Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 2 of 232
`
`C l11im C lrnrl for U.S. Patfnl !No. 9,6'15,705 ('"th<: ']OS Patctit")
`
`'l11c Accu:;c."<l lnstrumcnwliti<.-s include, but arc not ncct-Ssnrily limited 10. Apple iPhonc und Appk iPad compatible with Yale
`Sman Locks. and nny 1-\pple produc1 or device 1hal is substaolially or reasonably similar 10 1he func1iomility s.:i fonh below. 11,e
`Accused ln.itrumenwlitics infringe the claims of 1he '705 r atcm. as described below. either directly under 3S U.S.C. § 271(a). or
`indirectly undc.-r 3S U.S.C. §§ 27 1 (b)-(c). The Accused hL~trumcrunJities infringe thcclairns of the '70S r,ucn1 li1ernlly and, to 1hc extent
`not litc-rnlly. 1.mdcr lhe doctrine of equivalents.
`
`Claim I
`
`~ccused Jns1rumc:ntallli~s:
`
`I. /\ system for providing To the e.ttent that the 11r,:umble i.,, Je~mcd u, be II limitutio11, tit~ Au11scd l11str1m,, 11u,Util!s are
`n mfigurl!d /1111s~ a Jt)'.'ilttm ln 111x11rd1111u w;,1, tltl,· t'luhtt.
`secure access to a
`controlled ilcm, !he
`syst1.,n comprising:
`
`Mure spt.-eilicnlly, lhc controlled item L'> a locking m1.-ch.unism of lhe door lock of the user's home. Tile
`,\ ccuscd lns1rumcn1ali1ics arc oonligun .. -d 10 pro\•idc secure acc<.'SS to the user·$ home viii Yolc Smart
`Locks when 1he uS(-1' l'.>fOvides biome1ric signal to 1be Accused Instrumentalities via •rouch 10 or Face
`ID.
`
`--when the ··St..-curc RemOlc Access"' feature is lumcd on. lhc 3flp will u.~c your phone':. buil1-i1
`autJlcn1icmion 100b 10 promp1 fingcrpl'im or facial rtX'.ogni1ion before you can unlock or lock you11
`1Qme remut.;ly (m)lt•· i r )'.Otlf 1?:hon.: docs not h.'l,•e 1ht-:sc foature.s.. it will e,rompt you to use your PIN·
`codclI'rhis fur1her cn~tm .. '$ th;u your door is only operated by the rig.hi people m 1he time you iotc.-nd
`for ii,"
`(hnps://us.yalehomc.-.oom/e,\/yale-ncws/blo.c/latcst-blog•postsfintroducing-biomcuic-vcrific::i1ion-for-
`aug.t1$1•;1 nd-y11lc-l0<:ks I /)
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 1
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`C l11im C lrnrl for U.S. Patfnl !No. 9,6'15,705 ('"th<: ']OS Patctit")
`
`'l11c Accu:;c."<l lnstrumcnwliti<.-s include, but arc not ncct-Ssnrily limited 10. Apple iPhonc und Appk iPad compatible with Yale
`Sman Locks. and nny 1-\pple produc1 or device 1hal is substaolially or reasonably similar 10 1he func1iomility s.:i fonh below. 11,e
`Accused ln.itrumenwlitics infringe the claims of 1he '705 r atcm. as described below. either directly under 3S U.S.C. § 271(a). or
`indirectly undc.-r 3S U.S.C. §§ 27 1 (b)-(c). The Accused hL~trumcrunJities infringe thcclairns of the '70S r,ucn1 li1ernlly and, to 1hc extent
`not litc-rnlly. 1.mdcr lhe doctrine of equivalents.
`
`Claim I
`
`~ccused Jns1rumc:ntallli~s:
`
`I. /\ system for providing To the e.ttent that the 11r,:umble i.,, Je~mcd u, be II limitutio11, tit~ Au11scd l11str1m,, 11u,Util!s are
`n mfigurl!d /1111s~ a Jt)'.'ilttm ln 111x11rd1111u w;,1, tltl,· t'luhtt.
`secure access to a
`controlled ilcm, !he
`syst1.,n comprising:
`
`Mure spt.-eilicnlly, lhc controlled item L'> a locking m1.-ch.unism of lhe door lock of the user's home. Tile
`,\ ccuscd lns1rumcn1ali1ics arc oonligun .. -d 10 pro\•idc secure acc<.'SS to the user·$ home viii Yolc Smart
`Locks when 1he uS(-1' l'.>fOvides biome1ric signal to 1be Accused Instrumentalities via •rouch 10 or Face
`ID.
`
`--when the ··St..-curc RemOlc Access"' feature is lumcd on. lhc 3flp will u.~c your phone':. buil1-i1
`autJlcn1icmion 100b 10 promp1 fingcrpl'im or facial rtX'.ogni1ion before you can unlock or lock you11
`1Qme remut.;ly (m)lt•· i r )'.Otlf 1?:hon.: docs not h.'l,•e 1ht-:sc foature.s.. it will e,rompt you to use your PIN·
`codclI'rhis fur1her cn~tm .. '$ th;u your door is only operated by the rig.hi people m 1he time you iotc.-nd
`for ii,"
`(hnps://us.yalehomc.-.oom/e,\/yale-ncws/blo.c/latcst-blog•postsfintroducing-biomcuic-vcrific::i1ion-for-
`aug.t1$1•;1 nd-y11lc-l0<:ks I /)
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 1
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 3 of 232
`
`Claim I
`
`Accu~cd lnslrumcnrnli1its:
`
`o...,
`
`Introducing Biometric Verification for August and Yale Locks
`
`(h11psJ/us.y.1IC'ho111c-.<."<tm/cn/ynll!-ntws/blog/latcs1-blog-postslin1rodueiog-biomeuic4 verilication-for•
`~ugu.sHmd-y.1lc-locksl/)
`
`2
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 2
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 4 of 232
`
`Cl:1im 1
`
`(hups://www .apple .com/shop/pn:KI uct/1 1 PAR 22M/ A/ya l~-assure-lock-sl -louchscrccn-dcadbol 1-bla<:k)
`
`3
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 3
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 5 of 232
`
`Claim 1
`
`Accused Instrumentalities
`
`The Accused Instrumentalities compatible with Yale Smart Locks are shown below:
`
`Compatibility
`
`iPhone Models
`iPhone 12 Pro
`
`iPhone 12 Pro Max
`
`iPhone 12 mini
`
`iPhone 12
`
`iPhone 11 Pro
`
`iPhone 11 Pro Max
`
`iPhone 11
`
`iPhone SE {2nd generation)
`
`iPhone XS
`
`iPhone XS Mox
`
`iPhone XR
`iPhone X
`
`iPhone8
`
`iPhone 8 Plus
`
`iPhone 7
`iPhone 7 Plus
`iPhone 6s
`
`iPhone 65 Plus
`
`iPhone SE {1st generation)
`
`iPad Models
`IPad Pro 12.9-inch
`(5th generation)
`
`iPad Pro 12.9-inch
`(4th generation)
`
`iPad Pro 12.9-inch
`(3rd generation)
`
`iPad Pro 12.9-inch
`(2nd generation)
`
`iPad Pro 12.9-inch
`(1st generation)
`
`iPad Pro 11-inch
`{3rd generation)
`
`iPad Pro 11-inch
`(2nd generation)
`
`1Pad Pro ti.inch
`{1st generation)
`
`iPad Pro 10.5-inch
`
`iPad Pro 9.7-inch
`
`iPad Air (4th generation)
`
`iPad Air (3rd generation)
`
`iPadAir 2
`
`iPad (8th generation)
`
`iPad (7th generation)
`
`iPad (6th generation)
`
`iPad (5th generation)
`
`iPad mini (5th generation)
`
`iPad mini 4
`
`https://www.apple.com/ shop/product/HP AR2ZM/ Nyale-assure-lock-sl-touchscreen-deadbo lt-b lack
`
`la. a memory compnsmg The Accused Instrumentalities include a memory comprising a database of biometric signatures.
`a database of biometric
`signatures;
`
`4
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 4
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 6 of 232
`
`C laim I
`
`Accused lns 1ru nu•111:alitie~
`
`Mon: spc.-cifically, 1hc iPhone allows muhiple biomclric signatures 10 he CUl(.>rcd in10 a database on the
`iPhonc:
`
`T 11uch JD
`
`11,c iPhonc allows the registration ofmuhipk fi ngerprint:,:
`
`•
`
`<.,
`- -
`<·
`- ·--
`0
`- -
`- - - c ,
`
`l~ig. from hups://support.applc.com/cn-u.s/HT'20 137 I under M:lnagc Touch ID Senings. In Lhe secoild
`bullet, il Ji1crally says:
`
`"lkgb.icr up lo five fingerprints:."
`
`"Touch JD can read muhiple lingerprin1s. an<I it can read fingcrpri nis in 360•dcgr<.'(.'S of oricn1a1ion. II
`then ere-at,..,_,; a maihematicol K1>n.""Sen1a1ion of your fingerprint and co,nparcs 1his to your enrolled
`f'in ·r rinl d11ta to idcntif a match and unlock
`r dc\•il-e. "
`
`s
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 5
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 7 of 232
`
`Claim I
`
`t\ccusi!!d ln~r.-ument;ilitief\
`
`(hllps:l/suppon.applc.com/cn•us/MT204S87)
`
`"'Touc h 10 can read m ulliplc tingcrprints and recognize finge'l)rints ttl any orientation of the linger.
`111c system then crcales a mathcmnlica1 rcprcscnlnlion or your linge'l)rinl and compar..:s it IC> Lhc
`n:gistcrcd fingerprint darn co dctc-nninc :i m:1tch :ind unlock your device."'
`(h11ps:l/suppon.applc.co111/en-us/MT204S87)
`
`f:u.-e ID
`llle iPhonc ,1llows the registration of muhiple face.~:
`
`To rcgisicr a fncc. the iPhonc lakes a series or pictures ofchc us<.':f in diffcrcnl poses while circling his
`head. This is revealed in detail in l111ps://suppon.apple.com/cn .. us/HT208109 in 1hc second section
`•con Ii •ure Fa,-e ID". there also the fi ure shown above.
`
`6
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 6
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 8 of 232
`
`Claim 1
`
`Accused Instrumentalities
`
`To register a second face, the iPhone offers a corresponding option in its settings. If the user selects the
`option "Set up an alternative appearance" as shown in the figure below (from How To Add A Second
`Face To Face ID - Macworld UK; https://www.macworld.co.uk/how-to/second-face-id-380342 l/), a
`second face is registered by the iPhone in the same way as the first face.
`
`"Set up Face ID or add another face.
`
`• Select "Settings"> "Face ID & Code"> "Configure alternate appearance" if you want to
`configure another face to be recognized by Face ID."
`
`(https://support.apple.com/de-de/ guide/iphone/i ph6d 162927 a/ios)
`
`7
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 7
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
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`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 9 of 232
`
`C laim I
`
`Accus,'<l lnstrum!'nl:1litic.,;
`
`(
`
`C
`C
`C
`C
`
`•
`
`...
`·-------·-·
`·--·--
`
`•
`
`-•-a
`
`The page How 1·0 Add A Second face To Fncc 10 • Macworld UK
`(h11ps://w·ww.m:,cworld.co.uk/how-1olsecond•foce•id-380342 1/) literally states:
`
`"F'acc 10 is a lbst nnd 5(.."CUrc way lo unlock your il)honc or iP:1d Pro. bul you mny no! know thal you
`can actually sec up more 1hon one foce 10 use the lcarure.
`This second foce could belong 10 a loved one, enabling your panncr or child to access your phone
`wi1hout requiring your smiling mug 10 un lock i1 ...
`·ro store the biometric signatures ("1cmpla1e datn") from 1he received biomc1ric signals. the iPhooc has
`a Sy$1.cm on Chip (SOC) calk<I ,1 Secure Enda.,c. A $('Cure Enelave 1)1"0<."('Ssor provides 1he Seeurc
`Enclave with <.-om utin • wer:
`
`8
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 8
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 10 of 232
`
`Claim 1
`
`Accused Instrumentalities
`
`"The Secure Enclave is a system on chip (SoC) that is included on all recent iPhone, ... devices"
`(Ex. A, Apple Platform Security, at 7.)
`
`"The Secure Enclave is a dedicated secure subsystem integrated into Apple systems on chip (SoCs)."
`(Id., at 9.)
`
`The Secure Enclave Processor provides the main computing power for the Secure Enclave."
`(Id., at IO.)
`
`"During enrollment, the Secure Enclave processes, encrypts, and stores the corresponding Touch ID
`and Face ID template data."
`(Id., at 19.)
`
`The Secure Enclave has access to a memory assigned to it and accessible only to it:
`
`Secure nonvolatile storage
`"The Secure Enclave is equipped with a dedicated secure nonvolatile storage device.
`The secure nonvolatile storage is connected to the Secure Enclave using a dedicated I2C bus, so that it
`can only be accessed by the Secure Enclave."
`(Id., at 15.)
`
`This memory serves as a database for storing the biometric signatures:
`
`"The secure nonvolatile storage is used for all anti-replay services in the Secure Enclave. Anti-replay
`services on the Secure Enclave are used for revocation of data over events that mark anti-replay
`boundaries including, but not limited to, the following:
`•
`•
`
`Adding or removing a Touch ID fingerprint or Face ID face" .
`
`(/d.,at 16.)
`
`9
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 9
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 11 of 232
`
`.Accusl.!d I Ds.lru mtml:d itic.
`
`TI1is cl.rwbas~ i:s i>hm,11 in mhe figure frntn Apph.:: Pl.iLrli•m1 ~ t.""1.:'uLiry ruprn<lu~~d bdow:
`
`--·
`
`-i
`
`- ...., ...
`
`I --i ~·-,I I
`
`l
`
`- ~(cid:173)~
`
`-·(cid:173)
`
`--
`
`lbtub.1.Sc I OS
`tE~. 1\ . Apple Platlom1 ·ecurity. ,tt " · ~
`
`rn
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 10
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 12 of 232
`
`Chiim I
`
`a 1mnsmittc:r sub-
`lb.
`syslcm c.-omprising:
`
`A:. :;et forth ilt deme11ts I b I . I bl, am/ I bl bt'lt1w, thr Act:u.w~d /,utrw11r11u,lilit~· i11d111/t' u
`1ra11smi11u ~·ub--sJ·.~tem .
`
`1l1e irhone's Secure Encl:avc is a mmsmincr sub-sysh:m. It sends ephemerally rc-cncryp1cd lite keys 10
`1he appliea1ion processor wi1h ils file system driver ("Applica1ion r roccssor filc•s)'stcm driver"') 10
`l'\.•ad the files in the NANO Fl:tsh St()mgc.
`
`---· -
`I --
`I
`---
`--
`I ··--I
`It
`·---... _ -- - --
`-
`-
`-
`---
`
`(E,x. A. 1-\pplc Pl.11form St.-curity, n1 9.)
`
`II
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 11
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 13 of 232
`
`Claim I
`
`Ac<.'u~td lnsfrumenralirie.."
`
`''sl'pOS can 1heo use 1he <:1>hemerol wrapping key to wr.ip file keys for u.sc hy the Af•plknlion
`Prnl·c..-.sor filc-syJtcm driwr. \Vh<•n the lilt•S'~krn drh·cr reads or\\ rites :1 Oh.\ it sends the
`wr,11>ptd key lo the A ES Engine. "
`(Id., 31 14.)
`
`"All wrapped lilc key hMdling occurs in 1he Secure Enc lave~ the file key ls never d irectly exposed 10
`1hc Applic;11ion Proc.~~r. { ... ] Wh'"·n 1hc s~-curc Enclaw unwraps ~1 fi le's keys. they're re,,ni1>rcd with
`lhc cph\'mcral key :lnd sen t l111ck to the A1•1>lka1icm ProctMOr,"
`(IJ .. 31 85.)
`
`Ex. 13. Behind the Scen<..-s with iOS Sccurilv, al 30.
`
`12
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 12
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 14 of 232
`
`Claim 1
`
`I b I.
`a biometric sensor
`configured
`to receive a
`biometric signal;
`
`Accused Iustrumeutalities
`
`The Accused Instrumentalities include a biometric sensor configured to receive a biometric signal.
`
`More specifically, the iPhone has at least one biometric sensor for capturing a fingerprint or a face
`(Touch ID and/or Face ID), namely a Touch ID sensor and a camera system with image sensor,
`respectively.
`
`Touch ID
`
`"Apple devices with a Touch ID sensor can be unlocked using a fingerprint."
`(Ex. A, Apple Platform Security, at 19.)
`
`"Touch ID is the fingerprint sensing system that makes secure access to supported Apple devices faster
`and easier. This technology reads fingerprint data from any angle and learns more about a user's
`fingerprint over time, with the sensor continuing to expand the fingerprint map as additional
`overlapping nodes are identified with each use."
`(Id.)
`
`"When the fingerprint sensor detects the touch of a finger, it triggers the advanced imaging array to
`scan the finger and sends the scan to the Secure Enclave."
`(Id.)
`
`The biometric sensor for Touch ID is located below the home button:
`
`"The Home button is a stack of different materials, capped with a sapphire crystal lens. The
`surrounding stainless-steel ring works as a ground and detects the user's finger. This action activates a
`capacitive touch sensor installed underneath the cover: A CMOS chip with small capacitors."
`(httos://annleinsider.com/inside/touch-id)
`
`13
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 13
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
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`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 15 of 232
`
`Ch1im I
`
`8iomc.1ric S<..,-nsor 121
`
`"W1wre i~ 1hc Touch I D scn!>ur locau .. xl?
`
`·n1c Touch II) S(."flSOr is loc3tcd cilhcr i11 the home buuon or• on the iPad Air(4th Q.cntrJlion) • in 1he 1op
`buuon.
`(hups://suppon,:01,pk .cornl,·n-us1M'r2013 71 )
`
`TI1e image seosor capcun:s: an 88-by-88-pixel, 500 PPI rtister scan:
`
`"111c 88-by•88°pi.xel. 500-ppi raster ~ n is temporarily s.iorcd in cncrypu •. -d memory within the Secure
`E11clave while being vectorized ror analysis, und then it's discarded. The analysis utiliz~ subdcrm al
`ridge llow ang.Je mapping. which i..~ a lossy proce:;s that discards minu1ia darn lluu would be n..-quircd 10
`r<..wnslntct the llS(.-1's uctual fingerprint. 111c. resulting map of nodes is stored without imy identity
`infom1a1ion in an encrypted lbm1a1 that can only be read by the SeclU'C Encla\!e, and i.s never sem to
`A
`le or backed u to iCloud or iT UJlCS. ,.
`
`14
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 14
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 16 of 232
`
`Claim 1
`
`Accused Instrumentalities
`
`(Ex. C, iOS Security white paper, at 8.)
`
`Face ID
`
`The biometric sensor for facial biometrics is a camera system ("TrueDepth camera system") with an
`image sensor.
`
`"With a simple glance, Face ID securely unlocks supported Apple devices. It provides intuitive and
`secure authentication enabled by the TrueDepth camera system, which uses advanced technologies to
`accurately map the geometry of a user's face. "
`(Ex. A, Apple Platform Security, at 20.)
`
`To receive a biometric signal, the camera system with image sensor reads over 30,000 infrared points
`to capture depth information along with a two-dimensional infrared image.
`
`"After the TrueDepth camera confirms the presence of an attentive face, it projects and reads over
`30,000 infrared dots to form a depth map of the face along with a 2D infrared image. This data is
`used to create a sequence of 2D images and depth maps, which are digitally signed and sent to the
`Secure Enclave. To counter both digital and physical spoofs, the TrueDepth camera randomizes the
`sequence of 2D images and depth map captures, and projects a device-specific random pattern. A
`portion of the Secure Neural Engine-protected within the Secure Enclave-transforms this data into a
`mathematical representation and compares that representation to the enrolled facial data. This enrolled
`facial data is itself a mathematical representation of the user's face captured across a variety of poses."
`(Id.)
`
`The camera system includes a biometric image sensor, namely a "CMOS image" sensor from Sony, to
`perform facial biometrics:
`
`15
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 15
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
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`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 17 of 232
`
`C laim I
`
`t\t.·.cused lnsr-rumcntali1ic~
`
`(hups://applci nsidcr .com/anic lcs/ I 7 /09/0'J/inner-worl:. ings-o f-~1ppl i:s-focc-id-cam1."ra-<lct:1i k"t1-in(cid:173)
`report)
`
`I b2. a lransmi1tcr sub(cid:173)
`s~tcm
`contr()IJCr
`configured to match the
`biometric sign.JI against
`membcts of the data.base of
`biometric si,simtun."S
`to
`I hereby
`output
`nn
`accessibility :ittributc: and
`
`The Ac-,·used lnstrnmf'11tulities iud,u/r II tru11s111ittt•r tofltro/1,:r ,·mifikure,I 10 emit,, st:eurt tllXtSJ'
`:dguul cam'e)'ing i11fi,rmation ,lrpe11d<'t1I t1ptm suid ucn~.~;,#,ilitJ' t1llrilm1,•,
`
`More specilic:illy, lhc iPhonc's System on Chip (SOC). i.e. the St.-cu.re Encla\'c with iL~ Secure Enclave
`Processor (SEP) or a S1.,~un: Neural Engine contaill\.-d lhcrcin, is :.t means ( I 03) 10 chl•d; a nuttch uf the(cid:173)
`biometric signal with elements of the bioineuic signature database.
`
`"The Sec'tlre /;,'ndtn-e is n system on chip (SoC) thal is indudcd on all r("C""nl iPhont, ... de,•ices"
`(Ex. A. Apple Platform Security. at 7.)
`
`16
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`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 16
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 18 of 232
`
`Claim 1
`
`Accused Instrumentalities
`
`"During matching, the Secure Enclave compares incoming data from the biometric sensor against the
`stored templates to determine whether to unlock the device or respond that a match is valid (for
`Apple Pay, in-app, and other uses of Touch ID and Face ID)."
`(Id., at 19.)
`
`The biometric signal received from the biometric sensor ("incoming data from the biometric sensor") is
`thus checked by the Secure Enclave and its SEP with the elements of the database of biometric
`signatures I 05, i.e. the "stored templates", for the presence of a match.
`
`For Touch ID, the Secure Enclave match verification is performed as follows:
`
`"The Secure Enclave is responsible for processing fingerprint data from the Touch ID sensor,
`determining if there is a match against registered fingerprints, and then enabling access or purchases on
`behalf of the user ... "
`(Ex. C, iOS Security white paper, at 7.)
`
`"During enrollment, the resulting map of nodes is stored in an encrypted format that can be read only
`by the Secure Enclave as a template to compare against for future matches .... "
`(Ex. A, Apple Platform Security, at 19.)
`
`"Touch ID can read multiple fingerprints, and it can read fingerprints in 360-degrees of orientation. It
`then creates a mathematical representation of your fingerprint and compares this to your enrolled
`fingerprint data to identify a match and unlock your device. "
`(https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204587)
`
`"Touch ID can read multiple fingerprints and recognize fingerprints at any orientation of the finger.
`The system then creates a mathematical representation of your fingerprint and compares it to the
`registered fingerprint data to determine a match and unlock your device."
`(https :// support.apple.com/ de-de/HT204 5 8 7)
`
`17
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 17
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 19 of 232
`
`Claim 1
`
`Accused Instrumentalities
`
`For Face ID, the Secure Enclave has a neural network protected by it, i.e., a Secure Neural Engine,
`which is used to verify the match:
`
`"Face ID uses neural networks for determining attention, matching, and antispoofing, so a user can
`unlock their phone with a glance."
`(Ex. A, Apple Platform Security, at 20.)
`
`"A portion of the Secure Neural Engine-protected within the Secure Enclave-transforms this data into a
`mathematical representation and compares that representation to the enrolled facial data. This enrolled
`facial data is itself a mathematical representation of the user's face captured across a variety of poses."
`(Id.).
`
`"Facial matching security
`Facial matching is performed within the Secure Enclave using neural networks trained specifically for
`that purpose ... Face ID data, including mathematical representations of a user's face, is encrypted and
`available only to the Secure Enclave. This data never leaves the device."
`(Id. at 23.)
`
`When the Secure Enclave, or more precisely the Touch ID or Face ID subsystem within the Secure
`Enclave, has determined that a match exists, an accessibility attribute is issued by the corresponding
`Touch ID or Face ID subsystem. This Touch ID or Face ID subsystem is also referred to as the SBIO.
`The accessibility attribute confirms that there is a match and that the iPhone is to be unlocked (" ...
`determine whether to unlock the device ... ").
`
`This confirmation of the match is signaled by the SBIO by issuing a random secret to which only the
`Touch ID or Face ID subsystem within the Secure Enclave has access:
`
`"During matching, the Secure Enclave compares incoming data from the biometric sensor against the
`stored templates to determine whether to unlock the device[ ... ]."
`(Id. at 19.)
`
`18
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 18
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 20 of 232
`
`Claim 1
`
`Accused Instrumentalities
`
`"Uses for Touch ID and Face ID
`
`Unlocking a device or user account
`[ ... ] keys for the highest class of Data Protection-which are held in the Secure Enclave[ ... ].
`
`With Touch ID or Face ID enabled, the keys aren't discarded when the device or account locks;
`instead, they're wrapped with a key that's given to the Touch ID or Face ID subsystem inside the
`Secure Enclave. When a user attempts to unlock the device or account, if the device detects a
`successful match, it provides the key for unwrapping the Data Protection keys, and the device or
`account is unlocked. This process provides additional protection by requiring cooperation between the
`Data Protection and Touch ID or Face ID subsystems to unlock the device."
`
`(Id. at 24.)
`
`"The class key is protected with the hardware UID and, for some classes, the user's passcode."
`(Id. at 85.)
`
`"Complete Protection
`(NSFileProtectionComp/ete): The class key is protected with a key derived from the user passcode or
`password and the device UID. Shortly after the user locks a device (10 seconds, if the Require
`Password setting is Immediately), the decrypted class key is discarded, rendering all data in this
`class inaccessible until the user enters the passcode again or unlocks (logs in to) the device using
`Touch ID or Face ID."
`
`(Id. at 86.)
`
`The Touch ID or Face ID subsystem within the Secure Enclave is the SBIO shown below. SBIO is an
`application that runs within the Secure Enclave on the SEP and is responsible for checking the match
`of biometric features. SBIO receives the corresponding biometric data from a biometric sensor, such as
`the Touch ID sensor. The random secret is stored in a memorv /"bio memorv") associated with the
`
`19
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 19
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`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 21 of 232
`
`Clnim I
`
`oumpuL from lhc bio memory upon malch. sec . lqi 3 in the diap,rum be-low('" J 11pw1
`liiUa.'sslful mt1tch ~end rm,dom .se rel lo KS"):
`
`l-0
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 20
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 22 of 232
`
`C laim I
`
`Accused lnstrumenll1lilie."
`
`(/(/., 31 25.)
`
`The mndom $(..-.:rct is issu<..-d 10 $KS. SKS is a Scct1rc Key Service application which is located within
`the Secure Enc hive on the SEP and is responsible ror decrypting class keys. The random sccrc1
`pro\•idcd by SOIO is used 10 decryp1 a master key ("4) dccrytN master key"), 111c master key is
`conc,uena1cd with the UID of 1he SEP and 1hus cbss keys arc decrypted and added to the SKS keyring
`(''S) dl'Cryp-1 cla,;,s keys. add lo keyring") r()r fbnhcr use by the Secure Enclave. The dccryplcd cla:;s
`keys include. for example, lhc class key of cla~ A.
`
`trnnsmiuer
`a
`I b3.
`conligun..-d 10 emit a secure
`access siynal convc:.yin~
`infonnation
`dependcn1
`upon
`said
`acc<..-ssibiti1y
`attribute~ nnd
`
`1'lte Auusc>d htstr111m•uu1/irh~ includt.• n 1r1111smitlt'r M 1tjig11rt•d ro emir It stturt! ,u·ccss si;:m.1I
`t·tmre,>·i11g iu/Qrmurion ,lepettdenl up,m suit/ urcc~·ibility uuributt!.
`
`For exiunplc, lhe S l't'"UJ\' f.nclavc emits a signul ,,~1h ephemerally rc-cncrypled rile keys:
`
`"scpOS can then use 1hc ephemel'al wrapping key 10 wrnp lilc keys for use by Lhc Application
`Procc:i.sor filc-syslen, dl'ivcr. When Lhc life-sysh.:m driver re:1ds or writes o file. it .scod.s 1hc \vt.:1ppc-d
`kc:v to the AES En •inc."
`
`21
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 21
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 23 of 232
`
`Claim I
`
`.. A 11 \Vrapp,;:tl Ii le k.:. h,mt..lling occur~ in the ccurc m: lave~ Lhc file k~)' is p~, er dire cl'~ .:xroSA.-d lu
`r,piicmh.m rroi,;c~or. 1 ... 1 \\'h"'n die ~LLN nr.:I ,,e- un~vrnp a t'il1.:' • L.c:i,.:i, lhcy"r • re,~ rnpfk,.."'d "ilh
`lh~
`th..: ..:J,ht'mt:ruJ kl')' ,md :scum h11ck Lo Lh..:- Applica1io,1 rrucl':-.sul'. 11
`(Id, :;1\ XS. )
`
`TI1e s.ignal wid~ lhe ephemi.;rally re-~mc-rypied file keys is a S-ecurc signal bl:causc it come:, f mm lhl!
`Seicure EtKlavt!' ilnd lhu!!i fm111 a sl'.~ure ~11viru11m~111. rur1l11.::rmure, Llt~ i!',naJ is secure becaus~ lhc
`ITTtmm,,u~:-d int'1Jm1atifln ii. \,'l1tryp1c,d. Th..: ..:miLL..:d fik l!!)•~ iuc cntl)pl1!1th,:i1ih lhi! ephcm~mJ hy:
`
`/\JI wrapr i!rl lile 1key handling occur."' 111 111~ · ccurc E:'llcl:ivc~ Lhc lilc l,;cy lj 11cvc1i dirci.:tly cx:Jw:..t.'tl lo
`l~LIN Em::l.L\'~ ni.>goLiale,s :111 ~ph ·m..:ml 1,,,cy with IJ1 • bS
`lht.:'
`r,11lk-0.Lion PrtJces.sor. AL ~an.UJl, 1h1.Z
`· nt;inc-. Whc-11 11,;.: • ei::•1n.: Encl ave um,rrti]h, a lilt!'~ kt.:j'l>, 1J1cy'ri.: ilt:W"t'".JJ1f)cd witli •J~c epl,eme:ral k and
`flP I ic:Jt~on Pn,,.r;,;s .. -.or."
`scnl bq,c;-1. to Ilic
`(h/,)
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 22
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 24 of 232
`
`Claim I
`
`At<:uscd ln~1rumcnt:1liries
`
`(Ex. B, Ot•.hi11d the Scenes with iOS Security. at 29.)
`
`(id., nt 30.)
`
`111e information 1ronsmi11cd by lhc emitted signal, i.e .• the cph<..'1n tr,dly re-eoerypccd file keys. is
`depender11 OJ11hc ~wailabili1'y mtribu1e, i.e., 1he oonfinn:uion that a biometric "template ma1ch" exists.
`l11is confinnation i.s signaled by 1he issuance of the random sccrcl (cf. step 3): Only if there is 11
`confim,alion of 1hc mutch and 1hc random secret is issued by 1he Touch ID or Face II) subsystem
`within the $<."Cu.re Encluve. i.e. S810, the- cl:t.,;...., key i.s a\'ailublc for re-encryptin~ the file keys.
`
`111c ru-cncrypted file keys are therefore infonnmion which is cmiucd depending on 1hc facl 1h.n1 the
`nvnilabilily altribulc h11s been emim.·d.
`
`23
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 23
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 25 of 232
`
`Claim 1
`
`Accused Instrumentalities
`
`le. a receiver sub-system As set forth in elements ]cl and lc2 below, the Accused Instrumentalities include a receiver sub-
`compnsmg:
`system.
`
`The receiver subsystem is the part of the system outside the Secure Enclave that is responsible for
`reading encrypted files from the NAND Flash Storage and receives ephemerally re-encrypted file keys
`from the Secure Enclave for this purrose:
`
`24
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 24
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 26 of 232
`
`C lillm I
`
`l
`
`Memory con(f'O ...
`
`NANO IIUII conlN>llot +-----►I
`
`t u"'•
`
`AlStnglM
`
`11 7
`
`.....
`... , ....
`
`s.air. kcl.1 ...
`
`~• ~ sw.oe
`
`2S
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 25
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 27 of 232
`
`laim m
`
`Ir.: I. ti ti.;i;..:i \ll"T !>uh-!iystcm Thf' .-f rc11· ;:d lu. 1r111m!1J.1uiiri&"S b,~ud.f' 11 rereir-u .,ub-~•.\JMI ,:o.nlraller cwifi;:ur:etl to: r-rtl!ii•t• the
`contmllcr configured
`lrafl miil"4 ,'>t'Cllrt' ucx,•
`tn;
`'ig1111,I.
`lrnns1u i lied
`n:cci ve
`the
`sl!CUi\e acer.:~> :1.i~~ut: and
`
`Ill! a.p-pliL"31jon proce:sS-Or ( 11 S) \ ith lile S} tem dri\'cr, ,,.,hich rec ivcs lhc cphcmcmUy r"C•Cll ryplcd
`me kc~', Tu nmd file~ f rum lll,e AND Flash slumt:,rc. Lh • i,pplirniion pru ... ~:w pruc:t.~,r.:
`tJu: N 'l\'i,;d
`5j,n11I hy creating .,l ~td 0 111nl{Lnd \\ ith tht; cp1it.'fflC'1111ly \',,'tll.rpt.-d rn~ k..:y no CtmillilJOd \J.ilh
`11:phcmcr.tll~,. ·rappoo mc_ke) '} and cn<ls it 10111 ~ 1omgc con1rollc:r ( I mn ( A D Fl~h rontrnHcr
`l!ny,inl"}. 11,is read runwn:u,d provides the !i'l.orogc comrollcr with .11 lhi.: infomH11Lion rcq\.lif"\.~
`with AE
`to :J\."•td al'!d decrypt the encrypkd file frnirn Lne · ~A D llm.h i,.Luru,ge-:
`
`26
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 26
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 28 of 232
`
`Ch1ini I
`
`Accu~c-d lnslrumcnt:ilitit•s
`
`"sepOS can 1hcn use the ephemeral wr.1ppin.g kC)' 10 wrnp iilc keys for u,:.c by tht• A1>Plil·a1io11
`1>rot•csJor filc-.sy~lem drh'<'I'. \\'h<'n tl1e fllt•$)'Slem driv1.•r re,1ds or wrile.s ;a tile, ii sends tbe
`wr-app<'d key 10 th<" AES Engine • ••
`(Ex. A. A1>plc Platfom1 $<..'(Urily, at 14.)
`
`"All wml)pcd fih.· key ha1ldlini ()l;t,;Ul'S in the Secure Enc Juve; the tile key is never direct!)' cxpo:;cd to
`the Applicn1ion rroc<.-ssor. ( ... ) When the Sccutc Enclave unwraps a file's kc)'S, lhcy'n: rcwrnppcd wi1h
`the cph1,,.'111cr.il key ::ind scnl b:1ck h> the Applic:itiun Proce~or."
`/Id .• a, s;.1
`lc2. provide conditional Tl,e Ac.-c11;,'cd l11Mr11mr11u1/i1it~· iuc/ude a rerefrttr ,mb-.S)'!item t.YJ1,jig11rt•d to prm·idr romlitlonal
`access to the control le.xi ucuss u, 1/,c c(mtrollc,I ilt•m de11~11de111 upou s aid i1,fl,rmalim1..
`item dependent upon said
`infom1ntion~
`
`More specifi<.-ally. the controlled item is a locking mechanism of'thc door loc;k of !he user's home. The
`Accused Jnstnm1cn1nlitics arc <:onligurtd 10 provide s.ec:urc acce...s 10 the user's home via Y11Jc Sm~rt
`Locks when lhc user pro\•id<.-s biometric :-ignal 10 1hc Accused lns1rumcn1alitics vin Tou<:h 11) or F:ic...-c
`ID.
`
`''When lhc .. Secure Remote Accc.-:s" feature i.'t !urned on. the app \\ ill use your phone's huih-i
`authcntie3tion tools to prompt fingerprint or foc.::ial rt.X"ogni1ion bcfon- you <.'all unlocl,. or lock you1
`to•nc reinotcl)'. {nou:: if )'.Our l)honc docs not ha\'c these fca1ur\.-s " will nromnL vou M 11-1,• \·our r1N
`odi.:)fTI1is furth<.-r c11Sul'(.":!i 1ha1 your door is only operated by the right people at the lime you intend
`rorit."
`(https;J/us.yalchomc.com/cn/ynle-news/blog/fa tcs1-blog-l)(r.>1s/in1nxlucing-biornettic-\!eritict1lion•for•
`augus1-and-y;i.le.locks I/)
`
`27
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 27
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 29 of 232
`
`C laim 1
`
`Art'USt.'<I lnstrumen talhie!i
`
`()pon
`
`Yale
`
`Introducing Biometric Verification for August and Yale Locks
`
`(h11ps:/fus.yalchomc.comf<.it/yale-ncws/blogflotcs1-blog-posts/in1roducing-biomc1ric-verification°for•
`august-and-ya le-locks I/)
`
`28
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 28
`ASSA ABLOY AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty Ltd.
`IPR2022-01006 - U.S. Patent No. 9,665,705
`
`
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00694 Document 1-9 Filed 05/23/22 Page 30 of 232
`
`Ch1im I
`
`Accused I nstr-umcnlalitic.~
`
`(httf'J$://ww·w.:1pplc.comh;hop/product/HPAR2ZM/tVyalc-assurc-lod:-s l-touchscr<.'t.'1l-dc:1dlx>l1-block)
`
`29
`
`ASSA ABLOY Ex. 1021 - Page 29
`ASSA ABLOY AB
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