Filed on behalf of: MicroPairing Technologies LLC
`
`By: Brent N. Bumgardner
`Registration No. 48,476
`NELSON BUMGARDNER CONROY P.C.
`3131 W. 7th Street, Suite 300
`Fort Worth, Texas 76107
`Telephone: (817) 377-3490
`Email: brent@nelbum.com
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`________________
`
`Unified Patents, LLC
`
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`MicroPairing Technologies LLC,
`
`Patent Owner
`
`________________
`
`Case IPR2022-00317
`
`U.S. Patent 7,178,049
`________________
`
`
`PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
`
`
`
`
`
`
`AHM, Exh. 1009, p. 1
`
`

`

`I.
`
`II.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`
`THE ’049 PATENT AND THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS .......................... 3
`
`A. Overview of ʼ049 Patent. ...................................................................... 3
`
`B.
`
`Challenged Claims. ............................................................................... 6
`
`III. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL .................................................................... 7
`
`IV. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ............................................................................ 7
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`“Configuring” [Preamble] ..................................................................... 7
`
`“Using the Task Manager for . . . Identifying Another Processor”
`[Claim 29.4] ........................................................................................... 7
`
`1. Petitioner’s construction is far from the plain and ordinary
` meaning of this phrase. .................................................................... 8
`
`2. Petitioner’s construction seeks to improperly import a limitation
`
`into the Challenged Claim without justification. ............................. 9
`
`3. Petitioner’s construction is unsupported by the intrinsic
`
`evidence. ........................................................................................10
`
`
`V. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ........................................................12
`
`A. Obviousness .........................................................................................12
`
`1. Claims cannot be found obvious if an element is absent...............13
`
`2. A petition must address the Graham factors. .................................13
`
`3. A petition must provide articulated reasoning with rational
`
`underpinning to combine references. .............................................14
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`
`
`ii
`
`AHM, Exh. 1009, p. 2
`
`

`

`VI. THE PETITION IS PLAINLY DEFICIENT AND INSTUTION MUST BE
`DENIED.........................................................................................................14
`
`A. Overview of the Primary Reference ....................................................15
`
`B.
`
`Preliminary Response Regarding Required Elements of the
`Independent Challenged Claims..........................................................18
`
`1. Kizuka does not disclose “operating a configuration manager that
`
`notifies the task manager upon detecting a failure running one of ..
`
`the identified vehicle applications in the multiprocessor system”
`
`[Claim 29.3] ...................................................................................20
`
`2. Kizuka does not disclose “using the task manager for automatically
`
`identifying another processor in the multiprocessor system for
`
`running the identified vehicle application” [Claim 29.4] ..............24
`
`3. Kizuka does not disclose “using the configuration manager to
`
`redirect the data and state information to the other identified
`
`processor . . . after detecting the failure” [Claim 29.5] .................28
`
`C. A POSITA Would Not Have Been Motivated to Combine Kizuka with
`Watabe as Petitioner Proposes ............................................................31
`
`1. Petitioner’s Analysis Lacks Articulated Reasoning. .....................31
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2. Watabe would be rendered unsatisfactory for its intended
` purpose. ..........................................................................................36
`
`
`VII. THE BOARD SHOULD EXERCISE DISCRETION UNDER 35 U.S.C.
`§314(A) TO DENY INSTITUTION .............................................................37
`
`A.
`
`The Board Should Deny Institution Because Institution Undermines
`Public Trust in the USPTO and Inter Partes Review Process. ...........38
`
`B.
`
`Efficiency Warrants Denying Institution. ...........................................41
`
`VIII. PETITIONER FAILED TO IDENTIFY ALL REAL PARTIES IN
`INTEREST ....................................................................................................42
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`
`
`iii
`
`AHM, Exh. 1009, p. 3
`
`

`

`A.
`
`Petitioner Has Not Met its Burden of Showing the Petition Identifies
`All Real Parties in Interest. .................................................................42
`
`B.
`
`The Board Should Determine the RPI Issue. ......................................47
`
`IX. PATENT OWNER’S FINAL COMMENTS ................................................49
`
`X.
`
`CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................50
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`
`
`iv
`
`AHM, Exh. 1009, p. 4
`
`

`

`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Cases
`
`Amazon Web Services, Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe,
` IPR2019-00103, Paper 22 (PTAB May 10, 2019) ...............................................26
`
`Ancestry.com DNA, LLC v. DNA Genotek Inc.,
` IPR2016-01152, Paper 11 (PTAB Nov. 23, 2016) ........................................ 34, 35
`
`Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019,
` Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) .............................................................. 38, 40, 41
`
`Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp.,
` 897 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................................................... 42, 46, 47
`
`Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Prod. Inc.,
` 876 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................................................................34
`
`Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc.,
` 675 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ........................................................................9, 12
`
`Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP,
` 616 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ............................................................................10
`
`CFMT, Inc. v. YieldUp Int’l Corp.,
` 349 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ......................................................... 13, 24, 28, 31
`
`Commerce Bancshares, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC,
` IPR2014-00793, Paper 7 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2014) ...................................................35
`
`Cont’l Cirs. LLC v. Intel Corp.,
` 915 F.3d 788 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ..........................................................................9, 12
`
`Duo Security Inc. v. Strikeforce Tech., Inc.,
` IPR2017-01064, Paper 7 (PTAB Oct. 16, 2017) ..................................................26
`
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`
`
`v
`
`AHM, Exh. 1009, p. 5
`
`

`

`Eiko Global, LLC v. Blackbird Tech LLC ,
` IPR2017-00980, Paper 16 (PTAB Sept. 1, 2017) .................................................26
`
`Eizo Corp. v. Barco N.V.,
` IPR2014-00358, Paper 11 (PTAB July 23, 2014) ................................................13
`
`EPOS Techs. Ltd. v. Pegasus Techs. Ltd.,
` 766 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ..........................................................................8, 9
`
`Fall Line Patents, LLC v. Unified Patents, LLC,
` 818 F. App’x 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2020) .....................................................................45
`
`Garmin Int’l, Inc. v. Patent of Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC,
` IPR2012-00001, Paper 15 (PTAB Jan. 9, 2013) ............................... 13, 24, 28, 31
`
`General Plastic Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha,
` IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) .................................................37
`
`Google Inc. v. InfoGation Corp.,
` IPR2017-00819, Paper 16 (PTAB Sept. 11, 2017)...............................................26
`
`Graham v. John Deere Co.,
` 383 U.S. 1 (1966) ..................................................................................................13
`
`In re Gordon,
` 733 F.2d 900 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ....................................................................... 31, 36
`
`In re Kahn,
` 441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ....................................................................... 14, 31
`
`
`In re Mouttet,
` 686 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ..................................................................... 31, 34
`
`In re Nuvasive, Inc.,
` 842 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 7, 2016) ................................................................31
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`
`
`vi
`
`AHM, Exh. 1009, p. 6
`
`

`

`
`In re Rijckaert,
` 9 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ................................................................................13
`
`In re Royka,
` 490 F.2d 981 (C.C.P.A. 1974) ..............................................................................13
`
`In re Wesslau,
` 353 F.2d 238 (1965) ..............................................................................................20
`
`Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs.,
` 512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ............................................................................14
`
`K/S HIMPP v. Hear-Wear Techs., LLC,
` 751 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................................................................27
`
`K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A.,
` 191 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ............................................................................10
`
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
` 550 U.S. 398 (2007) ................................................................................. 14, 31, 34
`
`LG Elecs., Inc. v. Cellular Commc’ns Equip. LLC,
` IPR2016-00197, Paper 7 (PTAB April 29, 2016) ................................................14
`
`Mayne Pharma Int’l Pty. Ltd. v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp.,
` 927 F.3d 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ............................................................................48
`
`Microsoft v. Enfish,
` 662 Fed. Appx. 981 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 30, 2016) .....................................................32
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
` 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .............................................................................. 9
`
`RPX Corporation v. Applications in Internet Time, LLC,
` IPR2015-01750, Paper 128 (PTAB October 2, 2020) ..........................................46
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`
`
`vii
`
`AHM, Exh. 1009, p. 7
`
`

`

`
`Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. EnerPol, LLC,
` IPR2018-00077, Paper 16 (PTAB Apr. 25, 2018) ...............................................26
`
`Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc.,
` 358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ..........................................................................8, 12
`
`TCT Mobile, Inc. v. Fundamental Innovation Sys. Int’l LLC,
` IPR2021-00597, Paper 8 (PTAB Aug. 25, 2021) .................................................37
`
`Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
` 988 F.2d 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ............................................................................10
`
`Unified Patents v. American Patents,
` IPR2019-00482, Paper 115 (PTAB Aug. 13, 2020) ...................................... 42, 43
`
`United Microelectronics Corp., et. al. v. Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC,
`IPR2017-1513, Paper 10 (PTAB May 22, 2018) .................................................26
`
`
`United Patents, Inc. v. Uniloc Luxembourg S.A.,
` IPR2018-00057, Paper 9 (PTAB May 11, 2018) .................................................26
`
`Unwired Planet, LLC v. Apple Inc.,
` 829 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .............................................................................. 9
`
`W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc.,
` 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ............................................................................20
`
`Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc.,
` 903 F.3d 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................................................................42
`
`Rules, Regulations, and Statutes:
`35 U.S.C. § 103 ....................................................................................... 1, 12, 13, 24
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) ...................................................................................................12
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`
`
`viii
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`AHM, Exh. 1009, p. 8
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`

`

`
`35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2) .................................................................................... 2, 42, 48
`
`35 U.S.C. § 313 .......................................................................................................... 1
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) ........................................................................................... passim
`
`35 U.S.C. §315(b) ....................................................................................................48
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316 ................................................................................................. 38, 41
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(b) ............................................................................................ 38, 41
`
`35 U.S.C. § 324(a) ...................................................................................................38
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.107 ..................................................................................................... 1
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) ...............................................................................................37
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) ...............................................................................................12
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.5(c)(3) ..............................................................................................48
`
`Other Authorities
`Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756 (Aug. 14, 2012) .............12
`
`PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (USPTO Nov. 2019) ................ 19, 30, 37
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`
`
`ix
`
`AHM, Exh. 1009, p. 9
`
`

`

`TABLE OF EXHIBITS
`
`Description
`
`Exhibit
`2001 U.S. Patent No. 7,146,260
`2002 United States Department of Commerce USPTO Summary of Ethics
`Rules 2021
`2003 Unified Patents Webpage – FAQs
`2004 Unified Patents Webpage – Member Gallery
`2005 Unified Patents Webpage – Membership Information
`2006 Honda Form 20-F
`2007 Nissan Financial Report
`2008 Toyota Form 20-F
`2009 Unified Patents Webpage – NPE Zones
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`
`
`x
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`AHM, Exh. 1009, p. 10
`
`

`

`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 313 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.107, Patent Owner
`
`MicroPairing Technologies LLC (“Patent Owner”) submits this Preliminary
`
`Response to Petitioner Unified Patent, LLC’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Inter Partes
`
`Review (“Petition,” Paper 2), challenging Claims 29–31 of U.S. Patent No.
`
`7,178,049 (the “’049 Patent”) (EX1001). The Board should not institute inter partes
`
`review because Petitioner has not met its burden of showing a reasonable likelihood
`
`of prevailing on its sole proposed ground of unpatentability—obviousness under 35
`
`U.S.C. § 103(a) in view of Kizuka and Watabe.
`
`As an initial matter, the Petition suffers from a number of fundamental flaws,
`
`each of which warrants denial of institution. For example, the Petition’s allegations
`
`are plainly deficient because Kizuka in combination with Watabe does not disclose
`
`or teach all limitations of the Challenged Claims. To address evidentiary gaps in
`
`Kizuka, the Petition not only mischaracterizes the teachings of the art, but also, relies
`
`upon a flawed claim construction that improperly imports a limitation into the claim
`
`language without justification or intrinsic support. Likewise, the Petition fails to
`
`establish that a person of ordinary skill in the art (a “POSITA”) would have been
`
`motivated to combine Kizuka with Watabe, as Petitioner proposes.
`
`The Board should also deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Petitioner is
`
`a non-practicing entity with a corporate structure and business practice that
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`
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`1
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`AHM, Exh. 1009, p. 11
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`

`

`undermines public trust in these proceedings. Petitioner’s activities before the
`
`USPTO are funded by undisclosed, publicly-traded entities who pay Petitioner
`
`“subscription fees” to challenge patents. Petitioner’s failure to identify these entities
`
`in its Petition prevents the Board from identifying conflicts of interest and allows for
`
`a perception of bias. The Board should guard against potential conflicts and such
`
`perceptions by exercising its discretion to deny institution or, at a minimum,
`
`requiring Petitioner to publicly identify its members whose “subscription fees” are
`
`used to fund its activities in this matter. Requiring Petitioner to identify its members
`
`is a low bar and provides a transparency that re-enforces public trust.
`
`Finally, the Board should also deny institution because the Petition is
`
`procedurally defective in failing to meet its burden of showing that it has identified
`
`all real parties in interest. See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). The Petitioner has a well-
`
`documented business model that accepts money from subscribers to “technology
`
`zones” that it uses to challenge the validity of patents that fall within those zones.
`
`But the Petition fails to identify the companies that fund the relevant “technology
`
`zone” as real parties in interest. For example, Honda, as a relevant member, is a real
`
`party in interest that should have been identified in the Petition but was not. Instead,
`
`the Petitioner merely submits a self-serving declaration that provides superficial
`
`details about Petitioner’s activities and, conspicuously, is completely silent as to
`
`what members’ subscription fees Petitioner is using to fund its activities with respect
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`
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`2
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`AHM, Exh. 1009, p. 12
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`

`

`to this proceeding or those members’ relationship with Petitioner. Without full and
`
`appropriate disclosure, the Board is unable to determine whether the Petition has
`
`satisfied its threshold requirement of identifying all real parties in interest; that is,
`
`whether the Petition identifies non-parities that are a beneficiary to the proceeding
`
`that have a preexisting, established relationship with the Petitioner.
`
`Each of these shortcomings independently prevents the Petition from meeting
`
`its burden, and the Petition should be denied for failing to show a reasonable
`
`likelihood that any Challenged Claim is unpatentable. Accordingly, the Board should
`
`not institute inter partes review of the ’049 Patent for at least the reasons set forth
`
`herein.
`
`II. THE ’049 PATENT AND THE CHALLENGED CLAIMS
`
`A. Overview of ʼ049 Patent.
`
`The ’049 Patent was filed on April 24, 2002 and issued on February 13, 2007,
`
`and is entitled “Method for Multi-Tasking Multiple Java Virtual Machines in a
`
`Secure Environment.” The’049 Patent allows for the construction of a secure real-
`
`time operation system from a portable language (e.g., Java) while providing a secure
`
`operating system. See EX1001, Abstract. The Challenged Claims relate to a method
`
`of handling a failure running a real-time vehicle application (e.g., vehicle brake
`
`control, driver assistance control, and environmental control) that occur in a
`
`distributed multi-processor system operating in a vehicle. See EX1001, 9:31-59. As
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`
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`3
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`AHM, Exh. 1009, p. 13
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`

`

`relevant to the challenged claims, in one disclosed embodiment, the ’049 Patent
`
`discloses recovering from a malfunctioning application on a processor, by using
`
`“lock step” methods to identify a failed application and efficiently move the failed
`
`application to another processor in a multiprocessor system.
`
`As the ’049 Patent explains, its distributed multiprocessor system includes
`
`multiple processors [16, 18, 20, 22 and 24] for running various real-time vehicle
`
`applications,1 and a secure-real-time executive (“SRE”) [14] for controlling various
`
`tasks, messaging, and security for each processor,2 as illustrated by Figure 2 below:
`
`EX1001, Figure 2.
`
`
`
`This secure-real-time executive is further comprised of at least a task manager
`
`[58] and a configuration manager [60]. See id., Fig. 3; 3:34-51. In order to effectively
`
`1 See id. 2:23-56.
`2 See id. 2:57-67; 3:34-42.
`
`
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
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`4
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`AHM, Exh. 1009, p. 14
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`

`

`handle a failure of a vehicle application in a vehicle’s multi-processor system, the
`
`task manager of the ’049 Patent is responsible for controlling (i) when different tasks
`
`are initiated on different processors (e.g., 16, 18, 20, 22 and 24) in the vehicle’s
`
`multi-processor system and (ii) when applications are activated in the system. See
`
`id., 4:6–11; 6:13–20; see also id., 10:60-64. In contrast, the configuration manager
`
`is responsible for (i) monitoring the operation of the different processors (e.g., 16,
`
`18, 20, 22 and 24) to ensure that the real-time vehicle application are running
`
`correctly and (ii) detecting any real-time vehicle application failures that may occur
`
`in the system’s processors. See id., 3:46-47; 4:23-31; 8:38-39; 10:65-11:1.
`
`Upon detecting a failure by the configuration manager, the configuration
`
`manager then sends a notification to the task manager of the detected failure. See id.,
`
`4:38-42; 11:1-2. Once notified of the detected failure by the configuration manager,
`
`the task manager identifies another processor where the failed application can be
`
`reloaded. See id., 4:6-8; 6:45-50; 7:46-48; 9:43-45. Once another processor has been
`
`identified by the task manager, the configuration manager then redirects the data and
`
`state information of the failed application to the newly-identified processor. See id.,
`
`4:42-59. Finally, the task manager redirects the failed application to the identified
`
`processor. See id., 4:59-65.
`
`
`
`
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`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`
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`5
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`AHM, Exh. 1009, p. 15
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`

`

`B. Challenged Claims.
`
`There are three Challenged Claims: 29-31. Claim 29 is an independent claim,
`
`while Claims 30-31 depend from Claim 29.
`
`Claim 29 recites:
`
`29. A method for configuring real-time vehicle applications in a
`distributed multi-processor system operating in a vehicle, comprising:
`
`identifying vehicle applications running on different processors in
`the multiprocessor system;
`
`operating a task manager that obtains different data and state
`information associated with the different vehicle applications;
`
`operating a configuration manager that notifies the task manager
`upon detecting a failure running one of the identified vehicle
`applications in the multiprocessor system;
`
`using the task manager for automatically identifying another
`processor in the multiprocessor system for running the identified
`vehicle application and redirecting the vehicle application associated
`with the detected failure to the other identified processor in the vehicle;
`
`using the configuration manager to redirect the data and state
`information to the other identified processor in the vehicle after
`detecting the failure; and
`
`initiating the identified application in the identified other processor.
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`
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`6
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`AHM, Exh. 1009, p. 16
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`

`

`The limitations that are at issue in this Preliminary Response have been
`
`emphasized, above. The arguments in this Preliminary Response pertain to
`
`independent Claim 29, but are equally applicable to Claims 30-31 because they
`
`depend from Claim 29. As such, should the Board accept Patent Owner’s arguments
`
`that trial should not be instituted on Claim 29, it necessarily follows that trial should
`
`not be instituted on the dependent claims.
`
`III. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL
`
`For the limited purpose of this Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not
`
`contest Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, but it reserves
`
`the right to do so in the event that trial is instituted.
`
`IV. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`
`
`A.
`
`“Configuring” [Preamble]
`
`For the limited purpose of this Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not
`
`contest the construction of the term “configuring.” Should the Board institute trial,
`
`Patent Owner reserves the right to address Petitioner’s claim construction position.
`
`B.
`
`“Using the Task Manager for . . . Identifying Another Processor”
`[Claim 29.4]
`
`This phrase is sufficiently clear on its face and does not require construction.
`
`To the extent the Board finds it necessary to construe the phrase “using the task
`
`manager for automatically identifying another processor in the multiprocessor
`
`system,” it should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Even if the Board finds
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`
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`7
`
`AHM, Exh. 1009, p. 17
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`

`

`that a construction for this phrase is needed, it should reject the construction
`
`proposed by Petitioner for at least the reasons set forth below.
`
`1.
`
`Petitioner’s construction is far from the plain and ordinary
`meaning of this phrase.
`
`
`
`Petitioner proposes construing this phrase to mean “using the task manager
`
`for automatically identifying another processor in the multiprocessor system . . .
`
`based on a received configuration manager notification.” Petition, p. 12 (emphasis
`
`added). Notably, Petitioner does not suggest the phrase “using the task manager for
`
`automatically identifying another processor in the multiprocessor system for running
`
`the identified vehicle application” is unclear. Indeed, its proposed construction
`
`includes this language. Instead, Petitioner improperly asks the Board to import the
`
`limitation “based on a received configuration manager notification” from the
`
`specification into the claim language. The Board should reject Petitioner’s overly
`
`narrow construction. See Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d
`
`870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is important not to import into a claim limitations
`
`that are not a part of the claim. For example, a particular embodiment appearing in
`
`the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is
`
`broader than the embodiment.”); EPOS Techs. Ltd. v. Pegasus Techs. Ltd., 766 F.3d
`
`1338, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
`
`
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`
`
`8
`
`AHM, Exh. 1009, p. 18
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`

`

`2.
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`Petitioner’s construction seeks to improperly import a
`limitation into the Challenged Claim without justification.
`
`Petitioner’s construction violates a cardinal rule of claim construction—
`
`
`
`improperly importing a limitation from a preferred embodiment into the claims
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`without legal justification. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2005); Cont’l Cirs. LLC v. Intel Corp., 915 F.3d 788, 796-97 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
`
`It is well established that “it is improper to read limitations from a preferred
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`embodiment described in the specification—even if it is the only embodiment—into
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`the claims absent a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the patentee intended
`
`the claims to be so limited.” EPOS Techs. Ltd. v. Pegasus Techs. Ltd., 766 F.3d
`
`1338, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2014);. see also Unwired Planet, LLC v. Apple Inc., 829 F.3d
`
`1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324,
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`1330 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Despite this requirement, the Petition does not identify any
`
`clear definition or unambiguous disavowal (nor can it) in either the specification or
`
`prosecution history that would limit the disputed phrase to a specific embodiment,
`
`as Petitioner proposes. See Petition, pp. 12-14. The disclosures that Petitioner relies
`
`on to support its proposed construction (see, e.g., Petition, p. 13 (citing EX1001,
`
`4:38-42, 3:45-52, 4:31-34)) are exemplary and do not rise to the level of a clear
`
`definition or an unambiguous disavowal. See, e.g., EX1001 at 4:43-44 (“In this
`
`example, . . . .”) (emphasis added).
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`
`
`9
`
`AHM, Exh. 1009, p. 19
`
`

`

`3.
`
`Petitioner’s construction is unsupported by the intrinsic
`evidence.
`
`Petitioner’s IPR-inspired construction not only runs afoul of controlling
`
`Federal Circuit precedent, it also is unsupported by the intrinsic evidence. As the
`
`Federal Circuit has instructed, claim construction “begins and ends . . . with the
`
`actual words of the claim.” Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP,
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`616 F.3d 1249, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2010); K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356,
`
`1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Courts do not rewrite claims; instead, we give effect to the
`
`terms chosen by the patentee.”). Here, the claim language recites “using the task
`
`manager for . . . identifying another processor in the multiprocessor system,” without
`
`narrowing that phrase. EX1001, 9:43-45. Had the applicant meant to further limit
`
`the claim to require the identification of another processor—by the task manager—
`
`to be “based on a received configuration manager notification,” it certainly could
`
`have done so. It would be improper to narrow the claim language as proposed by
`
`Petitioner now under the guise of claim construction. See Tex. Instruments, Inc. v.
`
`U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[C]ourts can
`
`neither broaden nor narrow claims to give the patentee something different than what
`
`he has set forth.”).
`
`
`
`Petitioner’s proposed construction is also inconsistent with the specification
`
`because it excludes other embodiments, where the task manager independently
`
`identifies other processors:
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`
`
`10
`
`AHM, Exh. 1009, p. 20
`
`

`

`• “One of the operations performed by the task manager 58 is to control when
`
`different tasks are initiated on different processors.” EX1001, 4:6-8 (emphasis
`
`added).
`
`• “[O]perating a task manager that obtains different Global Positioning System
`
`(GPS) data from a first processor operating a GPS application and obtains
`
`sensor fusion data from one or more second processors operating sensor
`
`applications.” EX1001, 10:60-64 (emphasis added).
`
`• “[T]he task manager redirecting the GPS or sensor applications associated
`
`with the detected failure to a third processor in the vehicle.” EX1001, 11:2-5
`
`(emphasis added).
`
`• “The device managers [task managers] 46 can each identify other devices in
`
`the multiprocessor system that it communicates with. For example, processors
`
`A, B, C and D communicate to each other over one or more communication
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`links including a Ethernet link 64, a wireless 802.11 link 68, or a blue tooth
`
`link 70. EX2001,3 4:32-39 (emphasis added).
`
`• “If all these data parameters are verified, the device managers 46 in one or
`
`more of the processors A, B, C and D add the new processor E to their
`
`processor arrays in block 82.” EX2001, 5:5-7 (emphasis added).
`
`• See also EX1001, 6:45-50; 7:46-48.
`
`
`3 The ’260 Patent (EX2001) is incorporated by reference. See EX1001, 3:59 – 4:4
`
`Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response
`
`
`
`11
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`AHM, Exh. 1009, p. 21
`
`

`

`Petitioner’s attempt to limit this phrase to a preferred embodiment in the
`
`specification is improper and should be rejected. See SuperGuide Corp., 358 F.3d at
`
`875; see also Cont’l Cirs. LLC v. Intel Corp., 915 F.3d 788, 796-97 (Fed. Cir. 2019);
`
`Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
`
`V. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`The Board may only grant a petition for inter partes review where “the
`
`information presented in the petition … shows that there is a reasonable likelihood
`
`that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged
`
`in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). Petitioner bears the
`
`burden of showing that this statutory threshold has been met. See Office Patent Trial
`
`Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“The Board … may institute
`
`a trial where the petitioner establishes that the standards for instituting the requested
`
`trial are met ….”).
`
`A. Obviousness
`
`Section 103 of the Patent Act provides that “[a] patent may not be obtained
`
`… if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
`
`art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time
`
`the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
`
`subject matter pertain