ECF No. 32, at 22 n.11. MicroPairing initially proposed
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`“devices that generate audio data.” ECF No. 46-1, at 2. At the claim construction hearing, however,
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`MicroPairing stated that it “is amenable to plain and ordinary meaning[.]” ECF No. 59, at 53:19–
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`20. Toyota also proposes the term’s plain and ordinary meaning. ECF No. 46-1, at 2. Therefore,
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`as discussed at the claim construction hearing, the Court construes the term “audio sources”
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`according to its plain and ordinary meaning. See ECF No. 59, at 53:13–21.
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`
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`5. “wireless audio output devices” / “the audio output devices”
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`The parties submit that the terms “wireless audio output devices” and “the audio output
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`devices” appear in Claim 10 of the asserted ‘073 Patent. See ECF No. 30, at 13 n.5; see also ECF
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`No. 32, at 23 n.12. MicroPairing asks the Court to construe the terms according to their plain and
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`ordinary meaning. ECF No. 46-1, at 3. Alternatively, MicroPairing proposes “devices configured
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`to output audio from audio data provided by wireless audio sources.” Id. Toyota proposes “wireless
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`devices that output sound.” Id. As discussed at the claim construction hearing, the Court construes
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`the terms “wireless audio output devices” and “the audio output devices” as “wireless devices that
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`output sound.” See ECF No. 59, at 53:22–58:10.
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`
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`6. “multiprocessor system” / “multi-processor system”
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`The parties submit that the terms “multiprocessor system” and “multi-processor system”
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`appear in Claims 1, 18, and 31 of the asserted ‘136 Patent; Claim 6 of the asserted ‘816 Patent;
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`and Claim 6 of the asserted ‘015 Patent.7 See ECF No. 30, at 15 n.7; see also ECF No. 32, at 25
`
`
`7 MicroPairing states that the term “multi-processor system” also appears in Claim 1 of the asserted ‘383
`Patent. ECF No. 30, at 15 n.7. However, the word “distributed” immediately precedes the term as it appears in Claim
`1 of the asserted ‘383 Patent and reads “distributed multi-processor system,” which the parties have asked the Court
`11
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`
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`AHM, Exh. 1021, p. 11
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`

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`n.13. The parties appear to agree that the terms should be construed consistently. MicroPairing
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`asks the Court to construe the terms according to their plain and ordinary meaning. ECF No. 46-
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`1, at 3. Toyota proposes “system of multiple processors which share memory, and in which the
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`processing tasks for an application can be coordinated across multiple processors.” Id.
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`MicroPairing submits that the terms are entitled to the full scope of their plain and ordinary
`
`meaning, namely “a system that includes multiple processors.”8 ECF No. 30, at 16. MicroPairing
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`argues that the relevant claim language and specifications do not require multiple processors in a
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`multiprocessing system to share memory and coordinate processing tasks. Id. Citing to the
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`specification for the unasserted ‘260 Patent, MicroPairing submits that the memory in a
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`multiprocessor system “may also include different local memories that are accessed locally by
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`specific processors.”9 Id.; see also ECF No. 30-3, at 5:44–46. MicroPairing further contends that
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`the relevant intrinsic records do not indicate that a multiprocessor system is limited to a system of
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`multiple processors “in which the processing tasks for an application can be coordinated across
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`multiple processors.” ECF No. 30, at 16. MicroPairing maintains that “the language of the asserted
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`claims itself defines how the claimed multiprocessor systems are configured.” Id.
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`In response, Toyota argues that the relevant claim language and specifications dispense
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`with MicroPairing’s construction that a multiprocessor system is simply a system that includes
`
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`to construe separately. See ECF No. 1-5, at 20:13–43. The Court, therefore, does not construe the term “multi-
`processor system” in Claim 1 of the asserted ‘383 Patent in this section.
`
` 8
`
` Elsewhere, MicroPairing submits that “a system with multiple processors” captures the full scope of the
`terms’ plain and ordinary meaning. See ECF No. 30, at 15. The distinction is immaterial. Construing the terms
`according to their plain and ordinary meaning, a system that includes multiple processors is a system with multiple
`processors and a system with multiple processors is a system that includes multiple processors.
`
` 9
`
` According to MicroPairing, the specification for the unasserted ‘260 Patent is incorporated into the
`specifications for each of the patents asserted in this case, except for the asserted ‘033 Patent. See ECF No. 30, at 16.
`Toyota appears to agree, stating in its responsive claim construction brief that the specification for the unasserted ‘260
`Patent “is incorporated by reference into the Multiprocessor Patents[.]” ECF No. 32, at 26.
`12
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`
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`AHM, Exh. 1021, p. 12
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`multiple processors. ECF No. 32, at 25–26. Toyota contends that the relevant claim language
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`establishes that a multiprocessor system requires “multiple processors to be networked together.”
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`Id. at 26. For instance, Toyota submits, Claim 6 of the asserted ‘816 Patent recites, “multiple
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`processors networked together into a multi-processor system.” Id. at 26; see also ECF No. 1-6, at
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`9:37–38. According to Toyota, the relevant specifications further explain “that part of networking
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`multiple processors together is giving them access to a shared memory.” ECF No. 32, at 26. Citing
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`the specification for the unasserted ‘260 Patent, Toyota argues that requiring the sharing of
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`memory among multiple processors is not, as MicroPairing contends, contrary to the ordinary
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`meaning of the terms.10 Id. at 28. In Toyota’s view, the fact that a multiprocessor system “may
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`also include . . . [t]he presence of additional local memories for specific processors does not detract
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`from the ‘260 Patent’s confirmation that the ordinary meaning of ‘multiprocessor system’ requires
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`a shared memory among multiple processors.” Id. Based on its proposition that a multiprocessor
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`system requires “multiple processors networked together,” Toyota further contends that the
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`relevant specifications describe, and therefore also require, that a multiprocessor system “facilitate
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`coordination of processing tasks for an application across multiple processors.” Id.
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`This is not the first time a court has construed the disputed terms. In Eagle Harbor
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`Holdings, LLC v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:11-CV-05503-BHS (W.D. Wash. July 29, 2013), the
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`court appointed a special master to construe the term “multiprocessor system” in, inter alia, Claim
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`1 of the asserted ‘136 Patent.11 See Special Master Order, Eagle Harbor Holdings, LLC v. Ford
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`10 Toyota also cites to extrinsic evidence. See ECF No. 32, at 27, 29. “Such evidence, however, is ‘less reliable
`than the patent and its prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms.’” Good Tech., 2013 WL 4052408,
`at *3 (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318).
`
`11 To be precise, the parties in Eagle Harbor asked the court to construe the terms “multiprocessor system,”
`“multiprocessor network,” and “a processor system, wherein a processor is coupled to at least a second processor.”
`See Special Master Order, Eagle Harbor Holdings, LLC v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:11-CV-05503-BHS (W.D. Wash.
`July 29, 2013), ECF No. 165, at 31–32.
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`
`
`13
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`AHM, Exh. 1021, p. 13
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`

`

`Motor Co., No. 3:11-CV-05503-BHS (W.D. Wash. July 29, 2013), ECF No. 165, at 31. The special
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`master observed that, in many instances, the term appeared in the preamble of a claim, followed
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`by the word “comprising.” Id. at 36. “Where the term is not in the preamble,” the special master
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`noted, “it is followed by the term ‘configured to’ and limitations describing requirements for the
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`multiprocessor system.” Id. “For example,” the special master illustrated, “claim 1 of the ‘136
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`patent includes the limitation ‘one or more of the multiple on-board processors coupled together
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`into a multiprocessor system and configured to’ followed by several additional limitations defining
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`the multiprocessor system.” Id.
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`Based on the structure of the claims in which the term appeared, the special master
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`concluded that the term is used in the nominative sense in the preamble and body of claims,
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`“providing a descriptive name to the set of limitations that follow, and in which the further
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`limitations completely set forth the invention.” Id. at 37. According to the special master, “A
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`person of ordinary skill would understand that the limitations following the preamble or the
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`‘configured to’ transition would define the requirements of the multiprocessor system.”12 Id. at
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`12 The special master reached this conclusion even though the terms “are sometimes used for the first time in
`the body of an asserted claim instead of the preamble[.]” Special Master Order, Eagle Harbor, No. 3:11-CV-05503-
`BHS, ECF No. 165, at 37. The special master explained:
`
`
`[T]he parties have agreed that these terms should be construed to mean the same
`thing in every instance, regardless of whether they appear in the preamble or in
`the body of the claim. This potentially raises an issue as to whether the precedent
`for interpretation of preamble is equally applicable to terms applying in the body
`of the claim, but in this instance even where these terms [first appear] in the body
`of a claim rather than in the preamble, they are still used in the same nominative
`sense. Because these terms are frequently used in the preamble in a nominative
`sense, or used in the body of a claim in the similar nominative sense, and where
`they are grouped together to be construed the same way, the guidance for
`interpretation of terms in a preamble should be applied to these terms.
`
`
`Id. The court subsequently considered a motion for further claim construction of the disputed terms. See Eagle Harbor
`Holdings, LLC v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:11-CV-05503-BHS, 2014 WL 12570145 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 4, 2014). In
`resolving the motion, the court recognized that, under Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d
`801 (Fed. Cir. 2002), “dependence on a particular disputed preamble phrase for antecedent basis may limit claim scope
`because it indicates a reliance on both the preamble and claim body to define the claimed invention.” Id. at 809. Still,
`the court concluded that further construction of the terms would be “unworkable because it is clear that the inventors
`14
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`
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`AHM, Exh. 1021, p. 14
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`

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`36–37. The term, the special master reasoned, is “not limiting and need not be expressly
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`construed.”13 Id. at 37. As a result, the special master construed the term “multiprocessor system”
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`according to its plain and ordinary meaning as defined by the limitations that follow the term. Id.
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`at 38. The court agreed and adopted the special master’s construction. See Order, Eagle Harbor
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`Holdings, LLC v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:11-CV-05503-BHS (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2